Judgment :- The plaintiff in a suit for redemption of a mortgage and recovery of possession of one item of property in the plaint schedule is the appellant. 2. The brief facts necessary for deciding the case are thus: The plaint schedule property four in number were mortgaged by the plaintiffs father and four others as per Ext.A1 otti deed dated 9-11-1100 M.E. in favour of defendants 1 to 4. On partition among the mortgagors as per Ext.A2 partition deed dated 12-3-1104 M.E. the equity of redemption of item No.2 in the plaint schedule was allotted to the share of plaintiffs father exclusively. Later the plaintiff s father executed Ext. A3 puisne mortgage in favour of the plaintiff authorising him to redeem item No.2 on payment of the proportionate mortgage money. Accordingly, the plaintiff filed the suit on the basis of Ext. A3 for redemption and recovery of plaint item No.2. It was alleged in the plaint that in respect of other items of the properties excluding item No.2 the mortgage stood extinguished and as such the plaintiff is entitled to partial redemption of the mortgage in so far as item No.2 is concerned. 3. After the filing of the suit the plaintiff filed I.A.No.5424 of 1972 to amend the plaint incorporating an alternate relief of redemption based on a different cause of action. As per the application the plaintiff wanted to include a material allegation in the plaint to the effect that if for any reason it is not possible to order redemption and recovery on the basis of Ext.A3,he should be allowed to redeem the mortgage and recover the property as one of the heirs of his father the original mortgagor. The plaintiff also filed I.A.No.5425 of 1972 for impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased Govinda Pillai. Both applications were allowed by a common order passed on 24-10-1972. Impleadment of the additional respondents was however allowed only subject to the plea of limitation. The material allegation incorporated by the amendment and the amended relief were in the following terms: 4. Defendants 5 to 7 are persons in possession of portions of the mortgaged properties under defendants 1 to 4. Defendants 8 to 11 were impleaded as the other legal representatives of the deceased Govinda Pillai. 5. The material allegation incorporated by the amendment and the amended relief were in the following terms: 4. Defendants 5 to 7 are persons in possession of portions of the mortgaged properties under defendants 1 to 4. Defendants 8 to 11 were impleaded as the other legal representatives of the deceased Govinda Pillai. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a joint written statement disputing the right of the plain tiff to redeem the property on the basis of Ext.A5. They questioned the validity of Ext.A3 mortgage also. It was further contended that the mortgage has not become split up and as such the suit is not maintainable. They also contended that the suit is barred by limitation since it has been filed long after 12 years from the date of execution of Ext. A3 mortgage. 6. The 6th defendant filed a separate written statement raising contentions which were more or less similar to those raised by defendants 1 and 2. Further it was contended that he is in possession of item 2 in the plaint schedule and had effected valuable improvements therein for which he is entitled to get Rs.1500/-. 7. On a consideration of the rival contentions the learned Munsiff found that the plaintiffs claim for redemption and recovery based upon Ext. A3 pusine mortgage is barred by limitation. However it was found that as one of the heirs of his father who was one of the original co-mortgagors under Ext. A1 the plaintiff is entitled to redeem and recover item No.2 property in the plaint schedule. It was also found that with respect to the other items of properties the mortgage stood extinguished and as such the prayer in the plaint for partial redemption is sustainable in law. It was farther found that all the legal heirs of Govinda Pillai in whom the equity of redemption in respect of item 2 had devolved on the death of Govinda Pillai are parties to the suit. After recording the above findings the suit was ultimately dismissed since according to the learned Munsiff the only prayer in the plaint was to allow the plaintiff to redeem and recover the property on behalf of his sub-tarwad and not on his behalf and that the plaintiff had failed to establish how the sub-tarwad got rights over the property sought to be redeemed. The lower appellate court while dismissing the appeal confirmed all the findings recorded and the ultimate dismissal of the suit by the learned Munsiff. 8. After the amendment the relief of redemption was claimed by the plain tiff alternatively in his capacity as one of the legal heirs of deceased Govinda Pillai also. The claim for redemption as a puisne mortgagee was found to be barred by limitation. That finding has not been challenged before me by the learned counsel for the appellant. The fact that the plaintiff is one of the legal heirs of Govinda Pillai and as such part of the equity of redemption has vested in him, is not disputed by the contesting defendant. Thus on the death of Govinda Pillai, plaintiff admittedly became a co-mortgagor of the property along with other heirs of Govinda Pillai as contemplated under S.59A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is also found by the lower appellate court that all the legal heirs of deceased Govinda Pillai are parties to the suit. In the light of these admitted facts it has to be held that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the mortgage in respect of item No.2 in its entirety on his own right under S.91 of the Transfer of Property Act. If this is the correct legal position, the plaintiffs claim for redemption as one of the