G. B. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a criminal revision against the order dt. 20-1-1981 passed by the Magistrate Pratapgarh in a case under S. 145, Cr. P. C. releasing the property in dispute in favour of Aditya Prasad Singh and Jairam Singh opposite parties 1 and 2. ( 2 ) THE dispute between the revisionists and opposite parties 1 and 2 relates to certain plots situated in village Bhopia Mau, District Pratapgarh. They were undisputedly Bhumidhari plots of one Smt. Manraj Kunwar. On 15-5-1978 S. O. of Police Station Kotwali Pratapgarh submitted a report that there is a dispute, between the parties about the aforesaid plots and it is likely to cause a breach of the peace. On that report a preliminary order was passed on 6-6-1978 and the property was attached on 5-7-1978. On service of the order both the parties put in appearance and filed their written statements. Aditya Prasad Singh and Jairam Singh who have heep described as first party in the impugned order pleaded in their written statement that Smt. Manraj Kunwar was Bhumidhar of the plots. She executed agreement for sale in their favour in respect of those plots on 19-2-1976 and delivered possession to them. The first party was, therefore, in possession of the plots at the time of the preliminary order. Sheo Badan Singh and Krishna Kumar Singh revisionists described as second party in the impugned order obtained sale deed of those plots on 20-9-1977 from Smt. Manraj Kunwar whereupon the opposite parties 1 and 2 filed Suit No. 7 of 1978 on 13-2-1978 for specific performance of the agreement and cancellation of the sale deed in the Court of the civil Judge, Pratapgath. That suit was decreed on 27-1-1979 in favour of opposite parties 1 and 2. The revisionists therefore, preferred an appeal. Thus, the suit was pending when the report was made by the police and the preliminary order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. and attachment order under S. 146, Cr. P. C. were made. The written statements by the parties were filed in February 1979 i. e. , after the decision of the civil suit for specific performance. The revisionists pleaded in their written statement that Smt. Manraj Kunwar did not execute any deed of agreement and the first party is not in possession of the plots in dispute. P. C. were made. The written statements by the parties were filed in February 1979 i. e. , after the decision of the civil suit for specific performance. The revisionists pleaded in their written statement that Smt. Manraj Kunwar did not execute any deed of agreement and the first party is not in possession of the plots in dispute. On the basis of the material placed before the learned Magistrate he came to the conclusion that there is a dispute between the parties regarding the aforesaid plots which is likely to cause a breach of the peace and the first party was in possession of the plots in dispute at the relevant time. He, therefore, passed an order for release of the property in favour of the first party and directed the second party not to interfere with the possession of the first party till the letter is evicted in due course of law. Feeling dissatisfied with this order the second party has filed the present revision. ( 3 ) THE record of the lower Court was summoned and perused and the parties counsel were heard at length. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the revisionists argued that when a civil suit was going on between the parties the Magistrate was not competent to initiate the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. In support of this argument he placed reliance upon Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. , 1985 Lucknow Civil Decisions 75 : ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ). Learned counsel for the opposite parties 1 and 2, on the other hand argued that even if civil suit in respect of the same subject matter was pending, criminal Court was not barred from exercising jurisdiction under Ss. 145 and 146, Cr. P. C. In order to strengthen his argument he placed reliance upon Jagdish v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panipat, 1987 0 Crlj 1198 (Punj and Har ). In any opinion the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists must be accepted in the circumstance of the case. ( 5 ) IT is undisputed that when the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. were initiated the suit for specific performance regarding the same property was pending in the Court of Civil Judge. In any opinion the contention of the learned counsel for the revisionists must be accepted in the circumstance of the case. ( 5 ) IT is undisputed that when the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. were initiated the suit for specific performance regarding the same property was pending in the Court of Civil Judge. There was a clear assertion of the plaintiffs in that suit that they are in possession of the land in dispute by virtue of the agreement for sale executed in their favour. The dispute for possession was, therefore, involved in that suit, the possession was therefore being examined by the civil Court when the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. were started and the dispute relating to possession had already been adjudicated, by the learned civil Judge, when the parties filed their written statements. At the time of the initiation of the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. the parties were in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as temporary injunction, appointment of receiver etc. and there was no necessity for multiplicity of litigation. In order to avoid multiplicity of litigation the learned Magistrate should have dropped proceedings when all the facts had come to his notice. This view clearly gets support from the following observations made in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. , 1985 Lucknow Civil Decisions 75 at pages 76-77 : ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ) :-"when a civil litigation is pending for the property wherein the question of possession is and has been adjudicated, we see hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceeding under S. 145 of the Code. There is no scope to doubt or dispute the position that the decree of the Civil Court is binding on the criminal Court in a matter like the one before us. Counsel for respondents 2-5 was not in a position to challenge the proposition that parallel proceedings should not be permitted to continue and in the event of a decree of the Civil Court, the criminal Court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil Court and parties are in a position to approach the civil Court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during pendency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. " ( 6 ) IN Jagdish v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Panipat, 1987 Cri LJ 1189 the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. , (AIR, 1985 SC 472) (supra) was cited and distinguished. It was observed that when in a suit for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land in dispute the Court ordered maintenance of status quo during pendency of the suit and declined to grant temporary injunction as the Court was not prima facie satisfied about any party being in possession of the land in dispute, the Magistrate is not barred from exercising jurisdiction under Ss. 145 and 146, Cr. P. C. In the present case there is no material on record indicating that the Civil Judge passed an order to maintain status quo because he was not satisfied prima facie about the plaintiffs possessions and declined to issue temporary injunction in such a circumstance. Thus, the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties 1 and 2 is distinguishable and the order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be supported. ( 7 ) AFTER having considered all the facts I am of the opinion that the present case is covered by the observations made in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U. P. , ( AIR 1985 SC 472 ) (supra) and the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. should, therefore, be quashed. ( 8 ) THE revision is, therefore, allowed and the order passed by the learned Magistrate in the proceedings under S. 145, Cr. P. C. is quashed. Petition allowed.