JUDGMENT Ram Pal Singh, J. -- 1. This judgment shall also govern the disposal of Cr.A. No. 688 of 1987 (State of M.P. v. Kanchhedi and other). 2. This appeal has been filed by six appellants/accused Kanchhedi, Makhan, Govindi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya as they were aggrieved by their conviction in Sessions Trial No. 254 of 1979 in the Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar. These six appellants have been convicted under section 304-I and section 148 and 149 IPC and sentenced to 10 years' R.I. each and. one year's R.I. on two counts each respectively. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. Criminal Appeal No. 688 of 1987 has been filed by the State, against 12 accused persons in S.T. No. 254/79, after obtaining requisite leave (six convicted appellants in Cr.A. No. 647/84 and other six acquitted accused in that Sessions Trial). Those six acquitted were also charged for other allied offences under sections 325, 323 and 324 of the IPC. 3. On 10.7.1979 at about 6 p.m. in village Madanpura of P.S. Rehli in District Sagar, there was one Awasthy who was the owner of an agricultural piece of land known as Parasharwala field. The said Awasthy had given this agricultural land to deceased Laxman, Leela and other members of the complainant party on sikmi. The deceased party wanted to purchase this piece of land for a consideration of Rs.5,000/-, but the appellants accused offered Rs.8,000/- as the price for the said land and Awasthy sold that Parasharwala field to the appellants and also handed over them the possession thereof. After taking possession over that field, according to the prosecution, the appellants cultivated that land and at the time of incident crop was standing. On 10.7.1979 in the noon, P.W.2 Narayan wanted to take his cattle through this field to the river but the appellant Govindi refused to grant this permission and he is further alleged to have slapped P.W.2 Narayan. When this incident in the noon had occurred, the appellant Makhan is also said to have been present at the spot. According to the prosecution story, at that time, the appellant Govindi and appellant Makhan were fixing fences around that Parasharwala field. 4. After getting the slap on his face, Narayan P.W.2 retreated from the field with his cattle. When this incident in the noon had occurred, the appellant Makhan is also said to have been present at the spot. According to the prosecution story, at that time, the appellant Govindi and appellant Makhan were fixing fences around that Parasharwala field. 4. After getting the slap on his face, Narayan P.W.2 retreated from the field with his cattle. The same day in the evening, a cow belonging to deceased Leela entered this Parasharwala field and started damaging the crop. Thereupon deceased Leela went in the field for taking away the cow. It is at this very time, according to the prosecution that after hearing hue and cry, P.W.2 Narayan, P.W.6 Kadori, P.W.14 Dhaniram and females Mst. Jankibai, Mst. Laxmibai, Mst. Radhabai, Mst. Rambai and Mst. Kusumbai reached the field and there they saw that the appellants Makhan, Govindi, Kanchhedi, Tulaiya, Lalli and Dammu had surrounded the deceased Leela and were assaulting him. The prosecution story further proceeds that the appellants Makhan, Govindi, Tulaiya, Lalli and Dammu were armed with big scissors and they were exhorting each other to kill deceased Leela. Deceased Leela was assaulted by these persons and when he fell down, his brother deceased Laxman arrived on the spot to save. It is further alleged that six other acquitted accused also arrived on the spot and surrounded deceased Laxman. On exhortation from Dammu to kill him also, the appellant Govindi attacked Laxman with his big scissor. After receiving injuries Laxman fled away towards his home. When Laxman rushed towards his home for saving himself, accused Lalli, Makhan, Govindi and others chased him away. The female folk, Dhaniram P.W.14, Kadori P.W.6 and Halle P.W. 4 were also present in that field and they also received the injuries. Lacchibai and Rambai respectively P.W.17 and P.W.19 also received injuries in this incident. Prosecution story further proceeds that when Narayan P.W.2 went to the house of deceased Laxman, he saw that he was dead in his home. It is further alleged that Leela was brought out of his hut and the appellants Makhan and Govindi, by their big scissors, amputated his hand and leg by giving several blows and in consequence deceased Leela died. 5. P.W.2 Narayan who is son of deceased Leela proceeded to P.S. Rehli and lodged the FIR at 8.10 p.m. which was taken down by Peer Ali P.W. 29, the Officer Incharge of the Police Station. 