Judgment Surendra Narain Jha, J. 1. By this application under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus for quashing the First Information Report giving rise to Ranchi Kotwali P.C. Case No. 0071/1984, dated 3-2-84 and also for quashing of confiscation proceeding and restraining the respondents from taking any action against the petitioners on the basis of the said First Information Report. It was further prayed that the articles seized be released in favour of the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are partners of a registered partnership firm known as M/s. Bharat Oils and registered under the Indian Partnership Act who carries on business of manufacturing and wholesale of edible oil. The said firm holds a licence under the provisions of Bihar Edible Oil Dealers Licensing Order, 1966 (for short the Licensing Order, 1966) which has been renewed from year to year. A renewal application in respect of licence alongwith renewal fee was submitted before the licencing authority annexing the original licence required to be submitted for such renewal. 3. It appears that on 2/3rd February,1984 the Executive Magistrate, respondent No.3 raided the business premises of the petitioners under the orders of Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector, Ranchi, respondent No.2 The raiding party after counting the stock at the business premises including the mills and the godowns locked and sealed the place where the articles were found and prepared a list of the seized articles including the articles taken by them as samples. 4. A written report was submitted by the respondent No.3 alleging, inter alia : That the licence has not been renewed for the year 1984 although it was valid till December, 1983. There was no entry with respect to Gunja seeds and there was no support for holding the seed in stock. Oil was packed in used tins of the several kinds bearing district marks. Stock register did not indicate the limits under the licence for storage and manufacture and number of other discrepancies were found by the raiding parties. 5. There was no entry with respect to Gunja seeds and there was no support for holding the seed in stock. Oil was packed in used tins of the several kinds bearing district marks. Stock register did not indicate the limits under the licence for storage and manufacture and number of other discrepancies were found by the raiding parties. 5. On the basis of the said report, the Officer in charge of Kotwali Police Station drew a formal First Information Report and registered the aforesaid Kotwali (Sukhdeonagar) P. S. Case No. 0071/1984 against the petitioners under Sec. 7/8 of the Essential Commodities Act (for short the Act) and Sections 420 and 272 of the Indian Penal Code (for short the Penal Code). A copy of the First Information Report is annexed as Annexure 2 to this application which is under challenge. 6. While admitting this application, vide order dated 13-3-1984, this Court did not stay the police investigation and the confiscation proceeding but the seized articles except Mahua were ordered to be released to the petitioners on furnishing sufficient security to the satisfaction of the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi and pending final hearing of this application, the petitioners were ordered not to be arrested. 7. A supplementary affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioners which shows that pursuant to the notice as contained in Annexure, the petitioners filed show cause reply before the Deputy Commissioner Ranchi in confiscation proceeding hearing Case No. 22-R- 28/83-84 and after hearing the parties, the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 4-9-1987 dropped the confiscation proceeding while observing as follows: "In view of the facts discussed above, I find that the only point that holds against the O.P. is point No.2. But, however, it has been contended by O.P. that there was no mens rea or injury to the State for nonmaintenance of the separate registers for different kind of oil. This as stated earlier has to be considered conjointly with other points. I find that the rest of the five points have been totally conceded by, the learned P. P. appearing on behalf of the State. If he had felt all that strongly about the case not being true, he could have advised the State earlier that the case was not" true and the prosecution would not be sustained in the court of law. If he had felt all that strongly about the case not being true, he could have advised the State earlier that the case was not" true and the prosecution would not be sustained in the court of law. Then there was no need of carrying on with this proceedings. The time of the court has been wanted in addition to the wastage of money and other needless harassment caused to the P.P., in this regard. The learned A.P.P. who, I believe has been there for the last 3-4 years could have saved all this for the State by conceding these, points earlier. However, the fact that he has chosen to concede these points right at the end appear to be slightly mysterious to the court. I would like that in the future learned A.P.P. behaves in more forthright manner and consider the cases at their intrinsic value. However, in view of the fact it has been totally conceded by the A.P.P and there being no supporting evidence against the O.P. the Court has no option but to order that the confiscation proceeding in relation to the commodities seized be dropped and the O.P. be discharged from all the liabilities that has been incurred in course of this proceeding." 