T. N. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) TWO Division Benches of this Court having expressed conflicting views on a legal question, the State Transport Authority, for short, Authority or S. T. A. , noted the dilomma and made an earnest endeavour to steer clear of the judicial controversy in passing the impugned order, Annexure-D, on 15-6-1972. However, that ingenuity was a short-lived one inasmuch as that order being challenged before a learned single Judge of this Court in this petition, he referred the controversy to a Division Bench and that Bench, in turn, referred for the opinion of a Larger Bench, the following question :-"whether the permit-holder has a right under any provision of law or under inherent powers of the Court, to get the period of permit extended for the period during which the permit remained suspended?" ( 2 ) BECAUSE we have taken the view that it is necessary to finally dispose of this matter to make amends for the unintended and fortuitous proerastination, it is necessary to state first few facts for that purpose. The petitioner was granted a permanent stage carriage permit on Datia Chhatarpur via Jhansi, Mauranipur route which was valid from 16-3-1969 to 15-1-1972. The grant was challenged by respondents 2 and 3 in appeal before State Transport Appellate Tribunal, for short, 'tribunal'. Unfortunately, final decision in that appeal was rendered rather belatedly on 22-2-1972, albeit dismissing the appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, an ex parte interim stay was granted on 4-8-1969 which was confirmed on 3-9-1969 after interparte hearing in that regard. As the petitioner succeeded and became entitled to resume operation, he applied to Tribunal complaining that he had to cease operation from 4-1-1969 to 10-3-1972 and be given necessary relief by extending the life of the permit to make up the loss. By order Annexure-A/1 passed on 20-4-1972 the Tribunal held that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of the period for which he had to suspend operation because of the stay order passed by the Authority. He then moved the Authority to grant extension of permit accordingly, but by the impugned order the prayer was rejected. ( 3 ) IN the impugned order, the basis for rejection of the prayer stated is "in the absence of any mandatory provision, we cannot grant this extension which defeats the intention of the Legislature". He then moved the Authority to grant extension of permit accordingly, but by the impugned order the prayer was rejected. ( 3 ) IN the impugned order, the basis for rejection of the prayer stated is "in the absence of any mandatory provision, we cannot grant this extension which defeats the intention of the Legislature". To reach this conclusion, justification was found in the changed circumstances of the case. Indeed, in the meantime, the scheme No. 30-M was published under Section 68-C, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for short, the 'act', and the route in question was found overlapping a portion of the notified route as a result of which the Authority found its jurisdiction impaired by the mandate of Section 68-F (1-D) of the Act. The Authority entertained the view that by granting the extension prayed on the basis of Tribunal's order, Section 68-F (1-D) would be defeated. Inasmuch as, that provision was legislated to facilitate the task of nationalisation and refusal to enforce the provision would result in the intention of the Legislature being defeated. ( 4 ) WE may refer now to the conflicting views of this Court of two Division Benches which really form the focus of the controversy mooted in the instant reference. The decision in Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service, Ltd. v. Raipur Transport Co. Ltd. (M. P. No. 254 of 1987) was heard and decided by a learned single and his decision was confirmed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 60 of 1968 in following terms :"4. This brings us to the next contention, viz. that the secretary had no power to grant a permit for the unexpired portion which was not available to the Raipur Transport Co. by reason of the stay. It was contended that the duration of the permit as noted in it had expired by then, and there was no direction either by the Appellate Authority or by the R. T. A. that a fresh permit be granted. In our opinion, it is the duty of Courts and tribunals to see that wrong orders do not harm a party, and the order of the Appellate Authority implied the restoration of the benefit of the permit to its full extent to the Raipur Transport Co. In our opinion, it is the duty of Courts and tribunals to see that wrong orders do not harm a party, and the order of the Appellate Authority implied the restoration of the benefit of the permit to its full extent to the Raipur Transport Co. The Secretary did not do anything more than to effectuate the order of the Appellate Authority, and we do not think that any fresh permit or renewal of the expired (7) permit was necessary. In any event, what was done was eminently just and proper, and we do not think we should interfere under article 226 of the Constitution. "the other view was expressed in the case of MPSRTC v. STA. by a Division Bench of this Court in M. P. No. 241 of 1970, decided on 10-7-1970. It was held by the Court in this case that there was no provision of law by which the petitioner could claim a right to get the permit extended for the period during which the permit remained suspended by an order of the Tribunal during pendency of the appeal. The Court took the view that it was not permissible to legislate juridically, and in the absence of specific provision to extend the life of the permit. Accordingly, the impugned order passed in that case by the State Transport Authority refusing extension was