JUDGMENT K.P. Radhakrishna Menon, J. 1. The employer is the petitioner. 2. Respondents 2 and 3 were engaged as Assistant tea maker and tea maker respectively in the estate of the petitioner company. They were dismissed from service with effect from 21-4-1982 for proved misconducts. The allegations against them were that they in combination committed theft, fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's property and business. These are misconducts coming under Clause.14(E), (G) and (I) of the Certified Standing Orders. These clauses provide that on the proof of the above misconducts the employee is liable to be dismissed from service. 3. Accepting the report of the enquiry officer who conducted the domestic enquiry, the management dismissed these employees from service. The matter was referred for adjudication to the fourth respondent Labour Court who registered the dispute as I. D. 68/84. The Labour Court formulated the following points. i. Whether the domestic enquiry is valid and proper? ii. Whether the punishment imposed is excessive or not justifiable? iii. To what relief, if any, the workmen are entitled? These points were considered and disposed of by Ext. P6 award. The Labour Court has found that the domestic enquiry has validly been conducted. The first point accordingly was answered in favour of the petitioner. Regarding Point Nos. 2 and 3, the Labour Court has observed thus:- "Having due regard to the fact that as a result of the negligence on the part of these two workmen the estate had suffered some loss, depriving them part of their wages will be the proper punishment. In my opinion the workmen should be reinstated in service, but only with half of the back wages'. Accordingly the dismissal of respondents 2 and 3 was set aside and they were directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and with half bank wages. 4. The Labour Court while considering Point No.1 has had in view the findings, the enquiry officer had entered in the report based on which respondents 2 and 3 were dismissed. The findings, the Labour Court observes, are beyond challenge. The comment of the Labour Court regarding the findings of the enquiry officer reads:- "......Regarding the findings also it is not possible to say that they are perverse or not supported by any evidence on record though a different view of the matter is quite possible. The findings, the Labour Court observes, are beyond challenge. The comment of the Labour Court regarding the findings of the enquiry officer reads:- "......Regarding the findings also it is not possible to say that they are perverse or not supported by any evidence on record though a different view of the matter is quite possible. The fact that this court may be inclined to take a different view regarding the inferences to be drawn from the evidence is not a valid ground to set aside the domestic enquiry since it cannot be said that the conclusions are those which cannot be arrived at by any reasonable person....." (emphasis supplied) The Labour Court therefore has found that the findings of the enquiry officer that the charges of fraud/dishonesty have been established although there is no evidence to sustain the charge of theft. These findings however, were given the go-bye by the Labour Court while considering point Nos. 2 and 3, pertaining to the case of the employees that the punishment imposed on them Was excessive and hence not justifiable. For the purpose of deciding these two points the Labour Court has entered a finding different from the finding it has entered while disposing of point No. 1. The said finding is that "......what the workmen are really guilty of is only some serious negligence in their work. But, for that the punishment of dismissal is certainly disproportionate and excessive particularly in view of the fact that neither of them seem to have had any previous punishment". He accordingly awarded a lessor punishment. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the award is a composite one in that, the Labour Court by the award has found that while the domestic enquiry was proper, the punishment imposed was excessive. It is true that there is no need for the Labour Court to go into the question as to whether or not the findings of the enquiry officer in regard to the guilt of the delinquent are sustainable while deciding the preliminary issue regarding the validity of the enquiry report. That does not mean that the Labour Court shall not look into the correctness of the findings / conclusions of the enquiry officer. That does not mean that the Labour Court shall not look into the correctness of the findings / conclusions of the enquiry officer. It has the jurisdiction to evaluate the evidence let in by the parties in the domestic enquiry afresh and come to its own conclusion as regards the guilt of a delinquent although initially the preliminary issue alone was considered. It is all the more so in a case where it decides to consider and dispose of both the preliminary issue as also the issue pertaining to the imposition of punishment by a composite order. It can either differ from or concur with the findings, the basis for the conclusion of the enquiry officer. But when once it concurs with the findings of the enquiry officer and the said findings therefore become its findings then it cannot give up the said findings while considering the question as to whether the punishment imposed is excessive. It should in this connection be remembered that there is nothing in the Industrial Law prohibiting the Labour Court from considering the correctness of the findings of the enquiry officer while deciding the issue pertaining to the validity of the domestic enquiry. The question as to whether the punishment is excessive or not in such circumstances requires to be considered only in the light of the said findings it enters while disposing of the preliminary issue. A reference in this connection to the following observation of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management (1973 (1) L. L. J. 278) is profitable:- "Therefore, it will be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time the satisfaction under S.11A about the guilt or otherwise of the workmen concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved...............If a proper enquiry is conducted by an employer and a correct finding arrived at regarding the misconduct, the