JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal 1. This is an appeal against the order dated 20-4-1989 granting temporary prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction to the plaintiffs- respondents for the removal of the construction on the disputed well and to restore the same in its normal condition. 2. At the time of presentation of the appeal, appearance was put in by the respondents and a counter-affidavit was filed. Subsequently rejoinder- affidavit was also filed and the parties agreed that the appeal may be disposed of at this very stage. In these circumstances the appeal has been heard on merits and the parties submit that all the necessary papers have been filed by them. The dispute relates to an alleged public well which is situate in the heart of a busy market and it is alleged that the public always used it for the purpose of setting up a Piyau for making cold drinking water available to the visitors in the market including outsiders during hot summer months. It is alleged in the plaint that the present appellant got a portion of the well allotted in his favour on a payment of some monthly rent with permission to raise a tin shed supported on pillars or poles. The grievance made was that this will deprive the public at large from the user of the well for setting up the Piyau during summer months. Along with the plaint, an application for interim relief was also made praying that the structures raised by the defendants appellant should be removed pending the suit and the same may be restored to its original position. The application was considered ex-parte and was allowed by the impugned order. 3. Sri N. Lal, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that on the. allegations made in the plaint, no case for grant of injunction has been made out and the court should not have issued the injunction, as prayed. He also submitted that the Court has not complied with the mandatory provision of Rule 3 of Order 39 CPC and this has seriously prejudiced the appellant. Even reasons for necessity of passing an ex-parte order of injunction have not been recorded in the order. For the above reasons it is submitted that the order of injunction passed by the trial court was illegal and erroneous. 4. Even reasons for necessity of passing an ex-parte order of injunction have not been recorded in the order. For the above reasons it is submitted that the order of injunction passed by the trial court was illegal and erroneous. 4. Sri R. H. Zaidi, learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents, has, however, supported the decision and submitted that necessary ingredients very much exist in the order and the same should not be examined in a pedantic manner but in a spirit in which the order has been made. During the argument, an effort was made to urge on the merits of the rival claims. A reference in this regard was made to Section 116 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, the appellant's contention being that under the aforesaid section, all public wells situate within the Municipality vested in the Municipal Board and the local Board had the power to manage the same. SRI Zaidi, however, submitted that the aforesaid provision did not apply to all kinds of public well. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this stage to give any opinion on the question as it is likely prejudice the rights of the parties and the same is being deliberately left to be decided by the trial court. The main thrust of the argument of the appellant was that no ex-parte injunction order can be passed by the court without recording clear reasons why, in its opinion, the object of granting injunction would be defeated if there was delay in doing so. In this connection he has heavily relied upon the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 which reads as under :- "Provided that, where it is proposed to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, the court shall record the reasons for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay." 5. The language of the proviso is plain enough and it is mandatory that before any court decides to issue an ex-parte injunction, it must give reasons as to why it was dispensing with the sending of notices in the first instance. As a matter of fact, according to Rule 3, in every case, the court ought to direct a notice of the application to the opposite party before granting injunction. As a matter of fact, according to Rule 3, in every case, the court ought to direct a notice of the application to the opposite party before granting injunction. There is only one exception to this general rule and it is in those cases where it appears that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay. Thus except in those limited class of cases where in the opinion of the Court, the very object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay, no injunction can be granted unless the other side has notice of the application. In cases covered by exception, it is necessary in terms of the proviso that the Court should record its reasons that the object of granting injunction would be defeated by delay consequent upon sending of the notice to the opposite party in the first instance. Whenever the court makes a departure from the normal course, it must record reasons for doing so, more so in a case where the law itself requires recording of reasons in that behalf. In the instant case, the order does not show that this aspect of the matter was at all considered before passing the impugned order. In fact if I may say so the court appears to have acted with undue haste. The order is cryptic and almost in a telegraphic language making most part of it unintelligible. Granting of injunction is a grave matter and before the court proceeds to do so, it must give careful thought to the facts of the case and the evidence adducecd before it even at the ex-parte stage. The order must show that the court has felt satisfied with the material on record that a good case for grant of injunction exists. It must also see that the requisite provisions of law have been complied with subject to which it has the power to issue injunction. The order under appeal does not indicate any anxiety on the part of the court to have done so. 6. I feel pity that in this case an officer of the rank of Civil Judge who must have put in several years working on the civil side should have passed an order like this in utter disregard of the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 39. 6. I feel pity that in this case an officer of the rank of Civil Judge who must have put in several years working on the civil side should have passed an order like this in utter disregard of the provisions of Rule 3 of Order 39. The latter portion of the proviso referred to earlier requires that there will be a specific order made by the court while granting injunction directing the applicant to deliver the application for injunction in the manner provided together with the affidavit in support thereof and the other documents referred to therein. It is also required that the applicant should be directed to file an affidavit to the effect that the copies have been so sent. All these provisions have been totally ignored. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the appellant, an allegation has been made that no such copies have been sent by registered post and no affidavit has been filed by the plaintiff-applicant as required by the proviso to Rule 3. In view of the above, the manner in which the order has been passed betrays serious lack of knowledge of procedure on the part of the learned lower court. It is a sound principle that whenever a court has to pass an order under specific provision of law, it is better to open the book and see what the provision is. It is not always sound to rely upon one's impression of the law or the provision contained in the Act or Code for it is always safe to have a look at the provision before passing the order. I have mentioned all this only with a view that the officers will take the advice seriously and in future avoid this kind of expression. I earnestly believe that the subordinate courts will take it in the spirit that all that has been said above is in a spirit of giving advice to avoid the pitfall which come in the way of officers in discharge of their duty as a Judicial Officer. 7. Having said what i have, I may now advert to the well established principle that a mandatory injunction should be resorted to only in very grave cases and in circumstances which really deserve an order in that form at least at the stage of temporary injunction. 7. Having said what i have, I may now advert to the well established principle that a mandatory injunction should be resorted to only in very grave cases and in circumstances which really deserve an order in that form at least at the stage of temporary injunction. The manner in which this order has been passed and if it had been executed, the result would have been that the appellant would have been left without remedy as the damage would have already been done. The mandatory injunction is not to be lightly granted and even if the court was of the view that it was a peak season of summer and the need for the Piyau was immediate, it should have fixed a shorter date and only after hearing the parties, an order should have been passed. 8. Having given my careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, I find that the order passed by the learned Civil Judge is illegal and erroneous and has not been passed in the form prescribed by law. In the circumstances the order is set aside. However, the parties are directed to appear before the lower court on 15th May, 1989. The court below, after giving proper opportunity to the parties, shall proceed to dispose of the matter of injunction on or before 19th of May, 1989. With these observations, the appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. A certified copy of this order may be issued to the learned counsel for the parties within 24 hours on payment of requisite charges. Appeal allowed.