B. L. YADAV, J. ( 1 ) THIS is the second application for bail. The first application for bail on behalf of Bissu, the appellant was rejected by Honble P. N. Bakshi, J. (as he then was), by order dated 23. 4. 82. The judgment in the Sessions Trial was delivered on 4. 8. 81 and the appellant was convicted under sections 302{ 148, I. P. C. and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The appellant was already in jail since 1979, prior to the date of conclusion of the trial. He was not granted bail during the pendency of this appeal in this Court for the last about nine years. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the applicant urged that as for the last about 11 years the applicant is in jail, his application was rejected even after the conclusion of trial when the appeal was filed in this Court. Hence on account of delay in disposal of appeal the applicant may be granted bail. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the State, on the other hand, urged that the deley in disposal of appeal in this Court is no ground for grant of bail, particularly when earlier application for bail has been rejected. ( 4 ) HAVING heard the- learned counsel for the parties, the point for determination is as to whether a case for bail has been made out for the applicant, keeping in view his detention in jail for the last about ten years and his appeal being pending for disposal in this Court for the last about eight years. The law pertaining to life and liberty is contained under Article 21 of the Constitution which runs as under: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. What has been provided as a fundamental right is not the early disposal of criminal cases or the Sessions trial or the criminal appeals, but only that nobody shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. There is a noticeable distinction between the relevant provisions of our Constitution and the corresponding provisions under the American Constitution. In the United States, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. There is a noticeable distinction between the relevant provisions of our Constitution and the corresponding provisions under the American Constitution. In the United States, speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The VIth amendment of the American Constitution provides as follows: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy a right to speedy and public trial. ( 5 ) SIMILARLY Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: Everyone arrested or detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. ( 6 ) IN Husain Ara Khatoon v. The Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows: We think that under our Constitution, though speedy trial has not specifically been enumerated as a fundamental right it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that procedure should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable, fair or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to ,enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. ( 7 ) IT is to be noticed that the framers of the Constitution appear to be conscious while enacting Article 21, which has been couched in a language with a broad sweep. The fundamental right of liberty contained in Article 21 cannot be enforced or complied with unless it is done in the same way as required by the legislature. There is a Latin maxim Actus Legitimi Non Recipient Modum which connotes that when doing of anything in a particular manner is sanctioned by law, then that cannot be done in a different way. There is a Latin maxim Actus Legitimi Non Recipient Modum which connotes that when doing of anything in a particular manner is sanctioned by law, then that cannot be done in a different way. In Taylor v. Taylor, Jessil, J. observed at page 431 as follows: When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a Court, and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, it means that no other mode is to be adopted. ( 8 ) IN Nazeer Ahmad v. King Emperor, it was held at pages 381 382 as follows: The rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way, to the exclusion of all other methods of performance, or not at all. ( 9 ) THE liberties embodied under Article 19 may be called civil liberties proper, whereas liberties guaranteed under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution are personal liberties. There is nothing more sacred than the life and personal liberties protected by Article 21 which is, in fact, a real charter of un-enumerated and newly discovered liberties of the person. These personal liberties have to be enforced and protected in the way they are required by the Parliament. ( 10 ) THE framers of the Constitution were conscious to enact Article 21 with a broad sweep. That procedure established by law to deprive a person of his life and liberty has to be commensurate with the constitutional mandate under Article 21. In other words, the procedure established by law and procedure for trial must be fair, just, reasonable and speedy. In Moti Ram v. State of M. P. , their Lordships of the Supreme Court emphasised the need of a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Code dealing with the bail matters, so that social justice and individual freedom and personal liberties are protected. Particular attention may be paid to the cases of poor persons. No hard and fast rule can ever be laid down as to what period can be said to be the period of inordinate delay in the disposal of trial or criminal appeal pending in this court. But considering that social, economical and political justice has been assured under the Preamble of the Constitution. No hard and fast rule can ever be laid down as to what period can be said to be the period of inordinate delay in the disposal of trial or criminal appeal pending in this court. But considering that social, economical and political justice has been assured under the Preamble of the Constitution. That solemn and sacred promise, could not be given effect to, in case a person is detained in jail for a number of years before the trial comes to an end or before the appeal could finally be disposed of. ( 11 ) THE matter can be viewed from another angle as to how the legislature wants these provisions to be interpreted or these problems to be solved. In our Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short the Code), under section 428, the principles of set off, well known in, civil law, have been incorporated and made applicable to criminal trial and also appeal which is continuation of the trial. ( 12 ) EX abundanti cautela, section 428 of the Code is set out below: p428 Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment. Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of, such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him, on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him. The object for the enactment of the aforesaid provision appears to be to provide set off of the preconviction, detention against the term of imprisonment imposed on the accused, and whatever be the factor taken into account by the Court while imposing the term of imprisonment. In case the sentence imposed upon the appellant is confirmed in appeal by this Court, no doubt his preconviction and detention can be covered, counted and set off or adjusted towards the period of sentence finally imposed. In case the sentence imposed upon the appellant is confirmed in appeal by this Court, no doubt his preconviction and detention can be covered, counted and set off or adjusted towards the period of sentence finally imposed. But assuming that there may be a fair chance of that the aforesaid appeal of the appellant is allowed and he is acquitted, but by the time his appeal has been finally disposed of, he has already served out the sentence, which could imposed upon him in appeal. What would be the practical use of the appeal being allowed in case the appellant has already served the sentence and he would be deprived of his life and liberty? In this view of the matter the problem is not very simple. In such matters while granting or refusing bail the Court has to keep in mind the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution and section 428 of the Code and both have to be harmoniously interpreted along with the provisions of sections 437, 439, and 389 for granting bail. ( 13 ) THE Court, while granting or refusing bail, has to keep in mind the provisions of section 428 which highlights wide powers to grant bail. It would not be out of place to make a reference to an eminent American Judge i. e. , Justice Holms putting it that in such matters a pragmatic approach has to be made with regard to crying need lam of the considered opinion that new dimensions have now been added and new horizons have been opened for grant of bail by the enactment of section 428 of the Code read with Article 21 of the Constitution. The sections 437, 439 and 389 of the Code pertaining to powers of this Court and the Sessions Court or of the Magistrate for grant of bail have to be considered along with section 428 of the Code and Article 21 of the Constitution. The relevant provisions, particularly section 428 have widened the scope of bail and any circumscribed or restricted interpretation thereof would not only retro gate but also de horse the intention of the legislature. In such matters I am of the view, old principles of interpretation of pemil statutes have to be kept in mind that the statute prescribing punishment must be strictly construed in favour of the accused or convicted person. In such matters I am of the view, old principles of interpretation of pemil statutes have to be kept in mind that the statute prescribing punishment must be strictly construed in favour of the accused or convicted person. In other words, the provisions of such statutes are never construed against the accused or convicted person beyond their literal and obvious meaning. The Courts will not attribute to the legislature to punish more severely then the language of the statute clearly imports. Similarly, there are other principles or interpretation that in case a statute is capable of two constructions, it has to be construed so as to operate in favour of the life and liberty of the accused. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what period can be said to be a period which could be said to be sufficient for the delay in trial and disposal of the appeal. That depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case and principle cannot be laid down in a straight-jacket formula. ( 14 ) WHAT I want to emphasise, with all humility at my command, that Fundamental Right under Article 12 of the Constitution has to be interpreted not like a dry mathematical formula, having its essence in the form, but as a organic living instance. Its significance is vital not formal. These constitutional provisions are sui genais, and deal with situations of immense significance dealing with life and liberty of simple, innocent, illiterate or in some cases great and noble citizens of this country. These constitutional fundamentals are not to be reduced to paper hopes, and peoples dupes. ( 15 ) SECTION 428 of the Code has got a positive and negative side of interpretation, even though the Parliament has not said so in so many words. But the negative side is implicit in it. The cardinal rule of interpretation of statutes is that it is to be interpreted according to its object and intent and not just according to its literal meaning. The statutes operate not for only a limited time but it operates in a time-continuum and are generally of indefinite duration. Interpretation and consideration of those necessarily imports their function and functioning. Original, as well as changing policies, keeping in view the social justice ensured by the Preamble of the Constitution have to be kept in mind. The statutes operate not for only a limited time but it operates in a time-continuum and are generally of indefinite duration. Interpretation and consideration of those necessarily imports their function and functioning. Original, as well as changing policies, keeping in view the social justice ensured by the Preamble of the Constitution have to be kept in mind. The mischief rule as propounded by Hydens case (3 Co. Rep 7a at p. 7b) is to be applied. What is object and purpose which Parliament wanted to attain and accomplish by ringing section 428 of the Code on the Statute book has to be over emphasised. These days the statutes put into effect the concept of social justice and social experiments and altogether operation a new larger scale. Both sides have to be kept in mind while exercising powers under sections 389, 437 and 439 of the Code. ( 16 ) I am therefore, of the considered opinion that as the appeal could not be disposed of even after eight years and is pending in this Court, the appellant is entitled to be released on bail. The application deserves to be allowed. ( 17 ) ACCORDINGLY, let the appellant Bissu be released on bail on his executing a personal bond and furnishing two heavy sureties to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur.