B. N. KIRPAL, J ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of theconstitution the petitioner is seeking an appropriate Writ forquashing the Notification No. F. 1/ps/hs/ 87-1227-1244 to 1433dated 2/02/1987 by virtue of which the Lt. Governor,delhi, appointed Mr. Justice M. L. Jain (retd.) (Respondentno. 4) and Mr. A. K. Baneqee (Respondent No. 5) as a Committee, inter alia, to monitor the investigation of criminal casesrelating to criminal offences which had been committed duringthe riots which had taken place after 31/10/1984. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts are that Smt. Indira Gandhi wasassassinated on the morning of 31/10/1984 at her residence at New Delhi. The news of her death was released inthe evening and it is alleged by the petitioner that, in consequence of the assassination, riots took place in Delhi between 31/10/1984 and 3/11/1984. During the saidriots there was loss to life and property. ( 3 ) IN an effort to bring to an end the disturbances in Punjab, and for the sake of solution in Punjab on 24/07/1985an accord was signed between the Prime Minister of India and"late Shri Harcharan Singh Longowal. This accord was precededby several meetings between the leaders and in pursuance tothe negotiations the Central Government on 26/04/1985appointed an one man Commission of Mr. Justice Ranganathmisra of the Supreme Court under Section 3 of the Commissionsof Inquiry Act The terms of reference of the Commission wereas follows:- (I) to inquire into the allegations in regard to the incidents of organised violence which took place indelhi following the assassination of the late Primeminister, Smt. Indira Gandhi. (II) to recommend measures which may be adopted forprevention of recurrence of such incidents. ( 4 ) AS a result of the accord the Commission s sphere wasextended to the riots which had taken place in Kanpur andbokaro as well. As a result thereof a revised notification dated 3/11/1985 was issued, and the first term of referenceof the Commission of Inquiry now reads as follows :- "to inquire into the allegations in regard to the incidentsof organised violence which took place in Delhi andthe disturbances which took place in the Bokarotehsil, in Chas Tehsil and at Kanpur following theassassination of the late Prime Minister, Shrimatiindira Gandhi". VARIOUS parties appeared before the Commission and it submitted its report in November, 19s6. ( 5 ) IN January, 1987 the aforesaid report was tabled on thefloor of the Lok Sabha. VARIOUS parties appeared before the Commission and it submitted its report in November, 19s6. ( 5 ) IN January, 1987 the aforesaid report was tabled on thefloor of the Lok Sabha. The said report dealt with the incidentswhich had taken place at Delhi and it was found that the number of persons killed was not below 2370 and not more than3874. No definite figure was, however, determined by thecommission. It was also observed by the Commission that"these incidents of 31/10/1984, appear to have been byway of involuntary reaction of a deep sence of grief, anguishand hatred for the assassins. There can be no scope to contend,and much less to accept, that at the initial stage on 31/10/1984, the violence that took place was organised". ( 6 ) AFTER referring to the incidents which took place subsequent to 31/10/1984 the Commission came to the conclusion which is given below:- "for reasons indicated elsewhere, the Commission hascome to the conclusion that violence was not orga-nised by the Congress (1) party or any official whomatters in the party". IT further observed that "the riots after spontaneous origingot into channelised methods in the bands of gangsters. Itwould not be wrong to say that there was organised violence at. Delhi and that was done by the anti-social elements and in theriots, thousands of people who do not really belong to the classification of anti-ocials did participate. Many of these participants were people from the lower ranks of the Congress (I)patry and sympathisers". ( 7 ) FROM the aforesaid conclusions it appears that the; Commission absolved the Congress party and senior local leaders ofthe said party of any responsibility, but it came to the conclusion that it was anti social elements who took command of thesituation and organised the riots. At the same time some persons, who could not be classified as anti socials, did participatein the riots, which included persons from the lower ranks ofthe Congress (1) party and sympathisers. ( 8 ) THE Commission also observed that unless the wrongdoers were punished appropriately in accordance with law, theywould feel encouraged and would get emboldened to look forward to fish in troubled waters. The Commission was of theopinion that every wrong doer should be punished in accordancewith law. ( 8 ) THE Commission also observed that unless the wrongdoers were punished appropriately in accordance with law, theywould feel encouraged and would get emboldened to look forward to fish in troubled waters. The Commission was of theopinion that every wrong doer should be punished in accordancewith law. The Commission also recorded a finding that somefirst Information Reports were not received, especially wherethe police were implicated, and on several occasions the oralreports which were recorded were not taken verbatim. In manycases, it was held, proper investigation had not taken place ?ndcases had ended in a final report though and a few persons hadbeen chargesheeted. Finally the Commission observed asfollows:- "the criminal activity in Delhi apart from being widespread and in greater intensity exhibited a variedspectrum of human conduct. This requires policeinvestigation and careful handling. The same policewho remained ineffective during riots and againstwhom several allegations were advanced, whetherrecorded or not, were the inevstigating agency inrespect of the FIRs. The Commission finds it notdifficult at all to appreciate and accept the contention of the victims that in such circumstances pro-per investigation could not be expected. Since thenumber of deaths is considerably great and therehave been number of other grave offences committed, it is necessary that the allegations should beproperly looked into and investigations suitablymonitored. This will mean fresh or further investigation and review of all actions subsequent thereof. For this purpose since the volume of work is quiteheavy, a Committee of at least two officers--onejudicial and one administrative, preferably a highranking police officer from outside Delhi--shouldbe appointed immediately with full authority tolook into the papers and give such directions to theprosecuting agency as the facts of each case wouldwarrant. Since there has been a lot of delay inattending to these prosecutions and as further delaywould prejudice proper trial and also the prospectof justice being done. it is necessary that expeditious steps should be taken to implement there aspects. " ( 9 ) IN response to the recommendations of Justice Rangnath Misra Commission the impugned notification was isscued bythe orders of the Administrator of the Union Territory of Delhiconstituting a Committee consisting of respondent Nos. 4. and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the said Committee ). The said notification reads as follows:- "whereas a number of deaths occurred and a number ofgrave offences were committed in various incidentsof rioting following the assassination of the lateprime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 31-10-84. 2. 4. and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the said Committee ). The said notification reads as follows:- "whereas a number of deaths occurred and a number ofgrave offences were committed in various incidentsof rioting following the assassination of the lateprime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 31-10-84. 2. AND whereas allegations have been made that cases relating to criminal offences were either not registered or were notproperly investigated and followed up by the police and government agencies concerned; 3. Now, therefore, in order to have such cases properlyregistered, investigated and followed up, the Administrator hereby appoints a Committee consisting of Justice M. L. Jain, a former Judge of Delhi High Court and Shri E. N. Renison, a retired IPS Officer, with the following terms of reference:- (A) To examine whether there were cases of omission toregister or properly investigate offences committedin Delhi during the period of riots from 31-10-84to 7-11-1984; (B) To recommend the registration of cases, where necessary, and to monitor the investigation thereof. (C) To monitor the conduct of the investigation and thefollow up of cases already registered by the policeand to suggest steps for effective action includingfresh and further investigation, where necessary. (D) To perform any other function in addition to theabove. 4. THE Administrator hereby authorises the Committee tolook into any paper related thereto and to give such instructionsor advice as it deems necessary to the police and the prosecutionagency relating to registration, investigation and prosecution ofsuch cases. 5. The Administrator i further pleased to direct that thecommittee will give a monthly report of the progress of its workto the Administrator. The Committee will function for a periodof six months. " ( 10 ) WE may here note that whereas in the Writ Petition thedate of the aforesaid notification is stated to be 2/02/1987 we were, at the time of arguments, informed by Shrianand that the correct date was "23-2-19 87. Furthermore,after the issuance of the notification Shri A. K. Banerjee, respondent No. 5, was appointed as one of the members in placeof Shri Renison. ( 11 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner a public notice was issuedby the said Committee enabling persons to file affidavits relatingto the said riots. The grievance of the petitioner is that on thebasis of the affidavits so collected the Committee had startedgiving directions to the police to register cases. ( 11 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner a public notice was issuedby the said Committee enabling persons to file affidavits relatingto the said riots. The grievance of the petitioner is that on thebasis of the affidavits so collected the Committee had startedgiving directions to the police to register cases. One such direction was contained in the letter dated 14/10/1987written on behalf of the Committee to the Additional Commissionerof Police, New Delhi. Preference in this letter was made to oneof the affidavits filed before the Committee and it was observedthat the said affidavit along with a statement of the deponentdiscloses commission of cognizable offences by some personsincluding the petitioner. According to this letter this offencehad not been registered and investigated. The police was askedthat the FIR be registered and the case investigated. The Addl. Commissioner wrote a reply dated 16/10/1987, whichhas been placed before us by the counsel for the Delhi Administration, in which letter it was staled that the letter dated 1 4/10/1987 of the Committee. should be routed to the policethrough the Delhi Administration. To this letter a reply dated 19/10/1987 was sent by the Secretary of the Committee. It was stated therein that by virtue of the aforesaid notificationappointing the Committee, the Administrator had authorisedthe Committee to give instructions or advice to to the police andthe prosecuting agencies relating to the registration, investigation and prosecution of such cases It was further stated that inview thereof there was no need to route the said letter throughthe Delhi Administration, and action was required to be takenby the police immediately. After the aforesaid communicationhad been sent by the Committee, the present writ petition wasfiled. By order dated 24/11/1987 Rule Nisi wasissued and by an interim injunction respondents No. 4 and 5were restrained from making recomendations for registration offresh cases and it was further directed that no further caseshould be registered on the directions orders of the respondentsno. 4 and 5. Theseinterim orders have been continued tilldate. ( 12 ) DURING the pendency of this petition two applicationswere filed being C. M. No. 5023 87 p. nd C. M. No. 83 88 inc. M. No. 5023187 the prayer on behalf of Shri Gobindamukhoty, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court and the Secretary,citizens Justice Committee was that the applicants be allowedto intervene in the case and file reply to the writ, petition andmake submissions at the time of hearing of the case. M. No. 5023187 the prayer on behalf of Shri Gobindamukhoty, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court and the Secretary,citizens Justice Committee was that the applicants be allowedto intervene in the case and file reply to the writ, petition andmake submissions at the time of hearing of the case. C. M. No. 83 88 was filed on behalf of the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties and the prayer was that the applicant should be allowed tointervene in the case and address arguments at the time ofhearing. By order dated 7/09/1988 the two applicants, without being impleaded as parties, were allowed to address arguments at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Wemay here note that at the. time of final arguments Shri S. C. Malik addressed arguments on behalf of the said applicants. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was first contended that theimpugned notification constituting the Committee was foundedon the basis of the recommendation of Justice Misra Commission. It was submitted that the said Commission had recommended the constitution of a Committee, like the present, beyond theterm of its reference. According to Shri Gupta, Justice Misracommission could only give a report with regard to the definitematters of public importance which had been referred to it andthe recommendation of the said Commission for a Committee,like the present, being set up, inter alia, for monitoring the progress of the criminal cases was without jurisdiction and ultravires, in either words, the recommendation of Ranganathmisra Commission were a nullity and the impugned notificationbased on those recommendations was also a nullity. ( 14 ) IN our opinion, there is no merit in this contention. . lit isnow well settled that the report of a Commission set up underthe Commissions of Inquiry Act is recommendatory in nature,and it has no power to enforce its recommendations. (See R. K. Dalmia vs. Justice Tendolkar AIR 195s SC 538) (1) Thisbeing so, it is open to the Government to accept all or any ofthe recommendations given by the Commission. Assuming thatthe Commission has travelled beyond the scope of the referencemade to it, it is, in our opinion, for the Government to decideand consider whether to accept or act on such a recommendationor not. The. Government may choose to ignore any advice orrecommendation which is given which is not sought for. Assuming thatthe Commission has travelled beyond the scope of the referencemade to it, it is, in our opinion, for the Government to decideand consider whether to accept or act on such a recommendationor not. The. Government may choose to ignore any advice orrecommendation which is given which is not sought for. But if anunsought for advice is tendered and the Government choosesto accept the same, then we fail to see as to ho wthe aceptance of such an advice can be impugned. In exercise of itsexecutive powers, the Government is free to seek advice fromany quarter. The advice so given helps the Governmant. incoming to an administrative decision. Dehors any statute asuggestion can be mooted to the Government to act. administratively, in a particular manner and we fall to see any legalimpediment in the Government accepting such an advice. If,therefore, the Commission exceeded the terms of its referenceand gave some recommendation or advice which was not coveredby the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Government, in our opinion, was not constrained by the provisions ofany law in accepting such a recommendation ( 15 ) IT was then contended that no enquiry committee, likethe present, could be appointed for the purpose of making anenquiry investigation into any matter of public importance byan executive order in exercise of the executive powers by thestate. Elaborating this contention Shri Gupta submitted that inview of the existence of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. no committee could be formed by an administrative order to gointo matters which fall within the purview of the Commissionsof Inquiry Act. In other words the Government could, _at best. have appointed another commission under the Commissions ofinquiry Act, but it could not have issued the impugned onexercise of its executive powers. ( 16 ) WE see no force HI this contention. The executivepower of the Government is co-extensive with the legislativepower. The executive power cannot be exercise in contravention of the provisions of any law. In the present case, the Commissions of Inquiry Act itself shows that the Government can setup an authority, other than a commission under the said Act,in respect of any definite matter of public importance. This isevident from the plain reading of the provisions of Section 11of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 1952. In the present case, the Commissions of Inquiry Act itself shows that the Government can setup an authority, other than a commission under the said Act,in respect of any definite matter of public importance. This isevident from the plain reading of the provisions of Section 11of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. 