H. C. Goel ( 1 ) SHRI Vimal Chand Jain, The creditor-respondent, had filed a company petition under S. 433 of the Companies Act (for short the Act ) against M/s. Ambey Flour Mills Pvt. Ltd, appellant, with lhe prayer that the appellant company may be wound-up. The allegations of the res- pondsat in tlis company patition are that he had advanced four sums of loan to the appallant, namely Rs. 30. 000. 00 on January 24, 19^0, Rs. 15. 000. 00 on May 23, 19m, Rs. 27,500. 00 on January 24,1980 and Rs. 3s,000. 00 on August 7, 1980. The appellant repaid certain amounts against principal and interest, but that the appellant company was not paying the balance amount and that it has come to the knowledge of the respondent that the appellant company is in heavy debts and is unable to repay the amount of loan. The respondent served a demand notice under S. 434 of the Act on the appellant company which was replied to by the appellant. The appellant denied having received the alleged sum Rs. 35,000. 00 of loan about which only there is a dispute between the parties. The appellant made certain payments out of the three amounts of loan in question to the respondent during the preliminary enquiry of the company petition. By the order dated August 4, the appellant was directed to file an affidavite giving the statement of account of the respondent in the books of account of the appellant company. By ths later order dated April 2 ->, 1988 Mahinder Narain J" the learned Company Judge, as his Lordship than was, observed that it was stated that the controversy was confined to the payment of interest and the payment of Rs. 35,000. 00 to the appellant A direction was given to the counsel for the respondent to look into the matter and to pin-point as to where it had been stated in the affidavit filed as to how and in what manner the money was paid to the piesent appellant. Counsel for the appellant was also directed to produce the books of account of the appellant relating to the date on which ths payment of Rs. 35,030. 00 in question was asserted to have been made. Counsel for the appellant was also directed to produce the books of account of the appellant relating to the date on which ths payment of Rs. 35,030. 00 in question was asserted to have been made. A certificate dated February 27, 1984 issued by Shri Vijay Gupta, Managing Director of the appellant company wherein the last entry of the receipt of Rs. 35,000. 00 in question also appeared was shown to the learned Judge on July 14, 1988. The learned Judge thereafter passed the impugned order on that date admitting the company petition. A direction was also given to advertise about the petition having been admitted in two dailies and the Delhi Gazette. Aganstthis order admitting the petition the appellant company preferred this appeal. ( 2 ) THE respondent has opposed the appeal. We have beard arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and were taken through the record of the case. The case of the respondent is that the sum of Rs. 35,000. 00 was advanced by him to the appellant company as a loan. He served a notice in writing at the registered office of the appellant company demanding the refund of that amount together with intereit thereon but that the appellant failed to pay the same or to secure or compound for that to his reasonable satisfaction for more than three weeks after the service of the demand notice on the appellant and that, as such, the appellant company was unable to pay its debt within the meaning of S. 433 (e) read with S. 434 (a) of the Act; that this was prima facie shown by the respondent to the learned Company Judge who thereon rightly admitted the winding-up petition. Mr. Goyle, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that the case of the appellant is that no such amount i. e. Rs. 35,000. Mr. Goyle, learned counsel for the appellant, has submitted that the case of the appellant is that no such amount i. e. Rs. 35,000. 00 was taken as a loan by the respondent which question could only be decided by a Civil Court and under the circumstances the question of any neglect by the appellant to repay the amount in question did not arise as the appellant b na fide disputed the factum of the alleged loan It was submitted that the material a> adduced by the parties on the record at the preliminary enquiry stage showed that the said plea of the appellant company was a bona fide plea and, as such, the learned Judge grossly erred in admitting the winding-up petition which has seiious adverse repercussions on the appellant company. It was contended that the moment the a pellant company showed that there was a bona fide dispute regarding the existence of the amount of loan in question the winding-up petition deserved to be dismissed forthwith and the petitioner s only remedy was to approach e Civil Court by filing a regular suit for the recovery of the alleged amount the loan in question, if so advised. ( 3 ) WE may say at the outset that we are of the considered view that no prima facie case whatsoever was made out by the respondent for the mission of the petition for winding-up of the appellant company as it wa E )t at all shown by the respondent that the appellant company was unable pay any debt owing from it as contemplated by S. 433 (e) of the Act. It the settled law and which was not disputed by Mr. Rawal, learned counsel for the respondent, that the machinery of winding-up is not to be allowed to be utilised simply as a means for realising debts due from a company. A winding-up petition is not the legitimate means of seeking to enforce payment of the debt which is bona fide disputed by the company. a debt is not disputed on some substantial grounds, the Court may decide it on the petition and make an order of winding-up of the company. However, if the debt is bona fide disputed, there cannot be neglect to pay within S. 434 (l) (a) of the Act. a debt is not disputed on some substantial grounds, the Court may decide it on the petition and make an order of winding-up of the company. However, if the debt is bona fide disputed, there cannot be neglect to pay within S. 434 (l) (a) of the Act. If there is no neglect, the deeming provision does not come into play and the ground of winding-up, namely that the company is unable to pay its debts is not substantiated. A petition presented ostencibly for a winding up Order but really to exercise pressure has to be dismissed and under circumstances may be stagmatised as scandulous abuse of the process of the Court. With this legal proposition in view we have to see if the appellant company had raised a bona fide dispute regarding the existence of the loan in question and its liability to repay the same or the facts and circumstances brought out on the record went to show that the mount in question had been advanced as a loan to the appellant company and the same was due to the respondent and the plea of denial of the amount a question was raised by the appellant falsely and without any basis and was a mala fide plea with a view to defeat the petition for winding-up if the company. Having regard to the facts and circumstances brought out on the record we are of the clear opinion that it could not be said that the plea as raised by the appellant company was not a bona fide plea and was a false or a designed plea. The respondent did not make any specific allegation that the appellant wasunable to pay its debts i. e. that it was inable to meet the current demands. As stated by us already above, the sole case of the respondent for seeking the winding-up of the company is hat the appsllant company had neglected to reply the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 togetber with interest thereon allegedly advanced as a loan to the appellant. The respondent had admittedly advanced the other three sumsof loan during the period from January 24, 1980 to May 24. 