Judgment P.S.Mishra and B.Prasad JJ. 1. This application is a telling-tale of an industry suffering as alleged on account of administrative apathy, negligence, callousness of recalcitrance. Petitioner No. 1 is a company registered under the Indian Companies Act and having its registered office in Bombay. It has got, according to the petitioner, two units at Pachrukhi in the district of Siwan, running in the name and style of Bihar Sugar Works and Bihar Distillery, the sugar unit manufacturing sugar by vaccum pan process till 1974. Petitioner No. 2 is a share-holder of the said company. The sugar work was started in the year 1932 by the famous scientist Late Dr. Bikram Sarabhai. Due to reasons that are stated in the petition Shri Sarabhai sold the company to one Sri B.P. Agarwal, in turn, sold the company to Shri Kundan Agarwal, who, however, failed to run it and closed it in the year 1974. Since the factory was closed since 1974, in the year 1977 Central Bank of India filed a suit in the court of subordinate Judge, Siwan, for recovery of loan being Title (Mortgage) Suit No. 42 of 1977. The court appointed a Receiver. Petitioner No. 2 intervened in the said suit and was made a defendant. The suit ended in a compromise, entered into between the Bank and the Company through its Chairman (respondent No. 2). 2. Petitioners have alleged that all endeavours to run the factory have, however, failed for the reason of interference by the respondent No. 4, who is at present Minister, Industries, Sugar-cane and Science and Technology of the State Government and a local Member of the Legislative Assembly. Petitioners have alleged that they acted at the behest of a competitor Sugar Manufacturer of the State of Uttar Pradesh and saw to it that petitioners works did not become operative. While the petitioner was still endeavouring for obtaining the necessary licence for manufacture of sugar under the Bihar Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Ordinance, 1978 and Successor Ordinances and the Act, the respondent-State of Bihar decided that there should be no licence granted to any sugar manufacturer unless there were arrangements made for sugarcane and area producing sugarcane reserved for them. This decision, according to the petitioners, was taken with a view to extend help to the Uttar Pradesh Manufacturer who had managed a reserved area producing sugarcane in the State of Bihar which reserved area, according to the petitioners, falls within the command area of the petitioners factory. Petitioners then approached the Chief Minister of the State in the year 1986 with a suggestion that their sugar unit be allowed to be converted into a Khandsari Mill. The then Chief Minister ordered the Secretary, Industries Department, vide his order, dated 26-7-1987 to issue a Khandsari licence to the petitioners, but according to the petitioners, due to maneuvering of respondent No. 4 and his supporter-Members of the Legislative Assembly they could not get even a Khandsari licence. Petitioner then tried to segregate and separate the sugar unit from the Distillery and a Public Ltd. Company was created as a subsidiary to the petitioner No. 1 transferring to it the Distillary and, accordingly, proportionately the liabilities of the petitioner No. 1 upon its sugar unit and the Distillary. Petitioners have alleged that in their attempt to save the company from being ruined on account of manoeuvrings and manipulations of the concerned respondents they moved for a Distillery licence to the Distillary Unit which was is under a Public Ltd. Company. Respondent No. 4, according to the petitioners, however, although had nothing to do with the Excise Department, called for the files and sat over the same, thus, leaving the factory in a lurch having only liabilities without there being any resources to augment its income. 3. Petitioners could not also sale the junk and scraps as when such attempt was made the officer-in-charge of Pachrukhi Police station by his letter dated 20-5-1984 restrained the petitioners from removing any article from the premises of the factory. Petitioners filed C.W.J.C. No. 2883 of 1984 before this Court. this Court observed: On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that neither the officer-in-charge nor any of the officers mentioned above has any authority to restrain the petitioner from removing any article from the premises of the mill which belonged to the petitioner-company. Petitioners filed C.W.J.C. No. 2883 of 1984 before this Court. this Court observed: On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that neither the officer-in-charge nor any of the officers mentioned above has any authority to restrain the petitioner from removing any article from the premises of the mill which belonged to the petitioner-company. Normally there was no difficulty in accepting this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner-company, but learned Standing Counsel who has appeared for the respondents pointed out that the company has not paid dues to the cane-growers which runs into lakhs and the company has also defaulted in payment to the State Government and Banks. Learned standing counsel has also pointed out from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the District Magistrate, respondent No. 3 that several certificate proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner-company for realisation of dues under different heads. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration we are of the view that it will not be proper to issue a writ of mandamus in the background mentioned above restraining the respondents from not interferring with the action of removal and sale of the articles of the mill by the petitioner-company. However, it need not be pointed out that a company is always entitled to dispose of such articles which are of no use and from disposal whereof the financial position of the company can be improved. Even for payment of the dues, some money has to be raised by disposing of certain articles which are of no use to the company, like scraps etc. Accordingly, we direct the petitioner to take prior permission in respect of sale or removal of such articles from the premises of the mill from the Divisional Commissioner. In our view, this is necessary in order to safeguard of the interest of cultivators whose dues have not been paid. It is also made clear that it will be open to the learned Commissioner, Saran Division, Chapra, to direct the petitioner-company to deposit the sale proceeds which can be utilised for payment of different dues including the dues to the cultivators. The order contained in Annexure 2 is modified to the extent indicated above. The officer-in-charge will not interfere in the removal or disposal of any article in respect of which there is an order of the Commissioner of the Division. The order of the Court, thus, is clear. The order contained in Annexure 2 is modified to the extent indicated above. The officer-in-charge will not interfere in the removal or disposal of any article in respect of which there is an order of the Commissioner of the Division. The order of the Court, thus, is clear. It is always open to a company to dispose of such articles which are of no use and from disposal whereof the financial position of the company can be improved. The Court, however, declined to issue any madamus and instead advisedly directed for the arrangement that the petitioners would seek prior permission from the Divisional Commissioner for sale or removal of such articles from the premises of the Mill which the petitioners desired to dispose of. The Court resorted to the said arrangement in order to safeguard the cultivators whose dues, according to the respondents, had not been paid. Petitioners have alleged in the petition that they could not find such resources so as to make investment and work the sugar factory or the distillery. They could not also get any benefit out of the special legislation introduced in the State of Bihar for extending relief to non-viable industries known as the Bihar Relief Undertaking (Special Provisions) Act, 1981. When, however, the petitioners found that by an order dated 1840-1984 the company had been declared as a Relief Undertaking they moved this Court again in C.W.J.C. No. 401 of 1985. They reiterated their prayer that a direction be given so that they may either dispose of such junk and scrap that were not worth any use in the factory or mill or direct for a suitable modification of the earlier order. This Court, however, recorded: We are not satisfied that any direction has been given in that order which needs correction in view of any order, issued by the State Government. However, we make it clear that when in the earlier writ application direction was given to utilise the sale proceeds of the articles of the company, for payment of different dues, including the dues to the cultivators in view of the later development it will be open to the Commissioner of the Division to allow the petitioner-Company to utilise part of the sale proceeds, for the purpose of revival of the Mill in accordance with the provisions of the Act aforesaid and in confirmity with the two notification Nos. 12045 and 12046 dated 18-10-1984 referred to above", and disposed of the writ application. The above, however, is an order by which two facts are clarified: (i) that there is no legal bar to the petitioners disposing of any property which belong to them and (ii) that the Commissioner of the Division was not given discretion to refuse the permission to sale. The direction that before any sale, petitioners would obtain prior permission from the Commissioner of the Division, was made with a view to ensuring that the competent authorities realised such dues which were legally payable by the petitioners and accordingly paid to the claimants. Clarification made in the above order is enough for an inference that such legal claims which were debts realisable from the petitioners, could be realised from the sale proceed. It was not an order by which any special jurisdiction was created in the Divisional Commissioner to act as an authority over and above the authorities under various laws to control the activities of the petitioner company. Any inference otherwise wilt amount to suggesting that the Court made as order which was wholly without jurisdiction. The proper way, therefore, to construe and understand the direction issued by this Court is to give a workable meaning and a legal meaning to the words and orders of this Court. We have no doubt that the Court never intended to create any special jurisdiction in the Divisional Commissioner. 4. Although several contentions have been raised before us, several grievances have been made and specific allegations of mala fide are made against the respondent No. 4 in particular and a lobby operating to ensure that the petitioners were not able to work either the sugar factory or the distillary, learned Counsel for the petitioner has confined the instant application to two contentions only, namely, (1) that respondents who have apparently decided not to grant any licence to the sugar or the khandsari unit of the petitioners should be directed to consider the petitioners claim for such grant of licence and (ii) since there has been no embargo either legal or otherwise on the sale of any of the properties belonging to the petitioners, respondents be restrained from interferring with the removal and transfer of the properties belonging to them. 5. