JUDGMENT K. Sukumaran, J. 1. This writ petition projects a legal fight between a clerical employee and a chemical company. The fight is in the area of industrial jurisprudence which has now a fairly firm terra-firma. 2. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is invoked by the employee. He was a Senior Assistant in the purchase department. For" one misconduct-a minor one-he was demoted on 27th November 1979. He was charged with yet another misconduct-A serious one-of the use of threatening language against a superior officer. He was found guilty of that misconduct too. The punishment was one of dismissal, on 18th March 1980. 3. On 7th March 1983 the industrial dispute was referred for adjudication by the Tribunal, the issue being: "Demotion and Dismissal of Sri H. Balakrishna Kamath". 4. The award was duly passed. It is dated 21st April 1986, and gazetted on 30th December 1986. 5. As to how in this world of advanced technology and technical gadgets, eight months should elapse between the expressed decision of a judicial mind, and a mechanical publication of it, is a matter of mystery. No one seems to be concerned about it; the Government understandably, and as is usually the case; nor even the trade unions, expected to be more alert in averting or at least shortening the agony of a dismissed employee. It has been the experience of the Court that repeated suggestions and directions made in the course of disposal of cases concerning that department, have not been helpful to wake it up from a supreme stupor. Further energies need not be wasted in that direction. 6. The Labour Court had before it substantial items of evidence, particularly of the documentary type; eighteen exhibits on the side of the management and thirty, on that of the union. Six witnesses gave evidence for the Management, before the Labour Court. The employee examined himself as W.W. 1. 7. The court had the benefit of very elaborate-elaborate even to a fault? arguments from either side. Both sides appeared to overlook the jurisdictional limitations. A mental satisfaction of the fullest presentation of the respective causes can prompt the court to err on the side of continued patience and prolonged submissions. 8. The facts and facets of the case, and even the shades and sights hither to left unillumined, make a long narration. arguments from either side. Both sides appeared to overlook the jurisdictional limitations. A mental satisfaction of the fullest presentation of the respective causes can prompt the court to err on the side of continued patience and prolonged submissions. 8. The facts and facets of the case, and even the shades and sights hither to left unillumined, make a long narration. The writ court can, however, afford to have a concentration on the crucial facts. Emphasis is therefore given in the factual narration, and the evidential discussion, and in the ultimate conclusion, only to facts and matters of momentum. 9. The employee is a graduate in Economics. 'Typewriting Higher' and 'Shorthand Lower' were his additional technical qualifications. He worked for a while in the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Mattancherry. He joined services of the company in June, 1961. In 1979 he was the Senior Assistant. 10. While dealing with files of the purchase department, he happened to make a note on 9th March 1979 in file No. M.P.R. 3670/3671 relating to purchase of M.S. Bolts and Nuts. On the note of the assistant (Materials) dated 9th February 1979, he made a remark: "Non-sense". 11. A memo was issued on 12th March 1979 directing him to show cause against initiation of disciplinary proceedings for using the word 'non sense'. His immediate reply made on 13th March 1979 was: ".......... I have not remarked as alleged in your Memo." The management was not satisfied with such a vague plea. It directed an enquiry. An enquiry was held by the Security Superintendent. The purchase officer. Thankappan and two co-employees Ramachandran and Ramakrishnan were examined in the domestic enquiry. It was brought out that the actual words written would only read: "Non-sense". Dictionaries in the English language would not disclose the existence of such a word. Possibly, it is this impression that prompted the employee to raise a plea of denial in his explanation. The management apparently wanted to overcome that difficulty by the evidence of the co-employees, who testified before the Enquiry Officer that they heard the employee uttering the word 'nonsense' while writing the word. The Enquiry Officer believed them. According to the Enquiry Officer the remark was really 'nonsense' and it was written maliciously. The management apparently wanted to overcome that difficulty by the evidence of the co-employees, who testified before the Enquiry Officer that they heard the employee uttering the word 'nonsense' while writing the word. The Enquiry Officer believed them. According to the Enquiry Officer the remark was really 'nonsense' and it was written maliciously. The employee further contended that his expression of an honest view, even when couched in crude language could not come within the purview of a mis-conduct as the term is understood in law. The employee attempted somewhat convincingly to explain his action as one intended only to protect