A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE only point urged on behalf of the petitioners in these two cases is that the impugned prosecutions are barred by limitation under the provisions of S. 468, Cr. P. C. The alleged offences for which the prosecutions have been launched and processes issued are punishable under S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) of the Companies Act with fine only and having undisputedly filed beyond six months after the alleged defaults were made, would be barred under S. 468 of the Code, unless they can be treated as "continuing offences" within the meaning of S. 472 of the Code. The only question, therefore, arising for our consideration in these cases is whether the offences punishable under S. 162 (1) and under S. 220 (3) of the Companies Act are "continuing offences" within the meaning of S. 472, Cr. P. C. An affirmative answer will warrant the discharge of the Rules; but a negative answer would require us to make the Rules absolute and quash the prosecutions. We have decided to return an affirmative answer both on principle as well as on authorities. Here are the reasons. ( 2 ) THE expression "continuing offence", far from being a stranger, was quite a regular visitor to our criminal domain, particularly in respect of offences which are not mala in se, but are only mala prohibita, e. g. , running a factory without a proper licence or using a structure erected without the necessary permission or a proper plan and the like; but after the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, it has now become a permanent entrant in our Criminal Jurisdiction in view of S. 472 of the Code, and applies to all offences, whether mala in se or mala prohibita, which are punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. ( 3 ) THE expression "continuing offence" or "continuous offence" does not appear to have any fixed concept; its meaning, nuances and effect very from statute to statute creating it. The Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State, AIR 1984 SC 1688 at P. 1690 has observed that the expression not having any fixed connotation or static import, is difficult to define and to put in a straight-jacket formula. The Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State, AIR 1984 SC 1688 at P. 1690 has observed that the expression not having any fixed connotation or static import, is difficult to define and to put in a straight-jacket formula. A Division Bench of this Court in Eastern Paper Mills v. State, 1988 Cal Cri LR (HC) 176 has, however, observed that "the difficulty in interpreting as to whether a particular offence is a continuing one or not has been removed by the decision" of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra ). With respect, we would only say that how we wished that it was so. ( 4 ) THE expression "offence" means, as would appear from its definition in the Cr. P. C. , or the Penal Code or the General Clauses Act, "any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force". An offence is not "continuing" or "continuous" merely because the effect thereof continues. An offence of hurt or grievous hurt is not a continuing one simply because the effect of the hurt caused has continued for quite a length of time. A distinction must be made between the offence and its effect and the continuation of the latter would not make the former a continuing offence and reference may be made to the observation of the Supreme Court in Balakrishna Savalram, AIR 1959 SC 798 at P. 807, made in the context of S. 23 of the preceding Limitation Act of 1908 dealing with "continuing wrong". But a "wrongful restraint" or a "wrongful continuing" may be a continuing offence so long the restraint or the confinement continues because it would be within the power of the offender to continue or to discontinue the offence even after the offence of restraint or confinement is committed for the first time. The offence of constructing Mills or Factories without a permit or licence, required by law would be completed with the completion of the construction; but when the law provides that no Mill or Factory shall be run without a permit or a licence the offence may be one continuing for the entire period during which the Mill or Factory is so run. For, as we have said, in that case the offender could continue the commission of the offence as well as discontinue the same. For, as we have said, in that case the offender could continue the commission of the offence as well as discontinue the same. We would like to think that if, after once an offence is committed, it is no longer in the power of the offender to effect its continuance or discontinuance, the offence cannot be said or be a continuing one. ( 5 ) FROM that point of view, an offence committed as a result of failure to submit return, balance-sheet, profit and loss account or other documents within the date or period prescribed therefor, as required under Ss. 159, 160, 161 or 220 should not ordinarily be a continuing offence, but an offence completed on the expiry of the date or the period. Because once documents are not submitted and the period prescribed for their submission has expired, it is no longer in the hands of the default or to continue the default or to discontinue the same. The default already being complete, the defaulter could not continue to do or repeat that very default any more or undo it. ( 6 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, AIR 1973 SC 908 is a clear authority for the view that when law requires submission of return within certain period, and there is a failure to do so, such non-compliance is ordinarily complete on the expiry of the period and is not a continuing offence. That was a case under the Mines Act, 1952, S. 66 whereof enjoined submission of annual return within the time prescribed and the Supreme Court ruled (at 810) that since the relevant ''regulation does not lay down that the owner, manager etc. of the mine concerned would be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of Regulation is complied with", non-compliance of the provisions resulting from non-submission of return within the prescribed period could not be a "continuing offence". of the mine concerned would be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of Regulation is complied with", non-compliance