Mahinder Narain ( 1 ) FROM the papers filed by plaintiff in this case, it is apparent that after the petition was filed, the matter was actually set down as a contested matter for trial. The husband gave evidence in support of his petition, which evidence was recorded by Mr, Justice Sheldon, and he preferred the evidence of husband to evidence tendered by the wife, the plaintiff herein, and he found, "i am satisfied that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with her. There is no doubt that the marriage has broken down, and the husband is entitled to decree nisi". The case before Mr. Justice Sheldon was, therefore, tried, and the judgment given, a decree nisi passed, which was made decree absolute, and was given on the merits of the case. ( 2 ) SECTION 1 of Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, is; "1. (1) Subject to section 3 below, a petition for divorce may be presented. . . . . on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. (2) The court hearing a petition for divorce shall not hold the marriage to have broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of one or more of the following: (a) (b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent ,. . . . . . "it is to be noted that in the Matrimonial Causes Act, no ground is stated as "cruelty". The harsh and accusatory nature of the word "cruelty" seems to have been deliberately avoided by the Parliament in England, and instead it has enacted that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. ( 3 ) UNDER the provisions of S. 13 (l) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, a party to a marriage is entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party after solemnization of the marriage, has treated the petitioner with cruelty. This provision covers the same g ound, as is covered by the provisions of section l (l) (2) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. The Matrimonial Causes Act having taken away the accusatory nature of the assertion, which is required to be made under the Hindu Marriage Act. This provision covers the same g ound, as is covered by the provisions of section l (l) (2) (b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. The Matrimonial Causes Act having taken away the accusatory nature of the assertion, which is required to be made under the Hindu Marriage Act. It is, therefore not possible to say that the Court in England has refused to recognise the law of India. ( 4 ) IT is also not possible for me to say that the proceedings in England having been entertained by a court who was not competent to entertain the same according to the laws of England, or that it entertained the same on an incorrect view of the international law. ( 5 ) FACTUALLY the plaintiff herein and the respondent in the proceedings in England, did have the opportunity to defend the suit filed against her. She led evidence in those proceedings. She just happens to have failed to have a decision in her favour. An opportunity of hearing been granted, it is not right to assert that the proceedings in England were opposed to natural justice. Nor is it proper to say that the judgment by a court of England has not been given on the merits of the case. In my view, the assertions made in the "particulars" annexed to the petition, it has been shown to me, and reproduced hereabove, could be made u/s 13 (l) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act regarding treatment of the petitioner with cruelty. The claim in the proceedings in England cannot, therefore, be said to be founded on the breach of law in force in India. ( 6 ) THERE is no assertion that the judgment has been obtained by fraud. As regards S. 19 of H. M. Act, that relates to jurisdiction, and it confers jurisdiction to courts with respect to marriages solemnized in India, to the place where the marriage was solemnized where the respondent at the time of presentation of the petition, resides, or the parties to the marriage last resided together. ( 7 ) THE petition in England was served on the plaintiff in England on 6. 7. 1985. ( 7 ) THE petition in England was served on the plaintiff in England on 6. 7. 1985. The respondent was residing in England at that time, and therefore, Sec. 19 could not be said to be violated as the plaintiff was at that time in England according to her case, for the purpose of joining the husband. Instead, the petition was served upon her. The requirement u/s 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not permanent residence, but residence, and residence in England with the intention to join the husband, was residence within the meaning of S. 19 of the Hindu Marriage Act. ( 8 ) AS far as Sec. 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act is concerned, it relates to the maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. There is no assertion in the plaint that the petition for maintenance or expenses for litigation were asked for from the husband, and refused. What was available in England to the plaintiff was to ask for and seek legal aid. The legal aid was sought, and as asserted in the plaint before me, the legal aid was refused. ( 9 ) IN the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to hold that there is breach of Ss. 13, 19 and 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, as asserted in para 42 of the plaint. As there was no refusal to recognise the law in India, and the judgment does not sustain the claim founded on a breach of law in force in India, in my view, the conditions postulated u/s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. are not fulfilled, and the plaintiff does not have any cause of action to challenge the conclusiveness of the judgment of the court in England, by which a decree of divorce has been granted by the High Court of Justice, Family Division (Divorce) District Registry, United Kingdom in cause No. 85 D, captioned Jagbir Singh Beniwal v. Anoop Beniwal, in favour of the defendant, and in view of the fact that the said decree of divorce dated 10. 10. 1988 does not suffer on account of any of the exceptions which are made in Sec. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no cause of action available with the plaintiff to institute this suit. 10. 1988 does not suffer on account of any of the exceptions which are made in Sec. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no cause of action available with the plaintiff to institute this suit. ( 10 ) IN as much as the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against the defendant, I have no alternative, but to reject the plaint. Ordered accordingly.