the financial interest of the company. A background of facts and files had been furnished by him to demonstrate his bona fides in the matter. The management felt that his motives were not that unselfish. A suggestion that the duty of local purchase was transferred to Ramachandran Nair, witness No. 2 in the enquiry, and that was the cause for distress in the form of deprivation of purchase opportunities. It is unnecessary to undertake an elaborate enquiry into those aspects. A close reading of the evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the withholding of relevant files from the enquiry would give the impression that some in the Purchase Department had many skeletons in the cupboard. The enquiry Officer's finding of guilt was accepted by the management. It claimed to have taken a lenient view. The punishment awarded was one of demotion from the post of Senior Assistant to that of an ordinary Assistant with effect from 28th November 1979. 12. The employee protested, and appealed against the punishment on 31st December 1979. On the very next day, the appeal was disposed of; it was dismissed. 13. The order of demotion dated 27th November 1979 was served on the employee on that day itself. The later events formed the subject matter of the subsequent charge. According to the management, at about 4.10 p.m. on 27th November 1979 the employee went to the cabin of the Superintendent of purchase, and shouted rudely at him and threatened him. The words actually used have been extracted in the memo of charges. It is better to have them extracted here too, for a better evaluation of the contentions as undertaken below. They read: "Thank you for the gracious service done. You are responsible for the punishment given to me. The words actually used have been extracted in the memo of charges. It is better to have them extracted here too, for a better evaluation of the contentions as undertaken below. They read: "Thank you for the gracious service done. You are responsible for the punishment given to me. I say this is not good for you.� The employee submitted his explanation. The enquiry followed. The workman did not participate in the actual enquiry. The enquiry was proceeded with in his absence The enquiry report was submitted on 3rd March, 1980. The management agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer. According to the Company, the acts of misconduct were major ones under Clause.67(v) 1, 8 and 19 of the Certified Standing Orders of the company. The order of dismissal, dated 18th March 1980 contained the concluding words as against the employee in these terms: "Misconducts proved against you are very grave and serious so as to warrant the punishment of dismissal. Your past service record is also not clean. Considering the gravity of the misconducts committed by you, I have no other alternative but to dismiss you from the service of the company in the interest of discipline and good behaviour. Accordingly, you are dismissed from the service of the company with effect from 18th March 1980." 14. As regards the first punishment, the material conclusions of the Labour Court are: (1) The Enquiry Officer was competent to hold the enquiry. It was not essential that the enquiry should have been conducted by the Head of the Department or Section, on a proper interpretation of the Standing O.68(a). The Chairman and Managing Director had ordered the enquiry in the present case. That is on the basis of the power conferred on the management under clause (f) of the Standing Orders. The provisions of sub-clause (a) will yield to those of sub-clause (f) of Clause.68. The contention had not been raised before the Enquiry Officer. The enquiry cannot be invalidated on that ground. (2) The reasons mentioned by the Enquiry Officer for turning down the request for production of files as contained in Ext. W-1 letter of the employee cannot be agreed to; however, no prejudice was caused to the workman by that refusal; there was necessity to have the files produced, as the object of having the files produced was to show the. W-1 letter of the employee cannot be agreed to; however, no prejudice was caused to the workman by that refusal; there was necessity to have the files produced, as the object of having the files produced was to show the. irregularities in making purchases and the objections of the employee. "It is quite possible that the said contention is not without any substance." However, having regard to the nature of the misconduct actually alleged, a consideration of that question was unnecessary. (3) "What is written in the file reads nonsense. The employee had not explained what exactly he had written if it ia not meant 'nonsense'; he cannot write meaningless words in the file. It is quite possible that the word was written after circling those remarks; the employee had intended to write the word nonsense, as against the remark made by Shri R. Ramachandran giving the note to him for orders. " In the absence of satisfactory explanation it has to be taken that Sri Kamath had written the word 'nonsense' or some meaningless word in which case also it will be an act subversive of good behaviour if not discipline. Sri. R. Ramachandran is of course not superior to Sri Kamath and even if he had done something wrong, Sri. Kamath cannot