B. C. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) BY the impugned judgment, appellant Gwalinbai has been held guilty of causing murder of his mother-in-law Bijhobai on or about 30th December, 1983 in a jungle at a distance of about two kilometers from their residence. She has been sentenced to imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THERE can be no doubt that Bijhobai is dead. Evidence of Dr. M. C. Jam (P. W. 11) who conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the deceased and has submitted his post mortem report Ex. P-B- A clinches the issue that Bijhobai died a homicidal death as a result of injuries sustained by her and which injuries could be caused by a weapon like Tangiya. In fact, this part of the finding reached by the learned Sessions Judge who tried the appellant, has not been challenged on behalf of the appellant. ( 3 ) THE prosecution rested its case only upon circumstantial evidence, there being no eye witness to the incident. Those circumstances found by the trial Court are: (i) that the appellant was last seen together with the deceased by Narsingh (P. W. 3); (ii) that the Tangiya was recovered at the instance of the appellant from her house and was found to be stained with blood, vide report of the Serologist Ex. P-15; (iii) that their relations were stained and that they were the only inmates of the house; and (iv)from the spot of the incident broken pieces of bangles were recovered like the one which the appellant wore. According to the lower Court, the irresistible conclusion from these circumstances is that it is the appellant who caused the murder of the deceased. ( 4 ) AFTER hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this appeal must be allowed. The law relating to appreciation of circumstantial evidence is now too well settled to be mentioned. The chain of events must be complete and the only conclusion should be of the guilt of the appellant and all otherwise possibilities must be ruled out. In our opinion, most of the circumstances found proved by the lower Court are innocuous and do not point out to the guilt of the appellant at all. It has been brought about by the prosecution itself that the appellant and the deceased were the only two persons living in the house. In our opinion, most of the circumstances found proved by the lower Court are innocuous and do not point out to the guilt of the appellant at all. It has been brought about by the prosecution itself that the appellant and the deceased were the only two persons living in the house. One would, therefore, normally expect them to put on similar types of bangles. At least, such a possibility does exist. Under these circumstances, if broken pieces of bangles were found on the spot where the dead body was found were like those which the appellant wore, can hardly be said to be an incriminating circumstances against the appellant. The alleged strained relations between the two are also not such as may give furnish motive to the crime. There were quarrels between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in- law and for which, as appears from the evidence, a panchayat was convened and there was the verdict of the Panchayat. Inspite of it, they lived together. However, there is no immediate cause leading to the commission of the crime. Instead, on the case of incident, both of them and gone together to cut the wood and that was not possible if the appellant had any intention to do away with the deceased. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove any motive for commission of the crime. ( 5 ) TRUE it is that the prosecution could prove that Tangiya (Art. A) was recovered from appellants house at her instance. . It is equally true that the Tangiya Was found containing blood. Nevertheless, in absence of report of chemical examiner, it cannot be said that it contained humane blood. This circumstance, therefore, is also not helpful to the prosecution. The only remaining circumstance is, the appellants being last seen with the deceased. This is deposed to only by Narsingh (P. W. 3 ). Narsinghs statement was recorded four days after commission of the crime. No explanation has been offered for this delay in recording his statement. This, in our opinion, Narsinghs statement doubtful. In this circumstance, Narsinghs statement may not be accepted without due corroboration. This is deposed to only by Narsingh (P. W. 3 ). Narsinghs statement was recorded four days after commission of the crime. No explanation has been offered for this delay in recording his statement. This, in our opinion, Narsinghs statement doubtful. In this circumstance, Narsinghs statement may not be accepted without due corroboration. Even so, it is now well settled that the circumstance that the deceased was last seen with the accused by itself may not be sufficient to hold the accused guilty See Shankarlal v. State of M. P. ( 6 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge who tried the appellant, has gone completely wrong in holding the appellant guilty. In our opinion, the prosecution could not prove the charge against her beyond reasonable doubt. She is, therefore, entitled to be acquitted. ( 7 ) THE appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and the consequent sentence of imprisonment for life, are set aside, and she is hereby acquitted. Appeal allowed. .