ORDER The concept of fairness in a Governmental action is no longer in the realm of consideration but has turned out to be one of the principles of law well recognised throughout the globe so as to give rise to a cause of action against a Government action. The Supreme Court of New South Wales in the Case of Asonend v. Public Service Board of New South Wales & anr. reported in 1985 LR (Commonwealth) observed: "There has been a growing body of precedents and other support for the desirability of and sometime the obligations upon the Public Administrative Tribunal at least to state reasons for their decisions affecting seriously the interest of the persons seeking those reasons. Sometimes this is expressed to be based on the requirements of natural justice and fairness. Sometimes it is articulated in terms of inherent necessity of the proper operation of judicial process. 2. Megarry, J in the case of Bates v. Lord Hailsham reported in 1983 (2) All ER also recognised the general duty of fairness being a guiding principle as regards administrative actions. 3. Our Supreme Court also in the case of Menoka Gandhi v Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) expressed the same view. 4. The law is, therefore, well settled on this score that in the event a Governmental action be termed to be unfair, Law Courts would not hesitate to declare it invalid and unsustainable, and consequently quash the same and it is on this score that Mr. Moitra appearing for the petitioner submitted that direction to have a de novo enquiry after the matter being dealt with at the highest level is not only unjust, but unfair and as such ought to be set aside and quashed. A brief reference to facts may be convenient at this stage. 5. The petitioner joined unarmed Police Service in 1967 and after completion of training period was posted as Sub-Inspector of Police in Bankura. In 1977, however, the petitioner on promotion joined as Inspector of Intelligence Branch, Task Porce and on 2nd February, 1977, assumed independent charge. 6. On the further factual score it appears that on the 1st January 1978 the petitioner was made Inspector-in-Charge of Salt Lake Police Station and discharged his duties as such till 16th May, 1980 when from the petitioner was posted in the Central Enforcement Branch, West Bengal. 6. On the further factual score it appears that on the 1st January 1978 the petitioner was made Inspector-in-Charge of Salt Lake Police Station and discharged his duties as such till 16th May, 1980 when from the petitioner was posted in the Central Enforcement Branch, West Bengal. On 30th January, 1984 a proceeding was initialed against the petitioner by the then Inspector-General of Police appointing the then Deputy Inspector General, Enforcement Branch as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the articles of charges in five counts for gross misconduct and dereliction of duty as Inspector-In-Charge of Salt Lake Police Station in 1979-80. it appears from records that action was initiated on a confidential report by the then Superintendent of Police, 24-Parganas against the petitioner under s. 7 of the Police Act, 1971. Since strenuous submissions have been made as regards the charges against the petitioner, it would only be proper to set out the charges at this juncture: "You, Inspector Shri Tarapada Ghose, formerly attached to Salt Lake P. S. as Inspector-in-Charge are hereby charged with gross misconduct and dereliction of duty unbecoming of a Police Officer in that : 1. Oh 5.4.80 at about 00.03 hours the then S.D.P.O. Belghoria visited Salt Lake P.S. and found some discrepancy regarding detailment of force etc. You were absent during the visit of the S D.P.O. to your P. S. You came to P. S, at about 01.35 hours on 5.4.80. immediately after the S. D. P. O. had left Your P. S. and made G D. against the S. D. P.O. vide G. D. E. No.195 dated 5.4 80 which is in clear violation of Police Order No. 5/52. 2. On 9.4 80 there was a case of robbery from D. B. Block. Thoughthe complaint revealed a case of robbery. instecd of starting a robbery case, Salt Lake P. S. case No. 9 dated 9.4.80 under ss. 458/380 I.P.C. was started. As you did not exert proper supervision, the then Addl. S. P. Barrackpore had to pass order on 13.4 80 to change sanction to 394 I.P.C. 3. During the month of March, 1989, there was an abnormal increase of crime in Salt Lake P. S. area when as many as 76 cases were reported against a monthly average of 25/30 cases during the last 3 years. S. P. Barrackpore had to pass order on 13.4 80 to change sanction to 394 I.P.C. 3. During the month of March, 1989, there was an abnormal increase of crime in Salt Lake P. S. area when as many as 76 cases were reported against a monthly average of 25/30 cases during the last 3 years. Action under preventive section of law during the month of March, 1980 was also unsatisfactory. Inspite of giving clear instruction by the Addl. S P. Barrackpore from time to time, you did not make proper supervision of these cases as a result, not even a single case relating to crime against property could be detected. 4. In view of increased incidence of crime, when you were asked by your superiors to intensify preventive measures like introduction of patrol, setting up of camps in the effected areas, checking of duties of the force, you took no pain to comply with the instruction in order to improve the crime position which were deteriorating fastly. Instead of that, you allowed illegal practice of giving permission to the Constables to remain absent without any leave. This was detected by S D. P. O. during his visit of Salt Lake P. S. on 137.79, 21.11.79 and 7.2.80 and inspection remarks of Addl. S. P. Barrackpore on 13 4.80. 5. You did not submit any personal diary from 28 79 till 7.480 inspite of reminders. You are, therefore, directed to report within 7 days from the date of receipt of charge together with statements of allegations whether you plead guilty to the charge' in full or part thereof or want an open enquiry and to be heard in person. Your reply to the charge would be submitted to Shri S. K. Singh, IPS, D.I. G. EB who has been asked to enquire into the proceeding drawn up against you. The statement of allegation on which the charge is based is enclosed herewith together with a list of P. Ws and list of documents to be exhibited." 