write such remarks on the file. It only shows lack of proper sense of discipline". There was no violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry. 15. The petitioner has naturally attacked the finding of the Labour Court on this aspect, though in the light of the subsequent events, and the drastic punishment of dismissal imposed on him in the second enquiry, a mere demotion pales into insignificance, in one sense. It was urged on behalf of the respondent that the Labour Court did not have that amplitude of powers as are available under S.11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, the wide appellate powers, while dealing with a case of punishment other than that of dismissal or discharge. If there be a proper enquiry, and if principle of natural justice have been complied with in the conduct thereof, the area of interference by the Labour Court, dwindles into almost nothingness, so proceeded the argument. 16. It is true that in the light of the subsequent events, the first enquiry did not notably loom large, in the scheme of things. 16. It is true that in the light of the subsequent events, the first enquiry did not notably loom large, in the scheme of things. Where is the minor discomfort of a demotion when, he has been almost overrun by a destructive dismissal? 17. I am of the view that a decision of this court on this aspect is necessary for more reasons than one. If no misconduct could be posited at all in relation to the acts alleged, it will have a considerable, bearing on the question of quantum of punishment in relation to the second charge. Even in relation to incidental matters, it can have its overtone, Courts have considered and pronounced upon issues, even when, in the light of subsequent events, the grant of relief had become unnecessary. Sometimes such an adjudication can pose a live issue between the parties in relation to the liability for costs. There may also be cases where the question is of general importance likely to arise again. A list between parties can continue to exist in such circumstances. The House of Lords recently proceeded to pronounce on an issue of importance in such circumstances. Vide British Medical Association v. Greater Glasgow Health Board 1989 (1) All ER 1984. An adjudication on the legal issues in relation to the first misconduct is therefore essential in the present case. I shall therefore deal with and discuss that matter first. 18. While the proper running of an establishment is indubitably a managerial privilege, disciplinary action is permissible only in the event of there being a misconduct. Different men react differently. Even if the behaviour of an individual employee is not as perfect, refined or cultured as is desirable, that circumstance by itself does not expose him to the difficult disciplinary action. The Labour Court itself, in the present case, had its wavering whether the words written amount to a breach of discipline or only a mere breach of propriety. If there is not even an impropriety in the conduct involved in such a noting in a file which was placed before the employee and by a subordinate, no misconduct could really be posited. A fortiorari no disciplinary action; and no punishment. 19. Communication of an idea had its chequered history in the evolution of man. A tedious research into the evolution of the language is unnecessary in this context. A fortiorari no disciplinary action; and no punishment. 19. Communication of an idea had its chequered history in the evolution of man. A tedious research into the evolution of the language is unnecessary in this context. Modern man is no longer a helpless animal which can express itself only by gesticulations, signs or sounds. A poet, rich in his vocabulary, made his heroine Sita, lament about imperfect language: "Now, this language is incomplete; Ambiguities make mistakes commit. (MALAYALAM)" 20. On the very word non-sense, and its employment thereof in diverse situations, the researcher, thinker or the writer can pick up very many instances of its usage in an inoffensive manner. Courts with their limitations in these fields, may not find it handy to locate such passages in the obese pages of history and literature. "What is History?" by Edward Hallett Carr, Fellow of Trinity College, would refer two situations where that Oxford Don and eminent historian had used that word, with perfect innocence and refinement. In page 2 of that book he says and in relation to the pandits of the earlier days: "I hope that I am sufficiently up-to-date to recognize that anything written in the 1890s must be. nonsense." While delivering his third lecture in History, Science and Morality, he dealt with the question of generalization in relation to history. He was emphasising about the commitment of a historian to generalization in almost the same way as of a scientist. Page 58 of the book contains a sentence reading: "It is nonsense to say that generalization is foreign to history; history thrives on generalizations." 