JUDGMENT S. B. Sinha, J. All these Letters Patent Appeals, with the consent of the parties, were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The basic facts of the case are not much in dispute. 3. Dr. N. P. Rao, appellant in L. P. A. No. 91/89 (R) and respondent no. 1 in L. P. A. No. 65/89 (R) and Sri B. P. Singh, appellant in L. P. A. No. 67/89 (R) and respondent no. 2 in L. P. A. No. 63/89 (R), filed application before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Jamshedpur under Section 26 (2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), which were registered as B. S. E. Case No. 2 of 1984 and B. S. E. Case No. 12 of 1987 respectively. 4. In their complaint petition, Dr. N. P. Rao and Sri B. P. Singh alleged that the management obtained letters of resignation from them forcibly upon threat, coercion and intimidation and thus the same amounts to termination of their service. 5. In the aforementioned cases under Section 26 (2) of the Act, the management, inter alia, took an objection that the submission of a letter of resignation does not come within the purview of dismissal, discharge or otherwise termination of services inasmuch as the same requires passing of a positive order by the management and in absence thereof, a complaint petition under Section 26 (2) of the Act, would not be maintainable. In the alternative, it was submitted that in any event as the complainants did not plead particulars of fraud or coercion etc. nor adduced any evidence in this regard, the complaint petitions were liable to be dismissed. 6. In the alternative, it was submitted that in any event as the complainants did not plead particulars of fraud or coercion etc. nor adduced any evidence in this regard, the complaint petitions were liable to be dismissed. 6. The Presiding Officer, Jamshedpur, however, by reason of an order dated 8-9-1988 passed in B. S. E. Case No. 2 of 1984 (Sri N. P. Rao vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.), an order dated 17-12-1988 passed in B. S. E. Case No. 12 of 1987 (Sri B. P. Sinha v. Tata Robin Fraser Ltd.) held that the complaint petitions filed by the complainants aforementioned were maintainable under Section 26 (2) of the Act, and further held that the purported letters of resignation being not voluntary ones, the same would come within the purview of 'otherwise terminated' as contemplated under Section 26 (2) of the Act, and on the basis of the said findings granted appropriate relief’s to the said complainants. 7. M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in B. S. E. Case No. 12 of 1987, filed a writ application in this Court which was marked as C. W. J. C. No. 93 of 1989 (R). M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. purported to be aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court in B. S. E. Case No. 12 of 1987 filed a writ petition in this Court which was marked as C.W.J.C. No. 2234 of 1988 (R). 8. C.W.J.C. No. 93 of 1989 (R) and C.W.J.C. No. 2234 of 1989 (R) were heard together by a learned Single Judge of this Court and by a judgment dated 13th April, 1989, the said petitions were allowed and the cases were remitted back to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur with certain directions. 9. By reason of the aforementioned judgment, the learned single Judge held that if a letter of resignation is obtained by fraud or coercion, the same would amount to termination of services of the concerned employee by the employer and thus a complaint petition at the instance of the employee under Section 26 (2) of the Act, would be maintainable. 10. The learned single Judge, however, held that in the said cases, the complainants had failed to plead particulars of fraud etc. 10. The learned single Judge, however, held that in the said cases, the complainants had failed to plead particulars of fraud etc. as is required under Order VI, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code, and as such, they were not entitled to the relief’s granted in their favour by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur on the basis of the pleadings and evidences adduced on their behalf. The learned Single Judge, however, remitted the matters back to the Labour Court at Jamshedpur, with a direction that the said court should give an opportunity to the complainants to amend their pleadings, if they so wanted and should further give an opportunity to the parties to adduce further evidences. 11. The writ petitioners, as also the concerned employees have filed these letters patent appeals against the aforementioned judgments passed by the learned Single Judge in C.W.J.C. Nos. 93/89 (R) and 2234/89 (R). 12. Mr. K. D. Chatterjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in L. P. A. Nos. 63 and 65 of 1989 (R), firstly submitted that Section 26 of the Act, contemplates filing of complaint petition when the cessation of service of an employee is caused by a positive Act, on the part of the employer and not by an Act, of the employee. 13. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 26 of the said Act, speaks of an order and thus passing of an order in writing is a condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court there under. The learned counsel, in this connection, placed strong reliance upon a division Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Kumar Sharma vs. State of Bihar reported in 1984 PLJR 832. 14. The learned counsel further submitted that Section 26 of the Act, does not contemplate entertainment of a complaint petition for all types of termination of services which may otherwise come within the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel, in this connection, has placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in R. P. Jaiswal vs. Bikran Singh, reported in 1977 BBCJ 711 and a decision of Madras High Court in C. R. Ramaswami vs. M/s Needle Industries (1) Ltd., reported in 1981 Labour and Industrial Cases page 765. 15. The learned counsel, in this connection, has placed strong reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in R. P. Jaiswal vs. Bikran Singh, reported in 1977 BBCJ 711 and a decision of Madras High Court in C. R. Ramaswami vs. M/s Needle Industries (1) Ltd., reported in 1981 Labour and Industrial Cases page 765. 15. The learned counsel next submitted that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court being a limited one and having been created by reason of the provisions of a statute, it could not acquire jurisdiction by creating a legal fiction that a resignation which cannot be an Act, of employee, in a given circumstances, may be treated to be an order of termination passed by an order of employer. 16. Mr. Chatterjee, further submitted that the words of a statute cannot be altered by tearing the veil nor the limited jurisdiction can be extended by this process. 17. The learned counsel next submitted that the decision of the learned Single Judge, to the effect that a letter of resignation which has been obtained by practicing fraud or coercion of the employee would amount to termination, is erroneous in law. 18. The learned counsel also contended that the learned Single Judge has wrongly relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Southern Roadways, Bangalore vs. K. Padmanbhan, reported in 1979 L.I.C. 234 and the decision of Bombay High Court in Shriam S. S. Sanstha vs. Education Officer, S. P., Nagpur, reported in 1984 L.I.C. 100. 19. The learned counsel submitted that the words "or otherwise terminated" occurring in Section 26 of the said Act, must be read in the context of the statute and as such the words should not be given the same meaning which is given under the Industrial Disputes Act. The learned counsel, in this connection, has referred to a passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statute, 12 Edition page 76. 20. The learned counsel further submitted that in this case, the concerned employees did not at all state the requisite material Facts nor gave particulars so as to plead fraud, coercion or duress in their respective complaint petition under Section 26 of the Act. 21. 20. The learned counsel further submitted that in this case, the concerned employees did not at all state the requisite material Facts nor gave particulars so as to plead fraud, coercion or duress in their respective complaint petition under Section 26 of the Act. 21. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event, that order of fresh trial passed by the learned Single Judge in his impugned judgment is impermissible in law inasmuch as a fresh trial on a fresh pleading and on fresh evidence is not permissible in law nor a court can direct a party to amend his pleadings suo motu. The learned counsel, in this connection, has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Corporation vs. Pancham reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C, 1008 and a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Sri Chand vs. Lakshmi Singh, reported in AIR 1969 Patna 107. 22. Mr. Chatterjee, further submitted that in any event, in this case, the complainants did not make any prayer for amendment of their pleadings either before the Labour Court or before the learned Single Judge nor filed any application for adducing additional evidence but in fact in letters patent appeals filed by them, they had taken a definite plea that the pleadings in the complaint petitions and the evidences adduced in the cases were sufficient for disposal of the case and neither any amendment in pleadings nor any additional evidence was necessary. 23. Mr. Tapen Sen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr. N. P. Rao, appellant in L.P.A. No. 91 of 1989(R) and respondent no. 1 in L.P.A. No, 65 of 1989(R), submitted that it was not necessary for the learned single Judge to remit the case back to the Labour Court as there had been sufficient pleadings in the complaint petition so as to bring the case of the complainant within the purview of otherwise terminated as envisaged under Section 26 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act. 24. The learned counsel further submitted not only there has been pleading but also there are evidences on the record to show that the resignation purported to have been tendered by the concerned employee, was not a voluntary one but a forced one. 24. The learned counsel further submitted not only there has been pleading but also there are evidences on the record to show that the resignation purported to have been tendered by the concerned employee, was not a voluntary one but a forced one. He took us through the pleadings as contained in the complaint petition as also the findings arrived at by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur and submitted that the 'employee' has been able to prove 'coercion' on the part of the employer which vitiates the purported resignation submitted by him. 25. Learned counsel further submitted that the superior officer of the employee was in a dominating position and he coerced Dr. Rao and created such a situation so the employee had no other option but to obey the dictate of the superior officer. 