ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 20th November 1985 passed by the 5th Additional District Judge, Allahabad, in Civil Revision No. 422 of 1983. 2. Facts in a narrow compass are that the petitioners filed suit No. 639 of 1967 arraying respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as defendants on various allegations, the relevant of which are that the petitioners purchased a part of Arazi Plot No. 3332 from one Rajaram on 27-4-1965 and the sale deed was registered on 7-2-1966. Another plot of land in Arazi plot No. 3333 was also purchased by the petitioner from Raja Ram and the sale deed was registered on 7-2-1966. It has been alleged that one Ram Chandra owner of Arazi Plot No. 3337 has encircled his plot by digging foundation and raising a wall thereon Such digging up of the foundation as alleged by the petitioner in the plaint was illegal as it had encroached upon the land of the petitioner. However, respondents Nos. 2 and 3 did not pay any heed to it and continued their illegal activities. The cause of action as is disclosed in para 12 of the petition arose to the petitioner against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 sometime a week back. It may be mentioned that the plaint has been verified on 2-1-1967. In this suit the petitioner had claimed the relief that the defendants be restrained from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioner over plots Nos. 3332 and 3333. Later on the petitioner filed an application for the withdrawal of the suit with authority to file a fresh suit. Objections were filed by the defendants against this application. The trial court allowed the application for unconditional withdrawal of the suit and rejected the objections preferred by the defendants. For clarity the entire order is reproduced below : "35A-2 by plaintiff for withdrawal of the suit with authority to file it afresh. 36/C objection by the defendant thereon. Heard. The plaintiffs learned counsel has stated that the application be treated for unconditional withdrawal. As such35A-2 is allowed. 36C is rejected Plaintiff to pay half cost of the suit to the defendant. Consign. Sd/- J. M. Srivastava 16-2-68." 3. 36/C objection by the defendant thereon. Heard. The plaintiffs learned counsel has stated that the application be treated for unconditional withdrawal. As such35A-2 is allowed. 36C is rejected Plaintiff to pay half cost of the suit to the defendant. Consign. Sd/- J. M. Srivastava 16-2-68." 3. The petitioner later on filed suit No. 76 of 1980 against respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who were also defendants in suit No. 639 of 1967. It may be mentioned that the verification of the plaint was made on 29-8-1979. The defendants contested the suit and filed objections. 4. Issues were framed by the trial court in the suit. Relevant issue No. 6 was framed as under : "Whether the present suit is barred under Order 23 Rule 1(4) C.P.C." The defendants prayed for the disposal of this issue as a preliminary issue. Vide order dated 18-8-1983 the learned Munsif decided the issue in the negative holding the suit to be maintainable. The defendants feeling aggrieved against this order preferred Revision No. 422 of 1983 in the court of District Judge, Allahabad which was decided by 5th Additional District Judge,- Allahabad, respondent No. 1, vide order dated 20-11-1985. The court below allowed the application and held that the suit is barred and set aside the order dated 18-8-1983 passed by the learned Munsif in Suit No. 76 of 1980. Hence this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri H. S. Nigam has submitted that the court below committed a manifest error of law inasmuch as he assumed the jurisdiction in deciding the revision and holding that the suit is barred under Order 23, Rule 1(4) C.P.C. For better appreciation Order 23, Rule 1(4) is reproduced below : "R. 1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim - (1) At any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim : ... ... ... Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim - (1) At any time after the institution of a suit the plaintiff may as against all or any of the defendants abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim : ... ... ... (4) Where the plaintiff (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1), or (b) withdraws from a suitor part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. .. .. .." The postulates of Order 23 Rule 1(4) clearly provide that in case the plaintiff abandons his suit or abandons a part of his claim or withdraws from the suit without the permission of the Court he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award. It has further been enjoined that the plaintiff shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim. It would be appropriate to appreciate the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 C.P.C., which provide that where the Court is satisfied that the suit must fail by reason of a lawful agreement or compromise or where the defendants have satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject matter of the suit. Learned counsel for the