Abdul Wahid v. Additional Commissioner (Admn) Meerut Division
1989-05-09
M.P.SINGH
body1989
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT M.P. Singh 1. The present petition is directed against an order of Additional Commissioner of Meerut Division Meerut dated 10-8-1988 whereby he has set aside the order of learned S.D.O. and has directed to confirm the auction sale dated 21-8-1986 and to deliver the possession of the land to Karan Singh (respondent no. 3). 2. The opposite party no. 3 has put in appearance. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged. On the request of the learned counsel for both the parties, the petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage. The brief facts are given below : The petitioner took a loan of Rs. 18000/- from the Union Bank of India and Rs. 20000/- from the Punjab National Bank on 7-8-1973 and 19-5-1971 respectively for purchasing a Tractor. The petitioner committed default in repayment of loan. Both the banks issued recovery certificate. In pursuance of that, the land belonging to the petitioner situated in village Tashipur Mustakam, Tashipur Ahatmal, Rajapur Ahatmal and Rajapur Mustakam were attached and ultimately put to auction on 21-8-86. The respondent no. 3 was the highest bidder. 3. On 25-8-1986 Naib Tehsildar recommended that the auction sale held on 21-8-1986 may not be approved and the auction notice be published again. 4. The S.D.O. by means of his order dated 4-9-1986 approved the said recommendation. Against this order, the respondent no. 3 filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Meerut which was allowed on 10-8-1988. The present writ petition is directed against this order. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Additional Commissioner has no jurisdiction to pass an order for confirming the sale. The auction sale was not in accordance with law. According to him, even if the petitioner failed to file any objection under Rules 285-1 and 285-H of UP ZA and LR Rules (hereinafter referred to as the rules) will not debar the petitioner from raising this point in the writ petition. His contention further was that the S.D.O. himself has not accepted the sale dated 21-8-86 and has set aside the same after recommendation of Tehsildar, before expiry of 30 days. It was not open to the Addl. Commissioner to set aside the order of S.D.O. dated 4-9-86. 5.
His contention further was that the S.D.O. himself has not accepted the sale dated 21-8-86 and has set aside the same after recommendation of Tehsildar, before expiry of 30 days. It was not open to the Addl. Commissioner to set aside the order of S.D.O. dated 4-9-86. 5. The main attack of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was material irregularity in publishing and conducting the sale inasmuch as, it was held after the expiry of 30 days from the date, the proclamation was issued. According to him, there was complete breach of Rule 281 (2) (i) which vitiated the sale. 6. In order to consider the worth of the argument, we will have to look into the relevant rules. Rule .85-1 reads as under :- "At any time within thirty days from the date of the sale, application may be made to the commissioner to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it ; but no sale shall be set aside on such ground unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he has sustained substantial injury by reasons of such irregularity or mistake." There is no dispute that the sale took place on 21-8-86 and the son of the petitioner also participated in the said auction. It was conducted by Naib Tehsildar in accordance with law. In the absence of any objection, the deposit of one fourth of auction money by the highest bidder and the balance has also been accepted by the authorities. 7. Thus under Rule 285-1, the petitioner could have moved the application before the Commissioner for setting aside the sale on the ground of material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the sale. He had an additional responsibility of satisfying the Commissioner that he has sustained substantial injury by reasons of irregularity of administration. The petitioner did not file any objection as contemplated under this rule. Not even an oral objection was raised at the time of auction. 8.
He had an additional responsibility of satisfying the Commissioner that he has sustained substantial injury by reasons of irregularity of administration. The petitioner did not file any objection as contemplated under this rule. Not even an oral objection was raised at the time of auction. 8. This leads us to examine Rule 285-H which provides as under :- "(1) Any person whose holding or other immoveable property has been sold under the Act, at any time within thirty days from the date of sale, apply to have the sale set aside on his depositing in the Collector's office (a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to 5 per cent of the purchase money ; and (b) for payment on account of the arrear, the amount specified in the proclamation in ZA Form 74 as that for the recovery of which the sale was ordered, less any amount which may, since account and (c) the costs of the sale. On making of such deposit, the Collector shall pass an order setting aside the sale. Provided that if a person applies under Rule 285-1 to set aside such sale, he shall not be entitled to make an application under this rule " If the petitioner was aggrieved, then he should have filed application for setting aside the sale after depositing 5 per cent of the purchase money along with other deposits as contemplated in the rule. Even this option was not exercised by the petitioner. Inaction on the part of the petitioner to do so debars him from raising this point in the writ petition for the first time. 9. There was no material irregularity on record on the basis of which, the Tehsildar could make suo moto report against the said auction. Neither, there was any objection in writing, nor there was any oral objection. The order of S.D.O. accepting the recommendation of Tehsildar for fresh auction sale was also without jurisdiction. 10. The points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner all need examination of facts which is beyond the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This court while exercising this jurisdiction, is not sitting as a court of appeal.
10. The points which have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner all need examination of facts which is beyond the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This court while exercising this jurisdiction, is not sitting as a court of appeal. Reliance may be placed on Munni Lal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 SC 29 , Beant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 388 and S. M. Umarsaheb v. K. H. Karimsab, 1970 SC ol. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Ram Chandra Arya v. Man Singh, AIR 1968 SC 954 . In that case, it has been held : "It is now well settled principle that, if a decree is passed against a minor without appointment of guardian, the decree is a nullity and is void and not merely voidable. This principle becomes applicable to the case of lunatic in view of Rule 15 of Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure so that the decree obtained against Ram Lal was a decree which has to be treated as without jurisdiction and void. In these circumstances, the sale held in execution of that decree must also be held to be void." 11. The controversy in the above case was whether the decree passed against minor without the appointment of guardian was a nullity and whether this principle was applicable to the case of lunatic also or not. It was held that such a decree was without jurisdiction and void. The sale held in execution of such a decree was also held to be void. The principle enunciated in that case has got no relevancy in the present case. Here, the entire procedure is controlled and regulated by Rule 285-H and 285-1. 12.
It was held that such a decree was without jurisdiction and void. The sale held in execution of such a decree was also held to be void. The principle enunciated in that case has got no relevancy in the present case. Here, the entire procedure is controlled and regulated by Rule 285-H and 285-1. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the Division Bench decision reported in Ashok Kumar Singh v. State of U. P., 1979 ALJ 203, wherein it has been held as under : "In a case where the loan has been secured by mortgage, charge or other encumbrance on immovable property, Sec. 4 (2) (b) mandatorily requires that the mortgaged property is first to be sold in the proceedings for the recovery of sum due from that person as if there is an arrear of land revenue and proceedings to recover the same from other property can be taken only if the Collector certifies that there is no prospect of realising the entire loan by sale of the property secured." Relying upon this decision, it was contended that the property attached was mortgaged. If the loan was not repaid then, the property so mortgaged should have been put to auction first. If the entire amount was not satisfied only then other property could be auctioned. The argument is misconceived inasmuch as section 4 (2) (b) of the U. P. Public Money Recoveries Act, 1972 makes specific provision of sale of mortgaged properties, whereas there is no parallel provision in the rules framed under the UP ZA and LR Act. This case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 13. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is reported in Ram Singh v. State of U. P., 1987 AWC 910 . This case is wholly irrelevant and I fail to understand for what purpose, the learned counsel for the petitioner has cited this case. In that case, proceedings under section 122-B was initiated on the report of Lekhpal. The petitioner of that case filed the objection stating that he was not in possession of the disputed land, hence it was held that no proceedings under section 122-B could be initiated.
In that case, proceedings under section 122-B was initiated on the report of Lekhpal. The petitioner of that case filed the objection stating that he was not in possession of the disputed land, hence it was held that no proceedings under section 122-B could be initiated. Now, I come to Rule 285-K which provides as under : "If no application under Rule 285-1 is made within that time allowed thereof, all claims on the ground of irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the sale shall be barred : Provided nothing contained in this rule shall bar the institution of a suit in the Civil Court for the purpose of setting aside a sale on the ground of fraud." This rule gives a fatal blow to the case of the petitioner. 14. The proper remedy for him was to file a Civil Suit for setting aside the sale in this case. This leads us to Rule 285-J which reads as under : "On the expiration of thirty days from the date of sale, if no such application as is mentioned in Rule 285-H or Rule 285-I, has been made or if such application has been made and rejected by the Collector or the Commissioner, the Collector shall pass an order confirming the sale after satisfying himself that the purchase of land in question by the bidder would be in contravention of the provisions of Section 154. Every order passed under this Rule shall be final." According to this rule, the Collector shall have to pass an order confirming the sale if the purchase by the bidder was not in contravention of section 154. Thus in the absence of objection under Rule 285-H and 285-1, the Collector has only to examine about the restriction on the transfer by Bhumidhar as contemplated in section 154. Thus, in the absence of these only a routine order was to be passed by the Collector confirming the sale. In the instant case, the order of the Collector is in contravention of Rule 285-J as well and it becomes bad in law. 15.
Thus, in the absence of these only a routine order was to be passed by the Collector confirming the sale. In the instant case, the order of the Collector is in contravention of Rule 285-J as well and it becomes bad in law. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon a case reported in Indu-Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner Agra Division, Agra, 1984 AWC 772 in which it has been held : "A sale is confirmed under Rule 285-J which provides that on expiration of thirty days from the date of sale if no such application as is mentioned in Rule 285-H or Rule 285-1 has been made is rejected by the Collector shall pass an order confirming the sale after satisfying himself that the purchase by the bidder would not be in contravention of the provisions of Section 154, of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and every order passed under this Rule shall be final. The nature of the proceedings under the provision aforementioned suggests that the period of thirty days is a fixed time schedule for the filing of an application for the setting aside of the sale ; and the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act do not seem to apply to the proceedings under Rule 285-1 as the Commissioner does not act as a court under that provision. The Commissioner in matters relating to realisation of arrears of land revenue acts as Revenue Officer, and not as a revenue court. The Commissioner in the instant case acted as an administrative authority in a proceeding which was quasi-judicial in nature Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can issue a writ or direction in a proceeding as the one in question." This case is directly against the petitioner. 16. For the reasons given above, I am of the view that the Tehsildar had no jurisdiction to make any recommendation for setting aside any sale dated 21-8-1986, in the absence of any material on the record nor the S.D.O. has got any power to pass order dated 8-9-1987 for a fresh auction. The order of Commissioner suffers from no error apparent on the face of record while confirming the sale. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force. The petition is accordingly dismissed.