Judgment 1. All these applications involve same question of law and as such they were taken upon of hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. In these cases the complaint petitions were filed either by the Marketing Officer or by the Supply Inspector before the Special Judge appointed under the provision of S. 12AA of the Essential Commodities Act (herein after referred to as the said Act). In terms of Essential Commodities (Special Provisions) Act; special procedures have been laid down for trial of case in terms of provision contained in S. 12AA(i)(e) thereof and as embargo has been placed by the Parliament to the effect that no cognizance can be taken by the Court unless a complaint petition is filed by a person authorised by the concerned government in this behalf. 3. In these cases, it appears that searches and seizure of the trade articles involved in the respective case were made by the Marketing Officer and/or Supply Inspector. As indicated hereinbefore the said officers filed their respective complaint petitions before the Special Judge (E.C. Act) and by orders passed in different cases the special judges concerned took cognizance of offence as against the petitioners purported to be u/S. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act 1955. 4. Mr. P. D. Aggarwal and Mr. Gopal Chowdhury learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners raised a short question in support of these applications. It was contended by the learned counsel that the complaint petitions having filed by the Marketing Officer and / or Supply Inspector who were not authorised, therefore, the order taking cognizance passed by the Special Judge, must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. 5. Mr. Agarwal in this connection, has referred to a decision of this court in V. Satyanarayan V/s. The State of Bihar and Anr. reported in 1988 E.I.C.C. 168; in Seikh Jamaluddin V/s. Md. Allim alias Alimuddin reported in 1988 EICC 152 : 1988 Pat LJR 350 and unreported decision of this Court in Mathura Lal V/s. State of Bihar being Cr. Misc. No. 4004 of 1988 (R) disposed of on 16th Aug. 1989 and a decision of mine in Kamla Singh V/s. State of Bihar being Cr. Misc. No.1486 of 1987 (R) disposed of on 5-10-1989. 6. Misc. No. 4004 of 1988 (R) disposed of on 16th Aug. 1989 and a decision of mine in Kamla Singh V/s. State of Bihar being Cr. Misc. No.1486 of 1987 (R) disposed of on 5-10-1989. 6. It was further brought to my notice that by a notification dated 7-7-1987 the Marketing Officers have been authorised by the State of Bihar to file complaint petitions but the Supply Inspectors have not yet been so authorised. 7. Mr. K. K. JhunJhunwala learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, submitted that u/ S. 11 of the said Act, a public servant is authorised to file the complaint petition and as in these cases also the complaint petitions are filed by public servant the court concerned was empowered to take cognizance of offence under the said provision. 8. According to Mr. JhunJhunwala this aspect of the matter has been considered by a decision of this court in Nawal Kishore Agarwal V/s. The State of Bihar reported in 1984 Pat LJR 680 : 1985 Cri LJ 254 which has been followed in M/s Manu Lal Sah V/s. The State of Bihar reported in i 985 Pat LJR (NOC) 6(G) : 1985 Cri LJ 260. Learned counsel further submitted that in this view of the matter the order taking cognizance passed by the learned special Judges must be held to be valid u/ S. 11 of the EC Act. 9. Mr. P. P. N. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State in some of the cases, submitted that u/ cl. 30 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licencses Unification) Order 1984, Marketing Officers, and/ or Supply Inspectors an authorised to make inspection, search and seizure of trade articles and in this view of the matter, there is no reason as to why complaint petition filed by them should not be held to be maintainable. 10. 30 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licencses Unification) Order 1984, Marketing Officers, and/ or Supply Inspectors an authorised to make inspection, search and seizure of trade articles and in this view of the matter, there is no reason as to why complaint petition filed by them should not be held to be maintainable. 10. Before proceeding with the rival contentions of the parties, it is relevant to note the designation of the complainant and dates when cognizance was taken by the Special Judge in each case separately which would appear from the following : From the formentioned chart it is evident that in all these cases cognizance had been taken prior to 7-7- 1987 with effect from which date the Marketing Officers were authorised by the State of Bihar to file complaint petition under S. 12AA of the said Act. 11. The Parliament inserted provision S. 12AA and S.12-B by Act No. 18 of 1981. The said provisions were later on amended by the Parliament by Act No. 42 of 1986 and by the Act No. 73 of 1986. 