26. The learned counsel further submitted that the very fact that the letter of resignation was obtained on the basis that the employee was found guilty of serious charges against him in a domestic enquiry coupled with the fact that the letter of resignation was kept typed by the superior officer and the acceptance thereof was aim ready and had already been signed, go to show that the said letter of resignation was obtained by coercion. 27. The learned counsel further submitted that the action on the part of the employer is thus vitiated in law. The learned counsel in this connection, has relied upon a well known decision of the Supreme Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguli, reported in 1986, Vol. 3, S. C. C. 156 at page 215. 28. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event, the provisions of the said Act, being a beneficent legislation the same should be construed in favour of the employee and thus the words 'otherwise terminated' should be given a broad and liberal meaning. The learned counsel, in this connection, relied open a decision in Regional Director E.S.I.C., Trichur Vs. Ramanaj Masch Industries, reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 278 and in Das Raj Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1988 S. C. 1182. 29. The learned counsel, in this connection, relied open a decision in Regional Director E.S.I.C., Trichur Vs. Ramanaj Masch Industries, reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 278 and in Das Raj Vs. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1988 S. C. 1182. 29. The learned counsel further submitted that, in any event, the findings of fact arrived at by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur, are binding upon this Court and the said findings of fact should not have been interfered with by the learned Single Judge only on the ground that there is no sufficient pleadings, particularly when both the parties understood the issues involved in the proceeding before the Labour Court. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision in Syed Yakoob Vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in AIR 1964 S. C. 477, in Babhutmal Vs. Laxmibai, reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 1297 and in Calcutta Port Shramik Union Vs. Calcutta R.sT. Association, reported in AIR 1988 S.C. 2168 . 30. Mr. Sen further submitted that termination of service may be brought about by adopting any method including one by procurement of forcible resignation and/or compulsory retirement. The learned counsel, in this connection, has placed strong reliance in the Manager, Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. J. Bastian, reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1110. 31. Replying to the contention of Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Sen, submitted that the decision of this Court in Krishana Kumar Sharma's case (supra) is not applicable inasmuch as in the said decision, the issue before this Court was as to whether the delay in filing the complaint under Section 26(2) of the said Act, should be condoned and from which date the limitation for filing such an application commence. The learned counsel, in this connection has also drawn our attention to unreported judgment of S. Roy. J, in Hanuman Saw Mills in CWJC No. 1775/85(R), disposed of on 12.5.1978 32. Mr. K. N. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in L.P.A. No. 67/89(R) and respondent no. 2 in L.P.A. No. 63/89(R), adopted the submission of Mr. Sen and further submitted that ‘forced’ resignation are covered by the words or otherwise terminated’ from service. 33. The learned counsel also submitted that the word 'coercion' must mean use of physical or mental force and in this connection, the learned counsel has referred to Curzan's Dictionary of Law at page 63. 34. Sen and further submitted that ‘forced’ resignation are covered by the words or otherwise terminated’ from service. 33. The learned counsel also submitted that the word 'coercion' must mean use of physical or mental force and in this connection, the learned counsel has referred to Curzan's Dictionary of Law at page 63. 34. The learned counsel further relied upon a recent decision of Bombay High Court in R.S. Survey vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., reported in 1989 Vol. I, Current Labour Reporter page 553 : 1189 Labour and Industrial Cases page 1406. 35. According to the learned counsel, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, after taking into consideration the decisions of the Supreme Court and various other decision has come to the conclusion that a forced resignation amounts to dismissal or discharge from service. The learned counsel submitted that as 'resignation' in this case was obtained by coercion, the same cannot be said to be a voluntary one. The learned counsel, in this connection, has also relied upon a decision in State of U.P. vs. Dharamvir Singh Tyagi and others, reported in 1986 Supplement Supreme Court Cases page 665. 36. Mr. Prasad also has taken us through the contents of the complaint petition filed on behalf of Shri B. P. Singh and submitted that the allegation made therein, constituted facts showing that the termination was obtained by coercion or misrepresentation. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event, in this case the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, passed an order in favour of the employees, on the basis of the statements made by Shri S. A. Hassan, Vice Chairman of the Company and as such, question of absence of pleading with regard to the particulars of fraud or coercion, even if it be accepted for the sake of argument to be correct, did not prejudice the management and as such there was no reason as to why the learned single Judge should have remitted the case back to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court for trial. 37. The learned counsel further submitted that even the pleadings of the employees were not specifically denied by the management. 38. 37. The learned counsel further submitted that even the pleadings of the employees were not specifically denied by the management. 38. It was further submitted by learned counsel that in any event, the pleadings in a proceeding under the Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, should not be construed pedantically and an order made by the authority under the said Act, should not be interfered with only on the ground of absence of pleadings when the other side was not prejudiced thereby as if joined issues and led evidence in this regard. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision in Madan Gopal Vs. Mamraj, reported in 1976 SC 461, in Monjushri Vs. B. L. Gupta, reported in 1977 SC 1158 and in Ram Sarup Gupta Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College, reported in 1987 SC 1242. 39. Mr. Chatterjee, in reply to the submission made on behalf of the appellants submitted that when allegations of fraud, coercion, malafide etc. are made, particulars thereof must be pleaded as otherwise any evidence adduced in support thereof would be inadmissible in evidence. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Bishundeo Vs. Seogeni Rai, reported in 1951 SC 280. 40. The learned counsel further submitted that from the pleadings of the parties as also the findings of the learned Labour Court, it would appear that there was no finding arrived at on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and in this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the pleadings of the parties do not contain sufficient particulars so as to make out a case of fraud or undue influence as such, on that ground alone, the letters patent appeals filed by the management should be allowed. 41. The learned counsel further submitted that for the purpose of consideration of the word 'fraud' or 'coercion' dictionary meaning should not be resorted to. In this connection, the learned counsel has referred to a passage from Vepa P. Saratha's Interpretation of Statute, 3rd Edition page 330. 42. The learned counsel next submitted that in any case, one should not start on an assumption that a servant is not a free agent and there is nothing to show that the employees were put in such a situation so that they could not deny the offer made by the employer. 42. The learned counsel next submitted that in any case, one should not start on an assumption that a servant is not a free agent and there is nothing to show that the employees were put in such a situation so that they could not deny the offer made by the employer. 43. The learned counsel submitted that there is nothing wrong in the employers giving a suggestion to the employee that as he is liable to be dismissed with stigmas attached or that as he has no prospect in the company, he should tender resignation and in such a situation, it is only for the employee concerned to accept the suggestion or not to accept the same. According to the learned counsel, while offering such a suggestion, there is no element of compulsion involved therein. 44. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as noticed hereinbefore, in my opinion, the following questions arise for consideration in this case; (A) Whether the resignation tendered by an employee which was obtained by the employer either by exercising fraud, coercion, undue influence deceit or mis-representation, comes within the purview of 'otherwise terminated' under the said Act? (B) Whether, in the fact, and circumstances of this case, the learned Single Judge has committed an error in holding that there had been no proper pleadings so as to enable the Presiding Officer, Labour Court to come to the conclusion that the resignations offered by the concerned employees were 'forced resignations' and were not voluntary ones? (C) Whether, in any event, in view of the findings of the learned Labour Court, this Court should have exercised its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for interfering with the impugned orders. 