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1989 DIGILAW 402 (ORI)

MANDO KUMHHARUNI v. DUTIA RANA

1989-11-30

V.GOPALASWAMY

body1989
JUDGMENT : V. Gopalaswamy, J. - The facts giving rise to this revision may be briefly stated as follows: At the instance of the present Petitioner Mando Kumbharuni, the learned Executive Magistrate, Sonepur, by his order dated 10-10-1985 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 154 of 1985, initiated proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of Ac.15.59 dec. of 1and of fourteen plot numbers under Khata No. 242 of Lachhipur (within Dungripali P. S. in Bolangir district) and the present Petitioner is the first party and the present opposite party Nos. 1 to 13 are the second party members. While passing the said preliminary order dated 10-10-1985, the learned Magistrate directed the attachment of the standing paddy crop u/s 145(8), Code of Criminal Procedure. The opposite party No. 1 Dutia Rana, son of Rahas Rana, filed Criminal Revision No. 67/102 of 1985 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Bolangir, challenging the order of the learned Magistrate dated 10-10-1985 initiating proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the lands in dispute. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, by his order dated 9-12-1985, set aside the order of the Executive Magistrate dated 10 -10-1985 initiating proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure and allowed the revision. Being aggrieved by that order, the present Petitioner (first party) has preferred this revision. 2. The Petitioner Mando Kumbharuni filed Title Suit No. 87 of 1966 in the court of the Munsif, Sonepur, for declaration of her title over the plaint 'B' schedule lands, which includes the lands which are the subject-matter of the 145, Code of Criminal Procedure proceeding. The suit was decreed and her title in respect of the said 'B' schedule lands was declared. Rahas Rana (father of the present opposite party No. 1) preferred the Title Appeal No. 57/42 of 1970/71 before the learned Subordinate Judge, Sonepur and the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the said Rahas Rana preferred Second Appeal No. 161 of 1973 before this Court. However, the Petitioner had taken possession of the 'B' schedule lands on 5-12-1973. The Second Appeal was only partly allowed in that this Court held that both the parties were entitled to joint possession. Subsequently, Rahas Rana filed a petition u/s 144, Code of Civil Procedure) in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1979 in the court of the learned Minsif for restitution of his share of lands. The Second Appeal was only partly allowed in that this Court held that both the parties were entitled to joint possession. Subsequently, Rahas Rana filed a petition u/s 144, Code of Civil Procedure) in Misc. Case No. 1 of 1979 in the court of the learned Minsif for restitution of his share of lands. The learned Munsif rejected the petition for restitution. Being aggrieved by the said order of the Munsif, the said Rahas Rana preference Misc. Appeal No. 5 of 1980 before the Subordinate Judge. Sonepur, and the same was allowed by him. As against the said order of restitution, the present Petitioner preferred Misc. Appeal No. 69 of 1983 before this Court and the impugned order of restitution was stayed by this Court. This Court by judgment dated 13-5-1988 set aside the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and allowed the appeal. It is in the background of the above stated facts, the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bolangir, merits consideration to find out if the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge setting aside the order of the Executive Magistrate initiating proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the lands in dispute is in accordance with law. 3. On a perusal of the impugned judgment, it is seen that the learned Additional Sessions Judge relied on the decision Ram Sumer Puri Mahant Vs. State of U.P. and Others for holding that the 145, Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings are not maintainable. In the appeal before the Supreme Court in respect of the very property, which was the subject-matter of proceedings u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, there was a Title Suit for possession and injunction, filed in the court of the civil Judge, and the Appellant was the Defendant in that suit and close relations of Respondents 2 to 5 were the Plaintiffs and after going into the question of title, the suit was dismissed by judgment dated 28-2-1981, and an appeal was carried from the decree of the civil Judge and the same was still pending. Considering these facts, when the 145, Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings were initiated, the Supreme Court found that there was no justification for initiating a preliminary criminal proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure as it was open to the parties to move the appellate court for appropriate interim orders. Considering these facts, when the 145, Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings were initiated, the Supreme Court found that there was no justification for initiating a preliminary criminal proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure as it was open to the parties to move the appellate court for appropriate interim orders. In the Supreme Court case, it is a suit for injunction as well. In this case the petition filed for restitution by opposite party No. l's father was rejected by the Munsif. No doubt the Misc. Appeal preferred by opposite party No. 1's father was allowed by the Sub-Judge, but the order so passed by the Sub-Judge directing restitution was stayed by this Court in Misc. Appeal No. 69 of 1983. The proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated on 10-10-1985. So by the date of the initiation of the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure no interim order was passed by this Court with respect to possession of