5. P.W.2 Narayan who is son of deceased Leela proceeded to P.S. Rehli and lodged the FIR at 8.10 p.m. which was taken down by Peer Ali P.W. 29, the Officer Incharge of the Police Station. Crime No. 119 of 1979 was registered under sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 of the IPC. After the investigation was complete, a charge-sheet was filed against 12 accused persons. Accused Kanchhedi, Makhan, Govindi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya were subsequently convicted and sentenced and accused Rajju, Tantu, Momal, Halle, Premi and Jumman were acquitted in the Sessions Trial against whose acquittal Criminal Appeal No. 688 of 1987 has been filed by the State Government. During the trial, the prosecution examined 29 witnesses from the side of the prosecution. P.W.1 Dr. S.K. Mishra has proved the injuries of Mst. Rambai P.W. 19, Lachhibai P.W. 17, Halle P.WA, Dhaniram P. W. 14. This witness has also proved the injuries sustained by the appellant-accused Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi. Enquiry reports of the appellant Kanchhedi is Ex.P.4, that of appellant Makhan Ex.P.6, and that of the appellant Govmdi Ex.P.8. P.W.24 Dr. Deep Chand Jain performed the post-mortem examinations of deceased Laxman and Leela. The post-mortem reports are respectively Ex.P.48 and P.49. Dr. Jain has described the injuries sustained by these two deceased in detail and also proved the cause of death. We need not dwell upon the details of the injuries proved by these two witnesses of the prosecution because the defence of the present appellants during the trial was that they were in cultivating peaceful possession of Parasharwala field and on the date of the incident, the deceased party consisting of two deceased persons Laxman and Leela, Narayan P.W. 2, Halle P.W. 4, Kadori P.W. 6, Dhaniram P.W. 14, Tika P.W.15 and some females were committing criminal trespass and were the aggressors. Their defence that the complainant party was armed with deadly weapons and after committing the criminal trespass, and after forming an unlawful assembly and with a common object, attacked the appellants in consequence of which the appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi sustained injuries upon their person. As these appellants had apprehension of grievous hurt or death, they exercised their statutory right of private defence of property and person in consequence of which Laxman and Leela who were the aggressors and trespassers, died. As these appellants had apprehension of grievous hurt or death, they exercised their statutory right of private defence of property and person in consequence of which Laxman and Leela who were the aggressors and trespassers, died. 5-A. The learned trial Judge, after appreciating the prosecution evidence has concluded and his findings are capsulised as under:- i) Parasharwala field was in cultivatory possession of the appellants in which the crops were standing. ii) The complainant party on the date of the incident committed criminal trespass upon this Parasharwala field and assaulted Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi. Thus, the complainant party was aggressor. iii) The appellants had the right of private defence of body and property, and iv) But in exercise of that right, the appellants exceeded the limit of law and hence, they committed an offence punishable under section 304-1 of the IPC etc. etc. 6. Shri S.C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Dilip Naik, learned Government Advocate both have taken us through the entire evidence on record. Shri Datt, learned counsel, contended at the bar that the conviction under section 304-I of the IPC is bad in law because the appellants had not formed an unlawful assembly and had no common object to commit the crime. He further contended that once the learned trial Judge arrived at the conclusion that the appellants had the right of private defence of body and property, he should have acquitted the appellants of the charges framed against them. Shri Dilip Naik, learned Govt. Advocate supported the impugned judgment of conviction and contended in support of Criminal Appeal No. 688 of 1987 that from the evidence, it has been proved by the prosecution that all the appellants were guilty of the offence with which they were charged. He attacked the acquittal of the present six appellants and six other acquitted accused from the charge of section 302 of the IPC. He also contended that it was not a case of exceeding the right of private defence of body and property but it was a gruesome murders which is apparent from the fact that the hand and one leg of the deceased Leela were hacked away by sharp edged weapons. He also contended that it was not a case of exceeding the right of private defence of body and property but it was a gruesome murders which is apparent from the fact that the hand and one leg of the deceased Leela were hacked away by sharp edged weapons. To conclude, he contended that all the accused should be convicted under section 302 of the IPC and also for forming an unlawful assembly and common object of committing murders of deceased Laxman and Leela. 7. It is relevant to note that appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi were injured in this very incident. On perusal of the First Information Report, which was lodged by P.W.2 Narayan, it has not been mentioned therein as to how the accused persons came to receive the injuries. The defence of these injured accused during the trial was that they have received these injuries because they were attacked by aggressor deceased Leela and deceased Laxman along with their companions P. W.4 Halle, P. W.6 Kadori and P.W.14 Dhaniram. They have further pleaded that the right of private defence of body and property was available to them. In Mitter Sen AIR 1976 SC 1154 the Supreme Court has held that when there is no mention in the FIR as to how the accused persons came to receive the injuries, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses cannot, therefore, be accepted at its face value and cannot be relied upon implicitly. Nowhere