Judgment :- 1. Defendant is the appellant. Plaintiff (respondent) filed the suit for eviction of the plaint schedule building with arrears of rent on the ground that the defendant took the building on rent for two years and that he has not surrendered the building after the expiry of the term. Defendant filed written statement contending inter alia that he did not receive any quit notice. The trial court held that as the tenancy expired after efflux of time notice is not necessary. The Sub Judge agreed with the trial court. 2. Learned counsel for the defendant relying on Lelitha v. Ayissumma (1977 KLT 587 - F. B. ) submitted that provisions in the lease deed for surrender of possession of the lease-hold without demur on demand made after the expiry of the term fixed is not a contract to the contrary and so quit notice cannot be dispensed with. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on another Full Bench decision of this Court in Devaki v. Alavi (1979 K. L. T. 67) for the contrary position. In the above decision the Full Bench of this Court held that a stipulation to the effect that the lessee shall surrender possession of the property leased on demand made in that behalf by the lessor, is nothing but a stipulation that the lease is determinable at the will of the lessor and hence a 'contract to the contrary' as envisaged under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 3. The presumption under S.106 is that the lease is from year to year or month to month, according to the nature of the property and is terminable by six months' or 15 days' notice, as the case may be. In view of the decision in Devaki's case (1979 KLT 67) notice under S.106 cannot be insisted if the lease is on condition that the land demised should be surrendered whenever required. Thus the later Full Bench decision of this court makes the position clear that a stipulation to the effect that the lessee shall surrender possession of the property leased on demand made in that behalf by the lessor is nothing but a stipulation that the lease is determinable at the will of the lessor and it is a 'contract to the contrary' and so notice under S.106 is not called for. As the lease in this case is for a definite period and as it expired by efflux of time the landlord is certainly within his right to ask for ejectment of the tenant by a simple demand for possession. There is no legal obligation for him to comply with the conditions in S.106. 4. Conflicting decisions of this Court may pose a problem to the single judge as to which of the decisions will have to be followed. In Deputy Commissioner v. Anandan (1987 (1) KLT 192) a Division Bench of this Court held that when two decisions of the Supreme Court by Benches of equal strength are there, the High Court is bound to follow the later decision even if there is a conflict between the two. That apart the later Full Bench decision (1979 KLT. 67) squarely applies to the facts of the case in hand where as in the earlier case (1977 KLT 587) the central question considered was whether notice under S.106 is a necessary pre-requisite for eviction under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1965. 5. The Supreme Court in Dattonpant Gopalwarao Dewakato v. Vithabrao Maruthirao Janagaval (1975 (1) SCWR 581) held thus: "No notice is necessary if a lease of immovable property determined under clause (a) of S.111 of the Transfer of Property Act by efflux of the time limited thereby" This being the law, contention of the defendant that suit is liable to be dismissed for want of notice is untenable. The concurrent findings of the Courts below are confirmed and the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs.