JUDGMENT - G.H. GUTTAL, J.:---This Criminal Revision application is by the accused in Criminal Case No. 437/P of 1987 pending in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 35th Court, V.T. Bombay. The Assistant Public Prosecutor sought leave to withdraw from the prosecution. The learned Magistrate rejected the application on the ground that the chances of likely failure of the case is not a valid ground for withdrawal of the prosecution. The accused impugn the Order. 2. The applicants on the one hand and the respondent No. 2, the complainant on the other, are neighbours. On a trivial quarrel over drying clothes in the gallery, there was a scuffle between the applicants on the one hand and the members of the family of the respondent No. 2 on the other. Then physical assault followed. A tooth of the applicant No. 2 was disclosed and uprooted. The applicant No. 1 filed the complaint at the Railway police Station at V.T. accusing the Respondent No. 2 of having committed offences punishable under sections 323, 325 r/w section 34 of the I.P.C. The respondent No. 2 filed a complaint seven days later, accusing the applicants of having committed the offences punishable under sections 323, 325 and 326 of the I.P.C. The only fact which distinguishes the two rival cases is that in the case filed by the applicants, the respondent No. 2 and members of her family have been accused of grievous hurt by dislocating a tooth. 3. The question is whether on these facts, the learned Magistrate was right in refusing to grant his consent to the withdrawal from the prosecution of the case No. 437/P of 1987 filed by the Respondent No. 2. 4. The Assistant public Prosecutor, in-charge of the case has, under section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the power to "withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried." But the exercise of this power is qualified by the words "with the consent of the Court". Mr. Neemuchwala urged that the word "consent" used in section 321 of the Code signifies a liberal acquiescence in the proposed withdrawal from the prosecution. He drew a contrast between the word "consent" used in section 321 and the word "permission" used in section 320(2) of the Code. Mr. Neemuchwala urged that the word "consent" used in section 321 of the Code signifies a liberal acquiescence in the proposed withdrawal from the prosecution. He drew a contrast between the word "consent" used in section 321 and the word "permission" used in section 320(2) of the Code. The word "consent" used as a noun means "complicance or approval of what is done or proposed by another" or agreement as to certain action or opinion (Webster's Third New International Dictionary). The word "permission" means the act of permitting or formal consent. But very often the words "consent" and "permission" are used inter-changeably. "Consent" is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side (The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, reprint edition 1987). While "consent" implies some positive action, the word "permission" may in certain contexts suggest passivity. But in essence the word "permission" is used to denote the act signified by the word "allowed" which implies positive decided assent. In whatever sense it is used, the word "permit", generally speaking, conveys the idea of affirmative action. Seen from any angle, the word "permit' means to give leave for an act which without that leave could not be totally done (Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Second Edition 1969, Volume 4) Thus the two words, even in contrast, do not bring out a significant difference so as to imply that "consent" is a passive assent. Both have the element of balancing the consequences of the Act. Although the two words have different shades of meaning, the context in which the word "consent" has been used in section 321, suggests that the consent is in the nature of sanction. The words "with the consent" implies that without such consent, the Public Prosecutor cannot withdraw from the prosecution. The consent of the Court is a necessary prerequisite for withdrawal referred to in section 321 of the Code. The consequences set out in Clauses (a) and (b) of section 321 follow "upon such withdrawal". "Such withdrawal" means the withdrawal from the prosecution which has the consent of the Court. Since the consent of the Court brings into existences the withdrawal from the prosecution resulting in discharge or acquittal of the accused, it follows that the Court has an affirmative duty. 5. The argument of Mr. "Such withdrawal" means the withdrawal from the prosecution which has the consent of the Court. Since the consent of the Court brings into existences the withdrawal from the prosecution resulting in discharge or acquittal of the accused, it follows that the Court has an affirmative duty. 5. The argument of Mr. Neemuchwala that the word 'consent" used in section 321 of the Cri.P.C. and the word "permission' used in section 320 of the Cri.P.C. are used in different senses is not right. The permission referred to in section 320 and the consent required by section 321 have one element in common " both are necessary before the compromise or withdrawal respectively is effectuated. In a sense, the consideration for granting "permission" under section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is less rigorous in practice because the Legislature itself thought it fit to permit compromise. On the other hand, under section 321 of the Code, the Court is given a more affirmative role, unlike section 320, the Legislature has not sanctioned withdrawal of cases generally. The contrast drawn by Mr. Neemuchwala does not support his argument that the Court is expected to be acquiescent in its response to withdrawal from prosecution. 