45. Re-Question-A: Section 26 of the said Act, as it originally stood, reads as follows : “(1) No employer shall discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months, except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one months notice or one month's wages in lieu of such notice. Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. Provided that such notice shall not be necessary where the services of such employee are dispensed with on a charge of such misconduct as may be prescribed by the State Government supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an inquiry held for the purpose. (2) Every such employee shall have a right of appeal to such authority and within such time as may be prescribed either on the ground that- (i) there was no reasonable cause for dispensing with his services, or (ii) no notice was served on him as required by sub-section (1), or (iii) he had not been guilty of any misconduct as held by the employer. (3) The decision of the appellate authority shell be final and binding on both the employer and the employee”. 46. The vires of the aforementioned provision, was challenged before this Court in Jugal Kishore Bhadani Vs. Labour Commissioner, Bihar, Patna and others, reported in AIR 1958. Patna 442. In that case, it was held that the appellate authority which is a tribunal of first instance enjoys a very wide power and his decision is not subject to any further appeal. The Division Bench held that absence of a forum of appeal constituted a serious lacuna in the Act. 47. Thereafter, Section 26 of the said Act, has been replaced by the Bihar Act, 26 of 1959 which came into force on 25th November, 1959. Section 26 of the said Act, as it was amended in 1959, reads as follows: “No employer shall dismiss or discharge from his employment any employee who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and without giving such employee at least one month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of such notice." 48. The vires of the provisions of Section 26 of the said Act, was again challenged in this Court in Jagadish Vastralaya vs. State reported in 1964 Patna 180, wherein a Bench of this Court held that the provisions of Section 26 of Bihar Act, No. 8 of 1954 as amended by Bihar Act, No. 26 of 1959, was constitutionally valid. 49. 49. The validity of Section 26 of the said Act, also became the subject matter of consideration by the Supreme Court in Caltex (India) Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna reported in A.I.R. 1966 S. C. 1729 and in The Chairman, M/s Brook Bond India Private Ltd. vs. Chandranath Choudhary reported in AIR 1969 SC 992 . 50. In the latter case the Supreme Court made a comparison between Section 26 of the Bihar Act, and Section 33A of the Central Act, and held that there was no repugnancy between those two sections as their purposes were wholly different. In that decision, the Supreme Court further held that in a proceeding under Section 26 of The Bihar Act, the competent authority had to arrive at its own finding on the evidence adduced in a domestic enquiry. 51. The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it originally stood, could have been invoked by a workman who were dismissed, discharged or 'otherwise terminated' by their employer only by taking recourse to collective bargaining and when a reference was made by the appropriate Government in exercise of its power under Section 10 of the said Act. However, Industrial Disputes Act, was amended by Central Act, No. 35 of 1965, as a result whereof, section 2A was inserted therein which permitted even an individual workman to seek redressal of his grievances by getting an industrial dispute raised, where any employer discharges dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminated the services of an individual workman. 52. After insertion of Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the vires of the provisions of Section 26 of the said Act, was again questioned, inter alia, on the ground that the said provisions being inconsistent with each other within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitutions Section 26 of the Bihar Act, must give way to a Parliamentary Legislation namely Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, in Managing Director, Indian Oil Corporation and others vs. C. D. Singh and others reported in 1972 BLJR 308. 53. A full Bench of this Court in the aforementioned decision held that Section 26 of the Bihar Act, is not repugnant to the Central Act, and there is no conflict between provisions of the said Acts. 53. A full Bench of this Court in the aforementioned decision held that Section 26 of the Bihar Act, is not repugnant to the Central Act, and there is no conflict between provisions of the said Acts. It was further held that the scope of the two Acts are entirely different inasmuch as Parliament in enacting the Central Act, did not mean to lay down a exhaustive Code with respect to Industrial and Labour disputes leaving no scope for State Act, to regulate the conditions of work and employment of employees in Shops and other Establishments. 54. The Full Bench of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.'s case (supra) further held that Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, merely made an individual dispute in certain cases, an Industrial Disputes and thereby the scope of the Industrial Disputes Act, was not changed. 55. From, what has been seen hereinbefore, it is thus clear that if an employer dismisses, discharges or otherwise terminates the service of an employee, he may, subject to the conditions laid down therein and the rules framed under the said Act, file a complaint and in that event the Labour Court will be entitled to grant appropriate relief to the concerned employees, if the conditions precedents on the part of the employer for discharging. dismissing or otherwise terminating the employees have not been fulfilled. 56. As noticed hereinbefore, the contention of Mr. Chatterjee is that the said Act, contemplates a positive Act, on the part of the employer resulting in discharge, dismissal or termination of services of the employee which in terms requires an order in writing. 57. Mr. Chatterjee, further submitted that etymologically, Section 26 does not bring within its fold any action which emanates from the employee i.e. submission of resignation to which (sic) an employee is otherwise entitled to take recourse to. 58. It is true that normally a complaint petition under Section 26 of the said Act, would be maintainable only when the employer discharges or otherwise terminates the services of an employee. 59. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is what is meant by otherwise termination of services. 60. It further requires consideration as to whether for effecting termination of services of an employee, an order in writing to that effect is a condition Precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 26 of the said Act. 59. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is what is meant by otherwise termination of services. 60. It further requires consideration as to whether for effecting termination of services of an employee, an order in writing to that effect is a condition Precedent for invoking the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 26 of the said Act. 61. A contract of service like any other contract pre-supposes lawful agreement between the parties containing the terms, conditions and covenants thereof. 62. However, in a case, where the service of the employees are regulated by a statute or service conditions are imposed by statutory provisions, the same would be deemed to be the terms, conditions and covenants of the service contract. 63. The termination of such a contact may be brought about either at the instance of the employee or at the instance of the employer but when the terms and conditions which may include termination of the service are governed by the statutory provisions the termination of service must be brought about in accordance with the provisions of statute, failing which such termination of contract of service would be rendered illegal. 64. Termination of services by submitting resignation is one of the modes whereby an employee can terminate the contract of service but the same, in turn, means an offer on the part of the employee to cause cessation of employment, if the dismissed employee so thinks fit. In other words tender of resignation by an employee envisages a voluntary Act, on his part and not an involuntary act. Thus, in a given case, if tender of resignation is obtained by force or coercion, intimidation or misrepresentation, the same is avoidable at the option of the employee. Whenever, a tender of resignation is brought about by an Act, of the employer coupled with his acceptance thereof and not on account of volition on the part of the employee but on account of positive acts of omission or commission on the part of the employer, such as force, threat etc. as soon as a resignation is accepted the same becomes a positive Act, on the part of the employer amounting to an order terminating the services of an employee. 65. as soon as a resignation is accepted the same becomes a positive Act, on the part of the employer amounting to an order terminating the services of an employee. 65. For such matter, in my opinion, it is not necessary to have an order in writing from the employer specifically terminating the services of the employee inasmuch as such an Act, on the past of the employee can be inferred from his conduct. 66. In my opinion, passing of an order in writing discharging, dismissing or otherwise terminating the services of an employee cannot be said to be a condition precedent before an aggrieved employee can take recourse to Section 26 of the said Act, for ventilating his grievance. If it is so construed in such a manner, an employee who is not allowed to work or who is forcibly stopped from working without serving upon him an order of dismissal, would never be able to ventilate his grievances by filing a complaint petition under Section 26 of the said Act. In my opinion, the same could not have been the intention of the legislature. 