7. Your reply to the charge would be submitted to Shri S. K. Singh, IPS, D.I. G. EB who has been asked to enquire into the proceeding drawn up against you. The statement of allegation on which the charge is based is enclosed herewith together with a list of P. Ws and list of documents to be exhibited." 7. On receipt of the charges noted above the petitioner submitted his written statement of defence on 14th May, 1984 denying the same with a further plea that upon consideration of s. 62 of the Police Act, 1861 the enquiry the face of it is wholly time barred and the substance of the defence was that on the petitioner reconstructed his answer to the charges from memory after such a long tapse time. Incidentally it is to be recorded that the Enquiry Officer being the Deputy Inspector-General, Enforcement Branch, was competent to make the order himself and the next superior rank is the Appellate Authority in the event of their being an appeal against the order of the Enquiry Officer. Section 7 of the Police Act authorises the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to act as an Enquiry Officer and to inflict punishment and the Inspector-General of Police would be the Appellate Authority in an enquiry as against the Inspectors. The Enquiry Officer being the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, however, passed an order on 12th July, 1984 directing that the proceeding is violative of the principles of natural justice and is vexatious and wholly unwarranted and as such, the Deputy Inspector General being the Enquiry Officer passed an order that the proceedings be filed. 8. Apparently it appears that the petitioner's contention as regards the abnormal delay caused by the authorities in framing the charges against him has weighed with the Enquiry Officer. In paragraph 6 of his report the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Enforcement Branch, West Bengal records: "6. In the case before me, the delinquency arises in the period from 1979 to 1980 and the enquiry was processed after a lapse of nearly 4 years. It is not clear why no action was taken by the authorities for such a long time and also why the matter was suddenly revived. I am in complete agreement with the principles of natural justice enunciated in the Gujrat High Court case referred to above. It is not clear why no action was taken by the authorities for such a long time and also why the matter was suddenly revived. I am in complete agreement with the principles of natural justice enunciated in the Gujrat High Court case referred to above. If the delinquent is called upon to enter into his defence on allegations which are over 4 years old, it would most certainly constitute denial of reasonable opportunity to him to showcase and thereby the principle of natural justice would be violative." 9. The judgment referred to in the order of the Deputy Inspector- General of Police, Enforcement Branch, is in the case of M. D. Parma v. Y. B. Zola reported in 1980 Labour & Industrial Case 89 in which Thackker, J. quashed disciplinary proceedings against the police constable in which delay of 18 months was caused in charging the constable concerned, and it was held that the delay by itself would constitute denial of reasonable opportunity and as such violative of the principles natural justice. 10. The other fact remain to be noted is that subsequent to such a finding the petitioner's permanent promotions to the rank of Inspector came up fur consideration before the appropriate authority and the petitioner's name also appears at Item No. 31 with the remark, "fit subject to exoneration from proceeding.;". Incidentally it is to be noted that apart from the proceeding noted above which have been directed to be filed by the Deputy lnspector General of Police on 12th of July, 1984, there existed no other proceeding against the petitioner and the endorsement as above was effected on 29th November, 1985. 11. It is indeed curious to note that even though the Enquiry Officer being the Deputy Inspector-General of Police recorded a finding to the effect that the proceedings be filed on 12th of July, 1984 no step whatsoever was taken upto at least 29th November, 1985 and the petitioner was kept in tenterhooks for a period of over 16 months-it is seen, however, that even after the expiry of 16 months, the petitioner's anxiety period did not come to an end. The appropriate authority on 29th November, 1985 as noted above simply recorded that though the petitioner is otherwise eligible for confirmation in the post of Inspector but the same would be subject to his exoneration-can it be said to be fair and reasonable that even after the expiry of 16 months period from the date of finding of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police that the proceeding be filed and the petitioner be exonerated that the appropriate authority would record the petitioner's promotion as Inspector confirmed subject to exoneration from the proceedings? The answer is in the negative. The petitioner's anxious waiting period, however, went on upto April 1986 wherein the Special Inspector-General of Police, Headquarters, West Bengal, set aside the finding of the Enquiry Officer and directed the de novo enquiry and it is this direction for de novo enquiry which is under challenge in this proceeding on the ground of being not fair, unreasonable and capricious in nature. 19. Mr. Moitra appearing for the petitioner also imputed malice on the part of the Special Inspector-General of Police towards the petitioner, as otherwise no such order, according to Mr. Moitra Could have been passed against the petitioner inter such a long lapse of time. In support of the contentions of "Malice" Mr. Moitra submitted that the Special Inspector General, Headquarters, sat tight over the matter for a sufficiently long period of time without any order whatsoever and that by itself shows malicious intent to harass the petitioner. 