12. After the aforementioned amendments, S. 12AA as it now stands read as follows : "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code (a) all offences under this Act shall be triable only by the Special Court constituted for the area in which the offence has been committed or where there are more special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court; (b) where a person accused for or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act is forwarded to a Magistrate u/sub-sec. (2) or sub-sec. (2A) of S. 167 of the Code such Magistrate may authorise the detention of such person in such custody as he thinks fit for a period not exceeding fifteen days in the whole where such Magistrate is a Judicial Magistrate and seven days in the whole where such Magistrate is an Executive Magistrate. Provided that where such Magistrate considers- (i) When such person is forwarded to him as aforesaid; or (ii) Upon or at any time before the expiry of Cr. Misc. No. Complainant Date of Cognizance 1. 1508/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 2. 1575/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 3. 1573/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 4. 1576/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 5. 1672/87 (R) Supply Inspector 20-6-87 6. Misc. No. Complainant Date of Cognizance 1. 1508/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 2. 1575/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 3. 1573/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 4. 1576/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 5. 1672/87 (R) Supply Inspector 20-6-87 6. 3434/87 (R) Supply Inspector 30-7-87 7. 1571/87 (R) Marketing Officer 23-5-87 the period of detention authorised by him; that the detention of such person is unnecessary, he may, if he is satisfied that the case falls under the proviso to Sections, order the release of such person on bail and if he is not satisfied, he shall or such person to be forwarded to the Special Court having jurisdiction; (c) the Special Court may, subject to the provision of cl. (d) of this sub-section, exercise, in relation to the person forwarded to it under cl. (b) the same power which a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try a case may exercise u/S. 167 of the Code in relation to an accused person in such case who has been forwarded to him under that Section; (d) save as aforesaid no person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence under this Act shall be released on bail by any court other than a Special Court or the High Court; Provided that a Special Court shall release any such person on bail- (i) without giving, the prosecution an opportunity to oppose the application for such release unless the Special Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such opportunity and, (ii) where the prosecution opposes the application if the Special Court is satisfied that there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence concerned. Provided further that the Special Court may direct that any such person may be released on bail if he is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is a sick or infirm persons, if the Special Court is satisfied that it is just and proper so to do for any other special reason to be recorded in writing; (e) a special court may upon appear police report of the facts constitution an offence under this Act (or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned (or any person aggrieved or any recognised consumer association) take cognizance of that offence without the accused being committed to it for trial. (f) all offences under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Secs. 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the Code shall, as far as may be, apply such trial : Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this Section, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. (2) When trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court may also try an offence other than an offence under this Act, with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial; Provided that such other offence is, under any other law for the time being in force, triable in a summary way : Provided further that in the case of any conviction for such other offence in such trial it shall not be lawful for the Special Court to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding the term provided for conviction in a summary trial under such other law. (3) A Special Court may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person suspected to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence under this Act, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned whether as principal or abettor in the commission thereof and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of S. 308 of the Code, be deemed to have been tendered u/S. 307 thereof. (4) Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of High Court regarding bail u/ S. 439 of the Code and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under cl. (b) of subsection (1) of that Section as if the reference to "Magistrate" in that Section included also a reference to a Special Court constituted u/S. 12-A." 13. From a perusal of the aforementioned provisions it would be evident that special courts have been constituted for the purpose of summary trial of the offender and for that purpose, special procedures have been provided for. 14. It is thus clear that by reason of the aforementioned amendment whereby Sec. 12-AA was inserted and which was subsequently amended by Parliament by Act No.42/86 and by Act No.73/86, a Special procedure has been provided in place of the procedure laid down under this Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. Sec. 11 is a general provision whereas the provision of S. 12AA is a special Provision. 