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also as a corollary submitted that the respondents should not confuse the separation of the Distillery unit from the sugar unit and try to sabotage any negotiations, grant of licence or any other activities of the Distillery in the name of charging the petitioners units with such dues which are cot legally payable. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the petitioners will abide by any valid order that may be made with respect to such dues which are payable and/are charges upon the property of the petitioners and for that they would readily accept any certificate issued or filed and leave either in cash or in kind properties to cover such claims but any attempt to forestall all that the petitioners may desire to do with a view to argumenting the income and raising finances would be at the cost of the petitioners business prospects and loss to them which cannot be compensated. Learned counsel for the respondents has contested the aforementioned claims and contentions on behalf of the petitioners on the ground, inter alia, that in the instant application the petitioners were seeking the same relief as they have sought in C.W.J.C. No. 2883 of 1984 and C.W.J.C. No. 401 of 1985 in so far as the removal and sale of the articles of the petitioners company are concerned, and unless there was an application made for grant of licence either for manufacturing sugar in accordance with Sec. 15 of the Bihar Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1978 or Sec. 16 thereof for Sugar/Khandsari, no question of granting or rejecting the licence can be considered by this Court. Learned counsel for the State has, however, submitted that the States stand has continuously been that the petitioners company have not been interested in running either the sugar factory or the distillery, but were intending to remove the properties belonging to the company so that they may not have to pay legal dues of the farmers an 1 the labourers. He has also submitted that the respondents cannot refuse the excise licence for the distillery and say that until and unless properties of this distillery are made free of the debts and other charges. They would not consider it. He has also submitted that the respondents cannot refuse the excise licence for the distillery and say that until and unless properties of this distillery are made free of the debts and other charges. They would not consider it. It will be useful to refer to some of the provisions of Bihar and Orissia Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 which in Sec. 3 defines a certificate debtor to mean a person named as debtor in a certificate filed under the said Act including any person whose name is substituted or added as debtor by the Certificate Officer, a certificate-holder to mean the Government or person in whose favour a certificate was filed under the Act including any person whose name was substituted or added as creditor by the Certificate Officer and moveable property including the growing crops. Schedule 1 is attached to the said Act and any arrear or money mentioned or referred to in Schedule 1 which includes any interest which may by law be chargeable thereon up to the date on which a certificate is signed. Sec. 8 states about the effect of service of notice of the Certificate which runs: Effect of service of notice of certificate.-From and after the service of notice of any certificate under Sec. 7 upon a certificate debtor- (a) any private transfer or delivery of his immoveable property situated in the district or, in the case of a Revenue paying estate, borne on the revenue roll of the district in which the certificate is filed or of any interest in any such property shall be void against any claim enforceable in examination or the certificate ; and (b) the amount due from time to time in respect of the certificate shall be a charge upon such property, to which every other charge created subsequently to the service of the said notice shall be postponed. The Act thereafter also provides for filing of petition denying the liability, (Sec. 9), hearing and determining of such petition (Sec. 10), power to amend certificate by addition, omission or substitution of parties (Sec. 11), and execution of certificate in (Part III of the Act). It is noticeable that, Sec. 8 particularly provides for the effect of service of notice of certificate upon the sale or transfer of immovable property and not any movable property. It is noticeable that, Sec. 8 particularly provides for the effect of service of notice of certificate upon the sale or transfer of immovable property and not any movable property. The amount due in respect of the certificate is made a charge upon the immovable property and not the movable property. Sec. 16 has a reference to certain sales of the properties covered by Sec. 8 of the Act. It states: 16. Certain sales by whom to be held,-Where a revenue-paying estate or any share therein is liable in execution of a certificate, such sale may be held either- (a) by the Certificate Officer exercising jurisdiction in the district to the revenue roll of which the estate or share appertains, or (b) by the Certificate Officer exercising jurisdiction in the district in which such estate or share is situated. Had these be the only provisions in the Act aforementioned, one could ultimately urge that immovable properties alone can be subjected to any restriction and not movable property, but in Sec. 18 of the Act a description has been