67. In Krishna Kumar Sharma's case (supra), no doubt the Division Bench held that the cause of action in filing a complaint petition under Section 26, arises from the date of order of terminating the services, but the said observations were made for the purpose of computation of period of limitation and not for any other purposes. In that case, the Division Bench was considering the desirability of the employer's passing an order in writing so as to enable the aggrieved employee to challenge the grounds contained in the order of dismissal in a proper manner. Even in Krishna Kumar Sharma's case, there has been no written order of dismissal but still then the relief granted to the concerned employee by the Labour Court was up held by this Court and in fact by reason of the said judgment, the management was directed to treat the petitioner as continuing in service and to give to him all benefits arising out of the continuity of the services till date. In that case itself, it was held that as the employee has worked for about three years continuously, the termination of his services without any notice or notice pay as also compensation at the rate of 15-days average wages for every completed year of service having not been complied with, the order of termination was bad. 68. Thus, from the decision of the said Division Bench itself, it is clear that an order in writing is required for the purpose of computation of limitation but absence thereof would not disentitle an employee from filing a complaint petition. 69. In The Manager, Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. J. Bastion, reported in AIR 1960 SC 1110 , the Supreme Court has held as follows : “That leaves only one question to be considered. It was urged before the authorities below that the present dispute is not an industrial dispute for the reason that the respondent had not been dismissed; but he had voluntarily retired. If it was a case of voluntary retirement as pleaded by the appellant undoubtedly the respondents application under Section 16 of the Act, would be incompetent. But can the termination of the respondent's services be properly characterized as voluntary retirement? In our opinion, there can be only one answer to this question and that is the one given by the authorities below. It is true that the respondent offered to retile, but he made it perfectly clear from the start that he was willing to retire provided he was given his due pension under the rules as well as custom. In addition to the pension he made a claim for gratuity. In fact, when his claim for pension was rejected he offered to continue to work as before and said that it was only if pension was granted that he would be willing to retire. It is common ground that the appellant has no rules of superannuation and no case has been made out for terminating the respondent's services, either under Standing Order 23 or 25. Therefore, it is not a discharge for any reasons justified by the Standing Orders. It is discontinuance of service brought about by the peremptory order passed by the appellant asking the respondent to hand over charge to Mr. Satyabralal, and naturally the respondent submitted to the order under protest. Therefore, it is not a discharge for any reasons justified by the Standing Orders. It is discontinuance of service brought about by the peremptory order passed by the appellant asking the respondent to hand over charge to Mr. Satyabralal, and naturally the respondent submitted to the order under protest. In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the appellant has illegally and improperly terminated the service of the respondent, and so the dispute raised by him is an industrial dispute which was properly taken up by him before the Assistant Labour Commissioner.” 70. From a perusal of the aforementioned decision, it is thus clear that a retirement which was not voluntary in nature and if discontinuance of service is brought about by an Act, on the part of the employer, the same would amount to termination of service. 71. In The Yeotmal District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. Yetmal vs. Ramchandta Wamannao Deshpande and another reported in 1978 Labour and Industrial Cases page 1321, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court while considering the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act., held that the term 'termination' embraces not merely the Act, of termination by the employer, but other cases of termination also, howsoever procured. 72. The Bombay High Court in that case after considering various decisions of the Supreme Court held as follows : “As to what is the meaning of the word 'termination' come for consideration of the Supreme Court in M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa ( AIR 1977 SC 31 ) 1976 Lab IC 1766), though in as some what different context. After making a reference to the definition of the term 'retrenchment' as defined in Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following observations in its earlier decision in State Bank of India vs. N. Sundra Money ( AIR 1976 SC 1111 ) : (1976 Lab IC 769,) which read as under: “Termination ............ for any reason whatsoever are the key words. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment, so the sole question is has the employee's service been terminated? ... ...A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term...... Termination by the employer, but the fact of termination however produced. Whatever the reason, every termination spells retrenchment, so the sole question is has the employee's service been terminated? ... ...A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the master or the running out of the stipulated term...... Termination by the employer, but the fact of termination however produced. ...an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. From the bare reading of these observations it is quite clear that the term 'termination' embraces not merely the Act, of termination by the employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. The word 'terminated' or 'termination' indicates only determination of contract of service, It postulates some Act, by somebody, which is taken to bring the employment to an end. Under the gratuity rules, an employee is entitled to a gratuity on termination of service by the Bank. It is equally well settled that the form of the order is not decisive of the whole matter. The employer's word in this behalf is not the last word. He can not give go-bye to his responsibility by merely using different word s nor the Tribunal will be debarred from going into the question as to whether, notwithstanding the form of the order, in substance, it is an action of termination of services by the employer or not. In this behalf we cannot be oblivious to the plight of respondent employee in this unequal fight with the petitioner Co-operative Bank, which is a big establishment.” 73. In M/s Southern Roadways Ltd. Bangalore Vs. K. Padmanabhan. reported in 1979 Labour and Industrial Cases page 234, the Karnataka High Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that securing a resignation of any employee by the employer by force or against his will, in substance, amounts to termination of the services of the concerned employee. The learned Judge held that the words ‘or otherwise terminates the services’ used in Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, covers such cases of the termination brought about in any way what so ever. The learned Judge held that the words ‘or otherwise terminates the services’ used in Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, covers such cases of the termination brought about in any way what so ever. It was further held that the question as to whether in a given case, the resignation was tendered voluntarily or secured under duress is a question of fact. 74. In Shriram Swami Shikashan Sanstha, Nagpur vs. Education Officer, Zila Parishad, Nagpur and another, reported in 1984 Lab IC page 100, a Division Bench of Bombay High Court while considering Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Services) Regulation Act, held as follows : “We feel that it is a well settled proposition of law that a forced resignation, which means a resignation not voluntarily given by the employee but is brought about by force, duress or in any other manner by the employer is by the Act, of the employer. In substance the contract of service comes to an end in such case by the action on the part of the employer. It, therefore, amounts to termination of the service by the employer.” 75. This aspect of the matter has been considered recently again by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in R. D. Survey vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. reported in 1989 Vol. I Current Labour Reporter page 553 : 1989 Labour and Industrial Cases page 1406. In that case, the Bombay High Court had held that the word discharge” or 'dismissal' will include in its forced resignation. In that case, the Bombay High Court took into consideration some of the decisions referred to hereinbefore. 