GULAB C. GUPTA; J. ( 1 ) THE applicant, by this application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, seek quashing of the proceedings started on a, complaint of the non-applicant before Shri M. R. Pandey, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal for the alleged offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The applicants had made a similar efforts before Shri C. C. Dwivedi, 3rd Addi. Sessions Judge, Bhopal by filling a revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was unfortunately dismissed. ( 2 ) IT appears that non-applicant Dr. Majid Hussain was a member of Muslim Welfare Society. The applicants are the members and office-bearers of the said society. The said society in its meeting dated 31-5-1984, passed a resolution against the non-applicant removing him from the membership of the society on the ground that he did not fulfil the requirements of the bye-laws and also because of 'mala fides and black-mailing tactics'. It appears that the aforesaid removal gave rise rivalry between the parties. The non-applicant published articles in some Urdu newspaper against the aforesaid society. The society felt that publication of articles by the non-applicant in news-paper were defamatory. One Rafiq Ahmad Khan, Advocate, acting under instructions from the applicant Mohd. Raja Khan, Secretary, of the Society served a notice dated 22-6-1984 (Annexure-1) on the non-applicant and two others calling upon them to express regret and apology for the writing, printing and publishing the defamatory articles, failing which legal criminal action was to be started in the Court of law. Para No. 1 of this notice, which is the subject-matter of the present application, reads as under: That you the addressee No. 2 were the member of the Muslim Welfare Society. Due to your mala fides and black: mailing tactics and other disqualifications the society by its resolution dated 31-5- 1984 has removed you from the original membership of the society. Consequently, you have adopted rival attitude and started to defame the society on false grounds. It further appears that the non-applicant did not tender apology and, therefore, a criminal complaint was filed against him in the Court of Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal on 28-7- 1984, where it is pending. Consequently, you have adopted rival attitude and started to defame the society on false grounds. It further appears that the non-applicant did not tender apology and, therefore, a criminal complaint was filed against him in the Court of Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal on 28-7- 1984, where it is pending. It appears that the non-applicant felt that the aforesaid allegations contained in notice of Shri Rafiq Ahmad Khan, Advocate, amounted to an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code and. therefore, filed a criminal complaint against the applicants which is the subject-matter of Criminal Trial No. 476/87 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal. The said complaint is based on notice dated 22-6-1984 and alleges that it makes the imputation that the non-applicant was a black mailer. Quoting aforesaid para No. 1 of the notice it is alleged that it amounts to defamation. Acting on the statement of the non-applicant and his two witnesses the learned Magistrate has registered the complaint and issued process against the applicants purporting to be in excercise of power under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The applicants in the present application seek quashing of these proceedings. ( 3 ) IT has already been noticed that the applicants had filed a revision under Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code challenging the legality of the order issuing process on them. Section 397 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibits any further application by way of revision by a person who has made an application either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge. It is submitted that the legislature, infact, intended to make the order in the revision final and therefore, even the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code would not be available for this purpose. Reliance has been placed on Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra fagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan and L. V. fadhav v. Shankarrao. None of these cases, however, support the aforesaid submission. They, on the contrary, clarify that two jurisdictions operate in different spheres and have different parameters. Reliance has been placed on Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra fagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration) Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan and L. V. fadhav v. Shankarrao. None of these cases, however, support the aforesaid submission. They, on the contrary, clarify that two jurisdictions operate in different spheres and have different parameters. Section 482 of the Criminal procedure code confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass order ex debito justice in cases where grave injustice has been done or where the process of the Court is seriously abused. The decision of Supreme Court in Delhi Municipality v. Ram Kishan (supra) reaffirmed that an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code: 1. Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; 2. Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; 3. Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. (Para 8) The Court also noted that the aforesaid are purely illustrative cases intended to provide guidelines. The ultimate conclusion of the Court is as under: It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of this powers under Section 482 of tile present Code. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of this powers under Section 482 of tile present Code. Since this decision takes into consideration all decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel, it is not considered necessary to deal with them in any detail. It is therefore obvious that though this Court does not lack jurisdiction to entertain the application, it will not readily accept the applicants prayer and quash proceedings. This Court would always remember that these powers are not appellate and are intended to be sparingly used under compelling circumstances. ( 4 ) IN view of the aforesaid, it may be examined if the Magistrate found sufficient ground to issue process against the applicants. Since the complaint is for offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, it must be ascertained whether the complaint discloses the necessary ingredient of the offence as defined under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. A bare reading of the aforesaid section brings out its three essential ingredients viz. , (i) making or publishing any imputation concerning the non-applicant (ii) such imputation must have been made by words, signs or visible representations, and (iii) such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or reason to believe that it will harm the reputation of the non- applicant. If these requirements are satisfied the person making or publishing the imputation would be liable to be punished under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The aforesaid is, however, subjected to ten exceptions, contained in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code which must be kept in view while considering the matter. Under the circumstances, the first question to be considered is whether the applicants made alleged imputation? The complaint, itself indicates that the offending remarks were made by Shri Rafiq Ahmad Khan, Advocate. Though the complaint alleges that the Advocate wrote the offending remarks under instructions from the applicants, the notice of the Advocate, does not support it. The notice (Annexure No. 1) is issued under the instructions of the Secretary