upheld and confirmed. ( 5 ) LONG back in 1962, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Veerappa v. Raman and Raman ( AIR 1952 SC 192 ), had an occasion to analyse and set at rest all doubts about the nature of rights under the Act of the transport operators. The Bench held categorically that the Act created new rights and liabilities and prescribed elaborate procedure for their regulation and observed, "no one is entitled to a permit as of right oven if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions". The grant of permit was, the Bench held, "entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities" because that depended on several circumstances to be taken into consideration by the authorities entrusted with the power in that regard under Section 42 of the Act. It was observed further that there was a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits and for appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. It was observed further that there was a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits and for appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The statute being a complete code, in regard to the new rights accrued thereunder, one has to look into the provisions of the statute itself for remedies for redress of grievance or for correction of errors. The High Court was found exceeding its jurisdiction in quashing the impugned proceedings and making further the direction to the Regional Transport Authority to grant permits to the petitioner. It was held that although the proceedings were vitiated as the parties and authorities were labouring under a misconception that for obtaining the permit ownership of the vehicle was necessary, the Authorities had passed orders in the impugned proceedings taking into consideration relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the exercise of discretion by them in that regard did not call for interference by the High Court or even by the Supreme Court. In clear and categorical terms they held, "the issue or refusal of permit is solely within the discretion of the transport authority and it is not a matter of right. " ( 6 ) THE nature, scope and the ambit of the right of a permit-holder under the Act is reflected not only in the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act captioned, "control of Transport Vehicles", but in those of Chapter IV-A as well containing "special provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings". Under S. 45, forums as are indicated, Regional Transport Authority and State Transport Authority, having powers and jurisdictions clearly defined under the Act to receive applications for permit. Sections 46 and 47 specify respectively the requisites of applications and matter to be taken into consideration by the authorities in dealing with the same. Section 87 lays down the procedure for granting permits; sub-section (2) authorises R. T. A. to appoint dates for receipt of applications and as per sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), applications are to be published, objections received and applicants' fate to be decided at a "public hearing". ( 7 ) WE extract now, also from Chapter IV relevant portion of the two pivotal provisions"56. ( 7 ) WE extract now, also from Chapter IV relevant portion of the two pivotal provisions"56. Duration and renewal of permits.- (1) (a) A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under Section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. . . . (2) A permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit : provided that the application for the renewal of a permit shall be made, - (a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, not less than one hundred and twenty days before the date of its expiry; and. . . Provided further that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications for permits. 64. Appeals.- (1) Any person - (a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted under sub-section (2), who shall, after giving such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard, give a decision thereon which shall be final. " (Emphasis added ). ( 8 ) OF Chapter IV-A, by Section 68-B the provisions of the Chapter are given overriding effect. Under Section 68-C, provision is made for a "scheme" to be prepared and published in respect of any area or route or a portion thereof to be run and operated by the State Transport Undertakings even to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons. Objections to the scheme may be filed under Section 68-D (1) (i) by any person already providing transport facilities along or near the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme. Objections to the scheme may be filed under Section 68-D (1) (i) by any person already providing transport facilities along or near the area or route proposed to be covered by the scheme. Having regard to the relevant provisions of Section 68-D, 68-F and 68-FF, in a recent Full Bench decision of this Court it has been pointed out that "on publication of an approved scheme, number of services on the route notified in the Scheme published under S. 68-C are frozen and operators not protected under the Scheme cannot operate on the notified route or even on a portion thereof" ( 9 ) HAVING analysed objectively the content and purport of the different provisions of Chapters IV and IVA of the Act, we find it difficult to resist the conclusion that the moment any permit is issued, its horoscope is statutorily cast. All events in its statutory life are pre-destined. One notable event in its life is inter-linking of fate of all transport operators interested in the route concerned. Not only the unsuccessful bidder can avail the right of appeal, the right of any operator to make a "fresh" application or of the permit-holder's to make "renewal" application on expiry of the permit, has to be dealt with strictly according to statutory provisions and time-table. There can obviously be no scope for extension, therefore, in any particular case of the statutory life of any permit as that event will result in upsetting the statutory procedure and time-schedules affecting the rights of not a single but of a group of operators, including the State Undertaking. In A. Vishwanathan ( AIR 1987 SC 731 ) granting temporary permits repeatedly was decried as that defeated Section 47, resulting in denial of reserved quotes to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes of non-temporary permit. For the same reason also, extension would be impermissible. Thus, on a posteriori consideration, the object of fixing inexorably statutory life of a permit is clearly established and courts are bound constitutionally to construe, accordingly, the provisions of Section 58 to fulfil that object. ( 10 ) ON another hypothesis also, the same conclusion is reached. By accepting a permit issued to him, for the duration of either three years or five years, the permit-holder accepts that his operation under the permit may suffer vicissitudes of fortunes and the duration was likely to be shortened. ( 10 ) ON another hypothesis also, the same conclusion is reached. By accepting a permit issued to him, for the duration of either three years or five years, the permit-holder accepts that his operation under the permit may suffer vicissitudes of fortunes and the duration was likely to be shortened. Indeed, such event as when the permit issued to him is challenged in appeal and operation of that is suspended during the pendency of the appeal has to be accepted by him as normal and not fortuitous. Indeed, the permit-holder may have to suffer similarly if his permit is cancelled or suspended under Section 60 for any breach by him of any condition of the permit or for any of the other causes specified therein. The redeeming feature of his fluctuating fortune is that on emerging successful in the appeal, in the exercise of his right of renewal he gets preference over "new" applicants. Beyond that he has no right because there is no scope for the permit holder to have any undefined right under the Act. If anything more has to be stated in this context, it has to be stressed that there is no property in the permit issued under the Act and that position is established on the holding in Brijmohan Parihar ( AIR 1987 SC 29 ). An agreement by a State Undertaking (MPSRTC) allowing him to operate his vehicle on the permit issued to the Undertaking was held unenforceable. ( 11 ) WE may examine now the scope of appellate power under Section 84. When any person is aggrieved by refusal of permit or, in other words, by grant of permit to his adversary, he may appeal but the "decision" which the appellate authority can give in that appeal can be, and has to be, limited only to the legality or validity of the "refusal"; beyond that, no other "decision" can be given in the appeal in that regard to bind parties to the appeal or the authority granting the impugned permit. During the pendency of the appeal, the validity of the permit being challenged its operation may be suspended if facts and circumstances so warrant. Indeed, the respondent aggrieved by that order would not be remedyless as it would be open to him to challenge even that suspension or stay of operation in a writ Court. During the pendency of the appeal, the validity of the permit being challenged its operation may be suspended if facts and circumstances so warrant. Indeed, the respondent aggrieved by that order would not be remedyless as it would be open to him to challenge even that suspension or stay of operation in a writ Court. Where a discretion is vested in any Court or tribunal, it has been held in A. Lakshman Rao, ( AIR 1971 SC 186 ), the discretion has to be exercised judicially and exercise of the discretion in an arbitrary or unjudicial manner is assailable in a higher Court. If the respondent is not aggrieved but is satisfied with a "stay order" passed in an appeal he cannot blame the appellate authority even if the "final" decision is belatedly rendered in the appeal in his favour. In any case, what is patently clear having regard to the scope and the ambit of the jurisdiction of the appellate authority under Section 64 is that in finally disposing of the appeal, no direction can be made by that authority for extending the life of the permit impugned in that appeal so as to nullify the statutory exercise of deliberately limiting the life of the permit under Section 58. The "decision" made under Section 64 which would be "final" or binding cannot transgress the bounds of Section 58 as the Tribunal rendering the decision under the Act must act in accordance with, and not in violation of, any provision of the Act. If the legislature has not vested wider power in the Tribunal to pass "any" order "it deemed fit" in disposing of the appeal in derogation of Section 58 and has deliberately conferred on it limited jurisdiction, legislature's wisdom in that regard cannot be questioned by courts. ( 12 ) THE view we have expressed receives support from the principle embodied in the maxim expressio unis est exclusio alterius. It has been held that when a statute prescribes a particular mode or manner in which a thing has to be done, it must be done in that manner or not at all as other modes are excluded by implication. In other words, statutory power can be exercised only in the manner prescribed or not at all. It has been held that when a statute prescribes a particular mode or manner in which a thing has to be done, it must be done in that manner or not at all as other modes are excluded by implication. In other words, statutory power can be exercised only in the manner