76. Although, it may not be possible for me to go to the extent that a force resignation wil1 come within the purview of the word 'discharge' or 'dismissal' but in my opinion, there cannot be any doubt that a resignation obtained by force, coercion or threat etc, and which is not a voluntary one, would come within the purview of the words 'or otherwise terminated; 77. Mr. Chatterjee, submitted that we should not follow the aforementioned decision as they have been rendered not under these hops and Establishment Act, but under different Acts and we should follow the decision of Madras High Court in Ramswami's case. which was under the Shops and Establishment Act. 78. Mr. Chatterjee, submitted that we should not follow the aforementioned decision as they have been rendered not under these hops and Establishment Act, but under different Acts and we should follow the decision of Madras High Court in Ramswami's case. which was under the Shops and Establishment Act. 78. It is true that the Madras High Court in C. R. Ramaswami vs. M/s Needle Industries (I) Ltd, and another reported in 1981 Labour and Industrial Cases Page 765, while considering the scope of Sections 41 (1) and 41 (2) of Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, held that the acceptance of resignation by the employer tendered by the employee, does not amount to dispednsion of service of the employee by the employer. The learned Judges sought to distinguish the decision of the Karnataka High Court in M/s Southern Roadways Ltd. case (supra) on the ground that in that the court was concerned with construction of the word 'otherwise terminated' occurring in Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, which is not in pari-matetia with Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, which would be evident from the following: "We are of the opinion that S: 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, having regard to the language in which it was couched and the context in which it was enacted, cannot be of any assistance whatever to the appellant in the present case. Here we are considering only one question, namely, whether the expression employer shall dispense with the services of a person employed will take in the case of an employer relieving an employee on the basis of the letter of resignation submitted by him, if he subsequently contends that the letter of resignation was obtained from him under coercion or threat. We are of the opinion that having regard to the language of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 47, the said section cannot comprehend such a case.” 79. We are of the opinion that having regard to the language of sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 47, the said section cannot comprehend such a case.” 79. In that decision itself the Madras High Court has referred to a judgment of its own court in The Lakshnu viles Bank Ltd vs. L. S. Pettebhat chettinr reported in 1970 Labour and Industrial Cases Page 1620, wherein it was held that when an employee has been retired from the services on that he has attained the age of superannuation although, the same was merely a camouflage; an application under Section 47 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, would be maintainable. 80. It is now well know that external aid of construction of a word is possible when the same word has been interpreted in a particular manner in other statute which are in part material i.e. statute dealing with the same subject matter or forming part of the same. There cannot be any doubt that the provisions of Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, is enacted for the same purpose for which Section 26 of said Act, has been enacted. 81. Both, the industrial Disputes Act, as also the said Act, have been inter alia enacted in terms of item nos. 23 and 24 of List- III of 7th Schedule of the Constitution of India, In fact, although the field of both the acts are broadly different, it is now well know that Shops and Establishment Act, supplements the Industrial Disputes Act. Both the acts aim at welfare of the employees and deals with the questions of employment and unemployment of the workmen/employees. 82. Recently the Supreme Court in The Krishna Dist. Co-op. Marketing Society Ltd, Vijyawada VS. N.V. Purnchandru and ors. reported in 1987 (55) F. L. R. 498, held that while granting the relief under Section 41 (1) and (3) of Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishment Act, 1933, the rights and liabilities of the parties can be governed by the provisions of Chapter 5A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and such rights and liabilities may be adjudicated upon and enforced in a proceeding before the authorities under the said Act, if the employees are workmen and the management is an industry as defined in the Central Act. 83. 83. There cannot, therefore, by any doubt whatsoever that in a given case, the provisions of both the acts supplement each other. Thus, viewed, in my opinion, the words' or otherwise terminated' occurring in Section 25 of the said Act, should be interpreted in the same manner as has been done by various courts of India Including the Supreme Court while construing Section 2-A and other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 84. Further the provisions of Section 26 of the said Act, will also have to be construed keeping in view the doctrine of ubi ju s-ibi remedium. In a case of this nature, the institution of a civil suit may not be an appropriate remedy as a civil court will not be in a position to pass decree for reinstatement of service in view of Section 14 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 To obtain a relief of reinstatement of service is a valuable right conferred upon an employee under the said Act. Thus the provision of the said Act, must be construed in such a manner so that its object may be achieved and not frustrated. A right granted to an employee under a statute cannot be permitted to be taken away indirectly which could not be done directly. 85. The decision of the Division Bench cited by Mr. Chatterjee in Rajeshwar Prasad Jaiswal vs. Bikram Singh & ors reported in 1977 BBCJ 711 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In that case, the establishment was closed by the employer as it was running at a loss. In that case this Court did not take into consideration the words or otherwise terminated' which were inserted in the said Act, in the year, 1975. 86. It is will known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically follows from it. 87. The very fact that earlier the act, by reason of amendment in Section 26 of Bihar Act, no. 86. It is will known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what logically follows from it. 87. The very fact that earlier the act, by reason of amendment in Section 26 of Bihar Act, no. 26 of 1959 was concerned only with a case of dismissal or discharge of services but not with the case of otherwise termination of service goes to show that the legislature in its wisdom intended to make the provisions of Section 26 of the said Act, a comprehensive one so as to include not only a case of discharge but also termination of service by employer in any form whatsoever, 88. It is, thus, clear that the Act, of an employer in obtaining a forced resignation shall cover the terminology or otherwise terminates and in this view of the matter, a complaint petition under Section 26 of the said Act, In such a situation is maintainable. It must therefore be held that this part of the judgment of the learned Single Judge is absolutely correct. 89. Re-Question B: In the complaint petition filed by Dr. N. P. Rao, it has been alleged as follows: “Complaint under Section 26: That in the evening of 16-7-1983, o. p. no. 2 summoned the applicant in his office and told that he has decided to dismiss the applicant from service. The o. p. no. 2 read out the contents of the dismissal letter to the applicant which contained a number of stigmas. Besides, o. p. no. 2 gave out that the Management had least confidence in the applicant. Other persons present in the O. P's. room at that time were Dr. Ranjit Pandey, Registrar and Mr. Ranjit Sinha, Senior Personnel Officer. The applicant was taken a back and was scared at the show scepter by the Head of the Department. The stigmas read out from the dismissal and announcement of loss of confidence by the management and the thought of the past 40 years unblemished service of the applicant's father in the same Main Hospital as Medical Officer and the innocence of the applicant himself coupled with the thought of his 22 years of devoted service in the Company created an emotional utter dismay in the mind of the applicant. The O. P. no. 2 made best use of the same and pushed. The O. P. no. 2 made best use of the same and pushed. Previously typed letter of resignation in the name of the applicant in his hands and asked him to sign the same, if the applicant wanted to save his prestige in the field of Medicine in the Town of Jamshedpur wherein the influence of Management prevailed in all walks of life of the citizens. At that time of psychological trap and utter confusion brought about under duress, the o. p. no. 2 got the signature of the complainant in the letter of resignation still held in the hands of O. P. no. 2 which ultimately became instrumental in terminating the services of the applicant. Immediately after obtaining the signature of the applicant on the letter of resignation the O. P. no. 2 handed him over a letter of acceptance to the applicant which was kept ready typed and signed previously. That the termination of the service of the applicant thus obtained through the threat of dismissal with stigma which could entail professional disputation, injury and damage, is illegal and without reasonable cause. That under the garb of resignation, the same having been obtained under duress purporting to terminate the service of the applicant was a colorable exercise of power in the present case which tantamount to victimization and unfair labour practice" 90. In this case, the Management entered into a defence that Dr. Rao was guilty of misconduct and he was liable to be dismissed from services. The management in support of its defence not only brought before the Labour Court the proceedings of the domestic enquiry but also examined 3 witnesses, but Labour Court held upon consideration of the materials on record, that the charges against Dr. Rao were not proved by the management. 91. The issues raised in this ease will thus have to be judged in the back drop of the fact that the management could not even prove the charges before the Labour Court although it raised the said issues by way of a defence and called upon the Labour Court to adjudicate the same. 92. In such a situation, the possibility of asking Dr. 92. In such a situation, the possibility of asking Dr. Rao to tender resignation by the Director of Health Services, may be viewed in the context that it was known to the authorities that in the event the order of dismissal is adjudicated by a Tribunal, the management would not be able to prove a reasonable cause for termination of service of Dr. Rao as the misconduct alleged against him was not proved. Before the Labour Court the Director of Medical services did not examine himself. From the pleadings of the parties, it is clear that the concerned employee made allegations against the director of Health Services to the effect that he was instrumental in obtaining resignation from him either by force or by coercion. It is true, that fraud, force and coercion deal with different situations but the chances of their overlapping with each other cannot be ruled out. 93. Further, even the statements made by the complainant in paragraph 14 of his complaint petition were not controverted by the management. 