JUDGMENT A.M. Bhattacharjee, J. In a suit for eviction of a tenant by the landlord on the ground that the suit-premises are reasonably required for the landlord's own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the landlord holds the same, three things must be proved under the provisions of s. 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act to entitle the landlord to get, and to enable the Court to make, a decree for eviction, and those are-(1) the landlord is the owner of the premises ; (2) the premises are reasonably required by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the landlord holds the same; and (3) the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. The third is very much comprised in the second, for one cannot be held to reasonably require any premises let to a tenant when he is nevertheless in possession of accommodation reasonably suitable and sufficient to meet his requirement. But this was still introduced in express terms by amending s. 13(l)(f) of the Act by the Amendment Act of 1969, map be ex maiori cautela or to make assurance doubly sure. 2. That the plaintiff; are not in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation has been found by the Court below and has not also been disputed before us. As to the extent of requirement, the materials on record clearly show that the plaintiffs are five brothers, all married, living with their spouses and two of them have two adult sons and one adult daughter and that the mother of the plaintiffs also live with them. The evidence adduced read along with unchallenged report of the Commissioner also show that the plaintiffs are in occupation of five rooms only. We have no doubt that assuming that only five rooms are reasonably good enough for the five couples, the mother, the two adult sons and one adult daughter would obviously need such further accommodation for their stay, study and all that so as to make the claim for requirement for the one tenanted room a reasonable requirement by all standard. 3. 3. It has however been urged that the plaintiffs are only the beneficiaries for whose benefit the suit-house is held by the trustees under a Deed of Trust executed by the deceased father of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs thus not being, and the trustees being, the legal owner, the suit at their instance was not maintainable under s. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act. The contention must fail for more reasons than one. 4. The defendant's challenge to the ownership of the plaintiff in the original written statement, paragraph 1, to the effect that “the defendant does not admit that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit-premises” was more casual than real and as a result no Issue was at all struck on the point. It is only when the plaintiffs adduced their evidence that the defendant thought it advisable to amend paragraph 1 of the written statement by adding at the end "that there are other owners as landlords besides the plaintiffs. That the defendant attorned to and admitted and accepted the plaintiff, only as his landlords by payment of rent as such and also otherwise is beyond dispute and has in fact been admitted by the defendant. But, as already noted, under s. 13(1)(ff) of the Premises Tenancy Act the plaintiff is to establish, not only his landlord-ship, but also his ownership, and it is only an owner-landlord who can invoke that Section. But there again, the defendant, notwithstanding his amendment of the written statement, has categorically stated in cross-examination that "I know that the plaintiffs are the present owners of the suit-house". That being so, this aspect should not have detained us any longer. 5. But from the judgment under appeal it appears that the question of ownership of the plaintiffs was argued and considered at some length and the same also has been urged before us here on behalf of the tenant. But the pleading, the conduct and the evidence apart, which have been referred to hereinabove, we would have to repel the same on grounds of law as well. 6. As would appear from Ext. 8, the Indenture of Trust, the Trust was for a limited period and a limited purpose. But the pleading, the conduct and the evidence apart, which have been referred to hereinabove, we would have to repel the same on grounds of law as well. 6. As would appear from Ext. 8, the Indenture of Trust, the Trust was for a limited period and a limited purpose. The period was until the attainment of majority by the youngest son or the marriage of the youngest daughter of the Settler and the purpose was looking after and management of the properties by the Trustees during that period and then making over of the properties to the sons of the Settlor, who are the present plaintiffs. 7. It is well-settled under the Law of Trust, as imported from the United Kingdom and put in legislative form in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, that a Trust for a specified purpose or for limited period, is extinguished on the fulfilment of the purpose or the expiry of the period. If, as here, the document of Trust provides for ultimate devolution of the trust properties to the beneficiaries or some of them after the expiry of certain period or on the fulfilment of certain object and the trust comes to an end on such expiry or fulfilment, the legal ownership of the trustees would also be extinguished thereby, leaving the trust-properties to the beneficiaries, who were so long the beneficial owners only. If the devolution of the trust-properties on the plaintiff-beneficiaries, on the youngest son having attained majority and the youngest daughter having been married was not provided in the Deed of Trust, then, even after the extinction of the Trust, a calling for conveyance of the trust-properties to the beneficiaries might have been necessary as a legal formality. But here such devolution having been specifically directed in the Trust-Deed itself and the mother, as sole surviving