co-mortgagor cannot be rejected merely for the reason that in the prayer portion of the plaint, the prayer for redemption was made for and on behalf of his sub-tarwad. If the plaintiff can, on his own right, redeem the entire mortgage in respect of item No.2 and necessary factual allegations to that effect is in the body of the plaint it may not be justifiable to refuse a decree for redemption in that capacity solely on the ground that he has in-appropriately or wrongly claimed redemption on behalf of the sub-tarwad and has failed to substantiate how the sub¬tarwad is entitled to claim redemption. Even if the plaintiff fails to establish the right of the sub-tarwad to redeem, he is, himself, entitled to redeem the mortgage and is accordingly en titled to a decree for redemption in the suit. Even if the plaintiff fails to establish the right of the sub-tarwad to redeem, he is, himself, entitled to redeem the mortgage and is accordingly en titled to a decree for redemption in the suit. In this view of the matter it has to be held that both the courts below have gone wrong in refusing the relief of redemption and recovery on the basis of the plaintiffs right as one of the co-mortgagor. 9. The learned counsel for the contesting defendant has advanced an argument that the plaintiffs right to redeem the property in his capacity as one of the legal heirs of deceased Govinda Pillai is barred by limitation. According to the counsel, the claim for redemption as one of the legal heir of deceased Govinda Pillai was incorporated in the plaint only by way of an amendment long after the expiry of the period of limitation for a suit for redemption based on Ext.A1 otti deed and as such the alternative relief prayed for should be held to be barred by limitation. The date of the original mortgage is 9-11-1100 M.E. corresponding to 22-6-1925. Under the law then in existence, the period prescribed for a suit for redemption is 50 years and that would have expired only by 22-6-1975. However, after the commencement of the Limitation Act 1963, as per S10 ofthe Act the suit ought to have been filed on or before 31-12-1970, that is within seven years from 1-1-1964 the date of the commencement of the new Act. The suit for redemption, O.S.No.753 of 1968, was actually instituted on 27-7-1968. But as originally filed, there was no prayer in the plaint for redemption in his capacity as one of the co-mortgagors of the property. Such a cause of action and claim was included in the plaint only on 24-10-1972 as per the order passed in I. ANo.5424 of 1972. On the date on which the amendment was allowed the time for instituting the suit for redemption as a co-mortgagor has lapsed. In the circumstances it is the argument of the learned counsel that the alternate claim to redeem the property in his capacity as one of the legal heirs of Govinda Pillai should be considered as barred by limitation. On the date on which the amendment was allowed the time for instituting the suit for redemption as a co-mortgagor has lapsed. In the circumstances it is the argument of the learned counsel that the alternate claim to redeem the property in his capacity as one of the legal heirs of Govinda Pillai should be considered as barred by limitation. The counsel further argued that this is especially so because all the other legal heirs have obviously lost their right to redeem by the time the amendment was allowed and they were impleaded in the suit, since they have not exercised their right to redeem the property within the prescribed period of limitation. In answer to the above contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that even though the amendment was allowed only on 24-10-1972 the amendment when allowed would relate back to the original date of filing of the suit and since the suit was originally filed on 27-7-1968, there will not be any limitation for the alternate claim included in the plaint. The learned counsel has contended that when once the amendment is allowed thereafter the relevant date for deciding whether the claim or cause of action introduced by the amendment is barred by limitation is the original date of filing of the suit and not the date on which the amendment was allowed. The learned counsel has in this connection relied upon the decisions reported in Trav.Mica Co. v. K. & H. Chambers, Madras (AIR 1956 T.C. 97) and J. Pompaiah v. H. Hanumantha Reddi (AIR 1959 A.P. 126). In the first decision, regarding the effect of an amendment introducing a new cause of action, the Travancore Cochin High Court has relying upon a series of decisions of the various High Court has held thus: "If the court allows an amendment of the plaint even after the expiry of the period of limitation on the new cause of action the amended suit with still be deemed to have been presented on the date when the original plaint was filed. Normally an amendment which deprives the opposite party of a right acquired by limitation may not be allowed but it is a matter for the Court to consider at the time of passing orders on the application for amendment and if the same is allowed, the date of suit for computing the period of limitation is still the date of the original plaint". The same is the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the point in the decision reported in J. Pompaiah V. H. Hanumantha Reddi (AIR 1959 AP. 126). 10. I am in respectful agreement with the principles laid down in the above decisions. Accordingly I hold that the plaintiffs right to redeem the mortgage as a co-mortgagor is not barred by limitation, since the amendment of the plaint incorporating the new cause of action as per I.A.No.5424 of 1972 relates back to the original date of filing of the plaint and the suit as originally filed was within the period of limitation. 