6. No doubt, in granting or withholding the permission to compound an offence, the Court is required to balance the pros and cons. This undoubtedly involves consideration of public interest based on the gravity of the crime, whether the consent of the complainant has been bought by a wealthy accused or other circumstances. In the exercise under section 320 of the Code, the public interest involved in granting the permission needs to be balanced against the public interest involved in refusal to grant the permission. But the Court acting under section 321 of the Code considers withdrawal from the prosecution, which is different from a compromise which is essentially a private agreement. Unlike the compromise requiring permission under section 320(2), the consent required under section 321 of the Code is not in relation to a private compromise by the parties. Public policy and the interest of justice are the dominant factors which enter into the consent under section 321 of the Code. Unlike the compromise requiring permission under section 320(2), the consent required under section 321 of the Code is not in relation to a private compromise by the parties. Public policy and the interest of justice are the dominant factors which enter into the consent under section 321 of the Code. The consent under section 321 of the Code is the result of balancing of variety of considerations such as gravity of the crime, the effect of withdrawal on the public confidence in the system, the objectivity displayed by the prosecuting machinery in making the application and as on. The considerations which arise in private compromises, do not arise in the exercise of the power under section 321 of the Code. 7. Now consider the facts of this case. Both the complainants aggrieved by the crime arising out of the same incident, rightfully expect that the Court will punish the offender. If one set of accused persuades the prosecuting machinery to withdraw the case, the other set of accused who are the complainants will not trust the system which permits the acquittal of their assailants. This is where the element of public interest comes in . In such circumstances, the prospect of acquittal for want of evidence, is not by itself a sound reason for granting consent to the withdrawal. 8. It is said that in the case in which the applicants are the complainants, a tooth has been broken making the offence, a grievous hurt. But the incident was common. In the scuffle which was neither preplanned nor aimed at the tooth, the accused used slightly greater force. In cross cases of this nature, as indeed in all cases, the interest of administration of justice is the paramount consideration. When facing such cases, it is exceedingly difficult for the Magistrate to draw a measured line and determine with mathematical precision where the public interest lies. However, in this case, the continued public confidence in the administration of justice is a valid consideration. To consider that in one case the offence is serious because a tooth was broken, is to a doubt a mechanical, unrealistic approach in the matter of withdrawal from the prosecution. The continued grievance of the respondents that they have been left out to be tried add the likelihood of their mistrust in the impartiality of the administration, are not conducive to the public confidence in the system. The continued grievance of the respondents that they have been left out to be tried add the likelihood of their mistrust in the impartiality of the administration, are not conducive to the public confidence in the system. 9. The learned Magistrate was right in his conclusion that in the circumstances of this case, likely failure of the prosecution case is not a valid reason for granting his consent to the withdrawal. Consent for withdrawal from the prosecution where there is only one complainant and one set of accused and consent in a case where there are cross cases involving two complainants stand on different footings. If the accused in one case succeeds in persuading the prosecution to withdraw from the prosecution, the effect of such a decision on the minds of the accused in the cross cases cannot be ignored. Public, interest demands that the accused has confidence in the judicial system. If the case against one set of a accused is withdrawn, the question will be why is it not withdrawn against the other set of accused. The legal difference between simple hurt and grievous hurt may be examined by the courts. But the lay citizens who are drawn into a scuffle do not measure the force use. Both the sets of the accused always look at the scuffle as the common incident. Both are aggrieved and expect that the offender will be tried and convicted. 10. The Criminal Revision Application is rejected. Rule discharged. Rule discharged. -----