21. Even in the context of the processing of a file in the administrative set up, such a situation had arisen in a fairly recent past. On the eve of Indian independence, an I.C.S. official of the lower cadre, entertained a doubt whether the implementation of a project should be proceeded with in view of an expected transfer of power. The rest of the nothings in the file could be better extracted. On the eve of Indian independence, an I.C.S. official of the lower cadre, entertained a doubt whether the implementation of a project should be proceeded with in view of an expected transfer of power. The rest of the nothings in the file could be better extracted. "Vere Birdwood quotes from a series of minutes which she saw in 1941 added to a file: "The most junior officer had written, 'I don't think we'd better start this project, there may not be time to finish it.' His senior officer had minuted on the file, 'What nonsense, I was told this in 1919.' And the most senior officer, the Governor, had minuted on that same file, 'Absolute nonsense. I was told this in 1909'." (See Plain Tales From the Raj, Edited by Charles Alien, Page 214.) 22. It is difficult to assume that the superior officers were committing serious acts of improprieties, much less of indiscipline, when they expressed their views forcibly and vigorously, in the manner indicated above, Persons in responsible heights and in countries of established democratic conventions, have expressed harsh words even in recent times. Rt. Hon. Norman Tebbet M. P., Chairman of the Conservative Party employed the words 'damn fool idea' while criticising an action of his political opponent, in an open meeting. The Court of Appeal had to consider some of the legal issues arising out of that incident. See Bookbinder v. Tebbit 1989 (1) All ER 1169. 23. There may be atmospheres where only words with all the chastity, could ordinarily gain admittance such as in the holy halls of legislatures. Speakers of the House of Commons have had trying times in testing the purity of the language and the permissibility of the expressions. Informative history in those experiences has been handed down by successive generations of speakers who have kept their vigil, keeping awake even when the debates crawled into the small hours of the day. One of them refers to his ruling that 'humbug' in the noun form was objectionable, though as an adjective, it was not. (See Mr. Speaker, Sir, by Selwyn Lloyd, page 63). 24. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the use of the word 'nonsense' in the file and as against the note put up by a subordinate official, will not amount to a misconduct. (See Mr. Speaker, Sir, by Selwyn Lloyd, page 63). 24. In the light of the above discussion, I hold that the use of the word 'nonsense' in the file and as against the note put up by a subordinate official, will not amount to a misconduct. It is true that as Lord Birkenhead said: The strongest difference of opinion is not inconsistent with the greatest decency of language. It is a matter of good advice. A mere missing of the refinement, however, is no misconduct. Even though the enquiry is perfect and the principles of natural justice properly venerated, an industrial punishment is impermissible if there be no misconduct. In that view of the matter, I would set aside the finding of the Labour Court in relation to the first charge. 25. That only opens up the more difficult area where the keener controversy is very much in sight. The Labour Court, as noted earlier, had passed on 17th September 1985 a preliminary order about the domestic enquiry on the second charge being infirm on the ground that there was an infraction of the principles of natural justice. Under the very same order, the Labour Court had held that the enquiry as regards the first charge was not violative of those principles. The union challenged the finding of the Labour Court to the extent it expressed a view adverse to its contentions regarding the first enquiry. The Management, as is discernible from the present counter affidavit, felt that it need contest the correctness of the preliminary order as regards the second enquiry only if and when it became necessary as a result of the ultimate award. The workman's writ petition was dismissed by judgment dated 17th October 1985, but reserving the right for the workman to challenge the final award if it went against him. I have taken the view that the finding on the first enquiry is unsustainable in law. The award to that extent has been quashed accordingly. That has made it unnecessary to subject the finding in the preliminary order as to a more detailed scrutiny in this original petition. I may, however, observe that there is much force in the contention that that enquiry in which the enquiry officer rejected the request of the workman for the production of certain connected files, is vitiated on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 26. I may, however, observe that there is much force in the contention that that enquiry in which the enquiry officer rejected the request of the workman for the production of certain connected files, is vitiated on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. 