1952. which is asfollows:- ( 17 ) IT was next contended that the impugned notification is violative of the mandatory provisions of the Cods of Criminalprocedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted thatall offences falling under the Indian Penal Code can be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with only according to the Criminal Procedure Code. and not by any other procedure, method,order or manner. To make investigation or monitor control of , supervise investigation is a statutory power of the police only. No authority, it was submitted, however august or high, hasthe power or competence to make investigation, to control orsupervise it or to require or instruct the police to make it or conduct it in any particular manner. Referring to Section 4 ofthe Delhi Police Act, Mr Gupta submitted that the power ofsuperintendence which vested with the LT. Governor did notinclude the power to give any instructions to the police officersregarding the manner in which they were to discharges theirduties. In the alternative it was submitted that this. power couldonly be exercised by the Lt. Governor and could not have beendelegated by him. According to the learned counsel the impugned notification had the effect of authorising the Committee toexercise the power of superintendence over the police and, further, the committee was authorised to issue instructions to thepolice and to the prosecuting agency with regard to the mannerin which the work was required to be performed by them. According to the petitioner the committee had no authority in lawto exercise any such powers. ( 18 ) THE submission on of the petitioner was controverted bymr. Anand and Mr. Malik. It was submitted by Mr. Anandthat in exercise of his executive powers, the Lt. Governor coulddelegate his authority to anyone else. The Lt. Governor, it wassubmitted, had the power of superintendence and this powercould be exercised by him personally or through his delegatee. Mr. Malik submitted that under section 4 of the Policeact the Lt. Governor had the power of superintendenceover the Police Officers. Anandthat in exercise of his executive powers, the Lt. Governor coulddelegate his authority to anyone else. The Lt. Governor, it wassubmitted, had the power of superintendence and this powercould be exercised by him personally or through his delegatee. Mr. Malik submitted that under section 4 of the Policeact the Lt. Governor had the power of superintendenceover the Police Officers. By virtue of the provisions ofarticle 239 of the Constitution the Administrator couldact through his subordinate officers. Just as the Presidentunder Article 53 and the Governor under Article 154 exercisetheir powers through their subirdinate officers, similarly, theadministrator could delegate his powers. The powers underarticle 239 were stated to heanalogous to the powers underarticles 53 and 154 of the Constitution. It was also contendedthat by the Delhi Administration Act law and order was vested inthe Lt. Governor. By issuing the impugned notification the Lt. Governor had exercised his power under Article 239 of the Constitution and had delegated his powers of superintendence to thecommittee. It was also submitted that the effect of the issuance!of the impugned notification was that respondents No. 4 and 5became subordinate officers of the Delhi Administrator andwere subject to the control of the Lt. Governor. ( 19 ) BEFORE examining the rival contentions it will be appropriate, at this stage, to analyse the impugned order, in order tofind out and determine as to what is the extent of delegationif any, by the Lt. Governor in favour of the committee. ( 20 ) CLAUSE I of the notification merely refers to the assassination of the late Prime Minister. Clause 2 refars to three typesof allegations which had been made relating to criminal offences. These allegations Were that either the criminal offences were notregistered or not properly investigated or not properly followedup by the police and the Government agencies concerned. ( 21 ) CLAUSE 3 of the notification contains the terms of reference. It is stipulated therein that the committee is appointedin order to have such cases "properly registered, investigated andfollowed up" (emphasis added ). This being the object the termsof reference spelt out the duties of the Committee; Clause 3 (a)provided that the committee had to examine (i) whether therewere cases of omission to register offences or (ii) omission toproperly investigate offences. This clause has to be read withclause 3 (b) which required the committee (i) to recommend theregistration of cases ad (ii) to monitor the investigation thereof. This clause has to be read withclause 3 (b) which required the committee (i) to recommend theregistration of cases ad (ii) to monitor the investigation thereof. In other words, the reading of clause 3 (a) and (b) showsthat the committee wan to see as to in which cases there wasomission to register the offences and to recommend the registtration thereof. Secondly, it had to see whether the cases were being properly investigated, and thirdly, it had to monitor theinvestigation of cases which had not been registered or whichwere being improperly investigated. Clause 3 (c) pertained tocases which had already been registered. this sub-clause required the monitoring of the conduct of such cases and alsoentitled the committee to suggest steps for taking effective actionincluding fresh and further investigation where necessary. Clause3 (d) is general in nature and it enabled the Committee to perform any other function, in addition to the above. ( 22 ) CLAUSE 4 authorised the Committee to look into anypapers relating to what has been referred to in clause 3. Thecommittee was also empowered to give such instructions or advice as it deemed necessary to the police and to the prosecutingagency in relation to the registration, investigation and prosecution of such cases. A question will arise as to wihch are thepapers which the Committee was entitled to look into. Thesaid clause, however, clearly empowers the Committee to dealdirectly with the police and the prosecuting agency when it provide; for giving of instructions or advice by the Committee tothem. Clause 4 does not provide for any communication beingexchanged between the Committee and the Administrator. Whatthe Committee is required to convey to the Administrator isprovided by clause 5. This clause requires the Committee tofurnish a monthy report of progress of ill- work to the Administrator. ( 23 ) IN our opinion, the aforesaid notification has to beread as a whole. These clauses are inter-related and interwoven and cannot be read in isolation, rather they are dependant upon each other. Reading clauses 3. 4 and 5 together itappears, quite clearly, that the Lt. Governor had delegatedcertain functions to the Committee. The functions which arcdelegated are contained in clause 3 of the. notification. The manner in which the power was to be exercised by the Committee specifically contained in clause 4. Reading clauses 3. 