16. In terms of S. 12AA(1)(e) of the Act, the Special Courts have been conferred with a power to take cognizance of offence upon perusal of a police report of the facts constituting an offence or upon complaint made by a Officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf by the Government concerned. 17. It may be noted that the power of the Special Court to take cognizance upon complaint petition filed by the officer of the Central Government or the State Government was specifically brought in, by reason of Act No. 73 of 1986 which came into force with effect from 1-5-1987. 17. It may be noted that the power of the Special Court to take cognizance upon complaint petition filed by the officer of the Central Government or the State Government was specifically brought in, by reason of Act No. 73 of 1986 which came into force with effect from 1-5-1987. Thus it is clear that as S. 12AA contains Special Provisions the same would prevail over the general provision as contained in S. 11 of the said Act. 18. It is now well known that where in a statute their exists both special provision and the general provision, the special provision over rides general provision (Generelia specialibus non-derogant). 19. It is, therefore, clear that if the prosecution intends to invoke the special procedure laid down u/S. 12AA of the E.C. Act, the same can be taken recourse to, only if the conditions precedent in respect thereof are fulfilled namely either a police report is submitted or complaint petition is filed by an Officer specially empowered in this behalf either by Central Government or by the State Government of the case. 20. It is, therefore, in my opinion, absolutely clear that the complaint petition could not have been filed by a person other than a person specially authorised in this behalf either by the Central Government or by the State Government, as the case may be. 21. In Ballabhadas Agarwala V/s. J. C. Chakravarty reported in AIR 1960 SC 576 : 1960 Cri LJ 752, the Supreme Court has clearly held that S. 257 of Calcutta Municipal Act are not merely enabling provision, but they were obligatory in the sense that no legal proceeding under the Act would be instituted except in accordance with the provision of the said act. 22. Evidently the said provision has been inserted by the Act 73 of 1986 by the Parliament with the purpose that court should not entertain any complaint petition filed by any person other than authorised by the Government concerned. 23. The Parliaments intention in inserting the words in S. 12AA(1)(e) "Officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf by the Government Concerned" is absolutely clear, specific and unambigious. 24. 23. The Parliaments intention in inserting the words in S. 12AA(1)(e) "Officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in this behalf by the Government Concerned" is absolutely clear, specific and unambigious. 24. Once, thus the prosecution intends to take recourse to the special provisions contained in S.12AA of the said Act, the procedure laid down therein must be strictly complied with as otherwise, cognizance taken as against the offenders would be illegal and without jurisdiction. The said Provisions being (sic). 25. The decisions relied upon by Shri Jhunjhunwala viz 1985 Pat LJR (NOC) 6 : 1985 Cri LJ 260 and 1984 Pat LJR 680 : 1985 Cri LJ 254 are not attracted in this case as the points raised in these cases were not available for consideration therein as the amendment in the said provision came into force with effect from 1 -5- 1987. 26. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by this Court in V/s. Satyanarayan 1988 EICC 168 (supra). The contention raised by Mr. K. K. Jhunjhunwala therefore, in my opinion, has no substance. 27. So far as the contention raised on behalf of the State By Shri P. P. N. Roy is concerned, it may be stated that limited power conferred upon an authority under a delegated legislation only for the purpose of making inspection, search or seizure cannot override the express provision of the Act. 28. Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order 1984, was made by the State Government in terms of the delegating notifications issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred upon it u/ S.5 of the said Act. 29. The Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order 1984, thus cannot override the express provision contained in the said Act, itself. 30. Further in any event only because the Marketing Officers and / or Supply Inspectors have been conferred with power by the delegatee to make inspection, search or seizure the same does not mean that he would be entitled to file complaint petition also in derogation to the express provisions contained in Sec. 12-AA( 1)(e) of the said Act as inserted by E.C. Act (Special Provision) Act 1981 as amended. 31. As noticed hereinbefore, Cl. 30 of the said Order does not authorise the Marketing Officers or the Supply inspectors to file the complaint petition. 32. 31. As noticed hereinbefore, Cl. 30 of the said Order does not authorise the Marketing Officers or the Supply inspectors to file the complaint petition. 32. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the contention raised by Mr. P. P. N. Roy must also, therefore, have to be negatived. 33. In the result these applications are allowed and the respective orders taking cognizance as against the petitioners in each cases are quashed. Applications allowed.