JUDGMENT 1. - In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner challenges the validity and correctness of order dated 6.12.1985 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Tonk and order dated 16.12.1985 issued by the Principal, Rajasthan Police Training Centre, Jodhpur. By the impugned order dated 6.12.1985, the petitioner was discharged from the post of Police Constable and by the impugned order dated 16.12.1985, he was relieved of the post. 2. Material facts which are quite interesting may be narrated in brief. In pursuance to notice Annexure-l dated 23.6.1977 issued by the Superintendent of Police, Tonk (respondent No. 2), the petitioner applied for the post of a civil police constable. After the due process, he was selected and his name appeared at serial No. 34 in the merit list of the selected candidates. Appointment, to the candidates in the merit list at serial No. 35, 36 and 37 viz. Kishan Lal, Gorilal and Rama were given but no appointment was given to the petitioner. On inquirers made by him, he came to know that the appointment was refused to him on account of the pendency of a criminal case for offences U/Sees. 147, 323 & 325 Indian Penal Code against him and some other persons in the court of a Judicial Magistrate. The petitioner approached respondent No. 2 contending before him that the pendency of the criminal case could not be taken as a valid ground for refusing appointment to him. His attempts proved abortive. He, therefore, filed a writ petition in this Court and challenged the action of respondent No. 2 for not giving hern the appointment. By order Annexure-3 dated April 20, 1982, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground that no mandamus can be issued in respect of the making of appointments. However, it was observed in the order : "All I can say is that the petitioner is not disqualified for appointment as a police constable merely because a criminal complaint has been filed against him. Nevertheless, the matter of appointment is something which is dependent on so mary other considerations and must therefore be kit to the best judgment of the authorities in the police department. This Court cannot possibly interfere in this matter." 3. The matter lingered on and no appointment of the petitioner was made. Nevertheless, the matter of appointment is something which is dependent on so mary other considerations and must therefore be kit to the best judgment of the authorities in the police department. This Court cannot possibly interfere in this matter." 3. The matter lingered on and no appointment of the petitioner was made. On 21.11.1984 Ladu Lal who was the complainant in the criminal case, submitted application Annexure 5 before the Superintendent of Police, Tonk stating therein that the offences were compounded and as such proper orders be passed. The Superintendent of Police thereafter issued order Annexure-4 on 1.12.1984 appointing the petitioner as a constable in the civil police and he was tent for training in the Rajasthan Police Training Centre, Jodhpur. While he was undergoing the training there, the impugned order dated 16.12.1985 was served on him and he was relieved of the post. The petitioner approached the Superintendent of Police. Tonk and asked for the copy of the order dated 6.12.1985 by which he was discharged from service. No copy was, however, supplied to him by the Superintendent of Police. He ran from pillar to post and made all efforts to seek reappointment but in vain on esquires being made, he learnt that Ladu Lal submitted an application on 18.7.1985 before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jaipur stating therein that no compromise between him and the petitioner was ever made and the criminal case is still pending against the petitioner in the court of the Judicial Magistrate. The Superintendent of Police, Tonk acting on this application, passed the impugned order on 6.12.1985, discharging the petitioner from service. It was in pursuance to this order dated 6.12.1985 that the petitioner was relieved from the post while he was undergoing the training at Jodhpur. The trial of the criminal case continued. By the judgment Annexure-6 dated January 17. 1985, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk convicted the petitioner and six others for the offences Under Sections 147, 323 & 325/149 IPC. But instead of sentencing them to any punishment, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate extended the benefit of probation Under section 360 Criminal Procedure Code and released them all on probation of good conduct. The petitioner again agitated before the Superintendent of Police, Tonk that the conviction did not stand as a bar in the way of his appointment specially when the benefit of probation was extended to him. The petitioner again agitated before the Superintendent of Police, Tonk that the conviction did not stand as a bar in the way of his appointment specially when the benefit of probation was extended to him. The result was, however, zero. The petitioner has now approached this court again for quashing the impugned orders dated 6.12.1985 and 16.12.1985 with the further prayer that he be deemed to be in continuous service. 