D. P. Wadhwa, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners in all these four writ petitions seekto challenge by the validity of the Household Electrical Appliances (Qualitycontrol) Order, 1981 and the Electrical Appliances (Quality Control) Order1988, both issued under S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (forshort the EC Act ). The two Orders will hereinafter be referred to as the1981 order and the 1988 order . ( 2 ) THE petitioner associations claim to represent persons who carry ontheir business of assembling house-hold electrical items, electrical traders, andalso manufacturers of house-hold electrical appliances. Some of the petitioners themeselves either assemble or produce certain items of householdelectrical appliances or produce components of these items. The respondentsnumbering four, are common in all these petitions. They are: (1) Union ofindia through the Secretary, Ministry of Industry, Department, of Industrialdevelopment; (2) Development Commissioner, Small Scale Industries; (3)Bureau of Indian Standards; and (4) Delhi Administration through the Jointdirector (Electrical ). ( 3 ) BUREAU of Indian Standards ( bis for short) is constituted underthe Bureau of Indian Standards Act 1986 (for short the his Act ) The BISAct has been enacted to provide for the establishment of a Bureau for theharmonious development of the activities of standardisation, marking andquality certification of goods and for matters connected therewith orincidential thereto. This act repeals Indian Standards Institution (Certificationmarks) Act 1952. his under the his Act is a body corporate and takes overthe functions of the Indian Standards Institution (for short isi ) which wasa Society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 and wasestablished under a certain resoluation of the Government of India in 1946. We may note that the functions of the ISI were the subject-matter of discussion in a decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Indian Standardsinstitution v. Management of Indian Standards Institution ( AIR 1976 SC 145 ). ( 4 ) VALIDITY of the aforesaid two orders has been challenged on variousgrounds like non-application of mind in promulgating the orders and beingultra vires S. 3 of the EC Act and their being unconstitutional. ( 5 ) TO understand the rival contentions, it will be useful to set outcertain relevant provisions of law at this stage itself. ( 4 ) VALIDITY of the aforesaid two orders has been challenged on variousgrounds like non-application of mind in promulgating the orders and beingultra vires S. 3 of the EC Act and their being unconstitutional. ( 5 ) TO understand the rival contentions, it will be useful to set outcertain relevant provisions of law at this stage itself. ( 6 ) EC Act was enacted to provide, as the preamble would show, in theinterests of the general public, for the control of the production, supply anddistribution of, and trade and commerce, in certain commodities. S. 2 (a)defines "ssential commodity" to mean certain classes of commodities likecattle fodder, coal, drugs, foodstuffs, iron and steel, paper, petroleum, rawcotton, cotton and wollen textiles, raw jute, component parts and accessoriesof automobiles, etc. (sub-clauses ) to (x) ). Sub-clause (xi)is relevant forour purpose and it is as under :- " (A) "essential commodity" means any of the following classes ofcommodities-XX XX XX XX (xi) any other class of commodity which the Central Governmentmay, by notified order, declare to be an essential commodity forthe purposes of this Act being a commodity with respect towhich Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33in the List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;". Relevant portion of Entry 33 in List III in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution is as follows:- "33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of,- (a) the products of any industry where the control of suchindustry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedientin the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as suchproducts;"the declaration mentioned in the Entry has been made by virtue of S. 2 ofthe Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (for short theindustries Act ). This Act itself is meant to provide for the development andregulation of certain industries S. 2 is as under : "2. Declaration as to expediency of control by the Union.--It ishereby declared that it is expedient in the public interest that theunion should take under its control the industries specified in the Firstschedule". Now, reference may be made to the First Schedule to the Industries Act; theheading No. 5 under Electrical Equipment is as under : "5. Electrical Equipment :- (1) Equipment for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity including transformers. (2) Electrical motors. (3) Electrical fans. (4) Electrical lamps. Now, reference may be made to the First Schedule to the Industries Act; theheading No. 5 under Electrical Equipment is as under : "5. Electrical Equipment :- (1) Equipment for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity including transformers. (2) Electrical motors. (3) Electrical fans. (4) Electrical lamps. (5) Electrical furnaces. (6) Electrial cables and wires. (7) X-ray equipment. (8) Electrical equipment. (9) Household appliances such as electric irons, heaters andthe like. (10) Storage batteries. (11) Dry cells". Under Explanation 1 to this Schedule, the articles specified under this headingshall include their component parts and accessories. ( 7 ) IT is not disputed howerver, that the Central Govenment has inexercise of its powers under S. 2 (a) (xi) of the EC Act notified householdelectrical appliances to be "essential commodity" as per notification S. O. No. 76 dated 4. 1. 1967. ( 8 ) UNDER sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the EC Act, if the Central Govenmentis of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining orincreasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing that equitabledistribution and availability at fair prices it may, by order, provide forregulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof andtrade and commerce therein. Any contravention of such an order entailsserious punishment as provided in S. 7 of this Act. Imprisonment may extendupto 7 years but shall not be less than 3 months and the person contraveningthe order shall also be liable to fine and the property in respect of which theorder has been contravened shall be forfeited to the Government. S. 6 ofthis Act says that any order made under S. 3 shall have effect notwithstandinganything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than thisact or any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other thanthis Act. ( 9 ) NOW, his Act prescribes the functions of his (S. 10) which includethe power of the Bureau to establish, publish and promote Indian Standardsin relation to any article or process. Ss. 11 and 12 prohibit improper use ofstandards Mark. ( 9 ) NOW, his Act prescribes the functions of his (S. 10) which includethe power of the Bureau to establish, publish and promote Indian Standardsin relation to any article or process. Ss. 11 and 12 prohibit improper use ofstandards Mark. Under S. 14 if the Central Government, after consultingthe Bureau, is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, in thepublic interest it may, by order, notify any article or process of any scheduledindustry which shall conform to the Indian Standards and direct the use ofthe Standard Mark under a licence as compulsory on such article or process"scheduled industry" means the industry as meaning under the Industries Act. Contraventions of the provisions of Ss. 11,12 and 14 entail punishment withimprisonment extending upto a term of 1 year or with line which mayextend to fifty thousand rupees or with both. The property in respect of whichthe contravention has taken place shall be forfeited to the Bureau as maybe directed by the court trying the contravention of the aforesaid provisions. ( 10 ) BUREAU of Indian Standards Rules 1987, ( bis Rules for short)have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of powers unders. 37 of the his Act. ( 11 ) THE first quality control order in respect of household electricalunder S. 3 of the EC Act was made in 1976. It is Household Electricalappliances (Quality Control) Order 1976. Under clause 3 of this Order, manufacture or store or sale, selling or distributing any household electricalappliance which did not conform with the specified standard was prohibited. In the Schedule to the Order, as many as 55 household electrical applianceswere listed and their respective Indian Standards specified. Director ofindustries Office in a State was given powers to oversee the operation of theorder. The items in the Schedule included (1) Electric Immersion Waterheaters (IS 368), (2) Electric Irons (IS 366): (3) Electric Stoves (IS 2994; (4)Electric Radiators (IS 369); (5) Switches for domestic and similar purposes (IS 3854); (6) 2 Amps switches for domestic and similar purposes (IS 4949);and (7) 3 Pin plugs and sockets outlets (IS 1293) (These are the seven itemssubject-matter of the 1988 Order ). This Order which was made on 31. 5. 1976was first expected to come into force on 1. 11. 