11. The learned counsel raised a further contention that even if the plaintiffs right to redeem as one of the co-mortgagor is not barred by limitation, a decree cannot be granted in the suit since the only prayer in the suit is to redeem the mortgage for and on behalf of the plaintiffs sub-tarwad. The counsel has pointed out that this is especially so for two reasons. Firstly, all other heirs of Govinda Pillai have admittedly lost their right to redeem the mortgage in their capacity as co-mortgagors even before the amendment of the plaint and before they were made parties to the suit. Secondly the plaintiff had specifically moved for an amendment of the relief portion to claim redemption on his own behalf by deleting the prayer to redeem on behalf of the sub-tarwad. That was not allowed. Hence the plaintiff could not now be allowed to redeem the mortgage on his own behalf. In my view this contention also cannot succeed. 12. Secondly the plaintiff had specifically moved for an amendment of the relief portion to claim redemption on his own behalf by deleting the prayer to redeem on behalf of the sub-tarwad. That was not allowed. Hence the plaintiff could not now be allowed to redeem the mortgage on his own behalf. In my view this contention also cannot succeed. 12. Rule 7 of Order VII C.P.C. which requires the relief to be specifically stated is to the following effect: "Relief to be specifically stated.-Every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the Court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement". The rule only states that every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative. It does not say that the relief should be stated in a particular manner or in a particular part of the plaint. Where a question arises as to whether a plaintiff has asked for a particular relief in his plaint, the whole of the plaint must be considered and the substance and not merely the form of the plaint should be looked to. This is the rule of construction which has to be applied when a question whether a plaintiff has made a prayer for a particular relief, is clear from the observation of the Supreme Court in the decision reported injanakiram Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer (AIR 1962 S.C. 633). In the above decision the question was whether the plaintiff had made a claim or prayer for possession of immovable properties or not. In that connection, after observing that on a consideration of the prayer portion of the plaint alone it is difficult to hold that such a prayer has been made by the plaintiff, their Lordships after going through the entire allegations in the plaint came to the conclusion that such a prayer should be deemed to have been made in the plaint. Their Lordships in that connection has observed thus: "In construing the plaint the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form". Examined in the light of the above principles the allegations in the plaint would clearly show that the plaintiff had alternatively made a definite claim in paragraph 5 of the plaint for redeeming the mortgage as one of the co-mortgagor. Even otherwise according to me, the prayer of the plaintiff for redemption on behalf of his sub-tarwad would take in a prayer for redemption on his behalf also since he is also a member of the sub-tarwad. The prayer to redeem on behalf of his sub-tarwad as a whole can be considered only as a larger relief. Even if the larger relief is found to be not allowable for some reason or other the plaintiff can be given the lesser relief of redemption on his own right especially in view of the specific allegations in paragraph 5 of the plaint where the plaintiff had made a specific claim to that effect and in view of the further fact that in law the plain tiff is in his own right entitled to redeem the mortgage in its entirety. The fact that the prayer for amendment of the relief portion of the plaint was refused will not disentitle the plaintiff from getting a relief based upon a claim specifically made by him in so many words in the body of the plaint itself. Such a technical plea cannot stand in the way of the court granting a claim specifically made in the plaint and which on the merit the plaintiff is entitled to get, in law. I reject the said contention also. 13. The defendants have claimed that they have effected improvements in the land and are entitled to value of those improvements. Under issue No.5, the trial court has found that a total amount of Rs.385/ 70 is payable as value of improvements. I reject the said contention also. 13. The defendants have claimed that they have effected improvements in the land and are entitled to value of those improvements. Under issue No.5, the trial court has found that a total amount of Rs.385/ 70 is payable as value of improvements. That finding has not been challenged before me by the learned counsel for the appellants and I fix the value of improvements as Rs.385/ 70, Though according to the plaintiff the proportionate mortgage amount is 300 fanams equal to Rs.42 paise 11 the defendants have disputed the same and have stated that as per the partition deed the proportionate amount is 1100 fanams. Accepting the contention of the defendants I fix the proportionate mortgage amount as 1100 fanams equal to Rs.154/45. Time for deposit of the mortgage amount is fixed as 3 months. The defendant is not entitled to any costs under R.7 0.34 of the C.P.C. In the result, I set aside the dismissal of the suit by the courts below and pass a decree for redemption of the property described as item No.2 in the plaint schedule in terms of .34 R.4 C.P.C. on deposit of the mortgage amount of Rs.154/ 45 and the value of improvement as determined herein within 3 months from today. The appeal is thus allowed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs.