S. CHATTERJI, J. ( 1 ) - The present writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned Show Cause Notice dated October 31, 1980, November 4, 1980, 29th November, 1980, 30th January, 1981 and the impugned requisition dated October 29, 1980 copies of which are Annexure "g" and "h" respectively to the writ petition and for other consequential relief' as stated in the writ petition itself It is stated that the petitioner Dunlop India Limited is one of the principal manufacturers of tyres and tubers and various rubber products like belting, hoses etc, in India and in its factory at Shahaganj near Calcutta and also at Ambatur in Tamil Nadu. It is father stated that a considerable technological advancement was made which did away with the use of canvas cloth and used only cords known as 'warp cords', calendered or spread with rubber. It has been elaborated in details that with use of man-made fibre cord as such rayon polyester etc. it was found to be necessary to pre-treat the warp cords by subjecting it to certain chemical processes to impart the adequate strength and stretching ability. Due to various technological advancement the elimination of abrasion at the cross-over points of the warp and wept has been a very significant improvement in tyre construction. Of late steel cords are also being used for reinforcing tyres. The essential character of fabric is lacking in warp sheets as there are no wept cords or thread at all or of equal density with the wrap cords. The petitioner has chimed that the warp sheets are purchased by them from the market at a stretch when they had already been subjected to charge of the excise duty relating to the yarn under the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the petitioner Company purchased the warp cord sheets from the manufacturers thereof and the price paid by the petitioner includes excise duty, levies upto the stage of manufacturing of warp cord sheets. In the petitioner's factory, there is alleged to be continuous process of manufacture starting from the impart by way of using the rubber with various chemicals and warp cord sheets ending with finished tyre. The petitioner has referred to an expert's report giving in details as to the stages of manufacture of the product and use of the chemical and other component materials. The petitioner has referred to an expert's report giving in details as to the stages of manufacture of the product and use of the chemical and other component materials. The continuous process of making a tyre is allegedly to subject the tyre cords to rubberisation by a thin film of rubber compound being pressed to the tyre cord. The petitioner has claimed that at stages in the series of steps whether it be in the case of belting or in the case of hoses as well as in the case of tyre cord, there is negligible use of fabric and such productions do not necessary cling to the definition of 'fabric' as laid down in Tariff Item No. 19 or under 22 of the Central Excise Tariffs. It is, however, placed on, record that by a Tariff Advice No. 36/77 dated 5th of October, 1977 the Central Board of Excise and Customs purported to express the view, that tyre cords, warp sheets are classifiable as fabrics under Item Nos. 19 to 22 (as the case may be) of the Central Excise Tariffs. Consequent upon the determination as contained in the said Tariff Advice No, 36/77 demands were made for payment of excise duty under the said Act as well as additional duty of excise under the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957. Being aggrieved, the petitioner made representations to the respondents showing the true nature of the tyre cords and wrap sheets and the change on technology resulting in substitution of canvas cloth which is a true fabric by the wrap sheets. The Central Board by its letter dated June 12, 1978 held that tyre cord warp sheets was not a classifiable either under the Item Nos. 19 (1) (4) or 22 (1) (b) of the First Schedule of the said Act. However, with effect from the 24th November, 1979 the said Act. as well as the said 1937 Act were amended by the Central Excises arid Salt and Additional Duties of Excise (Amendment) Act, 1980 under which the word 'manufacture' in relation to goods comprised in the item Nos. 12, 21 and 22 of the Central Excise Tariff's was defined to include certain process mentioned therein. as well as the said 1937 Act were amended by the Central Excises arid Salt and Additional Duties of Excise (Amendment) Act, 1980 under which the word 'manufacture' in relation to goods comprised in the item Nos. 12, 21 and 22 of the Central Excise Tariff's was defined to include certain process mentioned therein. By a Trade Notice No. 154/cotton Fab.-10ce/80 dated 30th September, 1980 issued by the West Bengal Collectorate purported to announce with tyre cord warp sheets were fabric and were to be classified under Item No. 19 or 20 passed on the Content of fabric or yarn or both used in this manufacture as the case may be. Pursuant to the above trade notice, the petitioner has been served with a communication dated 28/29th October, 1980 issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise alleging that tyre cord warp sheets were classifiable as warp sheets under Central Excise Tariffs Item No. 19 or No. 22 based on the contents of fabrics from yarn or both used in its manufacture. The petitioner has been called upon to take out the licence and to submit various applications and/or' declarations on the footing of the said communication. The petitioner is alleged to have been served with the notices to show cause-cum-demand as indicated above. Stating all these facts in details, the petitioner Company has moved the present writ petition on the ground that rubberisation tyre cord warp sheets and/or rubberised materials with vulcanisation is an intermediary and in-process stage and in a continuous process of manufacture which does not and cannot involve clearance or removal for the purpose of attracting excise duty. The application of non-vulcanised rubber, warp cord sheets and/or rubberised materials being sticky and adhesive substance is impossible of handling separately as a product and is of no use in a continuous process of manufacture ending with tyres and other rubber products of different number of