JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code) for quashing the proceedings in Criminal case No. 372/146/83 under Section 145 of the Code, pending in the Court of s. D. M. , Jaora. ( 2. ) CIRCUMSTANCES giving rise to the petition are these : The non-applicant no. 1, Anoopsingh on 13-3-1981 instituted. Civil Suit No. 34-A of 1981 in the Court of 1st Civil Judge Class II, Jaora against the applicant Shankarlal and shivnarayan, the non-applicant No. 2 and three others for declaration of his title to some items of property including the land in dispute and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his exclusive possession over the same. ( 3. ) THE non-applicant No. 1, Anoopsingh on 13-3-1981 itself, also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction. ( 4. ) SUBSEQUENT to the filing of the suit and during the pendency of the application for temporary injunction, the non-applicant, Anoopsingh moved an application on 6-7-1981 under Section 145 of the Code against the applicant, shankarlal and the non-applicant No. 2, Shivnarayan in the Court of sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jaora. ( 5. ) AFTER service of the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Code, the applicant Shankarlal on 10-11-1981, moved an application before the learned sub-Divisional Magistrate praying that in view of the pendency of the aforesaid civil Suit, the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code be dropped. ( 6. ) THE non-applicant No. 2, Shivnarayan filed another application on 3-2-1982, before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate praying that in view of the pendency of the aforesaid suit, the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code be stayed till the disposal of the aforesaid civil suit. ( 7. ) BY the order dated 13-3-1984, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate rejected the aforesaid application dated 3-2-1982, filed by the non-applicant No. 2, Shivnarayan and held that the pendency of civil suit does not furnish a ground for staying the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. ( 8. ) THE point for consideration is whether the application deserves to be allowed. ( 9. ) IT may be pointed out, that the proceedings under Section 145 of the code are intended to prevent a breach of the peace and to require the parties to get the dispute determined by a Civil Court. ( 8. ) THE point for consideration is whether the application deserves to be allowed. ( 9. ) IT may be pointed out, that the proceedings under Section 145 of the code are intended to prevent a breach of the peace and to require the parties to get the dispute determined by a Civil Court. When the parties have already gone to the Civil Court and the Civil Court is seized of the matter, proceedings under section 145 of the Code become meaningless. As pointed out in the decision in. Gajpatis case, 1977 MPLJ 567 = 1977 JLJ 664 in such a situation recourse may be had to Section 107 of the Code for maintenance of public peace. The real question is not of jurisdiction or legality but of discretion and propiety on the facts and in the circumstances. ( 10. ) IN the decision in Ramsumers case, AIR 1985 SC 472 title suit for possession and injunction in respect of certain property was dismissed by the civil Court on 28-2-1981. The matter was taken up in appeal and during the pendency of the appeal proceedings under section 145 of the Code were initiated with regard to the same property. The Magistrate passed the preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Code and also attached the property. The aggrieved party challenged that order in a revision petition before the High Court which refused to interfere but the Supreme Court quashed the proceedings under section 145 observing : "there is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the Criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permittted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the Criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the Civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the Civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. " ( AIR 1988 SC 1973 ) ( 11. ) IN the decision in Raghivirsinghs case, 1988 (1) MPWN 121 this decision in Ramsumers case has been distinguished and it has been held that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code cannot be dropped merely because second appeal is pending and order of status quo has been granted. It has, however, to be noted that in that case the non-applicant No. 1 was not a party to the civil litigation at all. The decision in Mahant Ramratandass case, 1988 (II)MPWN 45 may also be usefully persued. ( 12. ) IN the decision in Jhunamals case, AIR 1988 SC 1973 regarding the ratio of the decision in Ramsumers case it has been observed thus in paragraph 7 : "the ratio of the said decision is that a party should not be permitted to litigate before the Criminal Court when the Civil Suit is pending in respect of the same subject matter. That does not mean that a concluded order under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code made by the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction should be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has approached the Civil Court. " ( 13. ) IN the instant case, the non-applicant, Anoopsingh himself instituted the civil suit in March, 1981 and had also moved an application for temporary injunction. It was later in July, 1981, that he took recourse to Section 145 of the code. It was pertinent to point that he himself did not press his application for temporary injunction and got it dismissed on 2-7-1983. ( 14. ) ON a careful consideration, I am of the view that on facts this is pre-eminently a fit case, where following the ratio of decision in Ramsumers case, the stale proceedings under section 145 of the Code should in exercise of inherent powers under section 482 of the Code, be ordered to be dropped. If need be, recourse may be had to the provision of Section 107 of the Code. ( 15. ) IN the result, the application is allowed. If need be, recourse may be had to the provision of Section 107 of the Code. ( 15. ) IN the result, the application is allowed. The proceedings in the aforesaid criminal case pending in the Court of S. D. M. , Jaora are ordered to be dropped. Application allowed.