94. Before us, Mr. Sen has produced the evidence of Dr. Rao, wherefrom, it appears that Dr. Rao protested to tee action suggested by the management but he was not even allowed to think over the matter. 95. In such a situation, the Labour Court held as follows: “Admittedly the complainant was to be visited with the punishment of dismissal. Therefore, I am of the opinion the offer by the O.P. to the complainant to tender resignation was not free from undue influence. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to have been tendered with the free consent of the complainant. In the circumstances it is very difficult for me to say that the resignation was not obtained with the vice of undue influence……I find and hold that the resignation letter was obtained from the complainant by the O.P., by exerting undue influence and by creating a fear psychosis of stigma of dismissal.” “This so called resignation was not voluntary with his free consent so the termination of the services is void abinitio. Hence he is entitled to reinstatement with half back wages and other benefits.” 96. Hence he is entitled to reinstatement with half back wages and other benefits.” 96. So far as the case of Shri B. P. Singh concerned, in his complaint petition, he alleged as follows: “That the complainant was called in the office of Sri S.A. Hassan, Executive Vice-President of the Company who shouted at the top of his voice and by using force coercion, threat and intimidation created a situation and forcibly procured the signature of the complainant on a typed resignation letter which he was having with him and simultaneously handed over to the complainant a signed letter of acceptance of resignation which he had kept ready with him and in this manner the services of the complainant were illegally motivatedly and wrongfully terminated. That the complainant never intended to give up his employment of his own sweet will and never intended to resign of his services. The complainant wanted the Executive Vice President to let him know the reasons for such a course of action adopted by him which he did not disclose and said that the complainant can not go out of his office without signing of his resignation letter and without further great peril. 97. In this case the Executive Vice President of the management, Shri H. A. Hassan examined himself. After taking into consideration the materials on record, the Labour Court found as followed:- “The said letter was not submitted by the complainant in a normal and usual course. Mr. Hassan's statements, however, "conclusively show that he obtained the signature of the complainant under allurement of non-existent voluntary retirement scheme and under inducement." "Admittedly, he made him aware of the so-called voluntary retirement scheme......What more is left for him to induce the complainant, I fail to understand. The complainant had a long year of service and there was no prospect of getting employment elsewhere. Upon those facts a legitimate influence can be drawn that the complainant should not have gone to submit his resignation in the normal way. These are such strong circumstances which lead to the only inference that the so called resignation letter of the complainant could not be voluntary and with his free consent. I feel convinced that a fear psychosis was created in the mind of the complainant and his signature on the pre-typed purported resignation letter was under threat and inducement. These are such strong circumstances which lead to the only inference that the so called resignation letter of the complainant could not be voluntary and with his free consent. I feel convinced that a fear psychosis was created in the mind of the complainant and his signature on the pre-typed purported resignation letter was under threat and inducement. In view of the aforesaid statements of both these witnesses, I feel convinced that a fear psychosis was created in the mind of the complainant and his signature was obtained on the pre-typed purported resignation letter under threat and inducement.” 98. The said Act, having been enacted inter alia for welfare of the employees working in shops and establishments, therefore, is a beneficent piece of legislation so far as the employees are concerned. 99. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, the legislature intended to protect the interest of the employees, and provided for a forum where an employee who has suffered dismissal or discharge or whose services had otherwise been terminated by his employer without following the provisions of law, may file a complaint petition for redressal of his grievances. The power of the prescribed authority under the said Act, is very wide and is not inhibited by reason of the terms of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 100. The necessity of pleadings in a suit or other proceeding is to allow the opposite party to know the case of the applicant in order to enable him to meet the same so that be may join issues with him. 101. There cannot be any doubt that a party in a civil litigation, if sets up a plea of coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation must bring his case within the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 15 to 18 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and prove the same. Order 6, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code is attracted in a suit where a party sets of a plea of misrepresentation, malafide, fraud, undue influence etc. 102. Order 6, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code is attracted in a suit where a party sets of a plea of misrepresentation, malafide, fraud, undue influence etc. 102. Coercion and undue influence has been defined in Sections 15 and 16 of the Indian Contract Act, respectively which read as follows : “Coercion” defined- “Coercion” is the committing or, threatening to commit, any Act, forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement." "Undue influence" defined- (1) A contract is said to be induced by "undue influence" where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in fiduciary relation to the other; or (b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason on age, illness, or mental or bodily distress. (3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of another enters into a contract with him, and the transaction appears, on the face of it or no the evidence adduced, to be unconscionable the burden of proving that such contract was not induced by undue influence shall lie upon the person in a position to dominate the will of the other. Nothing in this sub-Section shall affect the provisions of Sec. 111 of the Indian Evidence-Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).” 103. The necessity to raise the plea of Coercion or undue influence must be judged in the context of the nature of the lis between the parties. In a case of this nature where a termination is said to be brought about by a forced resignation; what is required to be pleaded and proved is some Act, of force or compulsion either physical or mental so as to enable the employer to obtain resignation from his employee. 104. In a case of this nature where a termination is said to be brought about by a forced resignation; what is required to be pleaded and proved is some Act, of force or compulsion either physical or mental so as to enable the employer to obtain resignation from his employee. 104. Judged in this context, the requirement of proof of undue influence or coercion has to be considered. 105. Rules of pleading as embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure are not strictly applicable in an Industrial adjudication. 106. Even in a suit, the pleadings of the parties are not to be construed pedantically. It is also well known that normally the pleadings are liberally construed and read as a whole. 107. Further in the instant case what was required to be pleaded and proved by the employees were that the letters of resignation tendered by them were not voluntary in nature, and the same were obtained by the employer either by using some sort of force or compulsion whether physical or mental which was in negative of their choice. It has not been disputed in either of the cases that the concerned employees were called by their respective superior officers in their chambers, who accordingly to the management, were their disciplinary authorities. It is also not in dispute that the resignation letters were kept ready and they were pre-typed. It is also not in dispute that the letters accepting the resignation were not only pre-typed but were also pre-signed. 108. In the case of Dr. Rao, as seen hereinbefore, he was not only accosted with a threat of dismissal with stigmas attached to him; but also he was threatened that his carrier would be ruined even if he starts his private practice. 109. The employee concerned has supported his cases on oath but the Director of Medical services did not examine himself. Non-examination of a material witness in a case of this nature where the Director of the Medical Services stood in the capacity of a party to the lis, must be deprecated and an adverse inference must be drawn for his non-examination, Reference in this connection may be made to in Sardar Gurbaksh Singh vs. Gurdial Singh and another, reported in AIR 1927 P.C. page 230 and in Martand Pandharinath Chaudhry vs. Radhabai Krishna Roo Deshmukh, reported in AIR 1931 Bombay 97. 110. 110. In the case of B. P. Singh not only there had been a plea of application of mental force/compulsion but also a physical one to the effect that it was alleged, he would not be permitted to go out of the chamber unless he signs the letters of resignation. It is relevant to note that Sri Singh filed his complaint petition under Section 26 of the Act, on the very next day i.e. on 3.11.1987 whereas the occurrence took place at about 4.35 P.M. on the previous day i.e. 2.11.1987. 