petitioner in the light of the above provision has submitted that the application was filed by the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit. However, it is manifest that the trial court while allowing the application did not grant him the permission but only permitted the withdrawal of the suit unconditionally. The Court also directed that half of the cost be paid to the defendants. It is not clear from the record as to whether such costs were paid or not. 6. However, it is manifest that the trial court while allowing the application did not grant him the permission but only permitted the withdrawal of the suit unconditionally. The Court also directed that half of the cost be paid to the defendants. It is not clear from the record as to whether such costs were paid or not. 6. After the dismissal of the suit the plaintiff filed a suit under section 209/229 B of U. P. Z. A. and L.R. Act in the court of the S. D. M. for a declaration and ejectment of respondent No. 3. It is pertinent to mention that Smt. Zainab Bibi was not made a party in the suit in the revenue court. This suit abated in view of the commencement of the proceedings under the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 7. After about 8 years Suit No. 76 of 1980 was filed, Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the cause of action in this suit and the relief claimed are distinct from the one claimed in Suit No. 639 of 1967. It has been urged that in view of the cause of action and the relief in the subsequent suit being distinct they are not such subject matter which may preclude the petitioner from pursuing the second suit. In support of his submission learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madan Lal, AIR 1970 SC 987 . It is difficult to agree with such submission. Indeed the subject matter has nowhere been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. It has to be seen in the light of the controversy that the cause of action for Suit No. 639 of 1987 arose a week prior to the filing of the suit. However, in Suit No. 76 of 1980 the plaintiff has disclosed the cause of action as 2-9-1967. In Suit No. 76 of 1980 this date of cause of action 2-9-1967 is maintained though besides 2-9-1967 another date has been imported i.e. 26-8-1979 on the allegation that threatening was administered and as such cause of action accrued. However, in Suit No. 76 of 1980 the plaintiff has disclosed the cause of action as 2-9-1967. In Suit No. 76 of 1980 this date of cause of action 2-9-1967 is maintained though besides 2-9-1967 another date has been imported i.e. 26-8-1979 on the allegation that threatening was administered and as such cause of action accrued. The parties often in order to camouflage the lis pending between them import a cause of action which otherwise had not accrued to them and also couch the wordings of the relief in such a manner which may show that the relief claimed is different and is at variance with the subject matter in the earlier suit. The relief claimed in the earlier suit was for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession, but a perusal of the plaint would show that the plaintiff had already ceased to occupy the land and this allegation on the face of it was not correct. In Suit No. 76 of 1980 the plaintiff has claimed a decree for a declaration. It is in the teeth of the fact when the plaintiff had earlier stated that he is the owner in possession of the land in Suit No. 639 of 1967. Further the plaintiff has claimed the relief of being put back in possession after dispossessing the defendants. A perusal of the plaint allegations of the two suits show that the plaintiff was not in possession for which possession was claimed. Merely changing the words in the relief or adding or deleting some of them would not in any case come to the rescue of the plaintiff when it is borne out that the subject matter of the two suits is the same. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the plea of cause of action as well as relief of possession has been claimed in the writ petition for the first time and was not claimed before the court below. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that no such plea was raised. From a perusal of the order passed by respondent No. 1 it is revealing that much stress was laid as regards the order dated 16-2-1968 by which the trial court had permitted withdrawal of the suit unconditionally. A perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that no such plea was raised. From a perusal of the order passed by respondent No. 1 it is revealing that much stress was laid as regards the order dated 16-2-1968 by which the trial court had permitted withdrawal of the suit unconditionally. In this order there is no mention that the trial court had permitted the plaintiff to file a fresh suit. Even no inference can be drawn from it. 9. In view of the above discussion the petition fails and deserves to be dismissed. There is no manifest error of law apparent on the face of the record or any jurisdictional error in the order of the court below. 10. In the result the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.