Judgment :- 1. In this second appeal by the defendant, the only question to be decided is whether he is entitled to the benefits of the Debt Relief Act 17/1977. Liability which is under a hypothecation bond is admitted. The total amount due as balance on the date of suit was only a little more than Rs. 2, 000/-. It is undoubtedly a debt within the meaning of the Act. The only other question for consideration is whether the appellant is a debtor within the definition of the Act. The conditions necessary to come within that definition are that the debt excluding interest and his annual income also should not exceed Rs. 3, 000/-. Debt is below the limit. Annual income is from 2 acres 80 cents of paramba and 2 acres 70 cents of paddy field owned by the appellant. The commissioner, who submitted Ext. C1 report, assessed the income from the paddy field at Rs. 3, 000/- and found the net income to be Rs. 1,800/- after deducting Rs. 1,200/- towards expenses. Income from the paramba was assessed at Rs. 592/-. Total income was thus fixed at Rs. 2,392/- per year. Both the courts below followed V. Ramaswami Naidu and another v. Commissioner of Income-tax (AIR 1959 Madras 126) and said that in the absence of statutory definitions of income, the words total income should take its ordinary dictionary meaning which covers that which comes in as the periodical produce of one's work, business, lands or investments and as such the annual or periodical receipts accruing to the person. Total income' was, therefore, treated as gross income. Benefit of the Act was, therefore, refused on the ground that his total annual income is Rs. 3, 592/- without deducting expenses. 2. As observed by M.P. Menon, J. in Kunhiraman v. Kunhambu (1980 KLT 297), the fixation of qualification with reference to the annual income of a person, as also the extent of his total indebtedness, makes it clear that the class of persons the legislature wants to protect is that class whose annual income and whose capacity to incur debts are within low limits. The legislature did not want to protect persons with larger income whose capacity to incur and discharge debts are higher. But the line drawn for that purpose is arbitrary and insufficient. It is not fool-proof or fair and effective. The legislature did not want to protect persons with larger income whose capacity to incur and discharge debts are higher. But the line drawn for that purpose is arbitrary and insufficient. It is not fool-proof or fair and effective. A man who advanced all what he had including the sale proceeds of his sole property will have to forgo the same even in favour of a person who has immense wealth if the amount is Rs.3,000/-or below and the annual income of the borrower is also below that limit. Property owned by the debtor may not be yielding but its value may be high. He may be able to discharge the debt by selling a portion of it but he need not repay because of the income limit. That is what happened in this case. The respondent is having 51/2 acres of land and the debt is charged also. It is only common knowledge that a portion of the property is sufficient to wipe off the debt. It is for the legislature to rectify this anomaly. 3. But as the law now stands, I do not think that the decrees of the courts below could be sustained in spite of my feeling that it is inequitable to concede the benefit of the debt relief legislation to the appellant who is evidently having assets more than sufficient to pay off the charged debt. But a hard case cannot make bad law. There is no case for the respondent that the appellant is having any income other than that shown in the report of the commissioner. No such evidence is also there. The report is not objected or disproved. The gross income and net income of the appellant will have, therefore, to be accepted as Rs.3,592/- and Rs. 2392/- respectively. The only question is which of the two is to be taken as the total annual income. 4. I do not think that the courts below were correct in holding on the basis of the decision in Ramaswami Naidu's case (AIR. 1959 Madras 126) that income to be calculated is the gross income. That decision itself may not support that view fully. It is accepted position of law that when the word 'income' or any other word is not defined in the statute, the presumption should be that the legislature used it in the ordinary and popular meaning. 1959 Madras 126) that income to be calculated is the gross income. That decision itself may not support that view fully. It is accepted position of law that when the word 'income' or any other word is not defined in the statute, the presumption should be that the legislature used it in the ordinary and popular meaning. In such a situation, it may be permissible to look to the dictionary meaning of the term in the absence of any definition thereof in the relevant statute. But dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament. That does not mean that the dictionary meaning cannot be accepted as correct. It is for the court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing, the courts may, no doubt, assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including, of course, consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries (Commissioner of Income tax, West Bengal v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy - A.I.R. 1957 S.C.768). This position has been accepted not only by Ramaswamy Naidu's case (A.I.R. 1959 Madras 126), but by a series of other decisions, including Arunachallam Chettiar v. Esmakkal Union Board (A.I.R. 1928 Madras 346), Deputy Commissioner v. Municipal Committee (A.I.R. 1931 Nagpur 45), Municipal Council of Mangalore v. Rev. L. Doneda (14 M.L.J. 410) and Masilamani Udayar v. Ramakrishna Chettiar (1982 (1) M.L.J. 209). Ramaswami Naidu's case (A.I.R. 1959 Madras 126) was a decision under the Ceylon Income-tax Act and Their Lordships were mainly considering the difference between income "accrued", "arose" and "received". 