in the FIR, it has been mentioned as to how the appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi came to have injuries upon their person. It was, therefore, imperative for the prosecution to discharge this burden. Failure to do so compels us to look at the defence of accused persons. Nowhere in the FIR, it has been mentioned as to how the appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi came to have injuries upon their person. It was, therefore, imperative for the prosecution to discharge this burden. Failure to do so compels us to look at the defence of accused persons. In Lakshmi Singh AIR 1976 SC 2263 also the Supreme Court has explained in detail the settled principles of law with regard to the law of private defence which is being reproduced for convenience: "In a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the Court can draw the following inferences: (1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version; (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most material point and, therefore, their evidence is unreliable; (3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused, it is rendered probable so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case. The omission on the part of the prosecution to explain the injuries on the person of the accused assumes much greater importance where the evidence consists of interested or inimical witnesses or where the defence gives a version which competes in probability with that of the prosecution one." Thus, keeping in view these sterling principles, it can safely be concluded that the prosecution has purposely lied on the most material point and, therefore, its evidence is unreliable. Though the prosecution tried to explain the injuries of the accused party but that explaining was an after-thought and contrary to the law laid down in Mitter Sen (supra). We also conclude that the defence version which explains the injuries on the person of the accused has been rendered probable and it has thrown sufficient doubt on the truthfulness of the prosecution case. It has also to be observed that all the prosecution witnesses appearing in this case are close relations of deceased Leela and Laxman. These prosecution witnesses have also received injuries upon their person and hence their presence cannot be doubted. It has also to be observed that all the prosecution witnesses appearing in this case are close relations of deceased Leela and Laxman. These prosecution witnesses have also received injuries upon their person and hence their presence cannot be doubted. They are thus not only interested but also inimical to the accused persons. The defence version competes in probability with that of the prosecution. 9. Consequently, we have no hesitation to concur with the findings of the trial Judge that Parasharwala field upon which the complainant party had not only committed criminal trespass but had also attacked the accused person, who were in cultivatory possession of the said field. We further concur with the findings of the trial Judge that the complainant party was the aggressor and they assaulted Kanchhedi, Makhan, and Govindi appellants and it is thereupon that a statutory right of private defence was available to these appellants not only of property but also of their body. The argument of the Government Advocate appears to be rediculous on the face of the record. We cannot forget the golden rule laid down in Munshiram AIR 1968 SC 702 and we quote the same: "The right of private defence serves a social purpose and that right should be liberally construed. Such a right not only will be restraining influence on bad characters but it will encourage the right spirit in a free citizen. There is nothing more degrading to the human spirit than to run away in the face of peril." To say that these appellants should have gone to the authorities to report the crime allegedly committed by the complainant party and take recourse of law is not only ridiculous but also opposed to the golden rule laid down in Munshiram (supra). Thus, right of private defence of person and property was available to the appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan, Govindi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya when they were attacked by deceased Leela and Laxman and also his companions. The limitations upon the exercise of private defence of person and property are: i) that if there is sufficient time for recourse to public authorities, the right is not available; ii) that more harm than necessary should not be caused; iii) that there must be reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the person or damage to the property concerned. 10. 