JUDGMENT 1. 1. These three petitions (ut supra) seeking relief for grant of anticipatory bail lend themselves to disposal by a common judgment, having been filed by three different sets of petitioners for an incident alleged to have taken place on 17.5.1988 wherein one, Nazir Khan lost his life and he succumbed to the injury alleged to have been caused by unlawful assembly consisting of the present petitioners-report of which was lodged on 17.5.1988 by one, Mehtab Khan at 11.30 P. M. at police station Laxmangarh (district Sikar)-upon which F. I. R. No. 46/88 was chalked out for the s tinder Sections 147, 148, 302/149. IPC. In this report, name of the petitioners (viz Yusuf Khan, Maqsood, & Mushtaq) finds place and the have been alleged as members of the unlawful assembly which committed murder of Nazir Khan. The petitioners are said to be military servicemen. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case diary with the help of the learned Public Prosecutor. 3. First and foremost contention urged by Shri Surendra Vyas on behalf of the petitioners is that two charge-sheets were filed-in one of the charge-sheets, names of the petitioners have not been mentioned and it was mentioned that the investigation was pending against the petitioners under Section 173(8), Cr.P.C.; but when subsequent another charge-sheet was filed, that too without any more material; and thus, according to the learned counsel, no cognizance can now be taken on subsequent charge-sheet filed against the present petitioners. To fortify his contention (ut supra), learned counsel cited a decision in Kunjalata Dei v. State of Orissa (1985 Cr.L.J. p. 1047) . 4. Tout au contraira, learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant wrangled that the cognizance can be taken on the material brought with the first charge-sheet; and they placed reliance upon the decision in D. D. Patel v. State of Gujarat (1980 Cr.L.J. 29) . 5. 4. Tout au contraira, learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel for the complainant wrangled that the cognizance can be taken on the material brought with the first charge-sheet; and they placed reliance upon the decision in D. D. Patel v. State of Gujarat (1980 Cr.L.J. 29) . 5. In the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner ( Kunjalata Dei v. State of Orissa ) no such observation is there that material supplied by the investigating agency alongwith F.I.R. and charge-sheet cannot he considered for the purpose of taking cognizance on the subsequent charge-sheet rather in that case cited, earlier material was considered and after considering the material including statement of Purna Chandra Prusty made before the police, the Court observed, it transpired that he has not made any statement from which it could be gathered that the accused has committed any offence. The Court also took note of the statement of Purna Chandra which was to the effect, "On the next day he heard a rumour which had been spread in Puri town that Biranchi and his family members murdered Biranchi's wife". According to the Orissa High Court in Kunjalata Dei v. State of Orissa (supra). supplementary charge-sheet cannot be submitted without making further investigation. 6. I have gone through another decision cited by the prosecution side and I am of the opinion that the observations made in D. D Patel v. State of Gujarat are fully applicable to the present case. The relevant observations are produced below : "It is not necessary that there should be a fresh investigation and discovery of new material for lodging an additional charge-sheet in the case. If the very material is misunderstood by the Police Station Officer and if he has received proper light from his superiors he can certainly file an additional charge-sheet though there may not be, strictly speaking, any further investigation and collection of new material. In such a case instead of new material there is new light that is received by him. Clause (8) is inserted in S. 173 as a new provision so that it may not be contended that on the submission of a charge-sheet investigation came into a standstill and the hands of the Police Officer are tied down. In such a case instead of new material there is new light that is received by him. Clause (8) is inserted in S. 173 as a new provision so that it may not be contended that on the submission of a charge-sheet investigation came into a standstill and the hands of the Police Officer are tied down. The circumstances which are only usual are enumerated there in the sub-section, but if the new interpretation of the evidence is brought to his notice, the powers on the investigation Officer cannot be curbed down because of the enumeration of those circumstances of the recovery or discovery of the new material." 7. Now, inverting to the present gamut of the facts and circumstances of the case I may stale that evidently and apparently as already pointed out, name of the present petitioners finds place in the first information report so also in the police statement of the eye witnesses as is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is thus clear that the very material has been misunderstood by the investigation office of the police and subsequently, the investigation officer has changed his opinion and came to this conclusion that the material already furnished alongwith first chargesheet was sufficient to file subsequent charge-sheet against the petitioners. In the instant case instead of new material there would have been a new light that was received by the investigation officer from his superiors. Therefore, the investigation officer filed subsequent charge sheet on the basis of material placed or brought with earlier charge-sheet. In my view, to arrest the propensity on the question whether such a state of affairs tantamounts to abuse of the process of the Court, the proper legal remedy is not under Section 438, Cr. P.C. 8. Thus, herein, I must preclude myself, sitting in a forum of discretion under Section 438, Cr. P.C. to dilate the controversy raised at the bar, any further, on the interesting and important question regarding the interpretation of Cl. (8) of S. 173, of the Cr. P.C. 1973. 