1976 but came into force asfrom 1. 7. 1977. This Order which was made on 31. 5. 1976was first expected to come into force on 1. 11. 1976 but came into force asfrom 1. 7. 1977. Its enforcement, however, was again suspended and it cameinto fores only on 1. 1. 1978. These postponements it appears, were done atthe instance of trade and industry. Various writ petitions challenging thisorder were filed in the Supreme Court and these were disposed of on 4. 1. 1978by the following order :-"4. 1. 1978 : These petitions were called on for hearing today. QUORUM :hon ble Chief Justice. Hon ble Mr. Justice Y. V. Chandrachudhon ble Mr. Justice P. M. Bhagwatihon ble Mr. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyerhon ble Mr. Justice S. Murtaze Fazal Alihon ble Mr. Justice D. A. Desaifor the Petitioners : -Mr. F. S. Nariman, Senior Adv. M/s S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Puri Advs. For U. O. I. Mr. S. N. Kaicker, Sol. Gen. ,miss A, Subhashini Adv. Upon hearing counsel, the Court passed the following order I "mr. Kacker informs us that there is already a Notification dated 24/05/1977, which exempts goods meant for export from complying with the I. S. I standards. Therefore, the petitioners exports arenot affected by the impugned notification. So far as the goods whichhave been manufactured upto 31/12/1977 and meant forinternal consumption are concerned, it is agreed between the partiesthat they will be subject to such safety tests as may be necessary tosatisfy the Notification impugned. These tests can be carried out bythe petitioners without dismantling the goods. Subject to thesedirections, these Writ petitions are dismissed. "one of the petitioners before the Supreme Court was Electrical Appliancesmanufactures Association. Validity of the 1976 Order was, therefore, upheld. This 1976 Order was repealed by Household Electrical Appliances (Qualitycontrol) Order 1981 which came into force on 12. 11. 1981, This Order wasmade as the Central Government was of the opinion that it was necessary andexpedient so to do for regulating the manufacture, store, sale and distributionof the household electrical appliances. 40 such household electrical appliances were mentioned in the Schedule to the Order with specifed standards. This schedule also contained the 7 itenis mentioned above in the 1976 Order. This Order also prohibited manufacture sale, etc. , of the household electricalappliances mentioned in the schedule which did not conform to specifiedstandards and provided for certification marks. 40 such household electrical appliances were mentioned in the Schedule to the Order with specifed standards. This schedule also contained the 7 itenis mentioned above in the 1976 Order. This Order also prohibited manufacture sale, etc. , of the household electricalappliances mentioned in the schedule which did not conform to specifiedstandards and provided for certification marks. This Order was morecomprehensive than the 1976 Order and its implementation was left with thestate Governments. Then in 1987 Electrical Appliances (Quality Control)Order 1987 was promulgated which lifted several items out of 40 itemslisted in the schedule to 1981 Order and provided for ISI. certification markon them as compulsory. This 1987 Order, however, was not implementedon account of representations from the industry and was ultimately by aseparate notification rescinded. The Central Government then promulgatedelectrical Appliances (Quality Control) Order 1988 for more effective controlof quality of 7 electrical appliances enumerated above. By another statutoryorder, the 1981 Order was amended in order to omit the said 7 electricalappliances included in the schedule to 1988 Order from the schedule to1981 Order. Now, under the 1988 Order, implementation of the Order wasgiven to the his under the his Act. This order directed that no person shallby himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture or store for sale, sellor distribute any electrical appliance which does not conform to the specifiedstandard and it shall be with standard mark of the Bureau. It further providesthat sub-standard or defective electrical appliances or raw material orcomponents which do not conform to the specified standard shall be deformedbeyond use and disposed of as scrap. As noted above, this Order was issuedunder S. 3 of the EC Act and applies to 7 electrical appliances set out in theschedule to this Order and these 7 items have been mentioned above. Theorder which is dated 18. 3. 1988 was to come into force on 1. 7. 1988 in respectof electric immersion water heaters, electric irons, electric stoves and electricradiators, and in respect of the three remaining items, namely, switches fordomestic and similar purposes 2 Amps switches for domestic and similarpurposes and 3-pin plugs and sockets uutlets, on 1. 9. 1988. ( 12 ) BOTH the 1981 Order and the 1988 Order have been challenged inthese writ petitions on various grounds. It is stated that the two Orders showcomplete non-application of mind by the Central Government. 9. 1988. ( 12 ) BOTH the 1981 Order and the 1988 Order have been challenged inthese writ petitions on various grounds. It is stated that the two Orders showcomplete non-application of mind by the Central Government. Standardswhich have been laid are so high that it is impossible to achieve thosestandards which would show arbitrary nature of the Orders and further thatthe conditions prevalent in the country regarding availability of raw material,standardised or otherwise, and working conditions of the persons who areengaged in the assembly and manufature of the electrical appliances givenin the schedules to the two Orders, which are in the tiny sector (not even smallscale sector), availability of laboratory/testing facilities and even the necessityof 1. S. specifications have not been kept in view. It is further stated that theorders are ultra vires S. 3 of the EC Act and are also unconstitutional beingviolative of articles 14. 19 (1) (g)and21ofthe Constitution and against thedirective Principles of State Policy and the spirit of the Constitution asenshrined in the preamble thereto. It was said that it was difficult to know asto what were the considerations that weighed with the Central Government tomake the impugned Orders, and that there was no necessity of compulsoryi. S. Specification keeping apart the safety aspect of the articles; the. rawmaterial was not available in the country; the Orders would lead to increasein the cost of the articles affeeting the trade and the public particularly themiddle and lower middle classes; the articles were being manufactured by tinyindustry and there were constraints of investment and space; testing facilitieswere not available; these would result in stoppage of production leavingthousands of persons unemployed; some of the persons engaged in theindustry were not manufaturing the articles but were merely assemblers; nostandards had been laid for the components which went into the manufactureof the articles; there was no reason to pick out only 7 articles in the 1988order; last 3 items were not accessories and could not be termed as "essentialcommodity" within the meaning of the EC Act; prototype of the article hadnot been prepared by his to show if the standards laid could be achieved;competing international market was not a relevant consideration and even ifit was a relevant consideration it could not be so under the EC Act- werethe various other contentions raised by the petitioners. ( 13 ) MASS of material has been brought on record in support of the rivalcontentions by the parties but we do not wish to burden this judgment withall that material. We think, it will suffice to give our conclusion on the pointsraised with our reasons which would also bring out the respective contentionsof the parties. ( 14 ) A commodity declared as "essential commodity" undar S. 2 (a) (xi)of the EC Act would be an "essential commodity" within the definition asgiven in clause (a) of S. 2 of that Act and thus would be beyond challengethis would, however, be subject to the condition that that commodity is acommodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtueof Entry 33 in List III in the 7th Schedule to the Constitution. This we arepointing out as it was argued before us that- (1) switches for domestic andsimilar purposes (IS 3854), (2) 2 Amps switches for domestic and similarpurposes (IS 4949), and (3) 3-pin plugs and socket outlets (IS 1293), could notbe termed as "essential commodity" within the meaning of S. 2 (a) (xi) of theec Act as these could not be said to be household appliances falling underheading No. 5, sub-heading (9), of the First Schedule to the Industries Act andthese items could not be said to be component parts and accessories of house-hold appliances within the meaning of Explanation 1 to the First Schedule"this argument, we would, however, consider a little later. ( 15 ) DURING the course of arguments, it was pointed out that theimpugned Orders had been laid before both Houses of Parliament after thesehad been made as required under sub-s. (6) of S. 3 of the EC Act and thesubmission, therefore, that these Orders were bad having not been placedbefore the Houses of Parliament was not pressed. ( 16 ) THE argument that before making the impugned Orders the Centralgovernment did not from the requisite opinion as required under S. 3 of theec Act was strenuously pressed by Mr. R. K. Jain who led the arguments onbehalf of the petitioners, ft cannot bedisputed that power under S 3 (1) tomake Orders could be exercised only if the condition precedent prescribedtherein was satisfied and that was that the Centra] Government should be of theopinion that it was necessary or expedient to regulate the production of anyessential commodity for one of the purposes mentioned therein. In Hamdarddawakhana v. Union of India ( AIR 1965 SC 1167 ), the Supreme Court held thatthe power to regulate the production of an essential commodity would includethe power to regulate the production, of essential commodities which mightoperate either qualitatively Reference was made to an earlier decision of thesupreme Court in M/s Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1989, decided on 30. 