10. It is not the law that a person when called upon the face the assault must run away to the Police Station or when his property has been the subject matter of trespass and mischief, he will allow the aggressor to take possession of the property and run to the public authorities for redress. When there is an element of invasion or aggression on the property by a person who has no right to possess, then there is obviously no room to have recourse to the public authorities and the accused has undoubtedly the right to resist the invasion on his right and use of force, if necessary. The right of private defence of property or person is available where there is real apprehension that the aggression may cause death or grievous death to the person. It is not necessary that death or grievous hurt should actually be caused before the right of private defence could be exercised. A mere reasonable apprehension is enough to put the right of private defence into operation. From the evidence on record, it can be gathered easily that there was no time for these appellants to take the recourse to the public authorities because the injuries on the person of the three appellants Kanchhedi, Makhan and Govindi indicate that in the circumstances in which these injuries were caused, there was apprehension of death or grievous hurt to the accused persons. But this valuable right of private defence cannot be misused by making it an instrument to wreak vendetta upon the aggressor. This right cannot be permitted to be used to kill the aggressor because he has attacked the accused. Right of private defence has been provided in Penal Code for the protection of self or others but it does not allow it to be used in anger to retaliate. This right is meant for the self preservation of the person subjected to aggression. Its limits are well defined and the operational area is well-marked. 11. We, therefore, concur with the findings of the learned trial Judge. Government Advocate could not dislodge or demolish the reasonings given by the learned trial Judge by which it has been held that the appellants had the right of private defence of body and property. Its limits are well defined and the operational area is well-marked. 11. We, therefore, concur with the findings of the learned trial Judge. Government Advocate could not dislodge or demolish the reasonings given by the learned trial Judge by which it has been held that the appellants had the right of private defence of body and property. It, therefore, has to be seen whether in committing the murders of Leela and Laxman, these appellants had exceeded the right of private defence of body and property or not. While evaluating the evidence of the prosecution, it was observed that after inflicting inabiling injuries to deceased Leela, the appellants Makhan and Govindi amputated the hand and leg of the deceased Leela. Leela deceased, at the time of this ghastly act of these two appellants Makhan and Govindi was already in such a condition that he could not have again threatened these appellants. The moment he fell down on the ground due to assault on him in exercise of right of private defence by the appellants, the right of private defence immediately came to an end. Even a single blow by any of the accused upon that helpless person, who could not cause any damage or who could not create any apprehension of death or grievous hurt, will amount to exceeding the right of private defence. At that very moment the injured person should be left by those exercising the right of private defence. It has been brought on record successfully by the prosecution that after deceased Leela fell on the ground, the appellants Makhan and Govindi amputated and cut off the hand and leg of the deceased. This act of these two appellant clearly indicates that these two appellants had exceeded the right of private defence. When deceased Leela was helpless, amputation of his limbs is not only a cruel act on the part of these two appellants but it is also indicative of the fact that they exceeded the right of private defence. From the evidence on record, it appears that rest of the appellant Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya did not take part in assault either on deceased Leela or on other witnesses, after either they fled away from the spot or fell on the ground helpless. From the evidence on record, it appears that rest of the appellant Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya did not take part in assault either on deceased Leela or on other witnesses, after either they fled away from the spot or fell on the ground helpless. Therefore, it can be concluded easily that these four appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya did not exceed while exercising the right of private defence available to them. We do not agree with the findings of the learned trial Judge that these appellants had formed an unlawful assembly and, therefore, they were liable to be convicted under sections 148 and 149 IPC. 12. While defending their possession and person, the appellants cannot be said to have formed an unlawful assembly and also cannot be said that the appellants had the common object of committing the murders or causing injuries to the members of the complainant party. Once the learned trial Judge concluded that the appellants had the right of private defence of person and property, then their assembly does not become unlawful. On the contrary, the assembly of the complainant party was an unlawful assembly and they had the common object of not only committing the criminal trespass but also of committing crime of grievous hurt and murder. In Arjun Pradhan and another AIR 1979 SC 1259 the same principles have been enunciated by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the conviction of all the appellants under section 148 and section 149 IPC is bad in law and the convictions of the above named four appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya under section 304-I of the IPC and under sections 148 and 149 of the IPC are liable to be set aside. 