incorporated or that property which is liable to attachment and sale in execution of certificate which includes lands, houses or other buildings, goods, money, bank-notes, cheques, bills of exchange, hundies, promissory notes, Government Securities, bonds or other securities for money, debts, shares in corporation and all other saleable property, movable or immovable belonging to the certificate-debtor, or over which or the profits of which, he has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit, whether the same be held in the name of the certificate-debtor or by any other person in trust for him or on his behalf. Sec. 18, however, contains a list of such properties which cannot be attached, which list is as follows:- - (a) the necessary wearing-apparel, cooking vessels, beds and bedding of the certificate-debtor, his wife and children, and such personal ornaments as, in accordance with religious usage, cannot be parted with by any woman: (b) tools of artizans and where the certificate-debtor is an agriculturist his implements of husbandry and such cattle and seed gram as may in the opinion of the Certificate Officer be necessary to enable him to earn his livelihood as such, and such portion of agricultural produce as may have been declared to be free from liability under the provisions of the next following section: (c) houses and other buildings (with the materials and the site thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment) belonging to an agriculturist and occupied by him: (d) books of account; (e) a mere right to sue for damages; (f) any right of personal service; (g) stipends and gratuities allowed to pensioners of the Government or payable out of any service family pension fund notified in the official Gazette by the Central or any State Government in this behalf and political pensions. (h) allowances (being less than salary) of any public officer or of any servant of a railway company or local authority while absent from duty. (h) allowances (being less than salary) of any public officer or of any servant of a railway company or local authority while absent from duty. (i) the salary or allowances equal to salary of any such public officer or servant as is referred to its Clause (h) while on duty, to the extent of- (i) the whole of the salary, where the salary does not exceed twenty rupees monthly: (ii) twenty rupees monthly, where the salary exceeds twenty rupees and does not exceed forty rupees monthly ; and (iii) one moiety of the salary in any other case ; (j) the pay and allowances of persons to whom the Indian Articles of War apply: (k) all compulsory deposits and other sums in or derived from any fund to which the Provident Fund Act, 1897, for the time being applies in so far as they are declared by the said Act not to be liable to attachment; (l) the wages of labourers and domestic servants whether payable in money or in kind: (m) an expectancy of succession by survivorship or other merely contingent or possible right or interest; (n) a right to future maintenance: (o) any allowance declared by any Indian Law in force in the State, to be exempt from liability to attachment or sale in execution of a decree; (p) where the certificate-debtor is a person liable for the payment of land revenue and movable property which under any law for the time being applicable to him, is exempt from the sale for the recovery of an arrear of such revenue, and (q) any immovable property which under the Tenancy law for the time being in force in the local area in which the certificate is to be executed, would not have been liable to sale had the certificate been a decree of a court of ordinary jurisdiction. A close examination thus of the provisions in Secs. 8, 12 and 18 reveals that while transfer or delivery of any immovable property from the moment a certificate is filed and notice issued under Sec. 7 of the Act to the debtor is subjected to the proceedings, properties of other kind are allowed to be attached in execution of the certificate. They together show, therefore, that unless there is a determination as contemplated under Secs. They together show, therefore, that unless there is a determination as contemplated under Secs. 9 and 10 of the Act and execution thereafter merely because there are certain dues which may become a charge upon the property, movable properties are not covered by the provisions of the aforementioned Act. Movable properties can be sold, removed or otherwise appropriated without there being any let or hindrance by any authority. Interference with such property shall come only when the certificate demand is put to execution and order of attachment contemplated in Sec. 18 of the Act is issued. 6. Respondents have asserted that there are demands under the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1961 of the money payable to the agriculturists or cane-growers and money payable by the petitioner-company to the labourers. Such claims, according to the respondents, are public demands for which certificates have already been filed. As we have noticed above, by filing the certificate respondents have created a situation in which any private transfer or delivery of the immovable properties by the petitioners in the district of Siwan shall be void against any claim enforceable in execution of certificate and the amount due in respect of the certificates shall be a charge upon such immoveable properties. Since, however, no execution has yet come to fore, the stage of attachment as contemplated under Sec. 18 of the Act has not arrived. Petitioners, therefore, are free to sale properties other than immovable properties in the district so they are not encumberred by the charge of certificate filed by the respondents. 