13. "Malice" in common acceptation means, 'ill will' or 'spite', Admittedly 'ill will' or 'spite' can be: inferred, from the surrounding circumstances and no positive evidence need be attributed. While it is true, such an inference may be had from surrounding circumstances, but some evidence of personal spire of ill will must be there on record and without there being any such spite Law Courts would not re justified in coming to a finding of malice. Malice in law also requires some such evidence. In the present context, however, no such evidence is available to constitute either malice in law or in fact which call be imputed on to the Special Inspector-General of Police towards the writ petitioner. Sitting tight over the matter by itself is not sufficient to impute malice on to the Special Inspector-General of Police against the petitioner. 14. In the present context, however, no such evidence is available to constitute either malice in law or in fact which call be imputed on to the Special Inspector-General of Police towards the writ petitioner. Sitting tight over the matter by itself is not sufficient to impute malice on to the Special Inspector-General of Police against the petitioner. 14. On the fairness aspect, it is to be seen whether by reason of the long lapse of time, the order directing de novo enquiry can be termed to be fair or not ? 15. As early as in November 1967 the Government of West Bengal by a Memorandum No. 3773 of 200 recorded that delay in disciplinary proceedings is wasteful of time and money and the same is also unfair to the delinquent Government servant and lead to administrative inefficiency. The Notification noted above provides that they should be no delay at all in serving the charges against the accused and to appoint an Enquiry Officer and the enquiry including the examination of witnesses should be completed within a month from the submission of the written statement. 16. Incidentally it is to be noted that that the chargesheet speaks of incidents between July, 1979 to April 1980. The chargesheet was issued in January 1984 by the Special Inspector General of Police, Headquarters. The report of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police was forwarded to the Special Inspector-General shortly after 12th of July, 1984 petitioner's promotion was considered by the high echelons of the West Bengal Police in the presence of the Director-General and Inspector-General together with Special Inspector-General as also Deputy Inspector-General of Police of 29th November, 1965 wherein it has been recorded that the petitioner would be promoted subject to exoneration from proceedings. On 14th March, 1986 while reviewing the pending proceedings, the Director-General of Police directed the Special Inspector-General of Police to place the files in respect of the petitioner immediately and on 1st of April 1986 the Special Inspector-General passed the order for de novo enquiry after cancelling the report and finding of the then Deputy Inspector General of Police. 17. The above list of dates could have been probably avoided but judicial decorum prompts me to record the same since it has been stated that this long delay has resulted in a total unfair and illegal proceedings. 18. 17. The above list of dates could have been probably avoided but judicial decorum prompts me to record the same since it has been stated that this long delay has resulted in a total unfair and illegal proceedings. 18. Without going into the issue though strenuous submissions have been made on the score of the power of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police to pass an order which was disputed by the respondents, the principal issue to be considered is whether the action as noted above can be termed to be fair or reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration? Events of 1979) have been taken note of in the year 1984 after a lapse of about 5 years and 1984 finding is said to have been reconsidered after a lapse of further two years. The Special Inspector-General of Police while directing de novo enquiry recorded that simply because there has been delay in drawing up charges of misconduct or acts of corruption against a public servant that by itself does not mean and imply that the charges cannot be enquired into and that would be a dangerous proposition. The law of the land, however, provides the contrary. The law is well settled on that score-both by the High Court as also by the Supreme Court-that stale charges cannot and ought not to be allowed to be continued and I need not dilate an that score. The Special Inspector-General of Police, however, proceeded on a completely erroneous assumption of law and directed a further de novo enquiry, Police Department ought to be vigilant and should take expeditious steps in the matter of complaints and punish the delinquent officer after giving the concerned officer an opportunity of hearing with utmost expedition. The proceeding, must be fair, reasonable and in accordance with law. Otherwise, the Law, Courts would not hesitate to strike down the action. It is a plain exercise of judicial function to come in aid of the petitioner who seeds the relief on the ground of continuation of a harassive procedure. Four years have elapsed before the charges could be brought and nearly two years has elapsed before a further enquiry ha, been directed. By no stretch it can be said to be fair, reasonable and in accordance with law. Four years have elapsed before the charges could be brought and nearly two years has elapsed before a further enquiry ha, been directed. By no stretch it can be said to be fair, reasonable and in accordance with law. A person ought not to be allowed to be in torment over a proceeding initiated after 4 years from the date of the incident and without any steps being taken thereafter for a period of about two years. 19. In that view of the matter, this writ petition succeeds. The order of the Special of Inspector-General of Police,' Headquarters dated 1.8.1986 is set aside and quashed. As regards the promotional aspect the same be regularised in accordance with law and such regularisation be effected within a period of six weeks from the date hereof. There will be however, no order as to costs. Impugned order quashed.