26. The finding of the Labour Court that the second enquiry is vitiated by a negation of the principles of natural justice is grounded on the fact that the request of the workman to have the professional services of a lawyer was unjustly and illegally turned down. I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Labour I am inclined to agree with the finding of the Labour Court. The files produced, would fully support these findings of the Labour Court in the preliminary order on that aspect. In an enquiry of this nature, and for a major misconduct, the request for more sophisticated aid and guidance in the defence of an employee in a domestic enquiry, merits serious consideration. A Law Officer qualified in law, was conducting the case on behalf of the Management. The enquiry officer was a Deputy Superintendent of Police working on deputation in the company. The workman had been repeatedly complaining about a biassed attitude on his part. The Labour Court adverted to the principles gatherable on the aspect, as available from the decision of the Supreme Court. The Board of Trustees v. D. R. Nadkarni and others 1983 (1) LLJ 1 , and the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Karunakaran Nair 1985 KLT 680 . The conclusion reached cannot be characterised as suffering from an error of law or perverse on its face. 27. The further question is about the justifiability of the various findings on merits, and on the basis of the evaluation of the evidence permitted to be adduced by both sides before the Labour Court. 28. Some of the observations of the Labour Court, would afford a proper background for the evaluation of the crucial question. 29. The workman had a case that he had been pointing out the irregularities and illegalities committed by his superior officers in the matter of purchase and consequently the superior officers were annoyed against him. The files would disclose that he had been raising objections regarding various matters. 29. The workman had a case that he had been pointing out the irregularities and illegalities committed by his superior officers in the matter of purchase and consequently the superior officers were annoyed against him. The files would disclose that he had been raising objections regarding various matters. The Labour Court observed: "I am prepared to assume that most of them were not without substance." The Labour Court was further inclined to accept his claim that: , . " In a few instances on account of his objections, the company was saved from great loss." I am inclined to agree with the finding of the Labour Court. The files produced, would fully support these findings of the Labour Court. 30. The Labour Court thereafter concentrated on the incident and the scene thereof, namely the cabin of the Superintendent of purchase, where the incident is alleged to have happened. Certain facts are not in controversy. The order of demotion was served on the employee at about 3.16 p.m. on 27th November 1979. The Superintendent of purchase M.W. 2 has a cabin, carved out of the office hall. Adjacent to his cabin is that of Mr. Parameswaran Pillai, M.W. 4 in the domestic enquiry. The partition wall of the cabin is about 6 to 7 feet height. The lower portion is made of wood and the upper one with glass. To facilitate the use of a common telephone, there is a small opening in the partition wall. 31. Padmavathy, Stenographer of Ramakrishnan is M. W. 2. The purchase manager of the company is M. W. 5. 32. The evidence regarding the incident is furnished by M.Ws. 2 to 5. M. Ws. 2, 3 and 5 claim to have actually witnessed the entire scene. M. W. 4 had impression about the goings on, as the person occupying the very next cabin. 33. The workman denied the incident altogether. However, he did not adduce any evidence on his side. The labour court was aware of the discrepancies in the evidence regarding the evidence as given by the Management's witnesses. The discrepancies, according to the labour court, were not on material points, and consequently, the testimony as given by the witnesses could not be discredited on that ground. However, he did not adduce any evidence on his side. The labour court was aware of the discrepancies in the evidence regarding the evidence as given by the Management's witnesses. The discrepancies, according to the labour court, were not on material points, and consequently, the testimony as given by the witnesses could not be discredited on that ground. It even felt that the existence of discrepancies in the versions given by them about an incident which has taken place about six years earlier, would only add to the naturalness of their evidence, strongly commenting for the acceptance thereof. The substantial events, according to the labour court, had been made out. This was, notwithstanding its observation: "It is true that if we make a microscopic examination of what these witnesses have stated as to what Mr. Kamath is alleged to have told MW 2, some differences could be found." According to it, the witnesses had agreed on the substance of the conversation which proceeded from the employee. The witnesses had agreed as regards "most of the words used". The non-examination of any of his fellow workmen to support his theory of his leaving the office for consultation with unions officials, loomed large in the decision of the lower court. It accordingly found that the employee had behaved against the superior officer and talked to him in the manner alleged in the memo of charges. 