11. 1960), where the court,while dealing with the provisions of the Vegetable Oil Products Control Order1987 issued under S. 3 (1) of the EC Act, had definitely ruled that a qualitativeregulation in respect of the production of an essential commodity was permissible under S. 3 (1) of the EC Act. It was contended that there was no recitalin the impugned Order of 1988 to show that the Central Government formedthe requisite opinion before making the Order. A distinction was sought tobe drawn with reference to the 1981 Order which recited the opinion of thecentral Government that it was necessary and expedient to regulate themanufactures, store, sale and distribution of the household electrical appliancesmentioned in the Order. In Chinta Lingam v. Govt. of India (AIR 1971sc 474), certain control Orders issued under S. 3 (2) (d) of the EC Act wereunder challenge. One of the grounds of challenge was that the requisiteopinion of the Central Government within the meaning of S. 3 (1) of the saidact was not to be found in any of the Orders. The court observed as under:- "we are unable to see the necessity of reciting the requisite opinionwithin S. 3 (1) of the Act in the Control Orders. It is implicit in therecital in the Control Orders that they were being made under S. 3 ofthe Act that the Central Government had formed the requisite opinionwithin sub-s. (1) of that section. This disposes of the first four contentions. "this contention of the petitioners, therefore, has to be negatived. ( 17 ) BILL that still docs not conclude the matter on this point. It wasasserted that once in the affidavit the petitioners have stated that the requisiteopinion had not been formed and, in fact, could not have been formed onthe available material, it wasfor the Central Government to justify onaffidavit that such an opinion had been validity formed. Though the affidavitof the Centra! It wasasserted that once in the affidavit the petitioners have stated that the requisiteopinion had not been formed and, in fact, could not have been formed onthe available material, it wasfor the Central Government to justify onaffidavit that such an opinion had been validity formed. Though the affidavitof the Centra! Government was silent on this aspect, we, however, permittedthe Central Government to bring on record, on affidavit, if the recordsjustified formation of the opinion. An affidavit was filed and some relevantnotings from the files were also brought on record. In the affidavit and thenotings so filed, there was no reference to the provisions of the Industriesact. Mr. Jain, on behalf of the petitioners, referred to various provisions ofthe Industries Act and particularly to Ss. l5 and 16 which gave power tothe Central Government to cause investigation to be made into scheduledindustries or industrial undertakings and then for issuing of necessarydirections, and contended that formation of necessary opinion before makingthe impugned Orders was thus lacking. ( 18 ) WE are, howevper, of the opinion that we need not refer to theprovisions of the Industries Act while examining the validity of the impugnedorders. Both the EC Act and the Industries Act cover different fields thoughto some extent certain provisions may appear to overlap. It appears to usthat by virtue of S. 6 of the EC Act the impugned Orders would have overriding effect. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of thesupreme Court in Harishankar Bagla v. State of Maya Pradesh (AIR 1954sc 465), wherein the Supreme Court was considering S. 6 of the Essentialsupplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946. S. 6 of that Act is-similar to S. 6 ofthe EC Act. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that what S. 6 declaredwas that if there was any repugnancy in an order made under S. 3 with theprovisions of any other enactment, then notwithstanding that ineonsistencythe provisions of the Order would prevail in preference to the provisions ofother laws which were thus inconsistent with the provisions of the Order. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to examine the provisionsof the Industries Act vis-a-vis the impugned Orders made under S. 3 (1) ofthe EC Act. In this view of the matter, it is unnecessary for us to examine the provisionsof the Industries Act vis-a-vis the impugned Orders made under S. 3 (1) ofthe EC Act. ( 19 ) REFERENCE at this stage may again be made to the decision ofthe Supreme Court in Hamdard Dawakhana s case (supra) on two points: (1) In the absence of any specific averment made in the 1988 Order that thecentral Government had formed the necessary opinion, no presumptioncould be drawn that such opinion had been formed at the relevant time butit would be open to the Government to prove that such an opinion had beenformed at the relevant time, and it could not be suggested that failure tomention that fact expressly in the Order itself would preclude the Government from proving the said fact independently; and (2) the fact that theimpugned Orders could have been made under the his Act or the Industriesact, would not invalidate the Orders as having been issued under the EC Act. In this case there was challenge to a Fruit Products Order issued unders. 3 (1) of the EC Act, and it was contended that the Fruit Products Orderissued under S. 3 (1) of the EC Act was invalid because its relevant provisionindicated that it was an Order which could have been appropriately issuedunder the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954. The court was of theview that if S. 3 (1) of the EC Act authorised the Central Government toregulate the qualitative and quantitative production of essential commodities,it was idle to contend that the regulations imposed by the Fruit Productsorder in respect of the fruit products were outside the purview of S. 3 (1 ). The court negatived the contention that the Fruit Products Order was invalidinasmuch as it purported to tackle the problem of adulteration of fruitproducts which could be covered under the Prevention of Food Adulterationact. We, therefore, find no force in the submission, of the petitioners thatthe impugned Orders could have been made under the his Act or theindustries Act which specifically dealt with the development of industry andstandardisation of goods and the impugned Orders thus were invalid. ( 20 ) THE immediate question that arises for consideration is if theswitches, plugs and sockets are essential commodities under the EC Act. ( 20 ) THE immediate question that arises for consideration is if theswitches, plugs and sockets are essential commodities under the EC Act. There cannot be any dispute that the electric irons, heaters (stoves),immersion water heaters and radiators are all household or domestic electricalappliances and thus would be essential commodities under S. 2 (a) (xi) ofthe EC Act. Sub-heading (9) of heading 5 of the First Schedule to the Industries Act, which takes into account an industry engaged in manufacture orproduction of "household appliances such as electric irons, heaters and thelike" would certainly not mean to include switches, plugs and sockets. Anelectrical appliance is commonly understood as a device or instrument oreven a machine working on electricity for household work and would includein its meaning even a refrigerator or a vacuum cleaner. Switches, plugs andsockets cannot certainly be termed as household appliances. Then the argument was that these ould be termed as component parts and accessories ofhousehold appliances. We do not think they are even component parts asthese are not parts of the appliances, i. e. they do not go into the manufactureof the appliances. Their use is entirely different. The question that arise isif these are accessories. No argument appears to be needed to show thatsockets, switches and plugs cannot be termed as accessories to the householdappliances. An accessory is something added for convenience sake or, as inthe present case, to make the household appliance more useful. An accessoryis not essential in itself but merely adds to the convenience or effectivenessor usefulness of something else. It is something which is not a necessary partof something larger but which makes it more beautiful, useful and effective,etc. One normally uses the expression "the accessories for a car include thestereo, radio, air conditioner or even a heater". Webster s New Internationaldictionary defines accessory