111. Recently the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Smt. Niko Devi vs. Kirpa, reported in AIR 1989 H. P. 51, held as follows : "The law with regard to undue influence as is set out as aforesaid is by now well established and there are rulings galore from Supreme Court downwards wherein these provisions have been construed in detail. To cite a few of them, in AIR 1967 SC 878 , Subhas Chandra vs. Ganga Prasad, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed; “The court trying a case of undue influence must consider two things to start with namely (1) are the relations between the donor and the donee such that the donee is in a position to dominate the will of the donor, and (2) has the donee used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the donor? Upon the determination of these issues a third point emerges which is that of the onus probandi. If the transaction appears to be unconscionable, then the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence is to lie upon the person who was in a position to dominate the will of the other.” In AIR 1963 SC 1279 , Ladli Prashed vs. Karnal Distillery Co. Led. Karnal, it has been held: “that doctrine of undue influence under the common law was evolved by the courts England for granting protection against transactions procured by the exercise of insidious form of influence, spiritual and temporal. The doctrine applies to acts of bounty as well as to others transaction in which one party by exercising his position dominance obtain on unfair advantage over another. The Indian enactment is founded substantially on the rules of English Common Law. The first sub-section of S. 16 lays down the principle in general terms. By sub-sec. The doctrine applies to acts of bounty as well as to others transaction in which one party by exercising his position dominance obtain on unfair advantage over another. The Indian enactment is founded substantially on the rules of English Common Law. The first sub-section of S. 16 lays down the principle in general terms. By sub-sec. (2) a presumption arises that a person shall be deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another if the conditions sat out therein are full filled. Sub-sec. (3) lays down the conditions for raising a rebut-table presumption that a transaction is procured by the exercise of undue influence. The reason for the rule in the third sub-section is that a person who has obtained an advantage over another by dominating his will may also remain in a position to suppress the requisite evidence in support of the plea of undue influence”. 112. In both these cases apparently the transactions on the part of the employer were pre-planned. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the Director of the Health Services and the Vice-Chairman of the Company were in dominating position in relation to the employees concerned. 113. Before the employees, the higher authorities placed a dismal picture about their future, the employees were threatened that they will have no future career and in the case of Shri B. P. Singh even allurement was given by Shri Hassan which promises being non-existent could never be fulfilled. 114. Resignation must be a voluntary Act, on the part of the employee. It is evident from the respective letters of resignation that a condition existed in contract of services to the effect that before such a resignation is tendered, the same will be effective from a later date as a prior notice of one month was contemplated thereby. The employees concerned, before tendering their letters of resignation not only could not ponder over the matter but also was not in a position to withdraw the offer of resignation during the notice period. 115. The employees concerned, before tendering their letters of resignation not only could not ponder over the matter but also was not in a position to withdraw the offer of resignation during the notice period. 115. It is true that the condition of service previous notice was advantageous to the employer and not to the employee but still then the very fact that in the letters of resignation which were pre-typed, a purported request was made therein that the said notice period be waived and the said letter of resignation was accepted immediately, the goes to show that the stage of the dram was pre-set. 116. It is, therefore, clear that the letters of resignation were tendered not voluntarily by the employees but were obtained by the employers. Had it been voluntary acts on the part of the employees, it was for them to ask for waiver of the notice but as indicated hereinbefore, the letters of resignation were pre-typed and the letters accepting the resignation were not only pre-typed but were also pre-signed. 117. In the case of Shri B. P. Singh, Shri S. A. Hassan, the Vice-Chairman of the company clearly admitted that he also allured Sri Singh to tender his resignation. 118. These facts demonstrate fraudulent intention on the part of the employer, more so in the case of Shri B. P. Singh, in view of the fact that it has been held by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, that Shri Hassan even did not have power to accept such resignation in terms of the power of attorney executed in his favour by the Chairman of the management-company. 119. The learned Labour Court has found that Shri Hassan had exercised undue in flounce and/or caused misrepresentation in obtaining resignation from Shri Singh. These findings of fact has been arrived at by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court on the basis of the statements of the Vice-Chairman of the Company's himself. 120. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the court should not consult the dictionary for finding out the meaning of a word. 121. However, in the interpretation of statute Sarthi, 3rd Edn, page 330, upon which strong pieced by Mr. 120. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the court should not consult the dictionary for finding out the meaning of a word. 121. However, in the interpretation of statute Sarthi, 3rd Edn, page 330, upon which strong pieced by Mr. Chatterjee, it has been suggested that whether the meaning of a word can be asserted in the context of a particular statute or where a word has been defined in the statute itself, it is neither necessary nor proper to consult the dictionary. 122. However, the learned author himself in the aforementioned treatise referred to various decisions where the dictionary meaning was adopted in order to find out the real meaning or purpose of a word used. 123. Reference in this connection may also be made to the State of Bihar vs. Radha Krishna Prasad reported in 1983 SCC Vol. 3 page 118 and Coca Cola Company Canada Ltd. vs. Pepsicola Company, reported in 1942 P.C. page 40 Recently the Supreme Court in Prabesh Chandra Dalui vs. Siswanath Banerjee, reported in AIR 1989 S.C. Page 1834 in para 12 of the judgment referred to Black's Law Dictionary for ascertaining the meaning of extension". Reference in this connection may also be made to in Express Hotels Private Ltd. vs. State of Gujrat and another, reported in 1989 (3) SCC page 677 at page 689 and also to a recent fully bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in M. P. Wine Manufactures Association, Katni and ors. vs. State of Madhya pradesh and another reported in AIR 1989 M. P. page 2648 page 271. 124. It is also well known that when a word is not defined in the statute it self, it is permissible to refer to dictionary to find out the general sense in which that words is understood in common parlance. There cannot, however, be any doubt what so ever that in selecting out one of the various meanings of word, regard must also be had to the context of the statutes as it is a fundamental rule that the meaning of word and expression must take their colour from the context in which they appear. 125. As a matter of fact, as would be evident from the decisions referred to herein before, the Supreme Court itself referred to various dictionaries for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the words otherwise terminated. 125. As a matter of fact, as would be evident from the decisions referred to herein before, the Supreme Court itself referred to various dictionaries for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of the words otherwise terminated. Thus where a word is not defined in the Act, it is permissible to refer to the dictionary to ascertain its meaning. 126. In Curson's Dictionary of Law at page 63, 'coercion' has been defined to mean 'use of physical and mental force'. 127. In Webster's Dictionary also 'coercion' has been defined to mean compulsion whether moral or physical. 128. In Mozley and Whiteley's Dictionary coercion' has been defined as hereby: "The threat of taking away from another something that he possesses, or of preventing him from obtaining an advantage he would otherwise have obtained, by influence or duress. See Ellis Vs. Barker (1871), 40 L. J. Ch. 603. "Coercion involves something in the nature of negation of choke". (underlining is mine) Reference in this connection may also be made to Ballentine's Dictionary of Law where 'coercion' in its ordinary and also in the context of industrial jurisprudence has been stated thus: "Compulsion by the application of physical or mental force or persuasion... As an unfair labour practice:- Physical or mental persuation by affirmative conduct." Reference in this connection may also be made to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol-I at page 517 where 'coercion' inter alia has been defined to mean the following. “Implied coercion exists where a person is legally under subjection to another, and is induced, in consequence of such subjection, to do an Act, contrary to his will." From what has been seen hereinbefore, a person is said to Act, under coercion, if in doing so, physical or mental force is used upon him and he is not permitted to exercise his option or choice. 129. It is true, as referred to by Mr. Chatterjee that the Supreme Court in AIR 1951 page 280 has held as follows : “It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars and the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. See O. 6 R. 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 130. As indicated hereinbefore in dealing with a case involving industrial adjudication, such strict rules of pleading may not be resorted to. However, as indicated hereinbefore, the pleadings of the employees concerned in their application under Section 26 of the Act, did not lack material particulars in its entirety and the allegations are neither vague nor general in nature. 131. In fact, as in the case of Shri B. P. Singh, the Supreme Court in the case of Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad & ors. reported in AIR 1951 SC 177 has held that an alternative plea set up by the plaintiff, if admitted by the defendant, the Court need not go further and decree the plaintiff's suit on the basis of admission of the defendant himself. 