JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala 1. These are two petitions arising out of proceedings under the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The property in dispute is a shop situate in Aligarh. Kailash Chand Jain, Suresh Chand Jain and Ved Prakash Jain all the three brothers were the tenants of the said shop in dispute. M/s. M. S. Bansal Private Limited, Aligarh is the landlord of the said premises. In the year 1980, a release application under section 21 of the Act was filed by the landlord for release of the shop in dispute. This release application was registered as suit no. 50 of 1980. 3. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority on 16th December 1980. After the release order was obtained, the landlord enforced the same and took possession of the premises on 3rd January, 1981. After the possession was delivered to the landlord on 3rd January 1981, the Prescribed Authority by an order dated 28th January, 1981 struck off the execution in full satisfaction. Till that date no objection was filed by the tenant that he did not have the knowledge of the release order. On 19th February, 1981, an application was moved for setting aside the release order by Kailash Chand Jain on the ground that the tenant did not have the knowledge of the passing of the release order on 16th December, 1980. It may be noted here that only Kailash Chand Jain moved an application for restoration. The other co-tenants did not file any application for restoration, but were impleaded as respondents to the said application. 4. The above mentioned application for setting aside the order dated 16th December 1980 came up for hearing before the 1st Additional Civil Judge, Aligarh. He examined the matter in detail and was of the opinion that the application was beyond time and he further held that that sufficient cause has not been made out for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 16th December, 1980. The result was that this application for setting aside the order dated 16th December, 1980 was dismissed on 1st April 1981. Against the order dated 1st April, 1981 Kailash Chand Jain has filed writ petition no. 7550 of 1981 challenging the order dated 1st April, 1981 as also the release order dated 16th December, 1980 while another writ petition no. The result was that this application for setting aside the order dated 16th December, 1980 was dismissed on 1st April 1981. Against the order dated 1st April, 1981 Kailash Chand Jain has filed writ petition no. 7550 of 1981 challenging the order dated 1st April, 1981 as also the release order dated 16th December, 1980 while another writ petition no. 6411 of 1981 has been filed by Kailash Chand Jain for a relief that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Prescribed Authority to deliver him back possession of the premises. 5. Since both the writ petitions mentioned above arise out of the same property in dispute and common question of fact and law arises, they are being decided by a common judgment. 6. I have heard Sri V. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the tenant Kailash Chand Jain and Sri P. K. Jain learned counsel appearing for the landlord. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner tenant did not have the knowledge of the fact that the release order had been passed against him on 16th December, 1980. He got knowledge of the same only when an application was made by the landlord in another suit pending against him for ejectment and arrears of rent and as such the view taken by the court below that sufficient cause has not been made out for condonation of delay in moving the application for restoration is a view manifestly erroneous. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that possession could not have been delivered unless thirty days had expired from 16th December, 1980 and consequently, he was entitled to the restoration of the possession of the property in dispute. 8. I will consider the second submission of the learned counsel first. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that possession could not have been delivered unless thirty days had expired from 16th December, 1980 and consequently, he was entitled to the restoration of the possession of the property in dispute. 8. I will consider the second submission of the learned counsel first. In connection with the second submission learned counsel has relied on the provisions of sub-section (6) of section 21 of the Act, which reads as follows : "(6) On the expiration of a period of thirty days from an order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2), the tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined in its entirety or, as the case may be, in respect of any part of appurtenant land released in favour of the landlord, and in the latter case, the rent payable for the remainder of the building under tenancy shall be such as may be agreed upon between the parties and in the absence of such agreement as may be determined under section 8." 9. The above mentioned sub-section (6) of section 21 of the Act only lays down that tenancy of the tenant shall stand determined in its entirety on the expiration of a period of thirty days from an order passed for release under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. It does not debar the landlord from enforcing the release order for a period of thirty days of the passing of the said order of release. There is no bar placed on the power of the court to enforce the release order before the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of the release. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Harcharan Beharilal Sinha v. Prescribed Authority, 1980 ARC 114, which is an authority only for the proposition that section 21 (6) is applicable even to an order passed by an appellate authority but the specific question involved in this petition has not been decided. This decision on the other hand supports the respondent and order for restoration of possession has been passed. 10. There is one other reason why section 21 (6) of the Act will not apply to this case. This decision on the other hand supports the respondent and order for restoration of possession has been passed. 10. There is one other reason why section 21 (6) of the Act will not apply to this case. It is after determination of tenancy that landlord had filed a suit for ejectment which was pending in revision on the date of the passing of the release order. The question of again determining the tenancy did not arise. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that sub-section (6) of section 21 do not come in the way of the landlord in enforcing the release order. It cannot, therefore be said that the Prescribed Authority acted without jurisdiction or that the landlord acted in the manner against law in enforcing the release order. The second submission, consequently, made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, is not substantiated. 11. In regard to the first submission, it is necessary to mention a few facts which have been stated in the counter affidavit of the landlord. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit of Daya Shankar Dixit in writ no. 7530 of 19 1, it has been stated that one of the tenants Ved Prakash Jain had filed a written statement on 6th October, 1980. The other persons did not file the written statement as they were not interested in the shop. It is, therefore, clear from this very fact itself that the petitioner who is also one of the tenants of the property in dispute must be having knowledge of the pendency of the release application. It is not possible to believe the technical case taken by the petitioner that he got the knowledge of the release order only on 16-2-1981 when an application had been filed by the landlord in another suit filed under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act which was pending for ejectment and arrears of rent. 12. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, it has been further stated that the shop in dispute always remained closed and the tenants had another shop and they had shifted their business in that shop situate near G. T. road. 12. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit, it has been further stated that the shop in dispute always remained closed and the tenants had another shop and they had shifted their business in that shop situate near G. T. road. This fact is corroborated by the certificate of the delivery of possession attached as Annexure II to the counter affidavit, from which it is clear that there were hardly any goods worth a mention in the said shop when the possession was taken. In view of the averments made in the counter affidavit and the fact that one of the tenants had filed the written statement, it cannot be said that the view taken by the court below to the effect that the application for restoration was beyond time is a view which can be called arbitrary or unreasonable or in any manner manifestly erroneous. 13. I have perused the order dated 1st April 1981, I do not find any illegality in the same order. In the circumstances, the first submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner also, in my view, is not substantiated. 14. The possession of the property in dispute had been taken by the landlord as far back as on 3rd January, 1981. More than eight years have already elapsed. The petitioner tenant is already carrying on the business in another shop which is in his possession. This is also an important circumstance why I do not think it a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the result, both the petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs in both the petitions. Petitions dismissed.