as an object or device that is not essential initself but adds to the beauty, convenience, effectiveness of something else. ( 21 ) MR. A. S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel for the petitioner in one ofthe petitions, raised yet another argument. He referred to the constitutionof the I. S. I, wherein in Section 4 there is provision for constitution ofdivisions and Division Councils. One of the functions of a Division Councilis to create sectional committees which are to prepare standards. Mr. ( 21 ) MR. A. S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel for the petitioner in one ofthe petitions, raised yet another argument. He referred to the constitutionof the I. S. I, wherein in Section 4 there is provision for constitution ofdivisions and Division Councils. One of the functions of a Division Councilis to create sectional committees which are to prepare standards. Mr. Ahluwalia said the specifications for switches, plugs and sockets have beenfixed by Electrical Wiring Accessories Sectional Committee and those forelectrical appliances like electric iron, immersion water heater by theelectrical Appliances Sectional Committee. His argument was that plugs,sockets and switches were electrical wiring accessories and thus were notaccessories of electrical appliances. He also referred to sub-heading (6) ofheading No. 5 of the First Schedule to the Industries Act which is : Electricalcables and wires. He said explanation to Schedule I of the Industries Actreferred to above, would make plugs, sockets and switches accessories ofelectrical cables and wires. There is yet another point. Electrical cables andwires are also essential commodity in view of S. O. 2532 dated 24. 7. 1970issued under S. 2 (a) (xi) of the EC Act and there is also the Electrical Cablesand Wires Control Order 1970 issued under S. 3 (1) of the EC Act controllingthe manufacture and pricing of the electrical cables and wires. Now. theseelectrical cables and wires are not covered under the 1988 Order. Thereappears to be no reason why J. S. I, certification mark is not compulsory onthe electrical cables and wires used in the four electrical appliances mentionedin the Order and there should be only compulsory certification mark on theplug on the other end of the cable or wire from any electrical appliance. Mr. Ahluwalia said that in the trade as well plugs, sockets and switcheswereconsidered as electrical wiring accessories and not as accessories of electricalappliances. Reference in support of the argument that plugs, sockets andswitches are not accessories may be made to a decision of the Supreme Courtin State of Bihar v. Bhagirath Sharma and another ( (1973)2 SCC 257 ), inwhich it was stated that motor tyres and motor tubes did not fall within theterm "component parts and accessories of automobiles" falling unders. 2 (a) (iii) of the EC Act. Following this judgment of the Supreme Court,a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in M/s. H. A. Hajeeismail and Ors. 2 (a) (iii) of the EC Act. Following this judgment of the Supreme Court,a learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in M/s. H. A. Hajeeismail and Ors. v. The Stale of Karnataka and Ors ( AIR 1975 Kar 67 ) wasof the view that tyres and tubes could not be said to be the component partsand accessories of automobiles. We do not think, however, that in Bhagirathshama s case (supra), the Supreme Court in terms held that tyres and tubesof motor vehicles were not component parts and accessories of automobiles. In Bhagirath Sharma"s case the Supreme Court considered the effect of twoorders issued by the State of Bihar under S. 3 of the EC Act. In the firstorder, item No. 1 in the schedule, read as- "i Component parts and accessories of automobiles". In the subsequent Order, there was an item which read- "11. Tyres and tubes of cars, buses, jeeps, vans, trucks, automobilesof any category whatsoever, tractors and tractor-trollies". The Supreme Court, therefore, confined its interpretation of the item"component parts and accessories of automobiles" to the facts of the casebefore it in view of the subsequent Order. The court held as under :- "6. In this background even assuming that from a broad pointof view, tyres and tubes of motor cars may be considered, to coveredby the general expression "component parts and accessories ofautomobiles" when construed in its widest import, on comparison ofthe scheduled items of the Order with she items in the other Notifications mentioned and considered in the earlier decision of the Highcourt (In Crl. Misc. Case No. 1479/1968), can it not be reasonablyand rationally assumed that it was not intended by the draftsman toextend the Order to "tyres and tubes of motor cars". In our view, thedrafting precedents furnished by the other Notifications considered inthe earlier decision of the High Court in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1479/1968do indicate that the draftsman did not intend the scheduled itemsin the Order as in force in May, 1969 to cover "tyres and tubes ofmotor cars". Even independently of this aspect, the Supreme Court was of the view thatthe item No. 1 of the Order did not lay down an ascertainable standard ofguilt by unambiguously specifying the tyres and tubes of motor cars as ascheduled item. Even independently of this aspect, the Supreme Court was of the view thatthe item No. 1 of the Order did not lay down an ascertainable standard ofguilt by unambiguously specifying the tyres and tubes of motor cars as ascheduled item. ( 22 ) THERE appears to be no indication in the records produced by therespondents that the Central Government ever formed an opinion or evenbis was of the view that three items, i. e. switches, sockets and plugs, wereaccessories to four other items. An article as an accessory cannot be anessential commodity standing alone. It has to go along with the principalitem of an electrical applicance. Each of the first four items is completewithout the lead wire and the plug attached to it. Plug then goes into thesocket. Plug and socket go hand in hand. There is one IS mark for both ofthem. Switch is there handy to put off or on the electric current. Switch canbe even dispensed with. The impugned Order s do not make the use of theswitch compulsory but if switch is to be used it must be of IS specifications. If one buys an electrical appliance of the like mentioned in the Orders, hemay get along with it lead wire and the plug but certainly not the socket andthe switch and thus these can never be accessories. The first four items of 1988order cannot be used at all at least without the lead wire which cannot beaccessory and on that argument has to be the component part of the fouritems. But, this is nobody s case. The plug without the lead wire (either as anaccessory or component part) cannot be used and it cannot, therefore, bea part of accessory of its own. Socket and switch can never be accessories aswhen one goes to buy any of the four items no one thinks of buying socketsand/or switches as accessories to those items. As noted above, plug wouldrather go with socket than as an accessory of any of the four items. Thenwe were told during the course of arguments that there was I. S. I, specificationfor moulded plugs as well. These are, however, not covered under the 1988order. We have been unable to understand the logic behind it. If the fouritems are manufactured or sold with the moulded plug there would not beany contravention. Thenwe were told during the course of arguments that there was I. S. I, specificationfor moulded plugs as well. These are, however, not covered under the 1988order. We have been unable to understand the logic behind it. If the fouritems are manufactured or sold with the moulded plug there would not beany contravention. Again, if any of these items is sold without any plug,there is no contravention. Can it be said that if any of these items is soldwith a plug not having the I. S. I. specifications as mentioned in the 1988order there would be contravention of the Order? ( 23 ) REFERENCE may usefully be made to the term accessories of variousitems in the Customs Tariff Act 1975. Chapter 85 of this Act, deals withelectrical/electronic machinery and equipment and parts thereof. Heading85. 16 contains various sub-headings which record domestic electrical applianceslike electric iron, etc. Heading 85. 09 refers to Electro-mechanical domesticappliances with self-contained electric motor like vacuum cleaners, foodgrinders and mixers and other appliances. Sockets, plugs and switches fallunder headings 85. 35 and 85. 