4 and 5 together itappears, quite clearly, that the Lt. Governor had delegatedcertain functions to the Committee. The functions which arcdelegated are contained in clause 3 of the. notification. The manner in which the power was to be exercised by the Committee specifically contained in clause 4. The Committewas an agency which was being constituted to directly dealwith and monitor cases pertaining to the offences which hadbeen committed during the riots, the notification does not envisage any interference by the Administrator in the work. of thecommittee. Furthermore, the notification also does not provide or stipulate any action being required to be taken by- thelt, Governor at the behest or suggestion or recommendation ofthe Committee. All that the notification prescribes is that the. Administrator, by monthly reports, should be kept informed titthe work which was being done by the Committee. Thesepowers were given because in the report of Justice Mishra it wasslated that the Committee which is appointed should have "fullauthority to look into the papers and give such directions to theprosecuting agency as the facts of each case would warrant". Emphasis added ). It is because Justice Misra Commissionreport envisaged a direct link and communication, between thecommittee and the prosecuting agency that, by the impugnednotification, power was given to the Committee to oversee thework of the police and the prosecuting agency. In other words,the police and the prosecuting agency by virtue of the impugned notification, were made directly subordinate to the Committee. The Committee had the power to issue directions to them, withmonthly information to the Administrator. Although in Clause3 expressions "recommend" and "suggest" are used, the saidclause doas not itself provide to whom the recommendation or. suggestion is to be made. The power of recommendation andsuggestion, contained in clause 3, as contemplated, by the notification, has to be exercised in the manner indicated in clause4, and that manner is by issuing instructions and advising theprosecuting agency or the police. It is for this reason that thecommittee in the aforesaid letter dated 19/10/1987informed the Commissioner of Police that it was not necessaryfor the Committee to route the instructions through the Delhiadministration. The Committee has understood the impugnednotification to mean that it has direct control over the aforesaid cases and, by virtue thereof, it could give directions to thepolice and the prosecuting agency directly. The Committee has understood the impugnednotification to mean that it has direct control over the aforesaid cases and, by virtue thereof, it could give directions to thepolice and the prosecuting agency directly. We are informedby the learned counsel at the Bar that the Administrator wasfurnished with the monthly reports of the progress of the workof the Committee. ( 24 ) IT was contended by Shri Malik that Clause 5 clearlyenvisaged the retention of the power of superintendence orsupervision by the Administrator himself. According to thelearned counsel Clause 5 enabled the Administrator to control the work of the Committee. We are unable to agree with thiscontention. Clause 5 only stipulates information being funished to the Administrator, by way of monthly reports, of theprogress of the work done by the Committee. By the impugnednotification nopower of superintendence has been retained bythe Administrator. Even assuming that the issuances of thenotification would not, in law, divest the Administrator of hispower of superintendence over police, whatever power it be, thefact remains that by the impugned notification the Committeehas also been given power of superintendence over the policeand the prosecuting agency in relation to the riot cases. Thequestion which arises is whether this can be done. ( 25 ) SECTION (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. provides for investigation,inquiry or trial for every offence under the Penal Code according to the provisions of the Code. It has been held by thesupreme Court in the case of A. R. Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak ( AIR 1984 SC 718 ) at page 729 (3) that "in the absence of aspecific provision made in the statute indicating that offencewill have to be investigated, inquired into, tried or otherwisedealt with according to that statute, the same will have to beinvestigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Criminal Procedure Code. " Inother words, Criminal Procedure Code is theparent statute which provides for investigation, inquiring intoand trial of the cases by the Criminal Courts of various designations. ( 26 ) IN H. N. Rishbud and another vs. State of Delhi (MR1955 SC 196x4) the Supreme Court had occasion to considorthe various provisions pertaining to investigation of a case. " Inother words, Criminal Procedure Code is theparent statute which provides for investigation, inquiring intoand trial of the cases by the Criminal Courts of various designations. ( 26 ) IN H. N. Rishbud and another vs. State of Delhi (MR1955 SC 196x4) the Supreme Court had occasion to considorthe various provisions pertaining to investigation of a case. Theobservations of the Court with regard to the scheme of thecode, which ars relevant to the instant case are as follows the scheme of the Code also shows that while it ispermissible for an officer in charge of a police station to depute some subordinate officer to conductsome of these steps in the investigation, the responsibility for every one of these steps is that of the person in the situation of the officer in chargeof the police station, it having been clearly provided in Section 168 that when a subordinate officer makes, an investigation he should report theresult to the officer in charge of the police station. It is also clear that the final step in the investigation, viz. , the formation of the opinion as to whether or not there is a case to place the accused ontrial is to be that of the officer in charge of thepolice station. There is no provision permittingdelegation thereof but only a provision entitlingsuperior officers to supervise or participate undersection 551. " (Emphasis added ). ( 27 ) THE aforesaid observations, therefore, leave no mannerof doubt that the power of investigation is exercisable by thepolice officers under the Code and it cannot be delegated and,further, it is only the superior officers who can supervise orparticipate in the exercise of such powers. The aforesaid decision in Rishbud s case was followed by the Supreme Court inthe case of Abhinandan Jha and Others vs. Dinesh Mishra (AIR1968 SC 117) (5 ). It was held that it was for the police toform an opinion as to whether a charge-sheet should be filed ornot. In that case a question arose whether the Magistrate couldcall upon the police to submit a charge-sheet. It was held inabhinandan Jha s case that the Magistrate may or may notaccept a report which is filed by the police, but he cannot directthe police to change its opinion so as to accord with his view. The Supreme Court observed that "we have already pointed outthat the investigation, under the Code, take sin several aspects. It was held inabhinandan Jha s case that the Magistrate may or may notaccept a report which is filed by the police, but he cannot directthe police to change its opinion so as to accord with his view. The Supreme Court observed that "we have already pointed outthat the investigation, under the Code, take sin several aspects. and stages, ending ultimately with the formation of an opinionby the police as to whether, on the material covered and collected a case is made out to place the accused before the Magistrate for trial, and the submission of either a charge-sheet, or. a final report is dependent on the nature of the opinion, soformed. The formation of the said opinion, by the police,aspointed out earlier, is the final step in the investigation, andthat final step is to be taken only by the police and by no otherauthority". ( 28 ) FROM the aforesaid decisions it is clear that the powerof investigation vests, exclusively, with the police. This powercannot be delegated by the police to anyone else. This givesrise to two questions, namely, is this power subject to thesuperintendence and control by any superior authority andsecondly, whether, the power of superintendence could be exercised through subordinate officers. ( 29 ) AS already noted,, it had been contended by Shri malik. that maintaining law and order is a duty which is cast on the Administrator of the Union Territory. The police is under his executive and administrative control and Section 4 of the Delhipolice Act specifically. enables the Lt. Governor to exercisepower of . superintendence. Further contention is that by investing of the powers vide the impugned notification on thecommittee the question of delegation does not arise becausethese are the powers of the Lt. Governor, and they can beexercised by himself or through his subordinate officers, Infact, it was. contended, such powers could be conferred by,thelt. Governor on any person and need not be coferred on"theexisting officers. Reliance was also placed by Shri Malik onincome Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi (AIR 1969 S c 430) (6) and it was contended that it is a firmlyestablished rule that an express grant of statutory