JUDGMENT S.N. Sahay, J. - This writ petition arises out of order dated July 16, 1979, passed by the U.P. Public Service Tribunal No. 3, Lucknow dismissing the claim petition of Mewa Ram Kanaujiya, petitioner. 2. It appears that the petitioner was appointed as an Assistant in the pay scale of Rs. 60/ to Rs. 100/ by order of Provincial Textile Controller, Kanpur dated December 31,1962. The appointment was made on temporary basis and was to take effect from December 3, 1962. The organisation of the Provincial Textile Controller was subsequently merged in the Directorate of Industries. An order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was passed on August 31, 1977 by the Joint Director of Industries Handlooms, Kanpur. The Petitioner filed a Claim Petition before the Public Services Tribunal and challenged the order of compulsory retirement on a number of grounds. However, the contentions of the petitioner were repelled and the claim petition was dismissed by the Tribunal. The Petitioner filed a review application also, but the review application met the same fate and was rejected by the Tribunal by order dated January 30. 1980. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that on the date on which the order of compulsory retirement was passed against the petitioner, the appointing authority of the petitioner was the Assistant Director of Industries and, therefore, the said order having been passed by the Joint Director, Industries, is without jurisdiction. In this connection, he has referred to a G. O. dated March 5, 1974 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition), whereby it was declared that the Assistant Director Handlooms, who was looking after the work of establishment at the Head Quarters would be the appointing authority in respect of the Ministerial and class IV staff of the Handlooms and Textiles Directorate, the maximum of whose pay scale did not exced Rs. 320/. This G. O. was amended by a subsequent Government Order dated September 5, 1974 (Annexure 3) and in respect of the abovementioned categories of employees, Assistant Director of Industries (Marketing) lookingafter the work of establishment at the Head Quarters was constituted to be the appointing authority. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was working in the pay scale of Rs. 200/ to Rs. 320/. This fact is admitted in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was working in the pay scale of Rs. 200/ to Rs. 320/. This fact is admitted in paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit. Thus according to the admitted position the Assistant Director (Marketing) referred to above, was the appointing authority in respect of the post held by the petitioner on the date of the order of compulsory retirement. 4. Under Clause (c) of Rule 56 of Fundamental Rules, Volume II, Part IIIV, as amended from time to time, the appointing authority is empowered to retire a Government Servant (whether permanent or temporary) without assigning any reason, after he has attained the age of 50 years. The expression appointing authority is defined in clause (3) of Rule 56, which reads as under: The expression 'appointing authority' means the authority which for the time being has power to make substantive appointment to the posts or service from which the Government Servant is required or wants to retire...... Therefore, according to Rule 56 (3) it was Assistant Director of Industries (Marketing), who alone had the jurisdiction to pass the order of compulsory retirement against the petitioner. This power could not be exercised by the Joint Director of Industries eventhough he might be a superior officer and the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution were inapplicable. The impugned order of compulsory retirement is therefore, without jurisdiction and could not be sustained. 5. The Tribunal did not record any specific finding as to who was the appointing authority of the petitioner and who was competent to pass the impugned order. In this connection the observations made by the Tribunal in the impugned order dated July 16, 1979, may be extracted below: 9. First we will take up the point of appointing authority raised by the claimant. Annexure1, is the order dated 31st December, 1962 appointing the claimant. It was signed by the Assistant Director on behalf of the Provincial Textile Controller U.P. The O. P. has relied upon a letter No. 291/XVIIIDI1337/59, dated 16.462 sent to the Director of Industries, U.P., Kanpur by the Government conveying a decision that the organisation of Provincial Textile Controller was merged with the establishment of Director of Industries. The marger appears to have been completed in accordance with the order contained in Endorsement No. 986/PTCKanpur dated 22.6.1972 signed by the CommissionerDirector of Industries. The marger appears to have been completed in accordance with the order contained in Endorsement No. 986/PTCKanpur dated 22.6.1972 signed by the CommissionerDirector of Industries. Subsequently, Governor issued a Notification No. 4653/R/181/15 1R/73, dated 531974 declaring the appointing authorities of diffrent employees of the newly constituted Directorate. According to the said Notification the Joint/Deputy Director of Industries, who were looking after Handloom Section were declared the appointing authority of Clerk whose maximum in the grade did not exceed Rs. 450/ . The contention of the opposite parties is that no post of Provincial Textile Controller was in existence at the time when impugned order was passed and the department has been merged with the Organisation of the Director of Industries. The allegations contained in the CA/WS were not specifically replied in the rejoinder affidavit to. Provision of Article 311 is not applicable to cases of compulsory retirement. 10. Besides this in the amended Rule 56 (c), it has been provided that an order under that provision could be passed by any authority authorised to make substantive appointment on the post held by the concerned employee. This amendment was effected by Act 24 of 1975. 6. It appears that the Tribunal took the view that as the order of compulsory retirement was not passed by way of punishment the provisions of Article 311 of Constitution were not attracted and it was immaterial whether the said order was passed by the appointing authority or by a superior authority. This view seems to be erroneous. As observed earlier, even if the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution do not apply, the order of compulsory retirement has to be passed by the Statutory authority mentioned in Fundamental Rule 56 and no other authority, whether he is superior or not, is competent to exercise the power which has been conferred by that Rule on the appointing authority. In view of this conclusion it will appear that the impugned order of compulsory retirement is illegal and the orders of the Public Services Tribunal are vitiated by a manifest error of law and they cannot be sustained. The result of this finding would be that both these orders will have to be quashed. The petitioner informed during the course of arguments that he attained the normal age of superannuation of 58 years in September, 1980 and there is no question of his reinstatement in service. The result of this finding would be that both these orders will have to be quashed. The petitioner informed during the course of arguments that he attained the normal age of superannuation of 58 years in September, 1980 and there is no question of his reinstatement in service. In case the said orders are quashed, the petitioner will only be entitled to consequential benefits arising therefrom. 7. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of compulsory retirement dated August 31, 1977 and the impugned orders of the Tribunal dated July 16, 1979 and January 30, 1980, are hereby quashed. As the petitioner has attained the normal age of superannuation of 58 years in September, 1980 there shall be no question of his reinstatement in service but he shall be entitled to such consequential benefits as he may be entitled to as a result of quashing of the said orders.