7. It would have been appropriate for the respondents to keep their objections to the grant of licence to the petitioners under the provisions of the Bihar Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, in abeyance because it appears that the petitioners have not applied as required by Secs. 15 and 16 of the Act for grant of a licence. Since, however, respondents have chosen to convass that petitioners are not qualified for grant of such licence, we deal summarily but not dismissively with the claim of the petitioners for grant of a licence for producing Khandsari. 15 and 16 of the Act for grant of a licence. Since, however, respondents have chosen to convass that petitioners are not qualified for grant of such licence, we deal summarily but not dismissively with the claim of the petitioners for grant of a licence for producing Khandsari. Although a passing reference has been made of the separation of the distillary unit from the sugar unit and it is not in issue before us whether petitioners are entitled to a grant or renewal of a distillery licence in the name of subsidiary public Ltd. Company or not since respondents have chosen to attack the right of the petitioners to create a subsidiary Public Ltd. Company and claim a licence in the name of the subsidiary company for manufacturing spirit, We may indicate our view upon it. Dealing first with the issue of grant of licence for manufacturing Khandsari, it is relevant to notice the definition of a factory, unit and sugar in the Act. Factory has been defined to mean any premises including the precincts thereof in any part of which sugar is manufactured by means of vaccum-pan process, Unit has been denned to mean a manufacturing unit engaged or ordinarily engaged in the manufacture or production of Khandsari sugar, gur, shakkar gul jagari or rab from cane juice by power crusher and sugar has been defined to mean any form of sugar containing more than ninety per centum of sucrose including sugarcandy or Khandsari sugar (sugar produced by open pan process) or bura sugar or srushed sugar or any sugar in crystalline or powdered form or sugar in process in a factory or raw sugar produced therein. It is not in dispute that the petitioners own a factory. They, however, do not have any licence for manufacture of sugar. Respondents have, however, suggested that petitioners are not an unit as contemplated by the Act. A factory may be an unit if it uses a power crusher to manufacture or produce Khandsari, sugar, gur, shakkar, gul, jagari or rab from cane juice. Power crusher has been denned to mean a crusher working with the aid of diesel, electrical or steam power and engaged or ordinarily engaged in crushing sugar-cane and extracting juice therefrom for the manufacture of gur, shakkar, gul, jagari, rab or khandsari sugar. Power crusher has been denned to mean a crusher working with the aid of diesel, electrical or steam power and engaged or ordinarily engaged in crushing sugar-cane and extracting juice therefrom for the manufacture of gur, shakkar, gul, jagari, rab or khandsari sugar. We have little doubt, therefore that even manufacture by vaccum-pan process may in view of the definition of the power crusher mean manufacture or production by a power-crusher. Still if there is any thing to distinguish a vaccum-pan process from a power crusher it will be with reference to the nature of the produce that the licencing authority may insist for the use of power crusher in place of a vaccum-pan process. Sec. 15 of the Sugar-cane Act says: 15. Licence for crushing cane in a factory,- {1) No cane shall be crushed in a factory unless the occupier thereof has obtained a licence, from the State Government in the form prescribed, authorising, crushing, of such quantities of cane, in the relevant crashing year as may be specified in the licence: Provided that the quantity specified in the licence shall not exceed the quantity published under Sec. 27. (2) On an application being made to the State Government in the prescribed form and manner, the licence shall be granted Provided that the State Government may refuse to grant licence in respect of a factory if- (a) it has already cancelles or refused to renew a licence previously granted ; or (b) no application was made to renew, for the preceding crushing year, a licence previously granted. (3) Except with the previous permission of the State Government, the quantity of cane crushed in the factory in the relevant crushing year shall not exceed the quantity specified in the licence. Sec. 27 says that the occupier of every factory shall submit to the Cane Commissioner on or before the prescribed date, in every crushing year, an estatimate in the prescribed manner, of the quantity of cane which may be required in the factory during such crushing year and the Cane Commissioner shall examine every estimate submitted under Sub-sec. (1) and where the occupier of the factory has failed to submit an estimate under Sub-sec. (1) and where the occupier of the factory has failed to submit an estimate under Sub-sec. (1), he shall draw up an estimate by him self in the prescribed manner and shall publish the saint: in such manner as may be prescribed with such modifications, if any, as he may think fit, after consultation with the council appointed for the said purpose. It is thus clear that ordinarily a licence shall be granted on an application being made to the State Govt. in the prescribed form and the manner. The State Government may refuse to grant licence in respect of a factory if it had already cancelled or refused to renew a licence previously granted or no application was made to