plies. The warp cord sheets is not commercially known as 'fabric' and it is accepted as such by those who used the warp cord sheets. The warp cord sheets is not commercially known as 'fabric' and it is accepted as such by those who used the warp cord sheets. A mere process cannot be equated with manufacture and the process applicable to a tyre cord warp sheets and/or rubberised materials does not amount to manufacture and as such no duty of excise can be levied on a process not amounting to manufacture within the meaning of Entry 84 of List I of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. The Rule was issued on 18th of February, 1981. ( 2 ) THE writ petition is contested by the respondents by filing affidavit-in-opposition. It is disclosed therein that the petitioner Company manufactures diverse exciseable goods including tyres falling under Item No. 16, Rubber product falling under Item No 16a and goods covered by the residuary Item No. 68 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises 1t Act, 1944. For carrying out the manufacturing operation as aforesaid, the petitioner company purchases textile fabrics commonly known in the market as "tyre, cord wrap sheet" from the producers of such textile fabrics These tyre cord warp sheets can be made of cotton yarn or of synthetic and/or man made yarn. The yarn so obtained are first come in companies and thereafter the said yarns are in a twisting machines. After twisting is complete the twisted yarns are used in warp yarns on a loom. There was all a1ong a confusion and/or doubt as to the Classification of said tyre cord warp sheets, whether made of cotton or of rayon, nylon yarn under the provisions of the said Act for the purpose of levy and/or imposition of duty thereon. The dispute regarding classification tyre cord warp sheets has been set at rest and a clear-cut unambiguous advice as to the attraction of excise duty in this behalf, a Tariff Advice bearing No. 52/80 dated 10. 9. 50 was issued indicating the principle that tyre cord warp sheet depending on the nature of yarn content should be classified either Item No. 19 or Item No. 22 of the said First Schedule to the said Act. 9. 50 was issued indicating the principle that tyre cord warp sheet depending on the nature of yarn content should be classified either Item No. 19 or Item No. 22 of the said First Schedule to the said Act. By an Act, namely the Central Exercises and Salt Additional Duties of Excise (Amendment) Act, 1980 there is an amendment to Section 2 (f) was made and simultaneously with the said amendments in the substantive law corresponding amendments were carried outs in the First Schedule against the respective Item No. 19 (1) 21, 21 (1) , 22 (1) of the first Schedule importing and unsearching therein the required concept of processing which was to be construed as manufacture within the meaning of the said section 2 (f) as amended by the said Amending Act. Pursuant to the issue of Trade Notice No. 154/cotton Fabrics/10/ce/80 dated 30. 9. 80 as stated above, the respondent No. 4, the Superintendent of Central Excise, Dunlop-I Range invited the attention of the petitioner Company informing inter alia that it was cord warp sheets be classifiable under Item No. 19 or Item No. 22 of the First Schedule of the said Act, the petitioner Company should not clearly consume in the petitioner's factory any process fabric without payment of Central Excise Duty thereon from the date of receipt of the said letter. The petitioner Company was also requested to submit an application for Central Excise Licence for manufacture of the processed fabrics and furnish a necessary declaration, classification list and price list along with relevant records. Inspite of such specific communication, the petitioner company failed and ignored to comply with the said request and the respondent No. 4 to furnish the requiring information and the respondent No. 4 had no alternative but to issue show-cause-cum-demand notices on different dates. ( 3 ) THE petitioner, however, controverted the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition by filing an affidavit-in-reply and reiterated the stand already taken in the main writ petition. ( 4 ) DR. Pal, the Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has strongly argued that the notices to show cause and the trade notice are absolutely irregular and illegal, and in fact there is no bar to challenge such Show Cause Notices and the Writ lies. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the decision reported in AIR 1962 S. C. , P. 1893 (Messrs. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the decision reported in AIR 1962 S. C. , P. 1893 (Messrs. East India, Commercial Company Limited Calcutta and Anr. vs. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Ors.) and also 1984 (2) E. Cus. Case. at Page 241. Dr. Pal has strongly relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1986 S. C. Page 1097 (Union Carbide India Limited vs. Union of India and Ors.) According to him the materials disclosed in the instant ease do not warrant the claim of excise duty for the products manufactured by the petitioner Company and steps taken by the respondents are otherwise guaranteed and uncalled for and the interference by the Writ Court is justified. ( 5 ) A strong argument has also been made on behalf of the contesting respondents by drawing the attention of the Court that the steps taken by the respondent authorities in issuing the notices consistent are well justified according to law. Such steps are neither contrary to nor inconsistent with the provisions of excise laws and the settled principles to demand excise duties as interpreted by various recent reported decisions. ( 6 ) HAVING gone through the detailed pleadings of the parties and considering the submissions made by the Learned Counsels appearing for the respects parades, this Court finds that in A. I. R. 1962 S. C. Page 1893 (supra) it was found that a writ of Prohibition is an order directed to an inferior Tribunal forbidding it continuing with a proceeding therein on the ground that the proceeding is without and/or in excess of jurisdiction and contrary to the law of the land statutory or otherwise. It has clearly been decided that where a Collector of Customs proposes to