34. The attack on this portion of the argument, launched by counsel for the petitioner, is not forceful enough. It is true that some of the actions of M. W. 2 were not merely improprieties and irregularities but also a misconduct. The employee was temperamentally rebellious against irregularities in the dealings of the company which came to his notice. He might have even seen some ghosts where really none was present. It is then natural that the employee might have lost his control, when he had been met with a punishment of demotion for the only reason that he acted to prevent irregularities and obviate a possible prospect of the company sustaining loss. The enquiry against him for the first charge could have been even motivated. I have already taken the view that the enquiry was infirm and that the conclusion reached there is unsustainable. If the employee had lost his restraint, it could only be natural, according to the Labour Court. The enquiry against him for the first charge could have been even motivated. I have already taken the view that the enquiry was infirm and that the conclusion reached there is unsustainable. If the employee had lost his restraint, it could only be natural, according to the Labour Court. However, the actual behaviour, according to it, was a serious breach of the discipline; yet not so serious as to warrant the most drastic of the punishments-dismissal from service. 35. I am in agreement with the substance of the conclusion about the employee's behaviour alleged against him. The words actually used, and the manner of their user, were both disruptive of the discipline in the establishment. The misconduct charged against the employee to that extent has been fully established. It is not for this court to re-evaluate the evidence in the case, in proceedings under Article. 226 of the Constitution. 36. In spite of the finding so entered, the labour Court found that the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct proved. It had accordingly directed the employer to dilute the disciplinary punishment, by converting it into discharge from that of dismissal. 37. With the prospect of unemployment facing him, and at a time when he was advanced in age, the employee is naturally dissatisfied with the limited relief he had from the Labour Court. 38. The manner in which the punishment has to be imposed, for a proved misconduct, is no longer, an untravefsed area of the legal field. Courts have always leaned in favour of the workmen. Quite often, its attitude had been of extreme softness. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court were relied on by the employee as indicative of the law laid down on the topic. (Rama Kant Misra v. State of U. P. 1982 (3) SCC 346 and Scooter India Ltd. v. Labour Court AIR 1989 SC 149 . Undoubtedly, the ratio of the decisions may have to be understood in their factual matrix. However, even the most resourceful mind will find it difficult to establish that the case dealt with herein is substantially different from that of Rama Kant Misra's case 1982 (3) SCC 346 decided by the Supreme Court. The vicious words used by the employee there, cannot be easily erased from mind. 39. From early times, even in a case of proved misconduct, disproportionate punishment had rightly received judicial condemnation. The vicious words used by the employee there, cannot be easily erased from mind. 39. From early times, even in a case of proved misconduct, disproportionate punishment had rightly received judicial condemnation. Outlines of Industrial Law by Mansfield Cooper and J. C. Wood and Rideout's Principles of Labour Law, are two handy texts where principles are discussed with reference to the English decisions. Chap.3 of the former, and Chap.4 of the latter, contain detailed discussions. A passage extracted in Jupiter General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shroff 1937 (3) All ER 67 to my mind, summarises the position clearly and accurately. "Their Lordships," said the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, "would be very loath to the assent to the view that a single outbreak of bad temper, accompanied, it may be, with regrettable language, is sufficient ground for dismissal. Sir John Beaumont, C. J., was stating a proposition of mere good sense when he observed that in such cases we must apply the standards of men and not of angels, and remember that men are apt to show temper when reprimanded." 40. Later developments including Papper v. Webb 1969 (1) WLR 514 and London Transport Executive v. Clarke (1981) ICR 355 are only projections of some principles in differing fact situations. With reference to the Pepper v. Webb supra, Rideout pertinently pointed out: "Certainly the court in Pepper v. Webb was more concerned with the fact that a steady deterioration had destroyed the relationship than in isolating any single breach necessary to explain the termination in contractual language." 41. It only remains now to apply the principles to the fact situation in the present case. 42. While in agreement with the labour court that the dismissal is unmeritted having regard to the nature of the misconduct, the only further question is whether a discharge from service, the punishment imposed by the Labour Court, is unduly harsh, or so unduly perverse as to merit interference by this court under Art.226 of the Constitution. 43. The situation arising for consideration has to be evaluated in the light of my conclusion about the invalidity of the punishment on the earlier charge. 