the lands in dispute. Hence the principle decided in Ram Sumer Mahant's case (supra) by the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 4. In Brajamohan Nath Vs. Smt. Kesi Tripathy and Another a decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, this Court held as follows: It is well settled in law that mere institution of a civil suit does not take away the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to initiate a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, unless an interim arrangement has been made by the civil court in the matter, of possession by an order of injunction or appointment of a receiver. The Magistrate has always jurisdiction to initiate and continue a proceeding, u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent breach of peace and to maintain law and order irrespective of the pendency of a civil suit unless an interim order of the civil court with respect to the possession of the disputed land is in operation. Hence in view of the above quoted observations of this Court, it is clear that merely because the Misc. Appeal in the matter of restitution of the lands in dispute was pending, it cannot be said that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. Hence in view of the above quoted observations of this Court, it is clear that merely because the Misc. Appeal in the matter of restitution of the lands in dispute was pending, it cannot be said that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. On a perusal of the impugned judgment it appears that before the learned Executive Magistrate each of the parties was claiming his exclusive possession over the disputed land. There is a dispute between the two parties, each of whom asserts the right to hold exclusive possession of the property as against the other, and because of such dispute, as there is every likelihdod of the breach of the peace, a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. 6. In this Court the learned Counsel for the opposite parties (second party) contended that as his party was in joint possession of the lands in question along with the other party, the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is not maintainable. Even if such a contention merits consideration, then also there is a dispute between the parties, the Petitioner claiming exclusive possession over the disputed land, whereas the opposite parties claim that they were in joint, possession over the disputed land. The learned, counsel for the opposite wrties contended that as the dispute is regarding the joint possession over the disputed lands, the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is not maintainable. In this context he relied on the decision Khetri Pradhan and Ors. v. Jagannath Pradhan and Ors. 40 (1974) C.L.T. 1283: In the said decision what was held is that where the dispute is with regard to the property in the joint possession of the parties, a proceeding cannot be initiated u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case whether at all the disputed lands were in the joint possession of the parties is itself a point to be decided by the Magistrate. So the above cited decision is in, no way helpful to the opposite parties in the present case. 7. In the decision Mallik Rafiq and Another Vs. Mallik Abdul Hakim and Another this Court held, relying on a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Kesheo Prasad Singh Vs. So the above cited decision is in, no way helpful to the opposite parties in the present case. 7. In the decision Mallik Rafiq and Another Vs. Mallik Abdul Hakim and Another this Court held, relying on a Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Kesheo Prasad Singh Vs. Ram Baran Chaubey that where one-set of persons claim exclusive possession on some lands, whereas another set of persons claim to be in joint possession along with them, a proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure would lie. In Mt. Sudamawati Kuer Vs. Ram Chandra Singh and Others relying on Kesheo Prasad Singh Vs. Ram Baran Chaubey the Division. Bench of the Patna High Court held that there can be a proceeding u/s 145 where persons jointly interested in land have a dispute with regard possession of the property. A case in which one party claims exclusive possession but another party claim to be in joint possession with the other party, is no less a question of disputed actual possession than if each party claimed exclusive possession of the entire area and, therefore, the question falls within the purview of Section 145. Hence relying on the above referred decisions, I hold that even if the opposite parties claim joint possession over the disputed lands, even then the proceeding u/s 145. Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. 8. Hence it is seen that in any view of the matter, whether the opposite parties claim exclusive possession or joint possession over the disputed lands the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable. Except for the reason that there is no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and as provided by Section 145(5), a proceeding initiated by a preliminary order u/s 145(1) must run its full course. (See Mathuralal Vs. Bhanwarlal and Another, . Hence in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Executive Magistrate initiating the proceeding u/s 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. In the result, the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is hereby set aside and the revision is allowed and Criminal Misc. Case No. 154 of 1985 is restored to the file of the learned. Executive Magistrate, Sonepur and he is directed to dispose of the Criminal Misc. 9. In the result, the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is hereby set aside and the revision is allowed and Criminal Misc. Case No. 154 of 1985 is restored to the file of the learned. Executive Magistrate, Sonepur and he is directed to dispose of the Criminal Misc. Case in accordance with law after giving notice to the parties. Revision allowed. Final Result : Allowed