of the provisions resulting from non-submission of return within the prescribed period could not be a "continuing offence". As a logical corollary the inference would be that if the relevant law has not only made the default punishable as offence, but has further provided that the penal liability therefor would also continue until the default is removed and that the continuance of the default is also punishable so long it continues, the continuance of the default would be a "continuing offence". ( 7 ) IF that is so, then looking at the provisions of S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) of the Companies Act, it would, in our view, be legitimate to hold that the offence punishable thereunder is and has been made a continuing one. As already noted, "offence" is an act or omission made punishable by law. S. 220 (3) provides that the offence thereunder, i. e. failure to submit balance-sheet etc. within the period prescribed shall be punishable with like punishment as is provided in S. 162 and S. 162 (1) provides that if a company fails to comply with any of the provisions contained in S. 159, S. 160 and S. 161, which enjoin filing of Annual Return and other documents within the period prescribed, "the Company and every officer of the Company who is in default shall be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day during which the default continues". If "offence" is, as it obviously is, a commission or omission, contravention or non-compliance, violation or default, made punishable by law and if the penal liability for the omission or default in filing the Return etc. within the prescribed period has been continued till the omission or default is made good and has been made punishable do die in diem for the entire period during which the omission or default continues, then such omission or default has obviously been made a continuing offence. within the prescribed period has been continued till the omission or default is made good and has been made punishable do die in diem for the entire period during which the omission or default continues, then such omission or default has obviously been made a continuing offence. In the Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi (1973 Cri LJ 347 : AIR 1973 SC 908 ) (supra), the failure to submit annual return within the prescribed period was held not to be a continuing offence because, as already noted (supra, at 910) (of AIR) : , there was nothing in the relevant law making the penal liability to continue till the default in filing return continued. This Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), therefore, should be treated as an authority for the view that if the penal liability for the default is continued and continuance of the default is also made punishable, say, with fine for each day of such continuance, as in S. 162 (1) of the Companies Act, the offence would be a continuing one. ( 8 ) IT must be noted, however that in the later decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria. AIR 1984 SC 1688 (supra), failure to pay the employer's contribution under the Employees' Provident Fund and Family Pension Act, 1952. within the time prescribed therefor has been held to be a continuing offence. A number of decisions of the different High Courts, including two Division Bench decisions of our High Court, noted hereafter have, however, held the offence not to be a continuing one. As already indicated, even where an offence does not intrinsically appear to be of continuing nature it would nevertheless have to be treated as a continuing one if the Legislature indicates to that effect. It is true that the object of the Act weighed very much with the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra ). But even that apart, we are inclined to think that, there are indications in the Act itself, e. g. , in S. 14c, that the Legislature viewed the offence of non-payment of contribution to be a continuing one. It is true that the object of the Act weighed very much with the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra ). But even that apart, we are inclined to think that, there are indications in the Act itself, e. g. , in S. 14c, that the Legislature viewed the offence of non-payment of contribution to be a continuing one. S. 14c (1) provides that while convicting an offender for the offence of making default in payment of any contribution, the Court may, in addition to the awarding of punishment, direct the offender to pay the amount within a specified period and S. 14c (2) provides that as and when such an order is made to pay the amount within a specified period, the offender, i. e. , "the employer shall not be liable under this Act for the continuation of the offence during the period". If the Legislature regarded the offence not to be a continuing, but to be complete once for all with the expiry of the period prescribed by the law for payment, it would have been all the more so after conviction, and it could not have been necessary for the Legislature to provide, as provided in S. 14c (2), that the offender "shall not be liable. . . . . in respect of continuation of the offence" during the period allowed by the Court for post-conviction payment. If the offence was not a continuing one, the question of continuation of the offence during the period allowed by the Court for post-conviction payment could not at all arise. But as indicated hereinbefore, even without the aid of this decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra), we have already, on principle as well as on the authority of the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), held the offences under S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) to be continuing offence. ( 9 ) THIS should have been sufficient to dispose of the cases and to discharge the Rules. But our attention has been drawn to a series of Division Bench decisions of this Court which appear to have taken a contrary view and as a later Bench should ordinarily and as far as possible follow decisions rendered by Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, we would have to govern ourselves accordingly unless we can justify our departure. But our attention has been drawn to a series of Division Bench decisions of this Court which appear to have taken a contrary view and as a later Bench should