9. Verily. the learned counsel for the petitioners stressed on the point that under Section 173 (8) Cr. P.C. if subsequent charge sheet is presented on the material produced earlier with first charge sheet no cognizance can be taken. (8) of S. 173, of the Cr. P.C. 1973. 9. Verily. the learned counsel for the petitioners stressed on the point that under Section 173 (8) Cr. P.C. if subsequent charge sheet is presented on the material produced earlier with first charge sheet no cognizance can be taken. Such a question first be brought to the notice of learned subordinate court but it cannot be adjudicated upon while exercising discretionary powers under Section 438, Cr.P.C, because dilated and elaborate documentation of the merits should and may leave the impression of prejudice to either of the parties, and only to be satisfied about a prima facie case is needed. 10. Such a controversy is set at liberty for more academic debate and dialogue in a proper forum. 11. And what I am required to see while exercising discretionary powers under Section 418, Cr. P.C . as is well laid down by their Lordships of the Apex Court in a fame judgment of Gurbaksh Singh v. State of Punjab( 1980(2) S.C.C. 565 ) followed in Pokar Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1985 Cr. L.J. 1175) , is whether the proposed accusation appears to stem not from motives of furthering the ends of justice but from some ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate the petitioners by having them arrested, and if so, on the evidentiary material as it stands on the record then only the petitioners would be entitled to their release on bail in the event of their arrest in addition to keeping in mind other relevant considerations governing the discretion, which are nature and seriousness of the proposed charges the context of the events likely to lead to making of the charges, a reasonable possibility of the petitioners' presence not being secured at the trial and the larger interests of the public or the State. 12. Applying the guidelines (ut supra) to the instant case, now I may deal with tho legal quibblings apart from hide and seek niceties heard in court. Admittedly cross case has been registered against the complainant party on the basis of the report lodged by Hanif Khan (person from the accused). I have also perused the report reproduced in the memo of' bail petition wherein the presence of the deceased Nazir Khan has not been shown. Admittedly cross case has been registered against the complainant party on the basis of the report lodged by Hanif Khan (person from the accused). I have also perused the report reproduced in the memo of' bail petition wherein the presence of the deceased Nazir Khan has not been shown. Further five of the persons from the accused side sustained 13 injuries whereas from the complainant side only five persons sustained injuries-one of whom succumbed to his injuries, Shri Vyas wrangled, and according to him, the complainant party was aggressor. 13. Having considered the point (ut supra), and perused the case diary specially the injury reports of the accused party-on their persons out of 13 injuries, two are incised wounds, two-lacerated wounds and others are stated to be abrasion and brusies, wherein injuries on the persons of the complainant party are said to be serious in nature. However, refraining myself to make any opinion on the merits of the points and the evidence including the injuries, I find that the petitioners' names are mentioned in the first information report and the police statements of the eye witness; the proposed charges against them are of serious nature of murder where one Nazir Khan succumbed to the injuries on his person inasmuch as from the case diary perused with the help of the learned Public Prosecutor, there is nothing to show that the accusation against the petitioners has been made with some ulterior motive with the object to humiliate them by having them arrested; neither is there any allegation of any political antagonism nor that the informant is an influential person. Moreso, the case diary discloses that the murder was committed in participation of the petitioners in the unlawful activity in the presence of the public. 14. Now, the only question which I am called upon to decide is whether in view of the fact as quibbled by Mr. Vyas that the petitioners are military servicemen, they are entitled to anticipatory bail. 14. Now, the only question which I am called upon to decide is whether in view of the fact as quibbled by Mr. Vyas that the petitioners are military servicemen, they are entitled to anticipatory bail. Unquestionably, no case is made out for anticipatory bail in this case and adopting from the decision in Pokar Ram v. State (ut supra) status in life, affluence or otherwise are hardly relevant considerations in cases of anticipatory bail, looking to the seriousness of the proposed charge of murder in a case where it has not been claimed by the petitioners that on the day of incident they were not present in the village rather their presence (Magsood, Mushtaq) has been admitted in the cross report lodged by Hanif Khan (person from the accused party). 15. Thus, for reasons stated (ut supra), I must say that there are no compelling circumstances made out for granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners accused of committing murder. Consequently, I am not prone to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners, Yusuf Khan Maqsood & Mushtaq whose bail petitions are liable to be rejected and are dismissed.Petition rejected. *******