prescribed or not at all. There is also high authority for the proposition that courts are not concerned with the policy of the Legislature or with the result and the Courts are bound to give effect to a statutory provision whose meaning is clear and they should not hesitate to do so merely because it would lead to hardship. In another case, this principle has been stated in terms of the maxim at res magis valeat quam pereat. It has been held that intention of the Legislature may not be treated as vain or left to operate in the thin air and a statute; on the other hand, may not also be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made. It is an occasion also to reiterate the relevance and importance, in this context, of the rule of harmonious construction which requires a statute to be read as a whole to ensure that each and every provision of the statute is given effect and conflict is avoided. Authorities abound for this well-settled rule of construction and those need not be cited. ( 13 ) FOR the several reasons aforesaid, we do not think if (that) law was correctly stated by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 60 of 1988 in the case of Punjab Sikh Regular Motor Service (M. P. No. 244 of 1957 ). If the appellate authority does not have jurisdiction to make any direction to extend the life of the permit to cover the period of non-operation of the vehicle during the period of stay order, it is impossible to visualise how it would be within the jurisdiction of R. T. A. or any other authority to do that which is statutorily prohibited. How can there be any question of adjustment of equities between parties when statutory provisions occupy any field? There being no property in permit, the question of restoration of the benefit of the permit to full extent to the permit-holder does not arise at all. How can there be any question of adjustment of equities between parties when statutory provisions occupy any field? There being no property in permit, the question of restoration of the benefit of the permit to full extent to the permit-holder does not arise at all. If the permit-holder is deprived of a part of the benefit by a lawful order passed in that regard by the appellate authority, he cannot claim any equitable relief. ( 14 ) IN a recent decision, the Apex Court, in Mithilesh Kumari ( AIR 1989 SC 1247 ), has expressed the view that delay in disposal of an appeal cannot be termed as an action of the court and the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit does not operate in such cases. As explained in Broom's Legal Maxims, the principle is drawn from Common Law giving power to Court to prevent prejudice to a suitor for delay occasioned by the act of the court. In all cases, however, mere delay in disposal of the matter cannot, and does not, arise as a result of an act of the Court and not of parties. In Atma Ram Mittal ( AIR 1988 SC 2031 ) the maxim was applied though, to interpret the statutory provision; but as a tool of purposive interpretation. Accordingly, applying the same rule of construction, it is possible to say in the instant case, that the maxim has no place in the interpretation of either Section 58 or 64, M. V. Act as a contrary view would rather defeat, instead of effectuating, Legislature's intention, for which purpose the maxim was used in Atma Ram (supra ). ( 15 ) THE discussion aforesaid leads to the inevitable conclusion that the question referred has to be answered in the negative. We hold, therefore, that neither the permit-holder has any right nor are there any "inherent powers" in the appellate Court under any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to extend the statutory permit-period so as to make good the loss the permit-holder suffered for non-operation of the permit during the period it remained suspended. We hold, therefore, that neither the permit-holder has any right nor are there any "inherent powers" in the appellate Court under any of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to extend the statutory permit-period so as to make good the loss the permit-holder suffered for non-operation of the permit during the period it remained suspended. Suffice it to reiterate, briefly, once again, that all powers in respect of grant of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act are to be found within the four corners of the Act as emphatically stated in Veerappa's case (supra) and as such, no scope exists for exercise of any "inherent power" outside the Act by any Court/tribunal or Authority. The exercise of discretion by the authority competent to grant permit is conditioned by different provisions of the Act; the scope of the right for a permit to be granted under the Act cannot be enlarged by any act of any Court or Authority or party not contemplated under the Act. Any direction by appellate tribunal to the competent authority for extending the life of the permit granted under the Act would be ultra vires and as such non est in law. ( 16 ) ON the basis of our conclusions aforesaid and our opinion on the question referred, we are of the view that the impugned order is unassailable and that the petition has no merit. The State Transport Authority has rightly taken the view that because of publication of notified Scheme No. 30-H there could be no question of granting extension directed by the appellate authority as there was statutory bar in that regard under Section 68-F (1-D ). Indeed, otherwise also, the Authority was justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner for extension of the life of the permit as that prayer could not be entertained. The permit-holder, according to us, had no right for extension of the life of the permit statutorily limited to three years. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case. Petition dismissed. .