ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition has been preferred by the petitioners against the order of remand passed by the appellate authority on 22-11-1985. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, it appears that the petitioners are cotenure holders with. Smt. Girja Devi, widow of Ram Dhan.., Proceedings for determination of surplus area of Ram Dhan were initiated and a portion of his land was declared as surplus. During the continuance of the proceedings, the tenure holder Ram Dhan died and the opposite party No. 3 Smt. Girja Devi was substituted in his place. The opposite party No. 3 preferred an appeal. The appeal was partly allowed. Thereafter she preferred a writ petition in this court which was decided on 1-12-1986. The learned Judge has passed the following relevant order:- "Therefore, this petition is partly allowed. The judgment of the appellate court below shall remain intact but the aforesaid sentence in the operative portion of the order shall he quashed and deleted. The prescribed authority shall proceed to redetermine the surplus land taking into consideration the choice given by the petitioner and, as far as possible, in accordance with the said choice as laid down in section 12-A and without applying clause (d) of Section 12-A to the acceptance of such choice. I make it clear that my aforesaid interpretation of Section 12-A(d) read with Section 5(7) is confined only to the controversy in respect of the exercise of choice and to the liability of a partition made after 8th June, 1973, and to be not taken into consideration by the ceiling authorities irrespective of the provisions of Section 5(7). My judgment shall, in no way, prejudice the rights of the petitioner and the respondents, if any, which they may otherwise have in law apart from the aforesaid narrow controversy. I should like to say, that I say nothing as to whether they have or they do not have any other rights." 3. It appears that the prescribed authority decided the claim of the tenure holder through its 'order dated 6-5-1985 contained in Annexure I attached with the writ petition. The tenure holders had preferred an appeal against the order dated 6-5-1985. During the pendency of the appeal by the tenure holder it appears that the State of U.P. had filed a review petition against the order dated 6-5-1985 as is evident from Annexure III attached with the writ petition. The tenure holders had preferred an appeal against the order dated 6-5-1985. During the pendency of the appeal by the tenure holder it appears that the State of U.P. had filed a review petition against the order dated 6-5-1985 as is evident from Annexure III attached with the writ petition. An application for condonation of delay had also been filed as it evident from Annexure 11 attached with the writ petition. The prescribed authority through its order dated 16-8-1985 (see Annexure IV) allowed the review application. Against the order allowing the review application, the petitioners in the present writ petition had preferred an appeal which has been dealt with by the impugned judgment dated 22-11-1985. 4. Before me the learned counsel forille petitioners has contended that the remedy by way of review has not been provided under the Act, therefore, the prescribed authority patently erred in allowing the review petition filed by the State of U.P. and the appellate authority has patently erred in remanding the case for deciding the review petition again. 5. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is to the effect that there was no direction in the order of this court dated 1-12-1978 for acceptance of the choice of the tenure holder, therefore, the review petition on behalf of the State was misconceived and should not have been entertained. 6. Third contention raised on behalf of the petitioners before me is that the State of U.P. was not aggrieved party in relation to the order dated 6-5-1985. Therefore, any review petition on behalf of the State of U.P. could not be entertained. 7. Fourth contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that there is no material allegation for condonation of delay in preferring the review petition. Therefore, the' prescribed authority has patently erred in rendering the order dated 16-8-1985 contained in Annexure IV attached with the writ petition. 8. The learned counsel for the State has contended before me that the writ petition is not maintainable. According to him no appeal lay against the order of the prescribed authority dated 16-8-85 at the instance of the petitioners. Moreover, the order passed by the appellate authority is in favour of the petitioners as the case has been remanded at his instance. Therefore, there is no valid ground for interference with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioners. Moreover, the order passed by the appellate authority is in favour of the petitioners as the case has been remanded at his instance. Therefore, there is no valid ground for interference with the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioners. The learned counsel for the State has tried to support the judgment of the prescribed authority on the ground that the review petition was maintainable at the instance of the State. 9. In rejoinder the learned counsel for the petitioners has suggested that the controversies raised before this court should be answered even if the petitioners' writ petition may not be maintainable or it is defective. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at a great length, I do not consider it a fit case that I should exercise my powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioners. 11. As regards the petitioners' contention that no review lay as it was not provided under the Act, 1 think that there is no statutory provision for reviewing the order passed by an authority under the Act. 12. Section 37 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act provided as below :- "Any office or authority holding an enquiry or hearing an objection under this Act, shall, in so far as it may be applicable, have all the powers and the privileges of a civil court, and follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the trial and disposal of suits relating to immovable property." In 1975 Rev. Dec. 254: ( AIR 1975 All 199 ) Banwari v. State of U.P. a learned single Judge of this Court has indicated as below:- ".........It will thus appear that the Prescribed Authority while disposing of an objection against the allotment order could exercise the inherent powers of a civil court under Section 151, C.P.C. However, it is not necessary to go to that extent, because, in my opinion, even if the prescribed authority did not possess inherent power of a Civil Court under Section 151, C.P.C. it certainly could review its order if the same was based upon a mistake and had resulted in injustice to someone else. In Smt. Lachmana v. Dy. In Smt. Lachmana v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (1966 Rev Dec 419) a Division Bench of this Court has held that every court and Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. This power is based on legal maxim which is to the effect that no party shall suffer because of the fault of the court or the Tribunal and that there is clear distinction between a statutory review and a review under the inherent powers of the Tribunal to rectify the wrong that has been committed by itself..........." In 1982 All CJ 30: (1982 All LJ 182) Jai Narain v. Joint Director of Consolidation placing reliance upon the ruling reported in AIR 1970 SC 1273 (para 4) it has been laid down as below:- "The power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication........." 