ordinarily and as far as possible follow decisions rendered by Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, we would have to govern ourselves accordingly unless we can justify our departure. ( 10 ) THE Division Bench decision in National Cotton Mills, (1984) 56 Com Cas 222 appears to be one directly on the point holding that an offence under S. 162 (1) of the Companies Act, 1956 is not a "continuing offence" within the meaning of S. 472, Cr. P. C. and therefore a complaint therefor would be barrel by limitation under S. 458 (2), if filed beyond the period prescribed. The Division Bench appears to have relied mainly on the Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi, (1973 Cri LJ 347) (supra) and also two earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court in Wire Machinery Manufacturing Corporation v. State, 1978 Cal HN 293 and in Krishna Kumar Dalmia v. The State, (1981) 2 Cal HN 301, both decisions under the Employees' Provident Funds and family Pension Act, 1952. In both these earlier Division Bench decisions, the offence for the failure to deposit the Employer's contribution within the time prescribed was, no doube, held to be not a continuing offence. But this view has now been fully overturned by the Supreme Court in Bhagirattr Kanoria, ( AIR 1984 SC 1688 ) (supra) and, therefore, this Division Bench decision of this Court in National Cotton Mills (1984 Tax LR 2043) (supra), being based to a great extent on the ratio of the aforesaid two earlier Division Bench decisions, must be taken to have lost good deal of its force. ( 11 ) AS to the Supreme Court decision in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), where the offence of failure to submit return within the prescribed period under the Mines Act was held not to be a continuing one in the absence of any provision continuing the penal liability for such non-compliance after the period prescribed, the Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra) purportedly relied thereon and held that continued non-compliance under S. 162 (1) of the Companies act was also not a continuing offence. Apart from our view that S. 162 (1) by making the penal liability for the default in submission in return to continue even after the period prescribed and providing punishment for every day till the default is removed, has made such continued nun-compliance a continuing offence, we would like to point out that the later decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) appears to be an authority for the view that such express provision making continued non-compliance also an offence is not always a sine duo non to an offence becoming a continuing one. ( 12 ) IT should be noted that the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi ( AIR 1973 SC 908 : 1973 Cri LJ 347) (supra) as well as in Bhagirath Kanuria (AIR 1984 SC 1988 (supra), both rendered by two-Judge Bench, have referred to the same set of five precedents, three English and two Indian and while in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), the approval might not have been that explicit, in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) the two-Judge Bench expressly declared that it did "adopt the reasoning in those cases". One such decision in London County Council v. Worley (1984) 2 QB 826 where construing the provisions of S. 85 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1852, prohibiting erection of a building on the side of a new street in certain circumstances and providing penalty for such erection and a further penalty for every day during which the offence would continue, it was held that while the offence for erection of the building was complete with its erection, its continuance made punishable de die in diem was a continuing offence. In fact this is in perfect consonance with the observation made in Deokaran Nenshi (supra, at 909, paragraph 5) that continuing offence "is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with". We would like to think that the offences punishable under S. 162 (1) and also S. 220 (3) of the Companies Act squarely come within this principle, as They arise out of a failure to obey or comply with the provision of S. 159, S. 161, and S. 220 (1) requiring submission of returns, balance sheet and other document and which, as the penal provisions therefor in S. 162 (1) provide in express terms, involve a penalty of daily fine, the liability for which continues for every day till the default continues and the requirement is not obeyed or complied with. As already pointed out, the offence for failure to submit return in Deokaran Nenshi (supra) was held not to be a continuing offence in the absence of analogous provisions in the Mines Act, 1952 and the Regulations thereunder and the later Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) has accordingly ruled (at 1691, paragraph 18) chat the decision in Deukaran Nenshi (supra) must be confined to such cases only, that is, cases where such default in submitting return has been made penal, but the penal liability has not been continued so long the default continues. ( 13 ) THE observations in the later Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria ( AIR 1984 SC 1688 ) (supra, at 1692, paragraph 18) would a fortiori make the offence punishable under S. 162 (1) or S. 220 (3) a continuing offence. As already indicated, that was a decision under the employers' Provident Funds and Family Pension Act, 1952, the provisions whereof require the employers to deposit the contribution within the period prescribed, but the penal section does not expressly provide that non-compliance thereof would render the employer liable to any continued or further penalty until payment. But still the Supreme Court observed thus (at 1692, paragraph 19) :"the appellants were unquestionably liable to pay their contribution to the Provident Fund before the due date and it was within their power to pay it as soon after the due date had expired had they willed. The late payment could not have absolved them of their original guilt, but it would have snapped the recurrence. Each day that they failed to, comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the Fund, they committed a fresh offence. The late payment could not have absolved them of their original guilt, but it would have snapped the recurrence. Each