power containswith it by necessary implication the authority to use allreasonable means to make such grant effective. Reliance was also placed by Shri Malik onincome Tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi (AIR 1969 S c 430) (6) and it was contended that it is a firmlyestablished rule that an express grant of statutory power containswith it by necessary implication the authority to use allreasonable means to make such grant effective. ( 30 ) WE find it difficult to agree with Shri L. R. Gupta thatthe power of investigation conferred on the police under theprovisions of Criminal Procedure Code. is not subject to any superintendence. The power of superintendence is, in our opinion, expressly contained in Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act. which reads asfollows :- "4. The superintendence of the Delhi Police throughoutdelhi shall vest in, and be exercisable by the Administrator and any control, direction or supervision exercisable by any officer over any member ofthe police force shall be exercisable subject to suchsuperintendence. " THIS section stipulates, that the superintendence of the Delhipolice shall vest in the Administrator, and secondly, if anyofficer has over any member of the police any power of control. direction or supervision, then the said power shall be exercisable by that superior officer subject to the superintendence ofthe Administrator. Section 64 of the Delhi Police Act stipulates that superior police officer may himself perform duties whichare imposed on a subordinate officer. . A superior officer, if heexecises any duties of a junior officer, would be subject tosuperintendence of the Administrator ( 31 ) IN order to understand the full meaning and importofthe expression "superintendence", it will be helpful to referto two decisions of the Supreme Court, the interpretation of asection, similar to Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act, came upfor consideration before the Supreme Court in the case ofstate of Bihar vs. J. A. C. 5a!danna ( AIR 1980 SC 326 . (7 ). One of the questions which arose in that case was whether thestate Government was competent to direct further investigationin a criminal case in which a report was submitted by the investigating agency under Section 173 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. to themagistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. In that case thestate of Bihar had entrusted to another officer, superior in rankto the officer incharge of a, police. station. the power to investigate the case. Reliance was placed by the Supreme Court onthe provisions of Section 3 of the. Indian Police Act. to themagistrate having jurisdiction to try the case. In that case thestate of Bihar had entrusted to another officer, superior in rankto the officer incharge of a, police. station. the power to investigate the case. Reliance was placed by the Supreme Court onthe provisions of Section 3 of the. Indian Police Act. whichread as follows :- "3. Superintendence in the State Government.- -Thesuperintendence of the police throughout a generalpolice-district shall vest in and shall be exercisedby the State Government to which such district issubordinate; and except as authorized under theprovision" of this Act, no person, officer, or Courtshall be empowered by the State Government tosupersede, or control any police functionary. it was observed by the Supreme Court that the word "superintendence" in Section 3 Would imply administrative control implying the authority enjoying such power to give directions tothe subordinate to discharge its. administrative duties and functions in the manner indicated in the order. The power of superintendence would comprehend the authority to give. directionsto perform the duty in a certain manner, to refrain from per-forming one or the other duty, to direct someone else to perform the duty and no inhibition or limitation can be read inthis power unless the section conferring such power prescribesone. While exercising such power under Section 3, which enabled the State Government to direct further investigation intothe case, it was oberved by the Supreme Court as follows :- "undoubtedly, such direction; will be given to aperson competent to investigate the offence andas has been pointed out, the police officer in ranksuperior to the police officer in charge of the policestation, to- wit Inspector General, Vigilance, hasbeen directed to carry on further investigation. An officer superior in rank to an officer in charge ofa police station could as wellexercise the power offurther investigation under Section 173 (8) in viewof the provisions embodied in Section 36 of thecode. If that be so, such superior officer could aswell undertake farther investigation on his own andit is immaterial and irrelevant that he does it at theinstance or the direction of the State Government. Such a direction in no way curbs his powers to furtherinvestigate on his own. "the aforesaid observations are important in two respects. firstly. If that be so, such superior officer could aswell undertake farther investigation on his own andit is immaterial and irrelevant that he does it at theinstance or the direction of the State Government. Such a direction in no way curbs his powers to furtherinvestigate on his own. "the aforesaid observations are important in two respects. firstly. it clearly show that the power of superintendence means thatthe authority in which such power is, vested can issue directionsregarding the manner in which investigation is to be carried out,and can also entrust the investigation to another officer. Secondly,and this is important, the person to whom the power to investigate is entrusted has necessarily to be a person who is competentto investigate the offence. In other words. the power of investigation must always be exercised by a police officer. This is precisely what was done in Saldanna s case (supra) The stategovernment, in exercise of its power of superintendence, directed another police officer to investigate into the offence. _powerwas not given by the State Government to a stranger to investigate. Power was given to superrior officer to investigate and thesupreme Court clarified that the superior officer had the powerto investigate by virtue of Section 36 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 32 ) APPLYING the analogy of Saldanna s case it is clear thatthe Lt. Governor has the power of superintendence under Sec-tion 4 of the Delhi Police Act, but he can only ask anotherpolice officer to discharge the duties as an investigator, if he isotherwise competent to investigate. Under Section 64 of the Delhipolice Act any officer superior in rank can discharge the functions of a junior officer. The decision whether to register an FIR,how to proceed with the investigation, are different steps in thecourse of investigation. The power of monitoring which has beenconferred on the Committee by the impugned notification is, infact, a power of investigating and this power cannot be vestedanyone who is not otherwise, in law, entitled to investigate. The Lt. Governor, therefore, could have conferred the powercontained in the notification on any superior police officer, butthis power could not be conferred "on an authority or a body,which is otherwise not entitled either under the Criminal Procedure Code. or underthe Delhi Police Act to carry out investigation. Savanna s case,-which was followed, with approval in State of West Bengal vs. Sampat Lal ( AIR 1985 SC 195 ) (8 ). or underthe Delhi Police Act to carry out investigation. Savanna s case,-which was followed, with approval in State of West Bengal vs. Sampat Lal ( AIR 1985 SC 195 ) (8 ). does not envisage the delegation by the State Government of the power of superintendenceon someone else. The power of superintendence under the Indialpolice Act was exercisable by the State Government itself. Itwas in the exercise of that power that investigation was entrused to a particular police officer. ( 33 ) THE power to investigate under the Code is with thepolice. Any power exercisable by a police officer is subject tothe superintendence of the Administrator, by virtue of theprovisions of Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act. Can theadministrator delegate his power of superintendence to someone else ? In our opinion, the answer to this query must bein the negative. The power which is contained in Section 4 isa tatutory power. The statute has conterrred the power on adesignated person, namely, the Administrator, this has beenadvisedly done because the Administrator is the senior-most inthe heirarchy of all the officers in the Union Territory of Delhiwhereas under the Indian Police Act the power of superintendence is conferred on the State Government, under the Delhipolice Act this power is conferred on the Administrator. Theadministrator is a person designate and unless he is specificallyauthorised by the Act he cannot delegate his powers on anyoneelse. It win be useful, in this context, to refer to the decisionof the Supreme Court in the case of Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan (1989 3scc 132) (9 ). In thatcase the power to appoint officers was, conferred on the Executive Council of the University and a question arose whether thevice Chancellor could take disciplinary action. In this regardthe Supreme Court observed at page 140 as follows :__ "20. Counsel for the appellant argued that the expresispower of the Vice-chancellor" to regulate the workand conduct of officers of the University implies a. swell, the power to take disciplinary action againstofficers. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the work andconduct of officers cannot include the power totake disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly. the Act confers power to appoint officers on theexecutive Council and it generally includes thepower to remove. The power is located undersection 24 (l) (xxix) of the Act. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the power to regulate the work andconduct of officers cannot include the power totake disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly. the Act confers power to appoint officers on theexecutive Council and it generally includes thepower to remove. The power is located undersection 24 (l) (xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore,futile to contend that the Vice Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the. Act prescribes a particular body to exercise apower, it must be exercised only by that body. Itcannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated. The law must also provide for such delegationhalsbury s Laws of England (Vol. 1. 4th odn. ,para 32) summarises these principles as follows : 32. Sub-delegation of powers.-In accordancewith the maxim delegatus non potest delegate, astatutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom It. it has been confidedunless sub-delegation of the power is authorised byexpress words or necessary implication. There isa strong presumption against construing a grantof legislative, judical or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation. and the-samemay be said of any power to the exercise of whichthe designated body should address its own mind. ( 34 ) THE aforesaid quotation by the Supreme Court fromhalsbury s Laws of England also finds support from Prof. H. W. R. Wade. who in his "administrative law" (fifth Edltion. pape 319) ha" observed as follows-- "an element which is essential to the lawful. exercise oi power. is that it should be exercreid by the authority upon whom it is conferred, and by no one elsethe principle is strictly applied, even where rtcauses administrative inconvenience except incases where it may reasonably be inferred that thepower was intended to be delegable. Normally thecourts are rigorous in requiring the power to beexercised by the precise person" or body stated Inthe statute, and in condemning as ultra viresaction taken by agents, sub-comnittees or delegates,however expressly authorised by the authority endowed with the power. " ( 35 ) THE decision in M. G. Mohammad Kunhi s case alsodoes not assist Mr. Malik. In that case the question arosewhether, in exercise of its appellate power?, the Income Taxtribunal had inherent right to grant stay of realisation of tax. In the present case the Lt. Governor is not exercising any appellate powers. " ( 35 ) THE decision in M. G. Mohammad Kunhi s case alsodoes not assist Mr. Malik. In that case the question arosewhether, in exercise of its appellate power?, the Income Taxtribunal had inherent right to grant stay of realisation of tax. In the present case the Lt. Governor is not exercising any appellate powers. In any case, the Lt. Governor can effestivelyexercise his statutory powers. under Section 4 of the Police Act,cither himself or through another police officer, but no one else. ( 36 ) IT was also submitted by Shri Malik that the effect ofissuing the impugned notification was that respondents No. 4and 5 became the officers of the Delhi Administration to whompower had been delegated by the Lt. Governor. It was contended that once the Committee members become subordinate officers of the Lt. Governor and they function under the control of the Lt. Governor, then the power which in vested inthe Committee is in fact exercised as if it is the power of thelt. Governor, and vesting of such power does not amount toabdication of the power by the Lt. Governor. ( 37 ) L ( is no doubt tn. ]c the Lt. Governor is the excaitivehead of the Delhi Administration. He is the Chief Administratorof Delhi. By virtue of Article 2?9 of the Constitution he hasexecutive powers. In order to enable him to exercise executivpowers, he can act assistance of officers subordinate to him. Subject to provisions of any law. he can also delegate his executive powers. In the present case, however, the powers ofsuperintendence are vested in the Administrator under Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act and they are not executivepowers. The powers under Section 4. are statutory and are tobe exercised by him in accordance with law. Under Section 4 of the Delhi police Act it is the Administrator who har the power of superintendence and no one else. It may be that. as theexecutive head. the Administrator is to see to the law and orderin Delhi said it is also true that in order to maintain law andorder in Delhi, the Lt. Governor may be able to delegate hispowers, but it is only the executive powers which can be delegated. Statutory powers can only be exercised by the personauthorised to exercise them by the statute. Statutory powerscan be delegated only if the statute permits such delegation. Governor may be able to delegate hispowers, but it is only the executive powers which can be delegated. Statutory powers can only be exercised by the personauthorised to exercise them by the statute. Statutory powerscan be delegated only if the statute permits such delegation. The statutory authority cannot abdicate its functions or "authority in favour of anyone else unless, it is authorised to do so. In the present case the Delhi Police Act, which confers powersof superintendence on the Lt. Governor, does not authorise orenable him to delegate his powers of superintendence in favourof any one else. General powers of delegation have not beenconferred on the Lt. Governor by the said Act. ( 38 ) TO put it differently, the Lt. Governor cannot exercisehis powers under Article 239 of the Constitution in a mannerwhich may be in conflict with any statutory provision. Thedelhi Police Act being a complete code by itself, the Lt. Governor cannot exercise his executive powers in such a wayo asto violate the provisions of any law. When the Delhi Police Actenables only the Police officers to investigate. subject to theunerintendence of the Lt. Governor, then no executive orderor notification can be issued which would have the effect ofconferring powers of investigation on a non notice officer. Executive powers under Article 239 cannot be exercised in a. wav so as to circumvent the provisions of the Delhi Police Act. ( 39 ) OUR attention was drawn to the provisions of Avocation of Business Rules framed by the President of India withregard to allocation of business in Delhi. The schedule to diesaid rules indicated the different departments. particulary thehome Department, which dealt with law and order and police. It was sought to be contended that in vcw of the aforesaid provisions, the Home Secretary or any other officer of the Homedepartment could issue direction- to ths Police. We are unableto agree with this. As held by the Supreme Court in the. discof State of Uttar Pradesh and Others vs. Babu Ram Upadhyay 1961 (2) SCR 679 . "the Police Act and the Rules madethereunder constitute a self-contained code providing for theappointment of the Police Officers and prescribing the procedure for their removal". The Delhi Police Act is, (similarly,) a complete code by itselfwhich also deals with the powers which are to be exercised bythe police officers. These powers