8. A second supplementary affidavit has also been filed in this case on behalf of the petitioners. It has been stated that the police after investigation submitted a charge-sheet under Sec. 7 of the E.C. Act and Secs. 420 and 272 of the Penal Code since the police investigation had not been stayed by this court at the time of admission of this application. Mr. Bharukha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners vehemently argued that since the Deputy Commissioner-cum-Collector acting under Sec. 6 A of the E.C. Act on consideration of all the material facts and evidence found that none of the charges against the petitioners are sustainable and discharged the petitioners in respect of all the allegations, there is no warrant for continuation of the Criminal Proceeding against the petitioners on those very grounds. That will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 9. That will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 9. It was further contended that the Special Judge, E.C. Act without applying his judicial mind has taken cognizance of the offence under Sec. 7 of E.C. Act a mechanical way and no case at all under Sections 420 and 272 of the Penal Code has been made out. It was lastly contended that so far as the allegations made in the First Information Report and charge-sheet submitted with regard to the offence under the E.C. Act is concerned, the cognizance taken for such offence is barred by limitation under Sec. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) and fit to be quashed on this ground alone. 10. In support of his first contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Ramavtar Prasad Kedia and others V/s. State of Bihar In the aforesaid case relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Uttam Chand and others V/s. Income Tax Officer, Central Circle, it was observed that the prosecution was started on certain allegations. The licensing authority accepted the show cause filed by the petitioners and came to the conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioners have not been substantiated. He accepted the show cause and discharged the petitioners. Even in the confiscation proceeding, the District Magistrate had observed that the violation is of technical nature and no other irregularities were found. Therefore, it was held that the cognizance would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and the cognizance was accordingly quashed. 11. In the instant case, I must say that in view of the observations made by the Deputy Commissioner, in the aforesaid confiscation proceeding, I find considerable force in the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and in my opinion, the continuation of the criminal proceeding on those very allegations would be an abuse of the process of the Court. I again repeat that there cannot be any justification for the State to proceed with the criminal case in view of the strong observations made by the Deputy Commissioner which has been quoted earlier. From a perusal of the First Information Report, I find that no essential ingredients of an offence under Secs. 420 and 272 of the Indian Penal Code are there. 12. From a perusal of the First Information Report, I find that no essential ingredients of an offence under Secs. 420 and 272 of the Indian Penal Code are there. 12. From a bare reading of Sec. 420 of the Penal Code, it appears that there must be a cheating and for cheating, in my opinion, three ingredients must be present, namely, (I) practice of deception by the offender; (2) on account of deception, there must be fraudulent or dishonest inducement so as to make the person deceived or to do something; and (3) by reason of doing of such thing, there must be causing Or likelihood of causing of damage or harm to the person deceived in body, mind and reputation. The essential ingredients for an offence of cheating, in my opinion, is that on the basis of a fraud or misrepresentation, the complainant is induced to part with any valuable right. In the instant case, I do not find that such case has been made out against the petitioners. So far as the cognizance of offence under Sec. 272 is concerned there is no allegation either in the First Information Report or in the chargesheet of adultering food or drink intended for sale so as to make the same noxious. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that no case under Sec. 420 or 272 of the Indian Penal Code has been made out against the petitioners. 13. Now coming to the point of limitation, from the First Information Report, it appears that the aforesaid case was registered as far back as 3-2-1984 and the police after investigation submitted charge-sheet on 27-4-1987 i.e. after more than three years, a copy of which is Annexure-4 to this application and on the basis of the said charge-sheet cognizance was taken against the petitioners vide order dated 7-5-87, passed in Special Case No. 71/84. I am not able to appreciate as to why the police took so much time in completing the investigation and in submission of the charge-sheet. 14. It was contended that cognizance itself is barred by limitation under Sec. 468 of the Code. Sec. 468 of the Code reads as follows : Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-sec. (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. 14. It was contended that cognizance itself is barred by limitation under Sec. 468 of the Code. Sec. 468 of the Code reads as follows : Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in Sub-sec. (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. The period of limitation shall be a) sixmonths, if the offence is punishable with fine only ; b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year ; c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years." 15. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that so far as allegations made in the First Information Report with regard to offence under Sec. 7 of the E.C. Act is concerned, the maximum punishment provided therefore is only one year under Sec. 7(1)(a)(i) of the E.C. Act Therefore, the taking of cognizance on 7-5-1987 is barred by limitation. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Vasudeo Agrawal & anr. V/s. State.3 In the aforesaid case cognizance was taken under Sec. 323 of the Penal Code and a Division Bench of this court held that the maximum sentence under Sec. 323 is one year and, therefore, no Court could take cognizance of the offence under Sec. 323 of the Penal Code after expiry of one year from the date of occurrence, and quashed the cognizance on the ground of limitation. On the other hand, Mr. Gododia learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the State submitted that the principle of law enunciated in the case of Vasudeo Agrawal & anr. V/s. State (supra) has been impliedly overruled by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Kripal Prasad and others V/s. The State of Bihar and ors., but, with great respect, I must say that, in my view, the principle enunciated in the said decision has not been over-ruled by the Full Bench. V/s. State (supra) has been impliedly overruled by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Kripal Prasad and others V/s. The State of Bihar and ors., but, with great respect, I must say that, in my view, the principle enunciated in the said decision has not been over-ruled by the Full Bench. The Full Bench relying on various decisions held that no question of limitation can possibly arise in the context of a continuing 1offence in view of Sec. 472 of the Code and it was held that the failure of employers to deposit the contribution in contravention of paragraphs 38 of 76 of Employees Provident Fund Scheme,1952 read with Sec. 14 of the Employees Provident Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 would be a continuing offence. 15. In the instant case, there is no question of any continuing offence. Therefore, in my view, the decision given in the Full Bench will not apply to the facts of the present case. It was further pointed out on behalf of the State that whether the disputed issues of limitation can appropriately be raised directly il the High Court for quashing of the proceeding under Sec. 482 of the said Code. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the petitioners cannot raise the points of limitation directly in the High Court but in this connection I may point out that in the case of State of Punjab V/s. Sarwan Singh, their Lordships held :- "The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material, evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statute seeks to subverse is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The object which the statute seeks to subverse is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution whether by the State pr a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitations." 16 In that view of the matter, I do not find any substance in the argument of the learned Standing Counsel because it is purely a point of law which can be raised at any stage just to prevent the abuse of the process of the court in the ends of justice and specially in this case where the Deputy Commissioner has himself made an observation that there was no need of carrying on with the proceeding and the time of the Court has been wasted in addition to the wastage of money and other needless harassment caused to the accused in this regard. 17. In this connection reference may also be made to a decision in the case of Surinder Mohan Vikal V/s. Aschraj Lal Chopra,6 where their Lordships held : "It would thus appear that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of subsection (1) of Sec. 468 which prohibits every court from taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in subsection (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. It is hardly necessary to say that statutes of limitation have legislative policy behind them. For instance, they shut out belated and dormant claims in order to save the accused from unnecessary harassment." 18. Taking into consideration all the facts and the circumstances, I feel that to allow the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court and in the ends of justice, it must be stopped. In view of the decision discussed above, in my opinion, the cognizance is barred by limitation and fit to be quashed on this score also. 19. Having examined the question very closely and having considered the matter in all its remification, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where the entire prosecution including the order of cognizance must be quashed. 20. For the reasons stated above, the prosecution including the order of cognizance is hereby quashed. 19. Having examined the question very closely and having considered the matter in all its remification, I am of the opinion that it is a fit case where the entire prosecution including the order of cognizance must be quashed. 20. For the reasons stated above, the prosecution including the order of cognizance is hereby quashed. In the result, this application is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.