renew for the preceding crushing year. No ground, which is not pertinent to the requirements of Sec. 15, can be invoked to deny grant of a licence. No ground which is not contemplated by the provisions of the Act or the Rules validly framed under the Act, shall be allowed to enter into the exercise of jurisdiction of the State Government for grant of a licence. Article 19(l(g) of the Constitution guarantees to every citizen practice or of any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business subject to the reasonable restrictions as provided in Clause (6) of the said Article. Any existing law would operate and the State may make any law relating to the professional or technical qualifications necessary of practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business or the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Such prohibition, however, has to be referable any existing law. if there is no existing law, the State may make any law prescribing such prohibitive limitations. If there is no law in existence or made by the State, a citizens right to carry on trade or business cannot be inhibited by extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Respondents have chosen to make a grievance of the petitioners creating a subsidiary company, transferring certain assets to the subsidary company. If there is no law in existence or made by the State, a citizens right to carry on trade or business cannot be inhibited by extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Respondents have chosen to make a grievance of the petitioners creating a subsidiary company, transferring certain assets to the subsidary company. They have alleged that, by such transfer to the subsidiary company petitioners are trying to defeat realising of such claims of the workers or the agriculturists which are presently before the Certificate Officer under the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly stated before us that petitioners by any contrivance or design shall not remove or transfer the property to the extent required for the satisfaction of the certificate claims filed against them. Why then respondents have not chosen to proceed with the certificate cases and obtained attachment orders, is not understandable. Why are they insisting that petitioners should not be granted a licence and thus may not be allowed to continue their trade and business ? Why are they insisting that they (petitioners) be not allowed to remove or transfer any moveable property ? These are puzzles which give credence to the allegations of mala fide made by the petitioners. We are, however, not required to predicate into the allegations of mala fide as we have already stated that the petitioners are yet to file a proper application for licence. We, however, state that petitioner No. 2 who is a. citizen is entitled to pretrade in accordance with law, 8. The above discussion would have concluded the case bat for one more aspect as to the licence for crushing and manufacture in an unit. As in Sec. 16 of the Sugar-cane Act states: 16. We, however, state that petitioner No. 2 who is a. citizen is entitled to pretrade in accordance with law, 8. The above discussion would have concluded the case bat for one more aspect as to the licence for crushing and manufacture in an unit. As in Sec. 16 of the Sugar-cane Act states: 16. Licence for crushing and manufacture in a unit.-No cane shall be crushed or cane juice shall be purchased for manufacture of rah and khandsari sugar or gur, shakkar, gur or jaigari in a unit, in the relevant crushing year except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence to be obtained by the owner of the unit from the Cane Commissioner by making an application to him and depositing with the prescribed authority, in the prescribed manner such sum of money, if any, as may be prescribed as security for the due performance of the conditions of the licence: Provided that where only cane grown by the owner of the units is crushed in the unit and no other cane nor cans juice is purchased for use in the unit, the owner of the unit shall not be required to obtain a licence. Petitioners thus may manufacture khandsari, sugar without a licence if they crush only such sugar-cane or use only such cane juice which they prodece or grow in their own land. If they so desire, they may apply for a licence for crushing sugar-cane and manufacture khandsari sugar in accordance with law. Their application for grant of khandsari sugar has to be disposed of on considerations having direct bearing to the production of the khandsari sugar and the terms and conditions which may be attached to a licencee manufacturing khandsari sugar. This nowhere prescribed that grant of a licence shall be refused on considerations other than obtaining in the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Laws of the land are strong enough to deal with a recalcitrant business man. A person engaged in unfair trade can be suitably punished. Since, however, trade is a fundamental right. State or any other authority under it cannot interfere with the trade of a citizen except in accordance with the prescriptions of law. 9. We do not intend to separately deal with the claim of the petitioners either for the renwal or for grant of a licence for the distillary. Since, however, trade is a fundamental right. State or any other authority under it cannot interfere with the trade of a citizen except in accordance with the prescriptions of law. 9. We do not intend to separately deal with the claim of the petitioners either for the renwal or for grant of a licence for the distillary. We are abstaining not because we find that the respondents