132. Further the rule of pleading in respect of 'fraud' and 'fraudulent intention' are different. 133. The requirement of pleading 'fraudulent intention' is contained in Order 6. Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows: "Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge or other condition of the mind of any person it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred." 134. In Madan Gopal Kanodia V.r. Mamraj Maniram & Ors. reported in 1976 SC 461, it was held as follows : “In the written statement filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure the particulars and essential details of the 21 bales of cloth were clearly mentioned in paragraph 1 (b). In Madan Gopal Kanodia V.r. Mamraj Maniram & Ors. reported in 1976 SC 461, it was held as follows : “In the written statement filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure the particulars and essential details of the 21 bales of cloth were clearly mentioned in paragraph 1 (b). Further more counsel for the plaintiff gave a statement before the trial court on September 5, 1952, where also all the essential details regarding the 200 bales of cloth were given. In the statement the counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the plaintiff had received the sale proceeds of 179 bales of cloth and that 21 bales of cloth remained unaccounted for. In the evidence also the plaintiff has sought to prove the very case set up in the plaint as also in the written statement filed later under orders of the Court. We are unable to see any substantial variation between the pleadings of the plaintiff and the evidence led by him at the trial. It is well-settled that pleadings are loosely drafted in the Courts and the Courts should not scrutinize the pleadings with such meticulous care so as to result in 'genuine claims being defeated on trivial grounds. In our opinion, the finding of the High Court that there was wide gape between the pleadings and the proof is not at all borne out from the record of the present case.” (underlining is mine) 135. In case of Smt. Maujushri Raha and Ors. Vs. B.L. Gupta and Ors. reported in AIR 1917 SC 1158, Supreme Court has held as follows: “Finally, it was contended that as there was no allegation of negligence against Ram Swaroop the driver of the M. P. Speedways Company the High Court ought not to have decreed the claim of Raha against the appellant Gupta. We have perused the plaint before the Claims Tribunal, which is rather loosely drafted but it clearly contains the relief of compensation even against Gupta and Ram Swaroop driver. The High Court has pointed out that even though there is no clear plea of negligence in the claim of Raha, the facts alleged and proved in the case clearly show that Ram Swaroop the, driver of the M. P. Speedways Company was both rash and negligent. The High Court has pointed out that even though there is no clear plea of negligence in the claim of Raha, the facts alleged and proved in the case clearly show that Ram Swaroop the, driver of the M. P. Speedways Company was both rash and negligent. Pleadings have to be interpreted not with formalistic rig our but with latitude or awareness of low legal literacy of poor people. We fully agree with the finding of the High Court and see no reason to disturb it. We also agree with the order of the High Court by which it makes Gupta and Bhuta jointly and severally liable. That was the only decree which could have been passed in the circumstances.” (underlining is mine) 136. In the case of Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L. Rs. Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1242 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: “The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction, no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in wards which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law, in such a case it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the substance of the pleading to determine the question. It is not desirable to place undue emphasis on form, instead the substance of the pleadings should be considered. Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial, Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on these issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.” 137. In the case of Calcutta Port Sharmik Union Vs. The Calcutta River Transport Association & Ors. In the case of Calcutta Port Sharmik Union Vs. The Calcutta River Transport Association & Ors. reported in 1989 SC 2168, the Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that an award made by an Industrial Tribunal should not be, interfered with on hyper technical grounds and by trying to dig hole here and there. 138. In the light of the decisions referred to hereinbefore while dealing with the question A', it has been held that a forced resignation comes within the purview of the word 'otherwise terminated', which necessarily implies an involuntary resignation or resignation obtained by force or compulsion without a right of choice given to the employee brought by force or compulsion whether moral or physical. 139. Taking thus into consideration all these facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the requisite pleading to constitute a 'forced resignation' had been made by the employees in their respective complaint petitions. 140. Re: Question 'C': It is now well known that a grant of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. A finding of fact arrived at by a statutory Tribunal can be interfered with only when the same is perverse or contains an error apparent on the facts of the order. 141. It is also well known that while exercising the jurisdiction of superintendent under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot interfere with a finding of fact. The purpose of invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court is to keep the inferior tribunal within their bounces so that they may feel bound by the provisions of statutes creating their jurisdiction. 142. In Babhutmal Raichani Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Trate and another, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1297 ’ it has been held that the High Court cannot in guide of exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 convert the writ petition into an appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and meet the decision of the subordinate Court on finding of the fact. It has further been held that time High Court cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence an reappreciaing it. 143. Reference in this connection may also be made to the case of Syed Yakoab vs. K. S. Redhakrishnan and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . 144. It has further been held that time High Court cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence an reappreciaing it. 143. Reference in this connection may also be made to the case of Syed Yakoab vs. K. S. Redhakrishnan and others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . 144. Recently the Supreme Court in the case of The State of U. P. vs. Maharaja Dharmendra Prasad Singh, reported in AIR 1989 SC 997 , held as follows: "However, Judicial Review under Article 226 cannot be converted into appeal. Judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of decision-making process". 145. The Supreme Court recently again in M/s Dwarika Das versus Board of Trustee, Bombay Port Trust, reported in A.I.R. 1919, S.C. 4 has held as follows: “In that view of the matter even under the shop of judicial review, it was contended whether it should have been given on join-tenancias or not, is not a mater which could be gone into by the Could be gone into by the Court, Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Justice Diploc in Council of Civil Service Unions vs. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All E.R. 935 at P. 950, where the learned Lord Justice classified 3 grounds subject to control of judicial review namely, illegality in rationality and procedural impropriety. Learned Addl. Solicitor General is right, in our opinion, in that we cannot rally substitute a decision reached by a fair procedure keeping the police of the respondent in mind by a different decision only on the ground that the decision which appeals to the court, is a better one. Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Chancellor Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police vs. Evahs, (1982) IWIR ) 155-In our opinion, it is necessary to remember that judicial review, in the words of Lord Bright man in that case, is not concerned with the decision but with the decision making process. As observed by Prof, Dias in "jurisprudence' (5th Edn. at p. 91) unless the restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power be itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. As observed by Prof, Dias in "jurisprudence' (5th Edn. at p. 91) unless the restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power be itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind the ways and means by which the Court can control or supervise the judicial section of any authority which is subject to judicial control. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the observation of Lord Justice Temple man in re Preston v. I.R.C., (1985) 2 WLR 836 and the observation of Lord Justice may in Regina vs. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, (1986) 2 WLR 144. It is not within the purview of a court to substitute a decision taken be constituted authority simply because the decision sought to be substituted is a better one.” Thus, the findings of fact arrived at by the Labour Court being based on evidence and being not perverse, the same could not have interfered with by this Court. To that extent the decision of the learned single judge cannot be sustained. 146. Taking into consideration these aspect of matter, I am of the view that whereas L.P.A. No. 65/89 (R) (M/s Tara Iron and Steel Co. Ltd Vs. N. P. Rao & another and by the Tata Robins Co. Ltd vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court & another (L.P.A. No. 63/89 (R), must be dismissed and the L.P.A. No. 91/89 (R) filed by Dr. N. P. Rao and L.P.A. No. 67/89 (R) filed by Shri B. P. Singh should be allowed. However there will be no order as to costs. B. P. Singh J; I agree. L.P.A. Nos. 67 & 91 allowed. L.P.A. Nos. 65 & 63 dismissed.