1980 by cheques. The sums of Rs. 35. 000. 00 in question was admittedly not paid by any cheque. The respondent has taken contradictory stands as regards the mode of payment of the sum of Rs. 35. 000. The respondent had admittedly advanced the other three sumsof loan during the period from January 24, 1980 to May 24. 1980 by cheques. The sums of Rs. 35. 000. 00 in question was admittedly not paid by any cheque. The respondent has taken contradictory stands as regards the mode of payment of the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 , In para 4 of the petition it was stated that this amount was paid in cash on August 7, 1980. In the very next para 5 this amount was shown as having been paid by pay order dated August 7. 1980. Two photo-copies of the certificate dated February 27, 1984 issued by Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta. a director of the appellant company, giving the details of the loans as advanced by the respondent to the appellant were placed on ihe record of the case. In one copy there is no description given about the last item of Rs. 3s. OOO. 00 shown as one of the. five amounts of loans advanced by the respondent to the appellant. In the other copy there is some description which is not quite legible giving date of August 7, 1988 appears against the entry relating to the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00. This description, however, is clearly made with different hand and ink than the entries appearing in the certificate prior thereto. No effort was made by the respondent to show before the learned Company Judge by summoning the record of the concerned bank or filing any certificate etc. from the concerned bank to show that any such pay order was issued by the respondent in favour of the appellant company Had the amount been paid by pay order, there should have been no difficulty in filing such a document on the record. . . but no effort was made on behalf of the respondent to get any such document produced on the record of the learned Company Judge. ( 4 ) APART from all this, the appellant company has alleged that the financial control of the appellant company was in the hands of one Shri S. N. Bhandari who was the Managing Director of the appellant company during the relevant period. Shri Bhandari is admittedly the real brother-in-law of Shri Vimal Chand Jain, respondent. It is averred by the appellant that although the appellant never received the alleged sum of Rs. 35. Shri Bhandari is admittedly the real brother-in-law of Shri Vimal Chand Jain, respondent. It is averred by the appellant that although the appellant never received the alleged sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 from the respondent, however, Shri Bhandari had stated that Shri Vimal Chand Jain had told Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta, the present Managing Director of the appellant company that Shri Vimal Chand Jain required a certificate urgently about his having advanced a loan of Rs. 35. 000. 00 to the appellant company and that at his instance he (Shri Vijay Kumar Gupta) issued the aforesaid certificate and as there were no particular regarding the alleged payment of Rs. 35. 000. 00 he had left the space blank which was later on filled in by someone on behalf of the respondent as "pay order dated 7. 880". It has also been pointed out on behalf of the appellant that whereas the appellant company issued regular receipts for the other three amounts of loan from the respondent, no receipt was admittedly issued by the appellant company regarding the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances as appearing on the record it cannot be said that the plea as raised by the appellant company was not a bona fide plea and that there was no bona fide dispute regarding the existence of the amount. Under the circumstances the petition did not merit admission and deserved to be dismissed leaving the respondent to seek his remedy by way of a civil suit. The learned Company Judge observed that a book of account was produced before the Court in terms of the order of the Court dated April 29, 1988 read with the order passed on August 4, 1987 and that the learned Judge was satisfied (presumably by looking at the book of account as produced by the respondent) that a sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 was paid out by the respondent to the appellant company. It was further observed that the appellant had already paid a sum of Rs. 1,07,000. 00 to the respondent and only the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 had not been paid and in view of that he admitted the petition for regular hearing. Firstly the account book was produced by the respondent in pursuance of the order dated April 29, 1988 and the order dated August 4. 1,07,000. 00 to the respondent and only the sum of Rs. 35. 000. 00 had not been paid and in view of that he admitted the petition for regular hearing. Firstly the account book was produced by the respondent in pursuance of the order dated April 29, 1988 and the order dated August 4. 1987 had no relevance with that. So, it is not quite understandable as to how did the learned Judge take the view that the order dated August 4, 1987 also had any bearing in the matter of the production of the book of account by the respondent. Then again we fail to see as to how by the existence of an entry in the book of account of the respondent showing a debit of Rs. 35. 000. 00 to the account of the appellant company was a clinching evidence on which alone the Court could be satisfied that the sum of Rs. 35,000. 00 wasin fact paid by the respondent to the appellant company. In fact this was no stage. for forming a final opinion so as to record satisfaction about the payment of the amount in question All that the Court was required to see at that stags was the prima facie state of things. The learned Company Judge thus mis-directed himself and the impugned order is not sustainable. We accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order and dismiss the company petition with costs to the appellant throughout.