4. The petition was opposed by the respondents. The facts were not controverted. The defence taken is that the petitioner was guilty of suppressing the material fact that a criminal case was pending against him. A stand was also taken by the respondents that on account of the petitioner's conviction Under sections 147, 323 & 325/149 IPC, he stood disqualified for appointment on the post of a constable. 5. We have heard Mr. N.K. Maloo learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Addl. Government Advocate Mr. Ashok Parihar. 6. Before we deal with the contentions addressed at the bar, it is necessary to read the impugned orders : 7. The impugned order dated 6.12.1985 by which the petitioner was discharged from service reads as under: dk;kZy; iqfyl v/kh{kd] ftyk Vksad ( jkt0 ) ft0Hkk0la0 1015 fnukad 6-12-1985 vkns'k egkfuns'kd iqfyl jktLFkku t;iqj ds i= la[;k ua0 5 ( 2 ) iqfyl QkslZ@dkfu0@85 fnukad 4-12-85 dh ikyuk esa Jh xksihyky iq= txyky xqtj fuoklh dqgkMk [kqnZ Fkkuk VksMk jk;flag dkfu ua0 528 ( lh0ih0 ) ds fo:) vfHk;ksx la[;k 15@77 /kkjk 147@325@323 rk0fg0 dk iaftc) Fkk tks vHkh rd U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gS dks rRdky izHkko ls iqfyl QkslZ ls fMLpktZ fd;k tkrk gSA g0@& iqfyl v/kh{kd ftyk Vksad ( jkt0 ) dzekad ua0 5@2 Vksad&QkslZ@85@4672&75 fnukad 6-12-85 izfrfyfi 1- mi egkfujh{kd iqfyl eq[;ky; jktLFkku t;iqj dks lwpukFkZ izLrqr gSA 2- izk/kkukpk;Z jktLFkku iqfyl V~sfuax lsUVj tks/kiqj dks Hkstdj fuosnu gS fd fj�qV Jh xksihyky dkfu0 ua0 520 ftyk Vksad dks ijUrq okfil iqfyl ykbu Vksad ds fy, jokuxh nh tkos rkfd og viuh onhZ bR;kfn lkeku iqfyl ykbu Vksad esa tek djkosaA 3- fjtoZ fujh{kd iqfyl ykbu Vksad 4- twfu;j ys[kkdkj dk;kZy; 5- vkns'k i=koyh lwpukFkZ ,oa ikyukFkZ g0@& iqfyl v/kh{kd] Vksad 8. The other impugned order Annexure-7 which was passed in pursuance to the above order runs as under : dk;kZy; iz/kkukpk;Z jkt0 iq0iz0 dsUnz tks/kiqj dzekad % 67@15&14 fnukad 16-12-85 dk;kZy; vkns'k ;g iqfyl v/kh{kd ftyk Vksad ds vkns'k dzekad 4672&75 fnukad 6-12-85 ds }kjk vkj{kh Jh xksihyky iq= txyky xqtj lh0ih0 dks rRdky izHkko ls fMLpktZ fd;k tkus ds dkj.k fnukad 16-12-85 dks e/;ku ckn bl laLFkku ls lacaf/kr ftys dks Hkstk tk jgk gSA g0@& iz/kkukpk;Z jktLFkku] iqfyl vf'k{k.k dsUnz tks/kiqj izfrfyfi %& 1- iqfyl v/kh{kd ftyk Vksad dks muds vkns'k dzekad 4672&75 fnukad 6-12-85 ds lanHkZ esa izsf"kr gSA 2- lwcsnkj egT;VsM@jk'ku LVksj@la0 Dok0 ek0 vkj0vkj0Vh0lh0 tks/kiqj dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf"kr gSA 3- fjdqV xksihyky dks crkSj izLFkku vkns'kA g0@& iz/kkukpk;Z jktLFkku iqfyl izf'k{k.k dsUnz tks/kiqj 9. In assailing the impugned order dated 6.12.1985, it was contended by Mr. Maloo that the reason for the terminators of the service is bad and unsustainable. It was argued that when the appointment order was issued on 1.12.1984, the criminal case was then also pending. It was argued that neither the appointment could be refused on account of the pendency of the criminal case nor the service of the petitioner could be terminated on account of the pendency of that criminal case. Reliance in support of the contention was placed on Rule 12 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1974 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rules). The contention raised has substantial force. 10. The rules relate to the recruitment etc. of the members belonging to the police subordinate service. The police constable is a member of service' as defined in the Act and he is, therefore, governed by these rules. Part III of the Rules lay down the procedure for recruitment. Rule 12 which relates to the character of the candidate which has a direct bearing on the controversy in our hand may be usefully reproduced : "12. Character:- The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. Part III of the Rules lay down the procedure for recruitment. Rule 12 which relates to the character of the candidate which has a direct bearing on the controversy in our hand may be usefully reproduced : "12. Character:- The character of a candidate for direct recruitment must be such as to qualify him for employment in the Service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the principal Academic officer of the University or College or School in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with his School or College or University and not related to him. Note:-(1) A conviction by a Court of law need not good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violence or with a movement which has its object to overthrow by violent means of Government as by law established the mere conviction need not be regarded as a disqualification. (2) Ex-prisoners who by their disciplined life while in prison and by either subsequent good conduct have proved to be completely reformed should not be discriminated against on grounds of the previous conviction for purposes of employment in the service. Those who are convicted of offence not involving moral turpitude shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent After Care Home or if there are no such homes in a particular district from the Superintendent of Police of that district. Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude shall be required to produce a certificate from the Superintendent After Care Home endorsed by the Inspector General of Prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in After Care Home". 11. A bare reading of Rule 12 makes the position amply clear that the mere conviction of the candidate by a court of law is not regarded as a disqualification for his entry into the service. Note (2) of Rule 12 even goes further. Persons convicted of offences after sometime of their conviction can also be considered for recruitment. 11. A bare reading of Rule 12 makes the position amply clear that the mere conviction of the candidate by a court of law is not regarded as a disqualification for his entry into the service. Note (2) of Rule 12 even goes further. Persons convicted of offences after sometime of their conviction can also be considered for recruitment. We have carefully gone through the rules and nowhere we find therein that the pendency of a criminal case against a candidate disqualifies him for his entry into the service. 12. The reasons as to why the pendency of a criminal case has not been made a disqualification for the candidate to enter into the service can be well understood. The trial of a criminal case may take time and ultimately the candidate may be acquitted therein. If the appointment is refused to him on account of the pendency of a criminal case against him, it will result in gross injustice to him because even on his ultimate acquittal he cannot enter into service. The legislature, therefore, in its wisdom thought it proper that the pendency of a criminal case should not be taken to be a disqualification for entry into the service. The respondents, therefore, acted unwisely in not giving the appointment to the petitioner only on account of the pendency of a criminal case against him. The Superintendent of Police used the pendency of the criminal case as a ploy ins cutting the appointment to the petitioner It was improper on his part. Moreso when in the judgment (Annexure-3) of the writ petition filed by the petitioner, it was observed that the pendency of the criminal case was not a disqualification for appointment. The Superintendent of Police even then did not make the appointment of the petitioner. It was only when the complainant Ladu Lal filed the compromise deed that the appointment was given to the petitioner. All that we can stay is that the act of the Superintendent of Police was neither just nor proper. Regarding the impugned order dated 6.12.1985 by which the petitioner was discharged from service, we have no hesitation in quashing it. The Rules as we have pointed out above are that the pendency of a criminal case do not create a disqualification for it candidate for entry into the Service. Regarding the impugned order dated 6.12.1985 by which the petitioner was discharged from service, we have no hesitation in quashing it. The Rules as we have pointed out above are that the pendency of a criminal case do not create a disqualification for it candidate for entry into the Service. The Rules again do not say that the member of the service' can be discharged from service only on account of the pendency of a criminal case against him. 13. We have the Rajasthan Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971 (for short the 'Conduct Rules') to regulate the conduct of Government servants employed in the State. These Rules apply to the petitioners also. Rule 4 of the Conduct Rules speaks about the improper and unbecoming conduct. It would be useful to read the relevant portion of it : "4. Improper and unbecoming conduct-Any Government servant who- (i) is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude whether in the course of the discharge of his duties or not. (ii) ........(iii)..........(iv)........... shall be liable to disciplinary action." 14. This rule also speaks about the conviction and not about the pendency of the criminal case. If a Government servant has been convicted of offence involving moral turpitude, he shall be liable to disciplinary action. This rule does not speak that his services can be terminated only on account of the pendency of a criminal case against him. We persistently asked the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate to support the action of the Superintendent of Police in terminating the petitioner's service on account of the pendency of a criminal case against Item by bringing any authority, rule, regulation, notification etc. to our note. The learned Additional Government Advocate could not sustain the impugned order dated 6-12-1985. 