cana. ot be exercised by themembers of the Home Department. The Delhi Police Act is, (similarly,) a complete code by itselfwhich also deals with the powers which are to be exercised bythe police officers. These powers cana. ot be exercised by themembers of the Home Department. The Allocation of Businessrules do not and cannot confer any such power on the Homesecretary or other officers of the Home Department. By allocating law and order or police to the Home Department underthe provisions of the Allocation to Business Rules no statutorypower is conferred on them. All that it means is that if anyquestion arose before the administration pertaining to the Policedepartment, then it is the Home Department which will dealwith it. For example, if the administration is to consider as lowhether the police force should be increased or not, then inorder to enable the Lt. Governor to take a decision in this regard, it will be the Home Department which will deal with thematter and advise the Administrator. The Allocation of Business Rules cannot and do not override or be in conflict with. the provisions of the Delhi Police Act or the Code of Criminalprocedure. ( 40 ) WE are also unable to agree with the contention of Shrimalik that respondents No. 4 and 5 were appointed as officersof the Home Department subordinate to the Lt. governor. Inorder that a person is appointed as an officer, there must be apost which exists to which an appointment can be made. Theimpugned notification purported to set up an independent Committee to whom certain powers had been entrusted. The notification docs not show that the said Committee was required towork under the control or superintendence of the Administrator. Furthermore we have already held that the Lt. Governor couldnot have delegated his powers on officers of the Home Department. ( 41 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion the conclusion which follows is that the Lt. Governor has power of superintendence overthe police by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act, thepower of Lt. Furthermore we have already held that the Lt. Governor couldnot have delegated his powers on officers of the Home Department. ( 41 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion the conclusion which follows is that the Lt. Governor has power of superintendence overthe police by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act, thepower of Lt. Governor under Section 4 could not band delegatedto any one but in exercise of the power he could have appointed another Police Officer or a team of Police Officers who wouldotherwise, by virtue of Section 64 of the Delhi Police Act, havethe power to investigate a case or to monitor or supervise theinvestigation of a cast; under the Code of Criminal Procedureit is only the Police officers who have the power to investigatea case, the Lt. Governor could not have appointed a Committee, like the present, to whom powers of investigation or directcontrol over investigation and registration of cases have beenconferred; by the impugned notification the Committee has beenvested with powers of investigation and of superintendence overthe police and the prosecuting agency and the vesting of suchpowers by the notification on non-police officers, namely, thecommittee is contrary to the provisions of the Delhi Police Actas well as the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 42 ) IN this connection it was lastly contended by Shri Malikthat Section 29 (2) of the Delhi Administration Act contains thepower of delegation by the Administrator. Section 29 (2) read?s. s follows :- " (2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, all executiveaction of the Administrator, whether taken in hisdiscretion or otherwise, shall be expressed to betaken in the name of the Administrator. " WE are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Malikthat Section 29 (2) contains any power of delegation. All thatthe said provision provides is that executive action of the Administrator shall be expressed to be taken in his name. Evenit be assumed that Section 29 (2) does envisage the delegationof power by the Administrator, it is clear that the said provision. relates only to "executive action of the Administrator", In thepresent case the Code of Criminal Procedure does not envisageany interference or action being taken by any authority not expressly provided for in the said Code. The power of investigation vests only with the Police officers. This is a statutory dutywhich is cast on them by the statute. relates only to "executive action of the Administrator", In thepresent case the Code of Criminal Procedure does not envisageany interference or action being taken by any authority not expressly provided for in the said Code. The power of investigation vests only with the Police officers. This is a statutory dutywhich is cast on them by the statute. It is only by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act that the power of superintendencehas been given to the Administrator. This power is statutoryand not executive. Whereas Section 29 (2) refers to executiveaction taken by the Administrator, the power which is excrciseableunder Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act is; not executivepower, but it is statutory power. As such, the question of Section 29 (2) applying to the case of exercise of statutory powerby the Lt. Governor cannot arise. ( 43 ) IT was also contended by Shri Gupta that by appointing acommittee without giving it powers under. he Commissions ofinquiry Act the provisions of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution have been violated. The submission is that what has,been referred to the Committee are definite matters of publicimportance and in respect thereof, a Commission of Inquirycould have been appointed. It is further submittedthat if a Commission had been appointed under the Commissioner of Inquiry Act, the petitioner s rights could have beensafeguarded because nothing adverse to the petitioner could havebeen held by the Commission without giving the petitioner anopportunity of being heard, because the Commission would havebeen obliged to issue notice under Section 8-B of the said Act. It is further contended that in an ordinary case it is the policewhich is required to monitor the progress of investigation, but inthe present case it is the Committee to which this power hadbeen granted. There is no reasonable basis for carving out casespertaining to riots and giving the power of monitoring the sameto the Committee. ( 44 ) IN our opinion there is no merit in this contention. It iswell settled that a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act can only make recommendations to thegovernment. The findings or recommendations of the Commission cannot be enforced. In the present case, what the Administrator lias sought to do is not to give recommendatory powersto the Committee. The Committee has been empowered to gavedirections to the police and to the prosecuting agency. The findings or recommendations of the Commission cannot be enforced. In the present case, what the Administrator lias sought to do is not to give recommendatory powersto the Committee. The Committee has been empowered to gavedirections to the police and to the prosecuting agency. Suchpowers could not have been conferred on the Committee if ithad been constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act. ( 45 ) IT has been further contended by Shri Gupta that thecommittee was not empowered to receive any affidavits. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the correct interpretation of the impugned notification the Committee wassupposed to apply its mind only on the basis of the documentswhich were already on record. The Committee it was contended, was not a Court and as statement of persons, whether recorded orally or in the form of affidavits, is evidence, the Committee, therefore, did not have any Jurisdiction to receive the saidform of evidence. Prima facie, we find it difficult to. accept thecontention of Shri Gupta. It is true that the Committee was nota Court and it is also correct that evidence is presented beforea Coart, "we, however, are unable to subscribe to the viewthat recording statement or taking an affidavit amounts to recording of evidence, which the Committee was prohibited to do. The Committee was seeking information with regard to thevarious incidents which had taken place during the riots. Apublic notice has been issued asking for the information to besupplied, inter alia by affidavits. The statement was sought inthe form of an affidavit so that the deponent was made awareof the seriousness of the situation and it was expected that aperson will not state falsehood when he swears an affidavit onoath. We 5nd no provision of law which, in any way, prohibitsa Committee or any other person requiring information to begiven by way of an affidavit. ( 46 ) THE impugned notification does not expressly give thepower to the Cominittee to receive any fresh or information or allegations with regard to the incidents of rioting. The Committee was. nevertheless, required to examine whetherthere were cases of omission to register or properly investigateoffences. We fail to understand as to how the Committee couldhave been made awars of cases where there were such omissions or improper investigation without some one informing thecommittee in respect thereto. The Committee was. nevertheless, required to examine whetherthere were cases of omission to register or properly investigateoffences. We fail to understand as to how the Committee couldhave been made awars of cases where there were such omissions or improper investigation without some one informing thecommittee in respect thereto. Clause 3 (d) expressly enables thecommittee to perform any other function in addition to whathas been enumerated in Clause 3 (a) to (c ). It was necessary inorder to perform functions enumerated in Clause 3, for the Committee to seek information as to whether there have been instances of omission to register cases or instances of improperinvestigation. This information could be supplied either by thepersons who had sought to register the cases or by some oneelse who knew about such instances. To restrict the Committeeto the documents which already existed would have hamperedthe Committee in carrying out it duties. We are, however, inagreement with Mr. Gupta that the Committee was not authorised to accept or act on any fresh allegations against individualspertaining to the said incidents of rioting. In other words, whereas it was open to the Committee to get information where therehas been omission to register or properly investigate offences,the Committee had no jurisdiction to accept any affidavits inwhich fresh allegations were levelled for the first time, whichallegations were not sought to be levelled at the time of or soonafter the riots had taken place. ( 47 ) IT was contended by Shri Malik that the petitioner isguilty of suppressing material facts and, in any case his conductis such that no relief could be granted to him. The submissionof Shri Malik was that the petitioner has not disclosed in thewrit petition that he was already being tr ed in two other murder cases. It was also contended that in Misra Commission Report there is reference to the allegation that the petitioner wasresponsible for an abduction. In the written arguments whichwere filed before the Misra Commission names were indicatedof those persons who had been identified in taking part in thecarnage and the petitioner s name was off of them. Lastly, itwas submitted that if these facts had been narrated, then underno circumstances any interim relief could have been grantedin this petition. ( 48 ) IT is submitted by Shri L. S. Gupta that it is not opento Shri Malik to raise the contention that the petitioner is guiltyof suppression of material facts. Lastly, itwas submitted that if these facts had been narrated, then underno circumstances any interim relief could have been grantedin this petition. ( 48 ) IT is submitted by Shri L. S. Gupta that it is not opento Shri Malik to raise the contention that the petitioner is guiltyof suppression of material facts. According to Shri Gupta theclients of Shri Malik have not been impleaded as parties to thewrit petition and they have only been permitted to address arguments. The submission is that it is only a party in a writ petition who could raise the contention like what is sought to beraised by Shri Malik and a mere intervenor cannot be permitted to raise such a contention. . On merits Shri Gupta submittedthat the petitioner has not been guilty of suppression of anymaterial. ( 49 ) IN our opinion, it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether such a contention can be urged by Shrimalik. It is no doubt true that Shri Malik s cients are not parties to the writ petition, but as this contention has been raisedwe propose to deal with it. It is true that, as is evident fromjustice Misra Commission. Report, the petitioner is involved intwo other murder cases and allegations of the type mentinedabove have been noticed in the said report against the petitioner. That, in our opinion is not sufficient to desentitle thepetitioner to approach the Court for redress. The petitioner hasreferred to the report of Misra Commission in his writ petition. It is in the report that reference is made to inc petitioner beinginvolved in two other murder cases, and also with regard to thecharge of abduction against him. It was not necessary, for thepurpose of this writ petition, for the petitioner to have highlighted or to have specifically mentioned other cases in whichhe was involved. The petitioner was specifically concerned withthe powers which had been conferred on the Committeein exercise of which powers the committee had directed the policeto register a case against him. If such a casehad been registered, that would have been a third murder caseagainst the petitioner. This was an independent grievance whichthe petitioner had and merely because he was involved in othercases can be no ground for refusing to grant relief to the petitioner. if he is otherwise entitled to it. If such a casehad been registered, that would have been a third murder caseagainst the petitioner. This was an independent grievance whichthe petitioner had and merely because he was involved in othercases can be no ground for refusing to grant relief to the petitioner. if he is otherwise entitled to it. The non mentioning ofthe aforesaid allegations is not fatal to the present writ petition,. It is also difficult to accept that if these allegations had beenspecifically mentioned then the interim orders would not havebeen passed. ( 50 ) BEFORE concluding we may observe that the report submitted by Ranganath Misra Commission was tailed on the floorof the House in Jannuary, 1987 and the recommendation on of thecommission for appointment of a Committee was accepted bythe Government, The Government acted promptly and constituted a Committee by virtue of the impugned notification dated23-2-1987, as suggested by the Commission, in order to takesteps for punishing the wrong doers. The purpose for which thecommittee Was constituted is commendable and laudable andwe do appreciate the prompt action taken by the Government inthis regard, but we are constrained to observe that howsoevercommendable and laudable the purpose may be, it has to beimplemented by the methods circumscribed by the laws. In otherwords, the methods sought to be employed for implementationshould conform to the laws. Under our Constitution, the ruleof law lias been made our way of life. The impugned notificationcould not withstand the rigour of the laws on the subject. Wedo hope that in order to redress the grievances of the victimsand to remedy the social injustices, the Government shall takenecessary steps, premissible under the law. for bringing the guiltyand wrongdcers to book. We do feel that such steps would betaken expeditiously and without any delay. Otherwise, it willamount to negation of rule of law. As observed by the Supremecourt in Mahendra Singh vs. State of West Bengal (AIR 1973sc 2288), (11) Undue delay in the final disposal of criminalcases tends, to some extent, to defeat the very purpose of criminal justice. Speedy disposal of criminal cases for commission ofoffences promote confidence of the society in the administrationof criminal justice which is essential for sustaining the faith ofthe law abiding members of the society in the effectiveness ofthe rule of law . ( 51 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowedand the impugned notification dated 23/02/1987 isquashed. Speedy disposal of criminal cases for commission ofoffences promote confidence of the society in the administrationof criminal justice which is essential for sustaining the faith ofthe law abiding members of the society in the effectiveness ofthe rule of law . ( 51 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowedand the impugned notification dated 23/02/1987 isquashed. There will be no orders as to costs.