day that they failed to, comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the Fund, they committed a fresh offence. "we have no manner of doubt that these observations would apply to an offence under S. 162 (1) or S. 220 (3) with all their rigour. True, the late submission of the documents beyond the period prescribed would not absolve the offenders of their initial guilt under those sections, but would at once snap the recurrence of the offence made punishable from day to day. In view of the principle enunciated in Deokaran Nenshi (1973 Cri LJ 347 : AIR 1973 SC 908 ) (supra, at 909, paragraph 5 and 910, paragraph 19), and amplified further in Bhagirath Kanoria ( AIR 1984 SC 1688 ) (supra, at 1692, paragraph 19), we would have to hold the offences under S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) to be continuing offence and would hold further and this we say with all respect, that the decision of the Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (1984 Tax LR 2043) (supra) can no longer be taken to be good law, particularly in view of the earlier Division Bench decisions in Wire Machinery (1978 Cri LJ 839) (supra) and in Krishna Kumar (1981 (2) Cal HN 301) (supra), relied on in National Cotton Mills (supra), having been overturned by the Supreme Court and the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Deokaran Nenshi (supra), referred to therein, having been duly explained and distinguished by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra ). The Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra) could not obviously consider the Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) as the latter was decided later. The Division Bench in National Cotton Mills (supra) could not obviously consider the Supreme Court decision in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra) as the latter was decided later. ( 14 ) BUT there appears to be yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in Eastern Paper Mills, 1988 Cal Cri LR (HC) 176 (Supra), where after referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Deokarau Nenshi (supra) as well as in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra), a view has been taken contrary to what we propose to take here, though on the basis of those very two Supreme Court decisions, but without any reference to any of the Division Bench decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore and it has been held that the offences under S. 162 (1) or S. 220 (3) are not continuing offences. ( 15 ) IT is trite to say that a Bench of this Court should normally accept a decision of a co-equal Bench as binding. But there are high authorities for the view that, even though the same should be the normal practice, there are circumstances, where a Bench may not follow and may have to depart from a precedent of co-ordinate jurisdiction. To borrow from the announcement of the House of the Lords on July 26, 1966, while the use of precedent is an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases and the same provides some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct or their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules, too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the propel development of law. While certainty in the field of law may be, and in fact is, most desirable, the craze for Certainty cannot be allowed to stultify the proper and logical development of law. We have also the high authority of Sir Asutosh speaking for a Division Bench of this Court in Virjiban Dass Moolji, AIR 1921 Cal 169 at p. 171, where the eminent Judge, after referring to various English decisions on the point, ruled thus :-"the answer to the question, what regard is to be had to an earlier decision of this Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, must depend upon a variety of circumstances. One important factor is the length of time during which it stood unchallenged. Another factor, possibly of greater importance, is whether the decision gives adequate reasons for the conclusion embodied therein. But the position is indefensible on principle, that although Judge may feel absolutely convinced that the decision produced before him is erroneous in law, he is still bound to decide against his own opinion. To take such a view is to hold that the Judge may be reduced to an automaton by the production of an earlier judgement". Now the decision in Eastern Paper Mills 1988 Cal Cri LR (HC) 176 (supra), having been decided on 13th May, 1988 (and reported obviously later) cannot be regarded to have stood for such length of period to attract the first factor referred to in those observations. And we may add, obviously with great respect, that the decision, after referring to the Supreme Court decisions in Deokaran Nenshi (1973 Cri LJ 347) (supra) and in Bhagirath Kanoria (AIR 1984 SC 1988) (supra), has not spelt out any adequate reason as to how those two decisions, under two other different enactments, could lead us to hold that the offences under S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) of the Companies Act are not continuing offences. No notice at all appears to have been taken of the observation in Deokaran Nenshi (supra, at 909, paragraph 5) that continuing offence "is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule of its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed", nor of the indication in that judgement (at 910, paragraph 9) that the absence of any provision in the relevant law continuing the penal liability for the continued disobedience or non compliance was the ground for holding the offence to be non-continuous nor the provisions of S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3) providing for continuation of the penal liability and for continued punishment for the continuance of the default were duly taken note of. The observations in Bhagirath Kanoria (supra, at 1692, paragraph 19) that even though belated compliance "could not have absolved them of their original guilt, but it would have snapped the recurrence" and that "each day they failed to comply with the obligation to pay their contribution to the Fund, they committed a fresh offence" were not also properly adverted to in the context of S. 162 (1) and S. 220 (3), whereunder the offence was made punishable till the default continued and