36. Sockets, plugs and switches are not treatedeither as parts of electrical appliances or accessories thereof. Rather the useof sockets, plugs and switches is for making the connection of the domesticelectrical appliances to the electrical circuits and they would thus appear to beaccessories of electric wiring equipment and not of the domestic electricalappliances. ( 24 ) AS we view that the last three items are now sought to be justifiedas accessories and so within the definition of the term "essential commodity"as appearing in the EC Act. It was not the case of the respondents andas noted above, we find no discussion in the records produced before us thatthe respondents themselves ever considered these three items as accessories. Infact, it appears that they themselves have been considering these itemsindependent of the first four items and not as their accessories. ( 25 ) AS discussed above, an accessory is something subsidiary to something more important and the test is if the appliance is complete in itself evenwithout the accessory. We are, therefore, of the opinion that a plug, a socketand a switch cannot be considered as accessories to household appliances andwould thus not be an "essential commodity" under the EC Act. That beingso, these three items cannot be subject-matter of any Order under S 3 (1) ofthe EC Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that a plug, a socketand a switch cannot be considered as accessories to household appliances andwould thus not be an "essential commodity" under the EC Act. That beingso, these three items cannot be subject-matter of any Order under S 3 (1) ofthe EC Act. ( 26 ) FROM the affidavit filed by the Central Government and thedocuments including the notings from the files of the Central Governmentbrought on recorded we find that a great deal of thought had been gone intobefore the Central Government formed its opinion that it was necessary orexpedient to make the 1976 Order, 1981 Order and then the 1988 Order. Press notes had also been is issued from time to time informing the publicand the trade and industry of the desire and necessity to impose strictstandards on the household appliances. ( 27 ) THE Government had been considering the need for quality controlon domestic and electrical appliances for use in houses since 1958. I. S. I, hadalso been pressing the Government for introduction of compulsory certification marks on these products. At one stage, when the Government wasexamining various proposals for ensuring the manufacture and supply ofintrinsically safe domestic electrical instrument, the Law Ministry opinedthat the provisions of Ss. 15 and 16 of the Industries Act were not availableto control the production of smaller undertakings and the provisions of theec Act alone could he used for. statutory action. This led to declaring thedomestic electrical appliances as an essential commodity under the EC Act. A Committee was constituted to examine the matter in detail and it recom-mended for enforcement of quality control and observed that quality controlwas imperative for production of quality goods obviously give a fillip to thesmall scale units to boost their exports for which there were tremendousopportunities in the neighbouring countries. In August 1969, the I. S. I. "certification Marks Advisory Committee passed the following resolution andforwarded the same to the Government :- "in the interest of the safety of consumers, 1. S. I. should approach thegovernment of India for issue of executive order prohibiting manufacture and sale of domestic electrical appliances and fittings notconforming to the related Indian Standards". In August 1969, the I. S. I. "certification Marks Advisory Committee passed the following resolution andforwarded the same to the Government :- "in the interest of the safety of consumers, 1. S. I. should approach thegovernment of India for issue of executive order prohibiting manufacture and sale of domestic electrical appliances and fittings notconforming to the related Indian Standards". The matter was still examined further with a view to deciding- (I) how soon the enforcement of the Quality Control could beeffected and how smoothly so that it would cause the leastdislocation on this account on the economics of existingmanufacturers ; (ii) whether State Governments who have the machinery for enforcements of the provisions of the proposed Order, should not bearthe expenditure involved on the enforcement of this highlydesirable measure which is essential to safeguard the interestsof the consumers. Ultimately, the 1976 Order was issued on 31. 5. 1976 but enforced onlyfrom 1. 7. 1978. The postponement, as seen above, was on the basis of representation received from the trade and industry. It was specifically broughtto the notice of all concerned that ultimate aim of the Government wasto insist on I. S. I, certification by all manufacturers of domestic electricalappliances. As a first step it was required of them that they conformedto I. S. I. standards. Then working of the 1976 Orde was reviewed from timeto time, again in consultation with trade and industry. The Committee wasconstituted of representatives of the Ministries. Development Commissioner,small Scale Industries, Indian Standards Institution, State Governments,manufacturers/dealers. It was noticed that there were complaints that marketwas being flooded with sub-standard electrical appliances and the Government was concerned about the safety in the use of domestic electricalappliances which were being used by housewives, many of them being illiterates or semi-literates. Mr. S. K. Misra, appearing for the Centralgovernment, submitted that the Government, in such a situation hadto rise to its responsibility and the ultimate aim was to make I. S. I. marking compulsory for all such products as it was apparent that substandard equality goods would pose a major hazard to life and limb. Hesaid that a great deal of risk was involved in the household electricalappliances particularly from those low price varieties used by housewises whowere not generally educated. From the records we find that a series ofmeetings were held for the enforcement of quality standards in consumergoods including the household electric appliances. Hesaid that a great deal of risk was involved in the household electricalappliances particularly from those low price varieties used by housewises whowere not generally educated. From the records we find that a series ofmeetings were held for the enforcement of quality standards in consumergoods including the household electric appliances. Various alternatives wereconsidered in these meetings and the alternative to enforce strictly the qualitycontrol order relating to household electrical appliances was accepted inpreference to that of de-reservation of electrical products and householdini-iliances reserved for the small scale sector. The Central Government had inits view various difficulties pointed out by the manufactures like- (1) testingfacilities were inadequate; (2) components of electrical appliances conformingto the I. S. I standards were not readily available; (3) small scale and cottagesector units would not be able to bear the burden of investment needed forsetting up the required testing facilities, etc. Considering all these factors, thecentral Govt. , decided to adopt step by step approach and in the firstinstance only a few selected electrical appliances had been brought undercompulsory marking. Sufficient time had been given to the manufacturers toprepare themselves for compulsory marking before the impugned Orderscame into effect. The 1976 Order had already been in force for the last manyyears and no manufacturer could really take the plea that he needed moretime to prepare himself for the implementation of the impugned Orders. In fact, at no point of time any manufacturer or manufacturers associationever disputed the standards laid by the I. S. I. and the only plea earlier raisedwas that more time was needed to conform to the requirements of theimpugned Orders, ( 28 ) AS noted above, against the 1976 Order various writ petitionswere filed in the Supreme Court. One of the petitioners therein was anassociation of electrical appliances manufacturers called Electrical Appliancesmanufacturers Association. In an affidavit filed by Mr. R. C. Gupta, Hony. General Secretary of the said Association, it was contended, inter-alia. One of the petitioners therein was anassociation of electrical appliances manufacturers called Electrical Appliancesmanufacturers Association. In an affidavit filed by Mr. R. C. Gupta, Hony. General Secretary of the said Association, it was contended, inter-alia. thatit was not possible for any small manufacturer of household electricalappliances to have elaborate laboratory for testing to I. S. I. specifications thecomponent parts and the raw materials; the component parts and rawmaterials were not available according to required standards; certain rawmaterials like spying steel and bimetal required for the manufacture ofthermostats and thermal cut-outs were not being manufactured indigenouslyand these had to be imported and that the quality and specifications of theseimported raw materials differed from time to time; it was impossible tocomply with the control Order and that it imposed an unreasonable restrictionon the fundamental rights of the manufacturers because the manufacturerscould not afford to have huge laboratory costing over lakhs of rupees and toemploy qualified technical engineers to operate the laboratory for the purboseof carrying out tests; infrastructural arrangements for carrying out varioustests as per the required standards were not available in the country assufficient number of laboratories fully equipped with complele instrumentsand technical staff to carry out the tests were not in existence; the controlorder violated the fundamental rights of the manufacturers under article (19) (1) (g) of the Constitution and that the Government did not apply itsmind in the matterinasmuch as electric irons, heaters, geysers, etc. weremanufactured by small producers in the country and were in plentiful supplywith the producers competing with each others both on quality and price andwere also available at reasonable prices; and lastly, the control Order wasultra vires S. 3 of the EC Act. ( 29 ) THE present petitions are replete with almost the same arguments. The correspondence that was exchanged between the Central Government,indian Standards Institution, trade and industry (particularly, Backliteelectrical Moulders Association (Registered) and Delhi Small Scale Domesticappliances Manufacturers Association), State Governments, meetings atvarious levels and other notings on the files, unmistakably show that therehave been extensive parleys before the impugned Orders were made and itcannot be said, therefore, that the Central Government did not apply itsmind or did not form its opinion before making the Orders. The trade andindustry had only been asking for extension of time in enforcement of theorders for its members to get prepared for compulsory I. S. I. markings. The trade andindustry had only been asking for extension of time in enforcement of theorders for its members to get prepared for compulsory I. S. I. markings. Thedelhi Small Scale Domestic Electrical Appliances Manufacturers Associationin its letter dated 6. 3. 1978 wanted two years time to equip itself for carryingout the requisite tests. In fact, in this letter the Association supported thegovernment decision to have safety as well as quality control of the domesticelectrical appliances. Similarly, the Backlite Electrical Moulders Association (Regd.) in its letter dated 31. 12. 1977m view of the problems listed in theletter, wanted the Order of 1976 to be postponed for a period of six monthsbefore safety requirements of I. S. I. specifications could be imposed and theassociation wanted three years more time for its members to be in a positionto market their products strictly as per I. S. I. Specifications. One of the writpetitions (W. P. No. 2096/88) is now filed by this Association, ft could not besaid that the other Association, i. e. Delhi Small Scale Domestic Electricalappliances Manufacturers Association, was not a representative body of themembers manufacturing domestic electrical appliances. As noted above, oneof the writ petitions in the Supreme Court was filed by this Association. Itappears that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 1899/88, i. e. All Indiaheating Elements Manufacturers Association, was perhaps not in existenceeven at that time. It cannot, therefore, be that a new Association could takeup the same points all over again in a case like the present one. ( 30 ) THE argument that fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under article l9 (1) (g) have been infringed by the impugned Ordersis of no avail because any such right is subject to all reasonable restrictionsimposed in the interest of general public as envisaged in clause (6) ofarticle 19 of the Constitution. This argument was based on the plea thatmany persons in the trade might well have to shut down their business asthey would be unable to afford huge outlay for installing facilities, gettingmore space and employing experts. Reference was made to guidelines bythe Municipal Corporation of Delhi for licensing of factories. This argument was based on the plea thatmany persons in the trade might well have to shut down their business asthey would be unable to afford huge outlay for installing facilities, gettingmore space and employing experts. Reference was made to guidelines bythe Municipal Corporation of Delhi for licensing of factories. It ismentioned therein that for a small entrepreneur desirous to set up trade/industry on a very limited scale, facility of licence has been extended withinthe dwelling unit of the entrepreneur and trades which were specified with arestricted power load of 1 kilowatt were permissible under this category calledhousehold category. The pre-requisite for grant of licence under this categoryis that the applicant should normally be residing at the premises where thetrade is proposed to start. It is stated that one of the trades falling underthis caiegory is that of domestic electrical appliances. Power is restricted toi kilowatt and the maximum number of workers permissible is four. Thehousehold licence is permissible on all floors except the basement and themaximum covered area should not be more than 200 sq. ft. Reference was alsomade by the petitioners to a booklet styled as Industrial Profile Delhi 1988issued by the Department of Industries, Delhi Administration, wherein it ismentioned that in respect of sophisticated industries like household electricalappliances, registration is being granted in all areas of Delhi (conformmg/non-conforming and rural areas) without production of M. L. C. and withouttaking into account the provisions of the Master Plan. In Narinder Kumarunion of India ( AIR 1960 SC 430 ), there was challenge to the Non-ferrousmetal Control Order 1958 issued under S. 3 of the EC Act. The effect of thisorder was that it completely eliminated the dealers from the trade in importedcopper, and henceforth any actual consumer of the commodity would haveto get it direct from the importer at price landed cost plus 3 thereof andthe channel of distribution through the dealer would disappear. The questionwas whether this total elimination of a dealer from trade in imported copperwas within the saving provisions of article 19 (6) of the Constitution or whethersuch total elimination was a mere restriction on the rights under articles19 (1) (f) (prior to the omission of this sub-clause) and 19 (1) (g) or went beyond restriction . The questionwas whether this total elimination of a dealer from trade in imported copperwas within the saving provisions of article 19 (6) of the Constitution or whethersuch total elimination was a mere restriction on the rights under articles19 (1) (f) (prior to the omission of this sub-clause) and 19 (1) (g) or went beyond restriction . The court observed as under : "it is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word "restriction" to be sufficiently wide to save laws"inconsistent" with Art. 19 (1) or "taking away the rights" conferredby the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word "restriction" to include cases of "prohibition" also. The contention that alaw prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved,cannot therefore be accepted. It is undobutedly correct, however, thatwhen, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage ofprohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that thetest of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the morethe need for strict scrutiny by the Court. (19) In applying the test of reasonableness, the Court has toconsider the question in the background of the facts and circumstancesunder which the order was made, taking into account the nature of theevil that was sought to be remedied by such law, the ratio of the harmcaused to individual citizens by the proposed remedy, to the beneficialeffect reasonably excepted to result to the general public. It will alsobe necessary to consider in that connection whether the restraint causedby the law is more than was necessary in the interests of the generalpublic. "the Supreme Court, after examining the provisions of the impugned Orderbefore it, therefore, held that clause 3 of the Order even though it resulted inthe elimination of the trader from the trade, was a reasonable restriction inthe interest of the general public. ( 31 ) WE are therefore, of the opinion that the impugned Orders are nothit by article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution notwithstanding the fact that manufacturers of domestic electrical appliances are eligible to get municipal licenceunder the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and also to getregistration as a small scale industry unit from the Delhi Administration. ( 31 ) WE are therefore, of the opinion that the impugned Orders are nothit by article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution notwithstanding the fact that manufacturers of domestic electrical appliances are eligible to get municipal licenceunder the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and also to getregistration as a small scale industry unit from the Delhi Administration. Boththe impugned Orders have been issued in public interest. Provisions of Art. 21of the Constitution were also pressed into service by the petitioners. Nodoubt, the expression "personal liberty" in article 21 has been held to be ofwidest import covering a variety of rights which go to constitute the personalliberty of a man, but we do not think it can be extended so as to take withinits ambit any right which would be immediate cause of danger to life andproperty of others or would pose a major hazard to life and limb. There canbe no compromise on this. We have been told that the 1988 Order applied to7 items because these items were much in vogue compared to the other items. The further argument that the Order of 1988 did not cover double-strokemultiple stove for which in fact there was no I. S. I standard or did not covera switch and a socket if manufactured as one unit, is certainly of no availthough we have held that switches and sockets are not essential commodities. We are also of the opinion that it is not for the Government to provide allsorts of facilities to the manufacturers and industry must also itself wake upto its responsibilities and produce appliance which are safe, durable andperform well so that a consumer gets proper price for the buy. It was arguedthat it was the interest of the consumer which was kept in view by thegovernment or that of the 1. S. I. and the interest of producer was not takeninto account. We do not think it was a correct statement to make. Thegovernment was quite concerned with the availability of raw material whichgoes into the manufacture of the electrical appliances and import of some ofthe items which were not available indigenously or were in short supply wasallowed freely. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the compulsory J. S. I. marking has been resorted to step by step. Then the question arose that thesmall manufacturers could illafford to import of their own various components. In fact, this is one of the reasons why the compulsory J. S. I. marking has been resorted to step by step. Then the question arose that thesmall manufacturers could illafford to import of their own various components. The Government through the National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. (NSIC) came up with a scheme called M. T. B. Plan (Material Technologybrand Plan) to help the industry in the import of raw material. It was thencontended that this scheme covered only those persons who were registered asa small scale industry with the respective Directorates of Industry. During thecourse of hearing, we issued notice to NSIC to see if units which were notregistered could also be helped. Proceedings of 8/05/1989 would berelevant. We reproduce the same as under :- "cw 1899/88mr. Mac, learned counsel for the National Small Industriescorporation Limited, stated that under the M. T. B. plan raw materialis to be imported provided the consumers are registered with thedirector of Industries as a small scale industry. Mr. Jain, learnedcounsel for the petitioner, however, expressed the difficulty that someof the consumers were having their industries in non-conformingareas and it might not be possible for them to get registration fromthe Director of Industries. He brought to our notice letter dated 7/12/1988 written by Mr, O. P. Sachdeva, Assistant Directedof industries (CT), to the effect that the consumers should first getj. S. I, certification before they could get registration. Officers of thedepartment of industries, Delhi Administration, namely, Shriv. K. Kaplir, Joint Director, and Shri 0. P. Sachdeva, Assistantdirector, are present. They have brought to our notice a booklettitled Industrial Profile Delhi 1988 issued by the Department ofindustries, Delhi Administration, wherein it is stated that industrieswhich were located in non-conforming areas and even in housescould be registered but they say this applies only to new industries. They are, however, prepared to make a statement that in casethe consumers in the present case make an application to thedepartment stating that earlier they were manufacturing goods with q certification and that now they wanted to have the goods manufactured with 1. S. I. certification, they would be granted provisionalcertificate of registration as small scale industrial unit. Mr. Macstates that on the basis of the provisional certificate, the N. S. I. Ccould give effect to that in terms of the scheme envisaged in them. T. B. Plan. Mr. S. I. certification, they would be granted provisionalcertificate of registration as small scale industrial unit. Mr. Macstates that on the basis of the provisional certificate, the N. S. I. Ccould give effect to that in terms of the scheme envisaged in them. T. B. Plan. Mr. Jain, however, then contends that the goods (rawmaterials) so imported by N. S. I. C. should be duly certified by thebureau of Standards that they conform to the especifications given inthe relevant Order. This, the respondents are not prepared to agreeto. It is stated that it is not the function of the B. T. S. to do suchcertification. In this view of the matter, it appears that we will haveto hear arguments in this petition as our attempts to find out a viamedia have not proved to be fruitful. " ( 32 ) THUS, it cannot be said that units engaged in the producti on orassembly of domestic electrical appliances would not be able to get therequisite raw materials. In fact, the Association should come forward tohelp its members and import raw materials for them and also providenecessary testing facilities, if required by the members. The contention of thepetitioners that raw material was not freely available or was not indigenouslyproduced in the country was seriously disputed by the respondents. Factsand figures were brought on record to support each others point of view. In these proceedings with whatever available material on record, it is notpossible for us to go into these disputed facts particularly when as noticed,above imports have been freely allowed. ( 33 ) IT was then contended that there were certain components whichgo into the manufacture of electrical appliances for which there is no I. S. I. standard and further that the I. S. I, did not itself first produce a prototype ofthe domestic electrical appliances inrespect of which compulsory I. S. I, markingwas required. We do not find any force in this argument as well. It is nobody scase that the standard prescribed by I. S. I, cannot be reached. If thereis no I. S. I, specification for any particular component a manufacturer/assembler is supposed to use a component of good quality so that the resultswhich are required are achieved. ( 34 ) I. S. I, (now BIS) is an expert body constituted of highly qualifiedpersons and is widely based. It associates with it representatives of trade andindustry and others. If thereis no I. S. I, specification for any particular component a manufacturer/assembler is supposed to use a component of good quality so that the resultswhich are required are achieved. ( 34 ) I. S. I, (now BIS) is an expert body constituted of highly qualifiedpersons and is widely based. It associates with it representatives of trade andindustry and others. Rule 3 of his Rules gives the contitution of thebureau. It consists of concerned Ministers of the Central Government-Secretary to the Govt. of India; Director-General of the Bureau (ex-Officio);four Member of Parliament; and various other persons such as 24 fromvarious Ministries and Departments of the Central Government dealing withimportant subjects of interest to the Bureau; 31 from each Stale Govtrnmenland Union territory; 10 from conusmers or recognised cousumer associations;2 representing farmers or their association; 31 from trade and industry andtheir associations; 10 from scientific and research institutions; 10 fromtechnical, educational and professional organisations; and lastly chairmenof the Advisory Committees under the Rules. A great (leal of consultationand tests are gone into before standards are approved and recommended. These standards are also further subject to change with the experience gainedor suggestions made/received. Mr. P. P. Rao, leraned counsel for the BISdescribed the procedure for preparation of Indian standards. Work of Formulation of standards is carried out in association and with the active involvementof all concerned interests, i. e. users, manufacturers, technologists, regulatoryagencies, Govt. technical organisations, testing and research laboratories andconsultants. Government departments which are concerned with the industrialpolicy such as D. G. T. D. , C. E. A. , and R. andd. associations like C. S. I. R. andsimilar bodies other are represented. It was pointed out that in spite of largenumber of Indian standars being available, level of adherence to these standardswas extremely low, the main reason for such an apathy being a generallack of awareness of the prescribed standards and there being not enoughteeth in the law to enforce those standards. In brief, the procedure forpreparation of national standard is that on receipt of a proposal, the work offormulation of standards is initiated by collecting the available informationabout the work already done at international and other national levelsand within the country at industry association level. For this purpose, abibliography is prepared and the available literature consulted, whereappropriate comparative analysis is done before standards formulation isattempted. For this purpose, abibliography is prepared and the available literature consulted, whereappropriate comparative analysis is done before standards formulation isattempted. While available international or national standards are there as thebasis for the first preliminary draft, factors like availability of desired rawmaterials, technological capability of the different segments of Indianindustry, and environmental conditions of use within the country are takeninto account and to this extent the proposed draft is modified from theoriginal international standard. The preliminary draft is examined criticallyby the concerned Sectional Committee of the Bureau of Indian Standardsconsisting of experts in the related area of technology and representatives ofall concerned interests, for required changes/improvements. All decisions inthe technical committee are taken by consensus and at no stage views of onecross-section through numerical majority 'are forced on the others. Whereconsensus is not reached, matter is deferred for consideration at a later stage. The aspect where consensus could not be attained is investigated in greaterdetail. One advantage of starting with international standard as the basis isthat it finds ready acceptance with the more important users. It is for themanufacturers to explain about difficulties, if any, in attaining performance levels prescribed in comparable international standards. In Indiaorganised and enlightened users act as a major pulling force for the manufacturers to achieve performance levels comparable to what is availableabroad and for periodic upgradation. However, because of wide variation inthe technological competence and resources available to the entire crosssections of industry quite often it is very difficult to put forward a viewpoint which would be acceptable to all. Further due to varying capabilitiesof manufacturers belonging to different sectors (small, medium and large),especially in cases of products under consideration, it is extremely difficultto lay down performance/quality requirements in Indian standards that wouldbe within the capabilities of large, medium and tiny sector units. In spiteof this constraint, with pressure from organized users as also the needin to upgrade technological near levels, the performance level invariablyagreed to is near about the same as that prescribed at international level. ( 35 ) AS seen above, procedure for laying down standards is quitecomplex and we do not think a court of law should go into the question ifthe standard is right or wrong as we find a court is ill-equipped to go into thisquestion of extreme techncial nature. When an expert body is constitutedunder a statute and makes its recommendations and Central Govrenment canact on the recommendations without more. When an expert body is constitutedunder a statute and makes its recommendations and Central Govrenment canact on the recommendations without more. ( 36 ) IT was conceded that safety angle is most important but then it wascontended that once this angle was taken care of, other things would becomeirrelevant as otherwise the industry would go into the hands of big industrialhouses and many persons would lose their jobs. Safety, no doubt, isan important factor but then durability and performance of a productcannot be overlooked. These are important as well. All these cannot besacrificed at the altar of supposed unemployment or even on the ground ofincrease in the cost of the product and thus making the product out of thereach of many persons as was contended. There is a strong consumermovement these days. Consumers are complaining of supply of sub-standardgoods. If ultimately the performance and durability of the product are goodand safety is also taken care of, it may finally turn out to be cheaper thanbuying a product of not a good quality. We cannot accept the contention ofthe petitioners that the standards laid are high and could not be achievedand are thus arbitrary. It is nobody's case that the standards laid could nobe achieved or that they were laid in vacuum or did not take into accountreality of things like availability of the raw materials in the country, lack ofinfrastructural facilities, etc. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 has beenenacted to provide for better protection of the interests of the consumers. One of the objects which this Act seeks to achieve is to promote and protectthe rights of consumers such as the right to be protected against marketingof goods which are hazardous to life and property. It was submitted by thepetitioners that application of all the three tests, i. e. type, acceptance androutine tests, was not necessary on an electrical appliance and that routinetest was sufficient to testify the safety of the appliance. It was submitted thatthere has been no casualty from use of an appliance after the routine test. We cannot entertain such an argument. It is unthinkable that there mustbe some casualties before an order is made for application of all the tests. Routine tests constitute (1) protection against electric shock, (2) high voltageand (3) earthing connection. It was submitted thatthere has been no casualty from use of an appliance after the routine test. We cannot entertain such an argument. It is unthinkable that there mustbe some casualties before an order is made for application of all the tests. Routine tests constitute (1) protection against electric shock, (2) high voltageand (3) earthing connection. Type tests constitute various tests comprising21 in number, like operation under overload conditions, moisture resistancemechanical strength, finish, measurement of heating up time, measurementof temporary distribution, etc. Acceptance tests constitute as many as 10tests and these may overlap type tests as well. When an expert body likei. S. I, insists on all three categories of tests, there is no justification whatsoever for the court to take a different view so that the appliance sold in themarket is fully safe, its performance is good and it remains in use for alonger period. It was pointed out by the respondents that a large numberof approved laboratories are available in the country for testing purposes. ( 37 ) IT is not that the Central Government has come up suddenly withthe impugned Orders. As seen above, since 1950s, certification by I. S. I, markson the products was sought to be made compulsory step by step. Trade andindustry had always been associated and it was merely asking for time andthe Central Government in deference to its wishes was postponing the enforcement of the Orders. This could not go on indefinitely and in fact, we find thatthe Central Government has been quite indulgent to the trade and industryin making and then enforcing the Orders. The 1981 Order is being challengedonly now because in the 1988 Order I. S. I, standards are sought to be enforcedby authority of law by the B. I. S. and at the pain of severe penalty. There issubstance in the submission of Mr. P. P. Rao that the 1988 Order is in factcontinuation of the 1981 Order prescribing certain additional requirementslike that the 7 items in the 1988 Order out of 40 in the 1981 Order shall beari S. I. marks in addition to conforming to specified standards. There issubstance in the submission of Mr. P. P. Rao that the 1988 Order is in factcontinuation of the 1981 Order prescribing certain additional requirementslike that the 7 items in the 1988 Order out of 40 in the 1981 Order shall beari S. I. marks in addition to conforming to specified standards. The petitionersdid not earlier challenge the 1981 Order and it has been in force for allthese eight years and we feel it is too late in the day for them to do so nowand as such the 1988 Order also is beyond challenge on the ground of lachesas well subject of course to what we have held about plugs, switches andsockets. This is apart from the fact that we have not found the standardsprescribed to be unreasonable. The petitioners cannot be heard to say thatthey have any fundamental right to manufacture goods not conforming to thestandards laid or to carry on business in goods not upto the standardsprescribed. Right of personal liberty does not extend to endanger the life ofothhers in manufacturing and selling electrical appliances not of the standardsprescribed, and which are unsafe. Restrictions which the impugned Ordersimpose are reasonable and are in the larger public interest. There is noviolation of any fundamental right of the petitioners nor do the Directiveprinciples of State Policy stand violated. Except what has been stated above,we find no merit in any other submission of the petitioners. ( 38 ) THE view which we have taken about plugs, switches and sockets isnot because standards prescribed therefore are not valid but only because theydo not fall within the definition of "essential commodity" under S. 2 (a) (xi)of the EC Act being not the accessories of electrical appliances, namely,immersion water heater, electric iron, stoves and radiators. They can at bestbe wiring accessories but then wires and cables have to be brought withinthe ambit of the impugned Orders. Unless an order under S. 3 (1) of the ECAct covers the principal item, it cannot cover merely an accessory of thatprincipal item. ( 39 ) IN the result, these writ petitions partly succeed. The Electricalappliances (Quality Control) Order 1988 in so far as it covers (1) Switchesfor domestic and similar purposes (IS 3854); (2) 2 Amps switches for domesticand similar purposes (IS 4949); and (3) 3-pin plugs and socket outlets (IS 1293), is quashed, and to that extent Rule is made absolute. ( 39 ) IN the result, these writ petitions partly succeed. The Electricalappliances (Quality Control) Order 1988 in so far as it covers (1) Switchesfor domestic and similar purposes (IS 3854); (2) 2 Amps switches for domesticand similar purposes (IS 4949); and (3) 3-pin plugs and socket outlets (IS 1293), is quashed, and to that extent Rule is made absolute. Otherwisethese writ petitions fail and are dismissed. We leave the parties to bear theirown costs.