43. The situation arising for consideration has to be evaluated in the light of my conclusion about the invalidity of the punishment on the earlier charge. If that punishment is totally unjustified-as I have held-the judicial mind should not boggle in viewing the emotions and attitudes of an employee, zealous in the protection of the interest of the employer in its financial matters, when confronted with a memo of punishment. (Even on the hypothesis that the first charge is proved, the ultimate conclusion, cannot be different in the circumstances). 44. It is difficult to reckon ordinary human beings as unattached ascetics of mysterious mental sublimity. By and large, the ordinary man does have his likes and dislikes, desires and detachments, fear and favour and affection and ill will. A very long enlightened discipline is necessarily to be liberated from those human 'weaknesses'. According to some thinkers, those who do not react can hardly claim any distinction from inanimate things. That is why John Ruskin termed those without reaction as mere sponges. Whitley Stokes commented on the lack of reaction on the Indian people at P. 17, Vol. I of the Anglo Indian Code, in these words: "In this country the danger is on the other side; the people are too little disposed to help themselves; ...... Under these circumstances we are desirous rather to rouse and encourage a manly spirit among the people than to multiply restrictions on the exercise of the right of self defence." This information about the background of the provisions of the Penal Code is relevant in the context. M.C. Setalvad referred to that passage in his Hamlyn lecture on 'Common Law of India'. Ma Caulay's conclusion was not without justification. Pages of Indian history would reveal how a daring youth from England-Job Charnock-came to rescue a girl and a life from being flung into the funeral pyre of her aged and dead husband, when hundreds of others were mutely looking on. An emotional reaction cannot, therefore, be termed as a miserable misconduct. 45. As in any other matters, expression of and emotion has its defined channels of reasonableness. Permitting emotion to go off the rails is disruptive of the social harmony. This is particularly so where organised activities are going on, be it in an educational institution or in a fabulous factory. Misguided manifestation of reaction can, therefore, rightly invite unpalatable consequences. 46. As in any other matters, expression of and emotion has its defined channels of reasonableness. Permitting emotion to go off the rails is disruptive of the social harmony. This is particularly so where organised activities are going on, be it in an educational institution or in a fabulous factory. Misguided manifestation of reaction can, therefore, rightly invite unpalatable consequences. 46. In the present case, an employee dashed into the cabin of the superior officer and behaved badly. He is therefore, liable for punishment. Yet, can he be punished with the deprivation of the very employment? Counsel for the third respondent rightly stressed a decision in Peer Mohammed v. District Manager, F.C. AIR 1984 KLT SN 42 Case No. 71. This court said: "............. talking intemperately and in an unsubordinate tone to the Head of an establishment, is also a very serious misconduct disruptive of discipline." No dilution in that dictum is called for. It must, however, be noted that the punishment, imposed on Peer Mohammed was not a deprivation of his employment, but only a minor penalty of 'bar of increments'. Even that punishment was challenged by the employee. The observations have been made while dismissing that challenge. The observations have to be understood in that context. Discipline cannot be subjected to a cheap higgling. However, some circumstances do distinguish Peer Mohammed's Case AIR 1984 KLT SN 42 Case No. 71 from the present one. The employee, in the present case, a victim of unjust treatment. The person whose cabin is dashed, was a person, who according to him, was the master mind of manipulations. The actual words employed by him do not contain any abusive language as such. There was no overt act against the superior officer. A statement that M.W. 2 is responsible for the punishment is not per se objectionable. So also the query: "Haven't you wife and children." And even his own personal detail: "I have no children." "Report if you so deem fit", may also not be very bad. The objectionable words, disjunctively viewed are: "This is grass for me" and "be careful". Cumulatively, they do make out an insubordinate behaviour. Judged by the yardstick of the Supreme Court case, this, employee cannot be visited with any punishment whatever. The objectionable words, disjunctively viewed are: "This is grass for me" and "be careful". Cumulatively, they do make out an insubordinate behaviour. Judged by the yardstick of the Supreme Court case, this, employee cannot be visited with any punishment whatever. I am inclined to hold that a punishment of deprivation of the employment would be against well settled principles of law, having regard to the circumstances of the case. I would therefore hold that the punishment of dismissal imposed on him by the Management, and the lesser punishment of