belated submission of return and other documents would have snapped the continuance of the offence. We would accordingly, with great respect, regret our inability to follow the decision in Eastern Paper Mills (supra) and, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, we would, to use a Jurisprudential phrase, hold the decision. To have been arrived at subsilentio, A decision sub silentio ceases to have, as pointed out in Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th Edition. Pages 153-154), any binding efficacy. That is also what was held by Sir Asutosh in Virjiban Das Moolji (supra ). To borrow from Salmond (supra), a decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the Particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind. The Court may consciously decide in one way because or point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the Court should not have decided in that manner unless it also decided point Bin the same manner, but that point B was not adverted to and considered in the manner it was necessary and there point B is said to pass sub silentio. ( 16 ) WE would, therefore, dismiss the revisional applications and discharge the Rules and would direct the records of the two cases, along with a copy of our order, to go down at once 10 the Court below for disposal of the cases as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law. ( 17 ) A. K. NANDI, J. :- I have had the advantage of going through the judgement of my learned brother Bhattacharjee, J. While agreeing with the process of his reasoning and the conclusion arrived at, I prefer to add a few lines to express the views of my own. ( 17 ) A. K. NANDI, J. :- I have had the advantage of going through the judgement of my learned brother Bhattacharjee, J. While agreeing with the process of his reasoning and the conclusion arrived at, I prefer to add a few lines to express the views of my own. ( 18 ) NO precise definition of a continuing offence has been given in any statute, and the Supreme Court has held that it is not possible either to give a precise definition. Nevertheless, it has been sought to be defined in different judgements of the Supreme Court as also of the High Courts. Bhattacharjee, J. , has dealt with different decisions in his judgement. I shall deal with some of them only in order to express as to how I have understood them. In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, AIR 1973 SC 908 it was held that an act which continued constituted a fresh offence every time on which it continued Distinction is sought to be struck between an offence committed once and for all and a continuing offence, If law does not render a continued disobedience or noncompliance an offence, it is not a continuing offence. In order to constitute a continuing offence, it must arise out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which, continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. It was a case under S. 66 of Mines Act. Applying these tests, the Supreme Court held that the offence was committed once and for all, and in that view of the matter, the offence complained of was held to be not a continuing offence. ( 19 ) IN Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1984 SC 1688 the default in payment of contribution by employer to Provident Fund was held to be a continuing offence. It was an offence under S. 14 (2) (a) Employees' Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act. The Hon'ble Judges noticed the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran (1973 Cri LJ 347) (supra) and did not strike a note of dissent. Nevertheless the offence was held to be a continuing offence. It was an offence under S. 14 (2) (a) Employees' Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act. The Hon'ble Judges noticed the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran (1973 Cri LJ 347) (supra) and did not strike a note of dissent. Nevertheless the offence was held to be a continuing offence. It is evident from paragraph 19 of the judgement that the object and purpose of the statute very much weighed with the Hon'ble Judges in holding the offence to be a continuing offence. ( 20 ) WE must not confuse between omission day to day constituting a continuing offence and an omission visited with a daily fine. An act or omission visited with daily fine is not necessarily a continuing offence. ( 21 ) THE distinction is eloquent in United Savings and Finance Company v. Deputy Chief Officer, Reserve Bank of India, 1980 Cri LJ 607 (Cal ). It was an offence under S. 58 (b) (2) of Reserve Bank of India Act. The default was not only punishable with a fine but the continuance of default was visited with daily fine. The relevant part of the provision reads as follows (para 8) :-". . if he persists in such failure or refusal, with further fine which may be extended to one thousand rupees for everyday after the first during which the offence continues". ( 22 ) IN view of the authorities I am of opinion that the imposition of daily fine was not the reason for characterising it as a, continuing offence. On the contrary, the persistent failure or refusal to comply was the reason for holding it to be a continuing offence. Daily fine prescribes only the measure of penalty, the object being enforcement or strict compliance with law and early compliance after default. The initial default thereby does not necessarily become a continuing offence. Initial default is an offence committed once and for all. ( 23 ) WE may, therefore, say that continuing offence is the act or omission over which the offender can exercise his control irrespective of the penal provision of daily fine. Law may cast an obligation upon a person either to discontinue an act or abstain from continuing an omission. If the obligation continues and it is not discharged, the default constitutes a continuing offence. Law may cast an obligation upon a person either to discontinue an act or abstain from continuing an omission. If the obligation continues and it is not discharged, the default constitutes a continuing offence. If continuance of an act or omission is an offence, it shall be continuing offence until the act is discontinued or the omission is abated. If this test is applied in the eases before us, the offences are to be regarded as continuing offence. Revision dismissed.