Judgment :- 1. Petitioner along with the 3rd respondent and 12 others were applicants for grant of a regular stage carriage permit on the route Kuttippuram-Guruvayur. It is a medium route and the petitioner is a medium operator and according to him he satisfies all the requirements for the grant of the permit and is liable to be preferred to the 3rd respondent for the grant. Inter alia the petitioner claims residence and office on the route and he had also specified the vehicle which he was going to offer in his very first representation. The vehicle offered by him was a 1986 model one. 2. By its proceedings dated 22-3-1986 the Regional Transport Authority (RTA for short) granted the permit to the 3rd respondent. Appeals were filed by the petitioner and three other applicants which were allowed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal on 18-9-1986 and the matter remitted to the RTA for fresh consideration. 3. The RTA considered the matter again and by its proceedings Ext.P1 dated 18-10-1986 preferred the petitioner to the 3rd respondent for the grant of the permit. Both the petitioner and the 3rd respondent received equal number of marks. They were both medium operators and they, had full sector qualification. Both had offered 1986 model vehicles registered within a day each other. But the petitioner was preferred for the reason that he had mentioned the particulars of his vehicle in the representation under S.57(3) whereas such details had not been furnished by the 3rd respondent. The petitioner was therefore, preferred and the grant made to him. 4. The 3rd respondent filed appeal against the grant before the appellate tribunal. The petitioner filed a detailed counter affidavit traversing the allegations in the appeal and inter alia pointed out three factors as disqualifying the 3rd respondent or as conferring preference on the petitioner. Firstly it was stated that the third respondent had transferred a regular permit which he had obtained over the route by means of a joint application filed by him and one V.K.Seethi, a copy of which is Ext. P4. The transfer was sought as "due to certain inconvenience". No other details were given. Second petitioner stated that the 3rd respondent had no residence on the route and that he was living more than 8 KMs. away. P4. The transfer was sought as "due to certain inconvenience". No other details were given. Second petitioner stated that the 3rd respondent had no residence on the route and that he was living more than 8 KMs. away. Thirdly it was stated that the 3rd respondent was employed in Abudabi from 1974 to 1985 and the other services granted to the 3rd respondent were being conducted by his brother Vasudeva Menon as a power-holder. 5. The third respondent filed a reply Ext.P3 wherein he did not deny the transfer of permit. It was also admitted by him that he was in Abudabi till 1985. But his case was that he had now come and settled down in India. Regarding residence his case was that he was residing in Kuttippuram, one of the termini of the route, in support of which he had produced a certificate from the Executive Officer of the Panchayat before the RTA even before the consideration of the applications on 22-3-1986. The 3rd respondent also hit back with a plea against the petitioner that his vehicle had been registered as a 1985 model vehicle, and that his residence was at Kadavallur, 2 KMs. away from the route. It was also pointed out that the petitioner was outside India most Of the time. Even when his application was submitted he was out of India. So far as the 3rd respondent is concerned, even when he was abroad he had made adequate arrangements with competent staff for the operation of the business. He had given power of attorney to his brother; whereas the petitioner did not have anyone as power-holder to act on his behalf. The 3rd respondent had his visa cancelled in 1985 and thereafter he has not gone abroad. 6. On these facts the Tribunal allowed the 3rd respondent's appeal and held that he was entitled to the permit in preference to the petitioner. The Tribunal noted that the R.T.A. had found that both the parties had residence and office on the route with full sector, and more than one year's experience and both of them had offered 1986 model vehicles. They had secured equal marks. Though the petitioner had disputed the residential qualification of the third respondent, the latter had produced documents to prove his residential qualification. They had secured equal marks. Though the petitioner had disputed the residential qualification of the third respondent, the latter had produced documents to prove his residential qualification. Having held thus, the Tribunal adverted to the mentioning of the details of the vehicle in the petitioner's application and the preference afforded thereby by the RTA The Tribunal did not act on this factor. The Tribunal noted that the 3rd respondent was a diploma holder in automobile engineering and business management and that he had longer experience. He also possessed a licence to drive transport vehicles, which he had produced. This authorisation was with effect from 12-3-1986 prior to the consideration of the applications by the RTA. The Tribunal felt that when both had secured equal marks, a licence to drive transport vehicle clearly gave an edge to the 3rd respondent as per the proviso to S.47(1)(f) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the Act). It was accordingly that the permit was granted to the 3rd respondent after setting aside the order Ext.P1. 7. Petitioner challenges the order Ext.P6. Interalia he points out that the 3rd respondent had no residence in the route. This does not appear to be correct as the broad sheet prepared in the case itself showed that the 3rd respondent had his residence on the route. He had also produced the certificate from the Executive Officer of the Panchayat before the consideration of the applications about his residential qualification. This point is therefore, without any substance. 