13. True, when there is no specific statutory provision for reviewing an order by an authority contemplated under the Act, the authority has no power to review its order. At this place I think it proper to mention that no court or Tribunal is debarred from exercising inherent jurisdiction apart from statutory jurisdiction to correct any error committed by itself. The aforesaid power for correcting error by the court itself is based on the maxim that no party should suffer because of the fault of the court or Tribunal. Taking the afore said view into consideration I think it proper to emphasise that every court and Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to rectify its mistake. The question in what circumstance the court or Tribunal shall rectify its mistake will depend upon the nature of the mistake committed by the Court and whether that mistake cannot be termed as clerical mistake or mistake apparent on the face of the record. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioners has emphasised before me that in the facts and circumstances of the. case, the State was not aggrieved party, therefore, it could not file review petition specially when the tenure holder was not very keen to challenge the order dated 6-5-1985. Section 32 of the Act indicates that State Government shall be a party to every proceeding under the provisions of the Act. case, the State was not aggrieved party, therefore, it could not file review petition specially when the tenure holder was not very keen to challenge the order dated 6-5-1985. Section 32 of the Act indicates that State Government shall be a party to every proceeding under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that State of U.P. cannot be termed as aggrieved party in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the order dated 6-5-1985 State of U.P. has been directed to take proceedings for expunction of the name of gaon sabha over some of the disputed land. Therefore, in my opinion, the State of U.P. could file review application. 15. In AIR 1966 SC 1164 The Sub-Divisional Officer, Mirzapur v. Raja Srinivasa Prasad Singh their Lordships of the Supreme Court have interpreted the words "the State Government shall be a party" in section 343 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and have indicated that the State Government shall be a party to every proceeding under that Act. 16. Similarly in the present case Section 32 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act also indicates that State Government shall be party to every proceeding under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that State shall not be an aggrieved party in the order dated 6-5-1985, therefore, it could not file a review petition. 17. As regards the second contention it is sufficient to state that the State of U.P. has indicated in its review application that the prescribed authority in the order dated 6-5-1985 had not carried out the directions of this court in the order dated 1-12-1978. The perusal of various orders in this writ petition does not indicate what direction was not carried out by the prescribed authority in its order dated 6-5-1985. While reviewing the order the prescribed authority has only made general observation that the prescribed authority in its order dated 6-5-1985 had not carried out the directions of this Court but had failed to point out specified direction. While reviewing the order the prescribed authority has only made general observation that the prescribed authority in its order dated 6-5-1985 had not carried out the directions of this Court but had failed to point out specified direction. However, the order of the prescribed authority reviewing the earlier order dated 6-5-1985 has been set aside, therefore, this question whether there is any justifying cause or patent error or clerical error for the exercise of powers by the prescribed authority or not would be strictly dealt with by the prescribed authority in pursuance of the impugned order of the appellate authority. 18. I have already indicated above that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that State was not an aggrieved party is not acceptable to me. 19. Lastly, it has been contended that while allowing the review petition the prescribed authority on 16-8-1985 has not indicated whether there existed sufficient cause for condonation of delay in preferring the review petition filed by the State of U.P., therefore, the impugned judgment of the appellate authority deserves to be quashed as it' has failed to examine the question of limitation involved. In the case, however it is not necessary to give any verdict on the aforesaid point because in pursuance of the impugned judgment of the appellate authority this question can be agitated before the prescribed authority hereafter. 20. In accordance with a Division Bench of this court the present petitioners could not file an appeal if the choice of the tenure holder was not accepted by the relevant authority. As the petitioners could not file appeal against the order dated 16-8-1985, I think that by the impugned judgment of the appellate authority the petitioners have been put to an advantageous position and they got an opportunity to press their claim before the prescribed authority. Therefore, no manifest injustice has occurred to the petitioners and in my opinion, it is not a fit case, where any interference should be made with the impugned judgment of the appellate authority at the instance of the petitioners. 21. However, the ends of justice demand that an observation be made to the effect that the prescribed authority hereafter shall decide the review petition preferred by the State of U.P. strictly in accordance with law and the discussions made above. 22. 21. However, the ends of justice demand that an observation be made to the effect that the prescribed authority hereafter shall decide the review petition preferred by the State of U.P. strictly in accordance with law and the discussions made above. 22. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed but the prescribed authority shall carry out the spirit of this order as discussed above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.