5. Income connotes periodical monetary returns 'coming in' with some sort of regularity from definite sources. It may be linked periodically to the fruit of a tree or crop of a field. (Commissioner of Income tax v. Shaw Wallace and Company - A.I.R. 1932 P.C.138). It is the income coming in as the periodical produce of one's work, business, lands or investments considered in reference to its amount and commonly expressed in terms of money. It is the annual or periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation and implies the idea of receipt actual or constructive. That does not mean that casual receipts is not income. It is the annual or periodical receipts accruing to a person or corporation and implies the idea of receipt actual or constructive. That does not mean that casual receipts is not income. Income will take in receipts of a casual and nonrecurring nature as well, if they arise from business or the exercise of a profession or occupation. It will take involuntary and gratuitous payments which are connected with the office, vocation or occupation. The surplus remaining with the person at the end of the year out of his mass receipts during the year constitute his total income for the year (Fr. Ephrem v. The Commissioner of Income tax -1989(1) K.L.T. 256 = I.L.R. 1989 (2) Kerala 86). But notional income which did not actually come to the person cannot be treated as his income (Chinna v. Sivarama Mudaliar -1987(2) K.L.T. 160). The expression 'income' in its normal connotation does not mean mere production or receipt of a commodity which may be converted into money. Income arise when the commodity is disposed of by sale, consumption or use in the manufacture or other process carried on by the person qua that commodity (S.S. Rajalinga Raja v. State of Madras - A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 814). 6. But the real question is whether in the absence of definition of 'income' in the statute the words 'total income' have to be taken as gross income or only net income. The words "aggregate income" were considered in Mammad Koya v. Executive Officer (1979 K.L.T. 58). It was held that expressions used by the legislature should be construed in the ordinary grammatical sense and full normal import when there is nothing in the context to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to use the words in a restrictive or limited sense. No such intention is discernible from the Debt Relief Act. That means, the word 'income' is not used in a restrictive sense. 7. Income must be actual or constructive for the year. The approach in assessing the income should be practical and real. Duplication in the assessment of income should be avoided. Any investment whether in the form of capital, labour or other expenses which is mided up with the return or receipts should not be added along with income. 7. Income must be actual or constructive for the year. The approach in assessing the income should be practical and real. Duplication in the assessment of income should be avoided. Any investment whether in the form of capital, labour or other expenses which is mided up with the return or receipts should not be added along with income. That investment may be from the income of that year or some previous year which may be added as income for those periods or from borrowings which will have to be repaid. Income in contrast to profits or gains means periodical monetary returns coming in and accruing to the person independently and not as the net proceeds. In that sense, income connotes incomings without regard to outgoings. Profits are the surplus by which the receipts exceed the expenditure. But profit or income can normally mean only the balance after deducting charges and losses and not mere gross receipts. When there is nothing in the statute to show that'income' is used otherwise than in the above natural and commonly accepted sense, it should be taken only as net income (Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon reprint 1987 pages 574 and 575). 'Rents and profits', 'income' and 'net income' of the estate are equivalent expressions. In the ordinary commercial sense,'income' may mean clear or net income (Bouvier's Law Dictionary 3rd Edition vol. 2 page 1527). Income of an estate is annual return from the estate and income from business is gain from it (Words & Phrases Vol. 5 page 35). 8. Income takes in receipts, actual or constructive, very often making due allowance for expenses incurred in earning such receipts (Mammad Keyi v. Wealth Tax Officer -1961 KLJ.1046). In computing the yield of trees for a particular year, an omission to exclude expenditure in connection with planting, upbringing or maintaining it may be justified in the assessment of its income. No expense must have been incurred for that year and no expense might have been necessary also. So also, in calculating business profits, the expenditure on capital investment or its interest may not be sometimes taken note of. Agriculture in the sense of raising crop in a paddy field stands on a different footing. If the land is not cultivated, there will not be any income. Income is only because the crop is raised. Raising of crop and taking the yield are in the same year. Agriculture in the sense of raising crop in a paddy field stands on a different footing. If the land is not cultivated, there will not be any income. Income is only because the crop is raised. Raising of crop and taking the yield are in the same year. But for the investment there would not have been any income. The investment must be from the income of that year or any previous year or from borrowings which will have to be repaid. If that is also added to income, it may amount to adding the same income twice and including in the income what is not income. Monetary value of the produce of agriculture will be income only after deducting the expenses incurred. If so, Rs. 2,392/- alone could be taken as the annual income of the appellant. Both the courts below went wrong in holding otherwise. If so, appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Debt Relief Act and the debt must be taken as statutorily wiped off. Second appeal is allowed. The decrees of the courts below are set aside and the suit is dismissed. No costs.