discharge awarded by the Labour Court, are both highly and illegally excessive and arbitrary. It will then follow that the employee is entitled to the relief of reinstatement. I declare so. 47. It may be mentioned that at the end of the arguments-which had some Athanasian like features - the Court suggested a compromise by way of reinstatement of the employee but without backwages. The employer reasonably reacted to the suggestion of the Court and counsel for the respondent employer reported, after due consultation, about the willingness to abide by that suggestion. The suggestion was, however, spurned by the employee. Counsel for the petitioner was at pains to submit the intense feeling the employee had, while having such a reaction to the Court's suggestion. In addition to his oral submission, he has attempted to clarify his stand by a written submission, indicating the circumstances in which, according to him, his client felt it difficult to forego benefits by way of backwages aggregating to a sum of about rupees one lakh during the period. The gracious gesture of the employer or the difficult decision of the employee shall not, however, sway the judicial mind. I have eschewed them, in the consideration of the various issues. It may be necessary, at least for records' sake, to indicate these developments also. 48. I am disinclined to accept the submission that the employee should be given the entirety of the backwages. That would virtually mean that there is no misconduct whatever on the part of the employee. That is not the position, as found by the Labour Court and by this Court. A misconduct of the nature, therefore, should entail appropriate punishment. A soft attitude would only spoil proper relationships. No employee shall have a feeling that a misconduct on his part is a matter of no consequence whatever. That is not the position, as found by the Labour Court and by this Court. A misconduct of the nature, therefore, should entail appropriate punishment. A soft attitude would only spoil proper relationships. No employee shall have a feeling that a misconduct on his part is a matter of no consequence whatever. He should necessarily feel that it is a matter of serious concern in relation to his career and to his life. He shall not feel that that is a mere flee-bite. A disproportionately soft punishment is as unproductive as disproportionately excessive punishment. I repel the contention, therefore, that the employee should be reinstated and with backwages. 49. Having found that the employee is entitled to reinstatement but not the entirety of the backwages, the Court must strive for a decision. (The decision must certainly be uninfluenced by the suggestion of the compromise by the Court and the reaction of the parties thereto). A final decision on that aspect by this Court may not be desirable as it then may partake the nature of an appellate jurisdiction. Certiorari jurisdiction is essentially different from that. May be, the technical rules of English practice would not make this court hamstrung in moulding the reliefs to an aggrieved party approaching the court. Even then, in the new situation which has emerged in the light of the decision on the substantial issues, as indicated above, a fresh evaluation by the Labour Court would be. more desirable. There are indications in the evidence about the employee being well experienced in his field of work. His qualifications have been already referred to. That he could have easier access to a specialised work of typist or of stenographer, cannot be doubted. His own admission about his employment prospects is also there. As to what relief he should be given in relation to the backwages for the intervening period is better adjudicated by the Labour Court, on a fresh evaluation of all the relevant matters. A more pointed discussion of the relevant aspects and the examination of additional evidence, if need be, (for which, the parties will have an opportunity hereafter) would be a more satisfactory solution to this somewhat complex question. I would, therefore, direct the Labour Court to consider the question of the reliefs in relation to the backwages for the intervening period, afresh. I would, therefore, direct the Labour Court to consider the question of the reliefs in relation to the backwages for the intervening period, afresh. On this limited aspect, the parties are permitted to adduce evidence, if any, in case they desire to do so. It is only proper that the employee is enabled to have a quick decision on this question, as he has been out of employment and in a distressed stage all this while. I would therefore direct that the Labour Court shall pass the award about the entitlement of the employee for backwages during the period from the dismissal and the reinstatement, within a period of four months from today. The State Government shall publish the award within a month of the receipt of the award from the Labour Court. The original Petition is accordingly allowed to the above extent. The respondent shall forthwith reinstate the employee in service. The Labour Court shall determine the residual question in the manner indicated above. As the employee has succeeded substantially in the matter, he is entitled to, and is hereby awarded, the costs with Advocate fee Rupees 500.