Tribunal, even though it has new power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the management, will have to give very cogent reason for not accepting the view of the employer......". It therefore follows that when once the Tribunal/Labour Court finds that the findings regarding the misconduct arrived at by the management are not perverse and hence beyond challenge although the said finding was made while disposing of the preliminary point, the Tribunal/Labour Court thereafter shall not give up the said finding and make afresh finding for the purpose of considering the issue pertaining to the imposition of punishment. It should in this connection be remembered that the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and punishment to be imposed are all functions of the management with which the Tribunal has limited power to interfere unless the findings are perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation or unfair labour practice. This is a well established principle. That means, if the findings based on which punishment was imposed, are perverse then the Tribunal can differ from the said findings and hold that no misconduct is proved and consequently order reinstatement with or without back wages. On the other hand, on concurring with the said findings, the Tribunal still has the power of interference provided it is established that the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation or unfair labour practice. 6. Applying the principles as stated above to the facts of this case, I am of opinion that the Labour Court erred in interfering with the imposition of punishment. The findings of the enquiry officer as upheld by the Labour Court in this regard is that the allegations of "fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's property and business" stand proved. Fraud and dishonesty, levelled against an employee if found established, to my mind, disentitle him to continue in service. The findings of the enquiry officer as upheld by the Labour Court in this regard is that the allegations of "fraud or dishonesty in connection with the employer's property and business" stand proved. Fraud and dishonesty, levelled against an employee if found established, to my mind, disentitle him to continue in service. 'Fraud' as observed by the Supreme Court in Dr. Vimala v. Delhi Administration (AIR 1963 S. C 1572) involves two elements namely deceit and injury to the person deceived. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. This is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. Respondents 2 and 3 who have defrauded the management, have now been directed to be reinstated by the Labour Court and in doing so the Labour Court has given up its finding that the findings of the enquiry officer which provides the basis for the dismissal of the employees from service, are not perverse; they are all supported by evidence. A lesser punishment however was given entering a different finding namely "what the workmen are really guilty of is only some serious negligence in the work . . ... for that the punishment of dismissal is certainly disproportionate.. "This finding in the circumstances is unwarranted. The award for this reason is Table to be set aside. 7. The above position notwithstanding the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 relying on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Baldev Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala (AIR 1987 S. C. 104) and Scooter India Ltd. v. Labour Court. Lucknow (AIR 1989 I SC. 149) contended that the Tribunal / Labour Court has the power under S.11A of The Industrial Disputes Act to analyse the evidence afresh and enter a finding different from the findings entered by the enquiry officer and interfere with the punishment imposed. There cannot be any dispute about this. It is seen from these rulings that the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider a question similar to the one posed in the case on hand namely where the Tribunal having once found that the findings of the enquiry officer are not perverse can still analyse the evidence and enter a different finding for the purpose of interfering with the punishment. A reference in this connection to the point considered by the Supreme Court in Scooter India Ltd. case is profitable. The point that was considered was "when the Labour Court had found that the enquiry proceedings had been conducted fairly and they were not vitiated in any manner and as such the findings did not call for any interference, the Labour Court could not be said to have exercised its powers under S.6 (2A) of The Act (analogous to S.11A) in a judicial manner". The Supreme Court considering this aspect has observed thus:- "It cannot therefore be said that the Labour Court had exercised its powers under S.6 (2A) of the Act in an arbitrary manner and not in a judicial manner. The Labour Court has taken the view that justice must be tempered with mercy and that the erring workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself and prove to be a loyal and disciplined employee of the petitioner company. It cannot therefore be said that merely because the Labour Court had found the enquiry to be fair and lawful and the findings not to be vitiated in any manner, it ought not to have interfered with the order of termination of service passed against the respondent in exercise of its powers under S.6 (2A) of the Act". I am of the view that the facts of the case considered by the Supreme Court are not similar to the facts of the present case. I therefore am not inclined to accept the above argument of the learned counsel. 8. What remains to be considered is. whether the matter should go back to the Labour Court for a denovo consideration regarding the issue pertaining to punishment. In view of the fact that the misconduct alleged and proved against the employees is one of fraud and dishonesty, I am of the view that the punishment awarded cannot be said to be excessive or harsh. In the circumstances it cannot also be said that it tantamounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice. There is therefore no need to remand the matter for a reconsideration. However the amounts paid by the management as per directions of this court and under S.17B of The Industrial Disputes Act need not be refunded. Ext. P6 accordingly is set aside. The O. P. is allowed. No costs.