13. As observed earlier, the appellants Makhan and Govindi undoubtedly had the right of private defence of body .and property, yet in amputating the limbs of deceased Leela, only Makhan and Govindi, appellants, exceeded their right and not the other appellants. Consequently, the four appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya cannot be said to be guilty of exceeding the statutory limits of the rights of private defence of body and property but the appellants Makhan and Govindi not only acted in a cruel manner in cutting away the limbs of a helpless deceased namely Leela but they also exceeded the statutory right of private defence. 14. Consequently, this appeal is partly allowed. 14. Consequently, this appeal is partly allowed. Judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya under Section 304-I and Sections 148 and 149 of the IPC imposed by the impugned judgment is set aside and they are acquitted of the charges framed against them. So far as the appellants Makhan and Govindi are concerned, their conviction under section 304-I of the IPC is maintained and undoubtedly these two appellants Makhan and Govindi stand acquitted from their convictions under sections 148 and 149 of the IPC. 15. We also heard Shri S.C. Datt, learned counsel for the appellants on the question of sentence to be imposed upon them i.e. appellants Makhan and Govindi, for the offence under section 304-I IPC. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be just and proper if the sentence of these two appellants is reduced to five years' R.I. instead of ten years' R.I. Consequently, the appeal of the appellants Makhan and Govindi is partly allowed in the matter of sentence for the offence under section 304-I of the IPC and they are sentenced to five years' R.I. instead of ten years' R.I. They are also acquitted of the offence under sections 148 and 149 of the IPC. So far as rest of the appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya are concerned, their appeal is allowed and they are acquitted from their conviction under section 304-I and under sections 148 and 149 of the IPC. 16. Now, we shall consider the Criminal Appeal No. 688 of 1987 filed by the State against acquittal of all the accused. In view of what we have held earlier, it has to be considered as to what are the powers of this Court with regard to an appeal against acquittal of the accused. The respondents in this appeal were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge has given cogent and sound reasons for recording their acquittal. In view of what we have held earlier, it has to be considered as to what are the powers of this Court with regard to an appeal against acquittal of the accused. The respondents in this appeal were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge has given cogent and sound reasons for recording their acquittal. In Ganesh Bhuwan Patel AIR 1979 SC 135 the Supreme Court observed as below: "Although in an appeal from an order of acquittal the powers of the High Court to re-assess the evidence and reach its own conclusions are as extensive as an in an appeal against an order of conviction, yet, as a rule of prudence, it should always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. Where two reasonable conclusions can be drawn on the evidence on record, the High Court should as a matter of judicial caution, refrain from interfering with the order of acquittal recorded by the Court below. In other words, if the main grounds on which the Court below has based its order acquitting the accused, are reasonable and plausible and cannot be entirely and effectively dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the acquittal." We therefore conclude, while keeping the aforesaid principles in mind that the reasons given by the learned trial Judge for recording acquittal of the respondents accused are reasonable and plausible. These reasons could not be dislodged or demolished by the learned Government Advocate. Hence, we are not inclined to disturb the finding of the learned trial Judge. Therefore, this appeal (Cr.A. No. 688 of 1987) is dismissed. 17. To conclude the appeal of the appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya is allowed and they stand acquitted of all the charges and they need not surrender to custody. Hence, we are not inclined to disturb the finding of the learned trial Judge. Therefore, this appeal (Cr.A. No. 688 of 1987) is dismissed. 17. To conclude the appeal of the appellants Kanchhedi, Lalli, Dammu and Tulaiya is allowed and they stand acquitted of all the charges and they need not surrender to custody. The conviction of the appellants Makhan and Govindi under section 304-I of the' IPC is maintained and the sentence as awarded by the trial Court is modified and instead of ten years' rigorous imprisonment, the appellants are sentenced to five years' rigorous imprisonment for this offence. The appellants Makhan and Govindi stand acquitted of the offence under section 148 and 149 of the IPC. Appellants Makhan and Govindi are said to be on bail. Hence, they must surrender to custody before the CJM, Sagar, Distt. Sagar on or before 15.12.1989 to undergo the sentence of imprisonment as awarded now for the offence under section 304-I of the IPC, for committing the murder of deceased Leela. Criminal Appeal No. 688 of 1987 filed by the State Government against the acquittal of the respondents therein is dismissed.