Judgment :- 1. 11th defendant is the appellant. Plaintiff (1st respondent) filed the suit for setting aside Ext.A-3 sale deed executed by his mother while he was a minor. The trial court decreed the suit holding that necessary permission from the District Court was not taken before the assignment. It has been confirmed by the lower appellate Court. 2. Ext. A-3 sale deed is dated 12-7-1966. Appellant contended that the suit ought to have been filed on or before 11-7-1979 and as the plaintiff filed the suit before the Sub Court only on 4-7-1980 it is barred by limitation. Admittedly the suit was filed before the Munsiff Court on 20-7-1976. It was found that the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the valuation of the subject matter of the suit exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff Court and returned the plaint to be presented before the Sub Court. The order was on 3-7-1980. The suit was presented on 4-7-1980 before the Sub Court. Counsel for the appellant contended that the Courts below ought to have held that the suit was filed in the proper Court only in 1980 and as the same cannot be considered as a continuation of the suit filed in the Court without jurisdiction the suit is barred by limitation. It is also pointed out that in the plaint before the Sub Court there are no averments to get over the period of limitation and so on that ground also the Courts below ought to have held that the suit is barred by limitation. 3. The only question to be considered is as to whether when a suit is returned for presentation from one Court on the ground that it has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit and it is presented before the court having proper jurisdiction can the plaintiff avail the aid of S.14 of the Limitation Act (for short, the Act). The suit was filed before the Munsiff Court well within the period of limitation. Then arose the question of pecuniary jurisdiction. A commission was issued to ascertain the value of the property. Accepting the report of the commissioner the Munsiff held that the value of the subject matter of the suit exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction and returned the plaint. 4. S.14(1) of the Act contemplates following conditions: i. The plaintiff was prosecuting the suit with due diligence; ii. A commission was issued to ascertain the value of the property. Accepting the report of the commissioner the Munsiff held that the value of the subject matter of the suit exceeded his pecuniary jurisdiction and returned the plaint. 4. S.14(1) of the Act contemplates following conditions: i. The plaintiff was prosecuting the suit with due diligence; ii. He prosecuted it in good faith and iii. The Court was unable to entertain the suit from defect in jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. The burden of proving the conditions to attract S.14(1) is undoubtedly on the plaintiff. 5. Contention of the plaintiff in that the suit was filed before the Munsiff Court with the bona fide belief that it was maintainable in that Court and as he diligently prosecuted the suit with that belief return of the plaint for presentation before Sub Court will surely attract S.14 of the Act On the other hand, defendant contended that the plaintiff having got the plaint returned from the Munsiff Court as the suit was found to be under-valued and presented it in the Sub Court, the time during which the suit was pending before the Munsiff Court and the presentation of the suit before the Sub Court cannot be excluded. It is also contended that as a specific ground of exclusion of time under S.14 of the Act has not been taken in the plaint the plaintiff cannot invoke its benefit. 0.7 R.6 C.P.C. provides that the plaint should show the grounds upon which exemption from the period of limitation is claimed. As the suit was filed before the Munsiff Court well within time there was no need for the plaintiff to say anything to get over the period of limitation. As the plaint was returned by the Munsiff and as it contains : the endorsement that it is returned for presentation before the proper Court the failure "to make averments claiming exclusion of time under S.14 of the Act is of no consequence. Averments necessary to get exemption from the period of limitation could have been made in the plaint presented before the Sub Court after necessary amendment. Averments necessary to get exemption from the period of limitation could have been made in the plaint presented before the Sub Court after necessary amendment. Even without such amendment in the plaint, if it is found that the suit was filed within time before the Court of incompetent jurisdiction and that Court returned the plaint for presentation before the Court having jurisdiction the hyper-technical contention that the plaint contains no necessary averments to get over the period of limitation and so the suit is exfacie barred by limitation is not tenable. The endorsement on the plaint can be relied on for the purpose of exclusion of time under