are reasonably disposed of towards the petitioners. We are doing so for the reason that our observations in regard to the right of trade of the petitioners shall make the respondents aware and alive of the rights which are guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of India and they shall abstain from denyinng such legal right unless they are empowered by law to do so. 10. We have dealt with the relevant contentions of the parties except a question repeatedly raised before us on behalf of the petitioners that be unreasonably delaying disposal of the claim of the petitioners for licence respondents have seen to it that petitioners suffer and also that by continuously denying to the petitioners permission to sale moveable properties they are creating obstacles due to which petitioners are not able to raise necessary funds. We have left out of the consideration the first part because the petitioners have yet to make an application for grant of a licence. We, however, observe that any undue delay in the disposal of the application for grant of licence may lead to an inference that respondents have some oblique reasons to deny to the petitioners their legitimate fundamental right. The other part we are not deciding beyond reiterating the law that the petitioners are entitled to dispose of the moveable properties which are not under attachment as required by the Sec. 18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. Respondents shall be well advised to refrain from interfering with the legitimate right of the petitioner under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India which states: 300-A. Person not to be deprived of property save by authority of law- No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Since do law authorises such interference with respect to moveable properties, respondents have to be restrained from interferring with the rights of the petitioners with respect to such properties which are covered by Sec. 8 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. 11. Since do law authorises such interference with respect to moveable properties, respondents have to be restrained from interferring with the rights of the petitioners with respect to such properties which are covered by Sec. 8 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. 11. We, however, do not propose to leave the petitioners free on any refrain with respect to moveable properties also. We have already referred to the earlier orders passed by this Court. Although we are aware of the legal provisions, we do not think that a condition that the Commissioner of the Division may ask the petitioners to keep such part of the moveable assets including liquid money for meeting the legitimate demands with respect to which certificates have already been filed is improper. It shall be open to the petitioners to inform the Divisional Commissioner about the value of the immoveable properties who may, if necessary direct the they will not touch and transfer such property to any other person. The Divisional Commissioner shall however, make no order and in no manner interfere with the petitioners to transfer or remove such properties which are beyond the certificate claims. The Divisional Commissioner or any other person including the respondent-State shall not, deny to the petitioner their Constitutional right under article 300-A of the Constitution of India to deal with their moveable properties- 12. Our conclusions, therefore, are: (i) respondents have no legal right to interfere with the petitioners right to transfer or dispose of or remove moveable properties of the petitioners They, however, can act in consonance with the observations made above, (ii) petitioners may apply for the grant of licence in accordance with law. Respondents may consider granting or refusing to grant renewing or refusing to renew the licence in accordance with law. Respondents, however, cannot introduce extraneous or irrelevant considerations other than the considerations arising out of the provisions in Secs. 15 and 16 of the Sugar-cane Act and Rules framed under the said Act for refusing to grant a licence. Unreasonable delay in disposal of the application for grant or renewal of licence may give rise to an inference that respondents actions are actuated by malice, and (iii) petitioners shall be liable to pay all such public demands with respect to which Demand Certificates are put in execution in accordance with Sec. 18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. Unreasonable delay in disposal of the application for grant or renewal of licence may give rise to an inference that respondents actions are actuated by malice, and (iii) petitioners shall be liable to pay all such public demands with respect to which Demand Certificates are put in execution in accordance with Sec. 18 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. If in case any property (moveable or immoveable) is under attachment in any such execution, petitioners shall not be entitled to transfer or remove the same. Petitioners shall be well advised to inform the Divisional Commissioner about the properties preserved by them to meet the certificate debts. The Commissioner of the Division shall be within his bounds in asking the petitioners to keep specified properties within the district of Siwan so that such certificate debts are satisfied. Petitioners shall be obliged to keep such properties separated from any transfer or removal of other properties by them. 13. In the result, this application is allowed in the manner as indicated above. Let an appropriate writ accordingly issue. On the facts of this case there shall be no order as to costs.