8. The main thrust of the petitioner's arguments was that the preference given to the 3rd respondent on the ground that he possessed a heavy vehicle driving licence was not warranted. Even if both the parties had obtained equal marks, there was no provision for giving preference on this ground under the provisions of the Act as amended in Kerala. It is also stated that the 3rd respondent has three other vehicles and therefore, the possession of a driving licence is not much relevant in considering the question of grant 9. This latter point is sufficiently answered by the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Writ Appeal No. 159/88, where the learned Chief Justice sitting with Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. held as follows:- "If one of the applicants possesses a Heavy Vehicles Driving Licence such a factor would advance the interests of the travelling public. This latter point is sufficiently answered by the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Writ Appeal No. 159/88, where the learned Chief Justice sitting with Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. held as follows:- "If one of the applicants possesses a Heavy Vehicles Driving Licence such a factor would advance the interests of the travelling public. We say so because if the Driver is not available and another suitable driver cannot be secured, the owner of the vehicle if he possesses the Heavy Vehicles Driving Licence can himself drive the vehicle and this will avoid inconvenience to the travelling public Besides, if the owner is familiar with the driving of the heavy vehicle he can be regarded as having a better knowledge about the functioning of the vehicle which thus enables him to manage the transport system more efficiently. We have therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the possession of Heavy Vehicles Driving Licence is a relevant factor which has a bearing on the interests of the travelling public." The possession of a heavy vehicles driving licence is therefore, an important relevant factor in evaluating the qualifications under S.47. If this be a relevant factor and if the Tribunal relied on this as giving an edge to the 3rd respondent over the petitioner, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has acted on irrelevant considerations in relying on this factor in the judgment Ext. P6. 10. However, counsel for the petitioner contended that the law as it stands, does not envisage any preference on the basis of possession of a driving licence. It is argued that S.47 enumerates the matters which shall be borne in mind by the RTA in considering an application for a stage carriage permit. There was a proviso after sub-section 1 (f) under which preference was given to a co-operative society, if other conditions were equal. This proviso was amended so far as Kerala was concerned by S.2 of the Motor Vehicles (Kerala Amendment) Act 16 of 1968 which came into force on 14-6-1968. The position under the Kerala Amendment was that if other conditions were equal the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation was to be given preference over other applicants and subject to this preference an application from a co-operative society was to have preference over applications from individual owners. The position under the Kerala Amendment was that if other conditions were equal the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation was to be given preference over other applicants and subject to this preference an application from a co-operative society was to have preference over applications from individual owners. In other words the position was that the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation got the first preference and subject to their rights a cooperative society was to be preferred over individual applicants, of course, subject to other conditions being equal. The Act under went a change by the Central Act 47 of 1978 which came into force on 16-1-1979. Thereunder the proviso as it originally stood under the Central Act was amended as follows:- "Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a cooperative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being, and an application for a stage carriage permit from a person who has a valid licence for driving transport vehicles shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners." The result was that so far as the Central enactment was concerned, preference was conferred on a co-operative society and to a person who had a valid driving licence for driving transport vehicles. They were to be given preference as far as may be, over applications from individual owners, if other conditions were equal. 11. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Kerala Amendment by Act 16 of 1968 has not been repealed by Central Act 47 of 1978. Therefore, so far as Kerala is concerned, the amendment by Act 16 of 1968 has to prevail which confers preference only to the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation and a co-operative society and not to a person having a heavy vehicles driving licence. 12. The law in question namely the Motor Vehicles Act is one falling under entry 35 of the concurrent list in Schedule.7 of the Constitution. Art.254 of the Constitution enacts that if the provision of any State Law is repugnant to any provision of a parliamentary law, which the parliament is competent to enact, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2) the Parliament law, whether passed before or after the State law shall prevail and the State law shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void. Clause (2) provides for cases where the State law has received the assent of the President. In such cases in the case of repugnancy between a State law and an earlier law made by the Parliament, then the State law shall prevail in that State if the law had been reserved for the consideration of President and had received his assent. This will not however, prevent Parliament from enacting any law at any time with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the State Legislature. 14. The first contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner that there is no repeal of Act 16 of 1968 by the subsequent Parliamentary legislation Act 47 of 1978 is irrelevant for the purpose of considering the operation of the two enactments. Though it is open to Parliament by subsequent legislation under the proviso to Art.254(2) to repeal a State Amendment, it is not obligatory on them to do so; nor does the absence of an express repeal affect the position, if there is real repugnancy between the two provisions as envisaged in Art.254. (Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC.752 and T.Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe AIR 1983 SC 150). 15. The real and crucial question is whether there is repugnancy between the Central Act 47 of 1978 and the State Amendment Act 16 of 1968. Even at the outset it has to be noted that despite a state amendment, parliamentary legislation is not prevented. The proviso to Art.254(2) expressly reserves this power to Parliament and in such cases the subsequent parliamentary legislation will prevail over the State legislation, in so far as they are inconsistent. 16. What exactly is the test of repugnancy? Higgins, J. observed as follows is Clyde Engineering Co,Ltd. v. Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466 (503):- "When is a law "inconsistent" with another law? Etymologically presume that things are inconsistent when they cannot stand together at the same time; and one law is inconsistent with another law when the command or power or other provision in one law conflicts directly with the command or power or provision in the other." Narasinga Rau, J. dealt with the matter as follows in Stewart v. Brojendra Kishore AIR 1939 Cal. 628:- "It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says 'do' and the other 'don't'. There is no true repugnancy,' according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. For reasons which we shall set forth presently, we think that this is too narrow a test; there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say 'don't' but in different ways. For example, one law may say 'No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time' and another law may say 'No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time'. Here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely, the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified." It is not therefore, necessary for two laws to be repugnant that they should be in direct conflict. Even without such conflict and even if the provisions of the laws are such that it may be possible to obey one without disobeying the other, there can be repugnancy. They may run in parallel lines with different provisions in relation to the same subject matter. The question is, did the parliamentary law evince an intention expressly or impliedly to cover the subject entirely. It may be that the laws confer separate rights on parties. In such cases there will be a repugnancy between two enactments, if the right conferred by one is not available in the other. To come back to Clyde Engineering Co. it is observed by the majority of Knox. C.J. and Gavan Duffy, J. with the concurrence of Isaacs, J. as follows: "Two enactments may be inconsistent although obedience to each of them maybe possible without disobeying the other. Statutes may do more than impose duties; they may, for instance, confer rights; and one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by that other even though the right be one which might be waived or abandoned without disobeying the statute which conferred it." 17. Statutes may do more than impose duties; they may, for instance, confer rights; and one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by that other even though the right be one which might be waived or abandoned without disobeying the statute which conferred it." 17. The Supreme Court dealt with the test of repugnancy in T.Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, AIR 1983 SC 150 as follows in para.15:- "The predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legislates under ' the proviso to clause (2). The proviso to Art.254(2) empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law even though it has become valid by virtue of the President's assent. Parliament may repeal or amend the repugnant State law, either directly or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the 'same matter'. Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does not expressly repeal a State law, even then, the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A state law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise when both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together e.g., when both prescribe punishment for the same offence but the punishment differs in degree or kind or in the procedure prescribed. In all such cases, the law made by Parliament shall prevail over the State law under Art.254(1)". Applying these tests to the case in hand, the question is whether the Central Amendment Act 47 of 1978 prevails over the State Amendment Act 16 of 1968 and if so, to what extent. The State amendment confers a right of preference on the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation as well as co-operative societies. The proviso under the Central Act had even earlier, conferred a preference to Co-operative societies. The amendment extended the preference to those holding valid licence for driving transport vehicles. The Central amendment does not operate in the same field in so far as the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation is concerned. It is not a legislation on the 'same matter' as envisaged by the Supreme Court in Barai's case, in relation to the Corporation. The amendment extended the preference to those holding valid licence for driving transport vehicles. The Central amendment does not operate in the same field in so far as the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation is concerned. It is not a legislation on the 'same matter' as envisaged by the Supreme Court in Barai's case, in relation to the Corporation. It is not repugnant to the State amendment on this point so that the primary preference given, to the Corporation will stand. The next preference given to co-operative societies also remains untouched, being given primacy over individual applicants by both the legislations. The question arises only so far as holders of valid licence for driving transport vehicles are concerned on whom the Parliamentary law confers an additional right by way of preference over individual applicants, while the State law is silent on the point. This preference has therefore to prevail and individual applicants have to be relegated to take their place behind such applicants, of course, other conditions being equal. 18. I therefore hold that other conditions being equal the order of preference under the proviso to S.47(1) in the grant of permits will be as follows: - a) Kerala State Road Transport Corporation b) Co-operative societies c) Holders of valid licence for driving licence d) Other applicants. 19. On the facts of this case therefore the third respondent is entitled to preference over the petitioner, as rightly held by the Tribunal. 20. The Division Bench in writ appeal No. 159/88 felt that they need not go into this question in the view that the holding of a driving licence is itself a relevant factor and irrespective of the availability of the amendment the preference has to be given. I have however dealt with the matter as it is one of frequent occurrence. 21. I therefore, overrule this contention of the petitioner as well. Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the Tribunal has not adverted to the various disqualifications incurred by the third respondent namely that he had transferred a permit and was a resident of Dubai. Though there was no denial of the transfer of permit, the third respondent demurred to the plea that he was a resident of Dubai. That has been explained. Though there was no denial of the transfer of permit, the third respondent demurred to the plea that he was a resident of Dubai. That has been explained. Whatever that be, the Tribunal, has applied its mind to the relevant qualifications of the petitioner and the third respondent and preferred the third' respondent in the bargain. That finding is supported by the material and the evidence on record. The circumstances pointed out are not such as to tilt the balance in favour of the petitioner. I am not therefore, inclined to interfere with the order Ext.P6 of the Tribunal. The original petition is therefore, dismissed. Issue carbon copy on usual terms.