S.16 of the Act read with 0.7 R.6 C.P.C. 6. Lahore High Court had occasion to consider a similar case as the present one. In Sukhbir Singh v. Piare Lal (AIR 1923 Lahore 591) a suit was returned to be presented before proper Court and when it was so presented before the Court having jurisdiction it was beyond time. In the plaint no statement as required under 0.7 R.6 C.P.C. was made. The High Court held that no statement was necessary as there was the endorsement of the Court returning the plaint giving the date of original presentation and the date of return. A similar view was taken in Binodilal v. Stayen-drasingh (AIR 1956 M.B. 97). In view of 0.7 R.6 C.P.C. there cannot be any doubt that where exemption from the period of limitation is claimed the plaint must show the ground on which such exemption is sought. But in a case where exists circumstances which are apparent on the face of the records entitling the plaintiff to claim the benefit of S.14 of the Act a too technical approach of the matter would tantamount to denial of real and substantial justice. 7. In the present case the endorsement on the plaint would show when the suit was actually filed before the Munsiff Court and when it was ordered to be returned for presentation before the proper Court. In cases where a party can make use of S.14 of the Act the Court must steer clear of technicalities. The returned plaint can definitely be treated as part of the new plaint. In cases where a party can make use of S.14 of the Act the Court must steer clear of technicalities. The returned plaint can definitely be treated as part of the new plaint. As the suit was filed within time and as the suit happened to he returned for presentation before the proper Court only because of the finding that the suit has been undervalued and as it has been presented before the competent Court within time it cannot be held that the suit is barred by limitation. In Bhanu Vikrama Panicker v. Janaki Amma (1968 K.L.T. 741) Madhavan Nair J. held as follows: "Order VII R.6 C.P.C. requires the plaint to show the grounds upon which exemption from the law of limitation is claimed. The grounds of exemption to be shown in the plaint must necessarily have been existing on its date or in other words must relate to events preceding the suit. Events subsequent to the original presentation of the plaint cannot normally be expected to be made in the plaint. Such events can be mentioned in a plaint only by an amendment thereof. But if the facts or events may be seen in the endorsements on the plaint such endorsements can be relied on for purpose of exclusion of time under S.14 of the Limitation Act read with Order VII R.6 C.P.C. 8. It is also useful to refer to Vijay Kumar Rampal v. Divan Devi (AIR 1985 S.C.1669) where the Supreme Court held thus: "S. 14 provides for exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction. In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding against the defendant shall be excluded where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from a defect of jurisdiction is unable to entertain it. The expression'good faith' qualifies prosecuting the proceedings in the Court which ultimately is found to have no jurisdiction. Failure to pay the requisite court-fee found deficient on a contention being raised or the error of judgment in valuing a suit filed before a Court which was ultimately found to have no jurisdiction has absolutely nothing to do with the question of good faith in prosecuting the suit as provided in S.14 of the Act. Failure to pay the requisite court-fee found deficient on a contention being raised or the error of judgment in valuing a suit filed before a Court which was ultimately found to have no jurisdiction has absolutely nothing to do with the question of good faith in prosecuting the suit as provided in S.14 of the Act. Thus the High Court is in error in holding that defective valuation and improper computation of court-fees disclosed lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff." In the Supreme Court case the plaint was ordered to be returned by the District Judge for presentation in the Court of Sub Judge and the next day the plaintiff took the plaint and on the same day presented it to the proper Court. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff should not be denied the benefit of S.14 merely on the ground that there was improper valuation of suit and negligence in computing Court fees. Defective valuation or improper computation of court fee found out later cannot lead to the conclusion that there was lack of good faith on the part of the plaintiff. Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India (AIR 1973 S.C. 373) and Abrham v. Sadanandan (1979 K.L.T. 493) relied on by the defendant have no application to the facts of the case in hand. There is no merit in the contention of the appellant that the suit is barred by limitation. Concurrent findings of the Courts below are confirmed. The second Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.