Mohd. Raja Khan, though it purports to be on behalf of the Muslim Welfare Society. Though the complaint alleges that the Advocate wrote the offending remarks under instructions from the applicants, the notice of the Advocate, does not support it. The notice (Annexure No. 1) is issued under the instructions of the Secretary Mohd. Raja Khan, though it purports to be on behalf of the Muslim Welfare Society. The complaint states that the applicants are members and officers of the said society. Simply because the applicants are members of the society, it cannot be assumed that they gave instructions to the Advocate to write the offending words. There is also no reason to doubt that the Advocate Shri Khan would have wrongly mentioned that the notice was being given at the instance of Secretary of the Society Shri Mohd. Raja Khan. The non-applicant in his evidence does not allege anything more. Since this is the only material on record is nothing against the applicants except applicant Mohd. Raja Khan to connect them with the notice and, therefore, there would be no justification whatsoever for holding even prima facie that these applicants made the aforesaid imputation. Paced with this situation, the learned Counsel for the non-applicant relied on subsequent event contained in para 7 of the complaint, wherein it is alleged that the non-applicant required the applicants to tender apology which the applicants refused to tender and asserted that they believe that he was the black mailer and, therefore, they got the offending remark written. If the intrinsic value of this statement makes it prima facie acceptable, it may be treated to be a circumstance connecting the applicants with the imputation. But neither the complaint nor the applicants statement clarify us to when the aforesaid admission was made. The complaint only says that after the demand of apology the situation became explosive and the applicants-accused persons shouted at the non-applicant to say that he was black-mailer and, therefore, they had got the notice written. This statement does not clarify whether the non-applicant met all applicants in any meeting where they were present or met them individually; time and place is also not mentioned. The intrinsic value of the statements, therefore, very little. Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code requires the Magistrate to find out sufficient grounds before issuing process. Mere ipse dixit of the applicant is neither sufficient reason nor ground within this provision. Apparently, therefore issue of process against the applicants except the applicant Mohd. The intrinsic value of the statements, therefore, very little. Section 204 of Criminal Procedure Code requires the Magistrate to find out sufficient grounds before issuing process. Mere ipse dixit of the applicant is neither sufficient reason nor ground within this provision. Apparently, therefore issue of process against the applicants except the applicant Mohd. Raja Khan was contrary to Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Once a complaint has been filed nothing more than the facts stated in the complaint can be permitted to be proved by evidence. Since. vague allegations against the applicants even if accepted, it would be an abuse of process of the Court to require them to face trial which is known to be long drawn and. bitterly contested. This, according to this Court is the compelling reason for exercise; of power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this view of the matter, proceedings in so far as applicants other than the applicant Mohd. Raja Khan are concerned, deserve to be quashed. ( 5 ) THIS Court should also inquire whether Mohd. Raja Khan made the imputation as alleged Pam No. 1 of the notice (Annexure No. 1) which is quoted in part in para No. 4 of the complaint when read as a whole, does not lead to the conclusion that it was applicant Mohd. Raja Khan who called the non-applicant a black-mailer. Indeed, the word Blackmailer is not used in this paragraph nor does this para contain the statement of the said applicant. This para, in fact, refers to the resolution of the Society dated 31-5-84 which has the effect of removing the non-applicant from origin membership, because of his mala fide and blackmailing tactics and other disqualification. The Secretary of the Society is not entitled to change the resolution. Under the circumstances, if use of the words mala fide and black mailing tactices had the effect of defaming the nonapplicant, he was defamed by the resolution dated 31-5-1984. The complaint does not pertain to said resolution. The submission of the learned Counsel for the non-applicant is that passing the resolution itself, would not amount to defamation as it was not published till 22-6-84 when this notice was given. The complaint does not pertain to said resolution. The submission of the learned Counsel for the non-applicant is that passing the resolution itself, would not amount to defamation as it was not published till 22-6-84 when this notice was given. Assuming that this submission is correct, the moot question requiring consideration would be, whether the Secretary of the Society in honestly and faithfully quoting the said resolution commits offence under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. Seventh Exception to this provision would entitle the general body of the Society to pass the censor resolution against the applicant in accordance with its bye-laws and an imputation made in that connection would not amount to defamation. If the alleged imputation when made did not amount to defamation, it is difficult to hold that its communication by the lawful authority would amount to defamation. Then it is also not possible to hold that the Secretary while communicating the said resolution to his Advocate intended to harm the non-applicant. Such a communication is privileged and does not amount to publication. The fact that the Advocate sent the impugned notice to two others would not be the circumstance against the Secretary. The Advocate was the best judge of the manner of serving notice. It cannot be seriously disputed that the Advocate could have issued separate and different notices to three different persons, if he had so wanted. Advocates style of functioning is not controlled by the instructing agent of the client and, therefore, the person instructing cannot be held responsible for any wrong done by the Advocate of his Act. It is admitted and in the opinion of this Court rightly, that if notice (Annexure No. 1) had not been addressed to the proprietor, Pasha Printing Press, requirement of publication of the same would not have been satisfied. This being the matter left to an expert, i. e. Advocate, the applicant Secretary would not prima facie be made responsible of the said publication. Since the burden of showing sufficient ground is on the non- applicant as is usually so on the prosecution in a criminal case, it was for the non-applicant to show that the publication of the resolution was also under instructions from the applicant Mohd. Raja Khan. Since the burden of showing sufficient ground is on the non- applicant as is usually so on the prosecution in a criminal case, it was for the non-applicant to show that the publication of the resolution was also under instructions from the applicant Mohd. Raja Khan. Consideration of intrinsic value of the evidence, therefore, makes it difficult for this Court to discover sufficient ground in this case as required under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In this view of the matter proceedings against the applicant No. 3 the Secretary also deserve to be quashed. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, the application succeeds and is allowed. Proceedings before Shri M. R. Pandey Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhopal in Criminal Case No. 476/87 are hereby quashed and the applicants discharged. Application allowed. .