Dr. Saraf, J. — This petition raises an important point regarding the nature, scope and ambit of the power of the Labour Court under section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the punishment awarded by the management. 2. Respondent No. 2 was working as a Mechanic in the tea estate of the petitioner No. 1, hereinafter the management. He was cha­rge sheeted by the management for commission of an act of dishonesty in respect of Company's money by claiming reimbursement of medical expenses on the strength of cash memos showing purchase of medicines on different dates during the relevant period which in fact did not relate to that period. The dates on cash memos were overwritten and altered and a false claim was made for reimbursement. A domestic enquiry was conducted by the management wherein charges levelled against the workman were proved and he was found “ guilty of the misconduct. The management, therefore, awarded him punishment of dismissal from service. 3. As the Union raised an industrial dispute, reference was made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Labour Court. The Labour Court rejected the domestic enquiry proceedings and directed the parties to adduce evidence on merits before it. On consideration of the evidence on record, the Labour Court arrived at a finding that the workman with a view to realise some amount incurred for treatment of his wife for the period not sanctioned by the management made alteration of cash memos by overwriting and there was no explanation from the workman in that regard. The learned Court observed that the conduct of the workman, therefore, could not in any way be overlooked. On the basis of the aforesaid finding and observation, the Labour Court came to a conclusion that "the workman was greedy and wanted somehow to realise the money he spent outside the period sanctioned for treatment of his wife". It, therefore, held that ''the workman was no doubt 'technically guilty' in this regard” 4. The learned Labour Court however, further held that in view of the fact that the workman had incurred entire amount so claimed in respect of treatment of his wife although a portion of the same was not sanctioned by the management, reinstatement of the workman without back wages would meet the ends of justice. The learned Labour Court however, further held that in view of the fact that the workman had incurred entire amount so claimed in respect of treatment of his wife although a portion of the same was not sanctioned by the management, reinstatement of the workman without back wages would meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, it interfered with the punishment of dismissal from service awarded by the management and directed reinstatement without back wages and benefits for the period of unemployment. 5. The management has challenged the aforesaid order of the learned Labour Court on the ground, inter alia, that having arrived at a conclusion that the charges against the workman were fully proved and having found him guilty, the Labour Court was not justified in holding the workman "technically guilty". The order has also been challenged on the ground that on the basis of the findings arrived at by the learned Labour Court itself in regard to the charges, there was no justification for interfering with the punishment of dismissal and directing reinstatement, and as such, the order of the Labour Court directing reinstatement is perverse and not tenable in law. 6. We have heard Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smti Abba Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the respondents. We have also gone through the award of the learned Labour Court and the evidence on record. On perusal of the same, we are of the opinion that in the instant case, the learned Labour Court did not exercise its discretion under section 11 A of the Act judicially. 7. Section 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 confers powe«- on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a lesser punishment in lieu of punishment imposed by the management. The power conferred under section 11 A is not an arbitrary one. It is not uncanalised, unguided and unlimited. It has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. The Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court should interfere with the decision of the management only if it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of the guilt of the workman concerned. It is not uncanalised, unguided and unlimited. It has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. The Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court should interfere with the decision of the management only if it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of the guilt of the workman concerned. While doing so, as held by the Supreme Court in Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union and another vs. Christian Medical College Vellore Association and others reported in (1987) 4 S C C 691, it has to give reasons for its decision because such a decision is subject to judicial review by the High Court and the Supreme Court. It cannot act on its whim or fancy and convert an order of dismissal into one of reinstatement in any and every case simply because it wants to be benevolent. The order must be based on reasons. 8. In order to exercise power under section 11A of the Act, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified. If it is so satisfied, it may set aside the order of discharge or dismissal. Secondly, if sets aside the order of discharge or dismissal, it may direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions as it may think fit. It may also give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal. On both the counts, it must be a reasoned order. For that purpose, it will be necessary to examine objectively all relevant factors stated above including those considered by the management. The employer might have lost confidence in the workman because of the misconduct and it may not be in the interest of the industry to order reinstatement. This is one relevant factor. There are very many other factors which may not justify reinstatement on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. All these factors are to be judged and weighed not on any subjective standard of the Court but from the point of view of expediency of the management also. There may be a case where reinstatement may not be found to be expedient even if the order of dismissal has been set aside. All these factors are to be judged and weighed not on any subjective standard of the Court but from the point of view of expediency of the management also. There may be a case where reinstatement may not be found to be expedient even if the order of dismissal has been set aside. In such a case, some other relief may be granted to the workman in lieu of reinstatement. But, for granting any other relief like lump sum monetary payment etc. also, the Labour Court will have to consider relevant factors such as the years of service put in, years of service still left, the salary and other benefits which the workman was receiving. Only on proper consideration of all the relevant factors, the Labour Court can come to a finding regarding the nature of punishment that would be just and proper. 9. In the instant case, the Labour Court while ordering reinstatement did not consider the relevant factors stated above and gave a finding which was not based on reasons. The order of the Labour Court directing reinstatement, therefore, is vitiated and cannot be sustained. 10. Mr. J. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the management, submitted in view of the fact that this matter is pending for a long time, we should ourselves decide the matter finally and sustain the order of dismissal or if so deemed fit, direct the management to make some ex-gratia payment, say a sum of Rs. 5,000/- which the management would not mind paying to avoid unnecessary prolonged litigation. 11. Smti Abha Bhattacharyya appearing for the workman submitted that in case this Court is not satisfied about the order of the Labour Court setting aside the order of dismissal and directing reinstatement of the workman, it should remit the matter for fresh disposal. According to her, the power of the High Court while scrutinising orders passed by the Labour Court under section 11 A of the Act is limited and in exercise of such powers, it should not substitute its own decision for that of the Labour Court. In support of the aforesaid submission, she placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor vs. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and another reported in (1984) 3 S C C 5. 12. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel. In support of the aforesaid submission, she placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor vs. Shri Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. and another reported in (1984) 3 S C C 5. 12. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel. True it is that in exercise of the powers under Article 227, the High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal and ordinarily it does not substitute its own finding regarding punishment in place of the one arrived at by the Tribunal. In such cases, orders are generally quashed and the matter remitted to the Labour Court or Tribunal. But that is a matter of practice and cannot be laid down as a rule. The High Court can, in an appropriate case, instead of remitting the case to the Labour Court or the Tribunal, decide the matter itself and give a final direction in regard to the punishment and thereby substitute its own finding for that of the Labour Court. This legal position is also well settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Singh Rathor (supra) wherein the Court after observing that it is not for the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence to substitute one finding for another and one punishment for another, made it clear that by the afore­said observation, it should not be understood to have denied that power to the High Court in every type of cases. 13. On perusal of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we are satisfied that it is not one of those cases where we can exercise our power and substitute our own finding in regard to punishment for that of the Tribunal. We, therefore, quash the impugned order of the Labour Court in so far as it relates to reinstatement of the workman for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. 14. The petition is, therefore, allowed. No order as to costs. A. Raghuvir, C. J. — I agree.