trustee, having made over the properties by the letter of attornment to the tenants or otherwise, the erstwhile beneficial ownership of the plaintiff, ripened into a full-fledged one under and in accordance with the Deed of Trust itself. But here such devolution having been specifically directed in the Trust-Deed itself and the mother, as sole surviving trustee, having made over the properties by the letter of attornment to the tenants or otherwise, the erstwhile beneficial ownership of the plaintiff, ripened into a full-fledged one under and in accordance with the Deed of Trust itself. And if a beneficial owner is to become a full owner, on the happening of a certain contingency and that contingency has happened, and the beneficial owner has, thereafter, been recognised and accepted as such by all concerned, that is sufficient ownership to enable such a one to invoke s. 13(1)(ff), even assuming that another formal document was necessary for perfection of his title. A learned single-Judge of this Court in Daval Prasad v. Nripendra (1986-1 Calcutta High Court Notes 67) has ruled, though in a slightly different context, that the absence of a formal deed of conveyance will not stand in the way of one, to invoke s. 13(1)(ff , if he is otherwise entitled to such ownership. 8. That part, it must now also be taken to be the settled law that though only an owner-landlord can invoke s. 13(1)(ff), what is necessary to enable him to do so is to prove the entire landlordship, and not necessarily the entire ownership and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath ( AIR 1976 SC 2335 ) and then in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak ( AIR 1977 SC 1599 ) and in Subhendu Prasad Roychowdhury ( AIR 1978 SC 835 ) are clear authorities for the view that even a co-owner of the property can maintain a suit, provided he is the sole landlord vis-a-vis the tenant, and to quote from Sri Ram Parischa (supra, at 2339), "it is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the suit property.........as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time the acknowledged landlord" and "a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner is". The Single-Judge decision of this Court in Bhagyalakshmi v. Nanda Dulal (77 Calcutta Weekly Notes 817) appears to have held that even the real owner, unless he is also a legal owner, can not sue under s. 13(1)(ff) and this may purport to lend some assurance to the view that a trustee only can, while a beneficiary cannot sue. The main ratio in Bhagayalakshmi (supra) was, however, based on the law laid down in the earlier Division Benches decisions of this Court in Yogmaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha (ILR 1968-1 Calcutta 70) and in Carritt Moran & Co. v. Bones (ILR 1969-1 Calcutta 347) to the effect that only a full, absolute and legal owner could invoke s. 13(1)(f). As already noted, this view has been overturned by the Supreme Court in the decisions noted above holding that even a co-owner can sue provided he is the sole landlord. 9. Is not a beneficial owner also an owner of the property? To quote from Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th Edition, pages 256-258), "a trust is a very important and curious instance of duplicate/ownership” and “trust property is that which is owned by the two persons at the same time”. To borrow further, the ownership of the trustee "is a matter of form rather than of substance, and nominal rather than real" and "if we have regard to the essence of the matter rather than to the form of it, a trustee is not an owner at all". "As between the trustee and beneficiary, the law recognises the truth of the matter; as between these two, the property belongs to the latter and not to the former. But as between the trustee and third persons, the fiction prevails" and "the trustee is clothed with the rights of his beneficiary". But where, as here, the trustees hold the property for the beneficiaries with a direction to "make over" the properties on the expiry of certain period and on the fulfilment of certain object, and on such expiry or fulfilment the trust terminates and stands extinguished and the trustees stand automatically discharged, (save in respect of their liability to render accounts), whatever was standing in the way of the legal ownership of the beneficiaries would also stand determined providing transmission of the legal ownership also. 10. 10. Be that as it may, if the beneficiaries are also owners, even though not full owners, and, as here, are also admittedly the sole landlords, nothing should disentitle them to sue for eviction under s. 13(1)(ff), on the ground that at one stage the formal ownership vested in the trustees and the same has not been formally conveyed by the trustees, whose ownership, however, has already come to an end. If the trust was still a subsisting one, different consideration might have arisen; but not when the trust is dead and past. 11. Assuming that there was no provision for making over or conveying the properties by the trustee, but the trust, being for a limited period or purpose, has determined on expiry or fulfilment, would the properties have reverted back to the settlor or, in his absence, to his heirs? Then also, the plaintiffs are admittedly such heirs, though others, like their sisters etc. might also have been co-heirs. But still then, the plaintiffs being admittedly the sole landlords, could have maintained the suit, as their being co-owners only would not in view of the Supreme Court decisions above referred to, have stood in the way. 12. The appeal thus fails and we dismiss the same and affirm the judgement and decree passed by the Court below with this modification that the tenant-appellant shall be allowed time till the 30th November, 1989 to vacate the suit-premises if he submits a written undertaking to that effect in the Court below within 31st August, Records to go down at once. No cost in the appeal. Ajit Kumar Nayak, J. : I agree. Appeal dismissed.