This revision petition arises from an order of the Assistant District Judge ([) Gauhati made on March 1st, 1989 in Title v. Execution Case No 9 of 1982 rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to stay the execution case pending disposal of the Title Suit No 65 of 1988 instituted by him in the Court of the Munsiff (II) Gauhati. 2. Facts :-The plaintiff petitioner instituted Title Suit No 65 of 1988 in the Court of the Munsiff (II) Gauhati against the decree-holders in the execution case claiming, inter alia, declaration that v. the plaintiff has right to possess the premises which is the subject matter of the execution case, and permanent injunction restraining the decree-holders and/or their agents from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff-petitioner. The plaintiff brought the suit alleging that he is tenant of decree-holders and has been occupying 7 rooms since 1972 and that he was not a party in the suit in which the decree under execution was passed. In the suit, the petitioner filed an application under Order 39, CPC for interlocutory prohibitory injunction for restraining the decree-holder from disturbing his alleged possession. The petition was rejected by the Munsiff. The order was appealed to the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal. Revision against the order of the Additional District Judge was dismissed by this Court in Civil Revision No 427 of 1988. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another application under section 151, CPC in the executing Court (the Assistant District Judge (I) Gauhati) for staying Title Execution Case No 9 of 1982. The Executing Court rejected the application. Hence this petition. 3. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the application for stay of the decree is maintainable under section 151, CPC on the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. Mr. G. K. Talukdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn my attention to a decision in Ram Chandra vs. Manmul Singh, AIR 1983 Sikkim 1, to support his contention that the applica­tion of the petitioner can be entertained under section 151, CPC. Against the decision of the Sikkim High Court, Mr. J. N. Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, has referred me to the decision in UBI vs. Mitra, AIR 1962 Assam 150, Ramesh Chandra ts. Against the decision of the Sikkim High Court, Mr. J. N. Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, has referred me to the decision in UBI vs. Mitra, AIR 1962 Assam 150, Ramesh Chandra ts. Beni Bala Das, 1974 ALR 215 and Usha Jain vs. Manmohan Bajaj, AIR 1980 MP 146 (FB). 5. The above decisions relate to the application field by a person who resisted or obstructed in obtaining the possession of the property in the course of the execution of a decree. In the context of 0 21 R 97, CPC, it has been held by this Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court that it is the right and privilege of a decree-holder, or auction purchaser alone to move the executing Court when either of them is resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of the decretal property (immovable) and that a third party cannot file an application under 0 21 R 97, CPC. In Sikkim's case, it has been held that if in the course of the execution of a decree for the delivery of any immovable property, a person in possession of the property, who is not a party to the decree, can file an application under section 151, CPC. In view of the provisions under 0 21 R 97, CPC and the decisions of this Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, I respectfully disagree with the decision of the Sikkim High Court. 6. In a suit, a person may be a party to the suit or a person claiming under a party, or a person is represented directly or indirectly, or sufficiently represented, by a party. In the case of a person who is-a complete stranger, under the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet," the general principle is that a person, not a party nor claiming under, or represented by, a party to a litigation is not bound by any decision in that litigation. However, whether such a judgment or order is admissible under the Evidence Act is another aspect. 7. However, whether such a judgment or order is admissible under the Evidence Act is another aspect. 7. In view of the above principle, where a decree-holder obtains a decree for eviction in a suit without making a person who has been in possession of the decretal land or part of it under a right derived from the decree-holder as a party to the suit either by mistake or other­wise, the decree shall not be binding to that person. If that person institutes a suit claiming his right to posses the property and makes an application for stay of the execution till the disposal of the suit apprehending that he may be evicted by virtue of the decree obtained by the decree holder, and if his application is not considered, a great injustice will be caused to him. Such an application is not within the meaning of 0 21 R 97 as it is not a case of resistance or obstruction in obtaining property in course of the execution of decree. The rules under 0 21 and 0 41, CPC relating to stay of decree are not exhaustive to cover such a case. Therefore, I am of the view that an application under section 151, CPC is maintainable if there is alle­gation in the petition that a person has been in the possession of the decretal land or a part of it under a right originated from the decree holder and the Court is to make an enquiry as to the allegation, if claim is bona fide or prima facie case exists, and pass necessary orders as it may deem fit. Therefore, petition filed by the petitioner was maintainable. 8. The next contention of Mr. Sarma, the learned counsel for the opposite parties, is that even if the petition under section 151 is maintainable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the revision petition is to be rejected, 9. Mr. Talukdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn my attention to the eviction notice dated April 27th, 1976 issued to the petitioner and four (4) others demanding possession of the decretal land and a rent receipt dated 7.7.88 for Rs. 700/- alleged to have been issued by the defendant-opposite parties. 10. Mr. Talukdar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn my attention to the eviction notice dated April 27th, 1976 issued to the petitioner and four (4) others demanding possession of the decretal land and a rent receipt dated 7.7.88 for Rs. 700/- alleged to have been issued by the defendant-opposite parties. 10. Although the notice of eviction was issued to five (5) persons including the present petitioner, the present petitioner was not made a party in the suit and as to why he was not make a party has been explained stating that the notice was issued to him under the bona fide belief that he was a partner of M/s Hans Kumar Jains. 11. As regards the receipt, the defendant-opposite parties deny to have issued the receipt and in this connection a criminal case is pending. Be that as it may, in Civil Revision no 427 of 1988 against the order of rejection of injunction, this Court has dealt with the notice and the receipt. After considering the rent receipt, the notice and other materials, this Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff resided in Rajasthan and therefore his possession of the decretal land is doubtful, and that the plaintiff petitioner has no prima facie case. Therefore, the submission of Mr. Sarma has sufficient force. 12. The executing Court has not held that no petition under section 151 is maintainable, but he has held, relying on the judgment of this Court in Civil Revision no 427 of 1988, that he was not inclined to invoke the jurisdiction under section 151. I do not find any jurisdictional error in exercise of its jurisdiction by the executing Court. In this view of the matter, there is no material to interfere with the impugned order. 13. For the foregoing reason, the revision petition is dismissed and the stay order stands vacated.