15. We may, therefore, sum up that the service of a Government servant cannot be terminated or the Government servant cannot be discharged from service only on account of there pendency of it criminal case against him. The reason is obvious. Unless the guilt is proved, one is presumed to be innocent. Moreover, criminal case may be launched out of enmity etc. It is, therefore, the conviction and not the pendency of a criminal case which should be taken into account for disciplinary action. 16. There is one more vice which makes the impugned order dated 6-12-1985 invalid. The petitioner had entered into service. Moreover, criminal case may be launched out of enmity etc. It is, therefore, the conviction and not the pendency of a criminal case which should be taken into account for disciplinary action. 16. There is one more vice which makes the impugned order dated 6-12-1985 invalid. The petitioner had entered into service. In his appointment order itself it was written that a criminal case was pending against him acid he was given the appointment on account of some compromise between him and the complainant. The principles of natural justice in these circumstances required that the petitioner should have been heard before he was discharged from service on account of the withdrawal of compromise. The petitioner would have explained his case that he could not be discharged merely on the ground of the pendency of a criminal case against him. The Superintendent of Police issued no notice to him nor heard him before he passed the impugned order. 17. For the reasons mentioned above, we cannot uphold the impugned orders by which the petitioner was discharged from service. 18. It was, however, contended by the learned Addl. Government Advocate that in the criminal case which was pending against the petitioner, he was convicted U/Sections 147, 323 & 325 Indian Penal Code by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk vide judgment Annexure-6 dated January 17, 1985. It was argued that this conviction disqualifies the petitioner now from entering into service. It was argued that in view of this fact, the relief of reinstatement should be refused to the petitioner. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate. 19. Judgment Annexure-6 was passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 17-1-1985. The impugned order discharging the petitioner from service was passed on 6-12-1985. Thus the judgment Annexure 6 was passed nearly a year ago. Strangely enough the Superintendent of Police did not take this judgment into consideration. It appears that this judgment did not come to his knowledge. 20. Moreover, as Rule 4 of the Conduct Rules speaks that a Government servant shall be liable to disciplinary action if he is convicted for an officer involving moral turpitude. It is only after taking the disciplinary action flowing from the conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude that Government servant can be punished. 20. Moreover, as Rule 4 of the Conduct Rules speaks that a Government servant shall be liable to disciplinary action if he is convicted for an officer involving moral turpitude. It is only after taking the disciplinary action flowing from the conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude that Government servant can be punished. What would be the procedure in such a case when one is convicted is laid down in the Raj is than Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, it is yet to be decided whether the petitioner was convicted of the offences involving moral turpitude. The emphasis is not on conviction but on the conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude. It is for the disciplinary authority to whether the offences for which the petitioner was convicted involved moral turpitude. All these matters should be decided by the disciplinary authority. We cannot impose our will on that of the disciplinary authority. These are the matters which should be first decided by the disciplinary authority. These things have not been decided so far. We, therefore, leave it to the respondents to decide these matters. However, the reinstatement of the petitioner should not be refused on such matters. 21. In the result, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned orders dated 6-12-1985 and 16-12-1985 by which the petitioner was discharged and relieved from service. The petitioner will be forthwith reinstated with continuity in service. 22. It will be, however, open to the respondents to initiate the disciplinary action on account of his conviction if the same can be taken under the relevant rules.No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******