take action under Section 167 (8) of the Central Customs Act read with Section 3 (2) of the Imports and Export (Control) Act, 1947, the proceedings under the said Sections being quasi-judicial in nature, whether a statute provides for a notice or not, it is incumbent upon the Collector to issue notice to the importer disclosing the circumstances under which proceedings are sought to be limited against him. Any proceedings, taken without such notice would be against the principles of natural justice and if on a reading of the said notice it is manifest on the assumption that the facts alleged or allegations made therein are true. If none of the conditions laid down in the specified sections was contravened, the Collector would have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings pursuant to their notices. In such a case the Collector can be prohibited from proceeding with the same. This Court has looked to the said principle and with regard to the facts of the present case it does not find that such principles are at all applicable. It is needless to observe that anything prohibited in law cannot be pursued by any authority, and any quasi-judicial authority is indeed prohibited to exercise any power in excess of its jurisdiction or beyond its jurisdiction. certainly, the writ will lie in such a case. In the instant case, however, there is something more. The dispute has arisen as to whether the products manufactured by the petitioner are covered by such Tariff Items which would attract duties. The respondent authorities have issued the impugned notices calling upon the petitioner to submit the explanation and the matter would be adjudicated the proper perspective. The Writ Court will not certainly interfere with the adjudicating process in the manner as provided in the Statute. Unless there is lack of jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings or that there is something done in excess of the jurisdiction which will cause manifest injustice to the parties the Writ Court will be slow to interfere with the functions of the statutory authority or any inferior Tribunal. This Court has also looked to the decision reported in A. I. R. 1986 S. C. , Page 1097 (supra ). There it has been found that aluminium cans produced and subsequently developed by the manufacturer into a completed and perfected component for being used as flashlight cases mere held not excisable goods and therefore, do not fall within the terms of Section 3 read with Entry 27 ,of the First Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 The aluminium cans prepared by the manufacturer of flashlights and are not sold is aluminium cans in the market. Also, the aluminum cans at the point at which excise duty has been levied, exist in a crude and elementary form incapable of being employed at that stage as a component flashlight. The cans have sharp uneven edges and in order to use them as a component in making flashlight cases the cans have to undergo various process such as trimming, threading and redrawn. After the cans are trimmed, threaded and redrawn, they are roaded, beaded and anodised or painted. It is at that point only that they become distinct complete component, capable of being used as a flashlight case for using battery cells and having a bulb fitted to the case. The question arose there as to whether the aluminium cans manufactured by the appellant are capable of sale to the consumer. It appeared on the facts before the Supreme Court that there are only two manufacturers of flashlights in India, the Union Carbide (India) Limited being one at them. The record disclosed the various processes of manufacturing of aluminium cans. Not a single instance was provided by the respondents demonstrating that such aluminium cans manufactured by the Union Carbide (India) Limited as covered by the said case can have a market. It was, however, also found that it did not seem to the Supreme Court that in order to attract excise duty the article manufactured must be capable of sale to a consumer. Entry 84 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution specifically speaks of the duties of excises on tobacco and other goods manufactured and produced in India and it is now will accepted that excise duty is an indirect tax only. The burden of the result is passed on the ultimate consumers. This Court being aware of the principles of law to attract the excise duties, has considered the present ease as to whether the issuance of the impugned notices and the trade notice are otherwise invalid and those should be struck down so that no proceedings can be initiated to adjudicate the matter in accordance with law. With great anxities, this Court has scrutinized the impugned notices and the requisitions but does not find those steps are found to be either irregular or invalid. The objections taken by the petitioner Comply are absolutely premature in nature. With great anxities, this Court has scrutinized the impugned notices and the requisitions but does not find those steps are found to be either irregular or invalid. The objections taken by the petitioner Comply are absolutely premature in nature. It is upto the petitioner Company to explain in response to the imposed notices to show cause that the products manufactured by the petitioner company do not attract the excise duty as per particular Tariff Items. There, the matter may be decided by admitting evidence if required. But it is obviously not permitted to challenge the notices treating them as steps beyond jurisdiction. This Court finds that the contentions made by the petitioners do not find support in law and this Court does not find any merit to challenge such steps of the respondents. This Court finds that the impugned notices and the requisitions made by the respondents are well justified and there is no bar and/or impediment to allow the respondents to proceed with such notices and to adjudicate the proceedings in accordance with law by giving all reasonable opportunities to petitioner and by complying with the principles of natural justice, on this finding there is no merit in the writ petition. The Rule is discharged. All interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs. The prayer for stay of operation of this order is refused. Rule discharged