JUDGMENT : V. Gopalaswamy, J. - The fact giving rise to the above referred to Criminal Misc. Cases Nos. 1018 and 1083 of 1988 may be briefly stated as follows: One Madan Mohan Das (the sole opposite party in both the cases) on behalf of his married daughter, filed the complaint case I.C.C. No. 47 of 1988 against the six accused persons, namely, Kama Prasad Rout and his parents Muralidhar Rout and Makhi Rout (Petitioners 1, 2 and 3 respectively in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1018/88) and Chandrakanti Bar and her parents Fakira Charan Bal and Basanta Kumari Bal (Petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively in Crl. Misc. Case No. 1083/88) in the Court of the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Kendrapara. The complainant alleges that though his daughter is the legally married wife of accused Kama Prasad Rout, the latter entered into a bigamous marriage with Chandra Kanti Bal. The learned S.D.J.M., Kendrapara after conducting an enquiry u/s 202, Code of Criminal Procedure has taken cognizance against all the six accused persons under Sections 494, 494/109 and 494/114, I.P.C. and summoned the accused persons to appear before him on 9-5-1988 in the said case. The above six accused persons did not appear on 9-5-1988, the date fixed for their appearance, but their counsel filed petitions u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure for dispensing with their personal attendance in Court praying for allowing them to be represented by their counsel. The learned S.D.J.M. by his order dated 9-5-1988 dismissed the petitions filed u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure on behalf of the two sets of accused persons. Being aggrieved by that order the three accused persons, Kama, Murali and Makhi preferred Criminal Revision No. 86 of 1988 and accused Chandrakanti, Fakira and Basanta Kumari preferred Criminal Revision No. 91 of 1988 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack and the latter by a common order dated 14-12 1988 dismissed both the revisions. Being aggrieved by that order, the two sets of revision Petitioners preferred the above referred two Criminal Misc. Cases Nos. 1018 and 1083 of 1988 and so both are disposed of by this common order. 2. In both the Criminal Misc. Being aggrieved by that order, the two sets of revision Petitioners preferred the above referred two Criminal Misc. Cases Nos. 1018 and 1083 of 1988 and so both are disposed of by this common order. 2. In both the Criminal Misc. Cases what is to be decided is the scope of Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure and the legality of the order dated 9-5-1988 passed by the learned, S.D.J.M. rejecting the petitions filed by the Petitioners u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, both the Criminal Misc. Cases are disposed of by this common order. 3. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners contended that as an order passed u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure is not an interlocutory order, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, erred in law in dismissing the revisions solely on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, in view of the prohibition u/s 397(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence from the contentions of the parties, the point whether at all an order passed u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure is an interlocutory order, arises for consideration in the present Misc. Cases. 4. In Amar Nath and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Another the Supreme Court has made the following observations which are of considerable assistance for understanding the true meaning of the expression "interlocutory order": ...In Webster's New World Dictionary 'interlocutory' has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appelaable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie u/s 327(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. From the above quoted observations, it is seen that any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. 5. For answering the question whether an order passed u/s 205(1) is an interlocutory order or not, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 317, Code of Criminal Procedure quoted below: Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure (1) Whenever a Magistrate issues a summons, he may, if he sees reason so to do, dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by his pleader. (2) But the Magistrate inquiring into or trying the case may, in his discretion, at any stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of the accused, and if necessary, enforce such attendance in the manner hereinbefore provided. Section 317, Code of Criminal Procedure (1) At any stage of an inquiry or trial under this Code, if the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused before the Court is not necessary in the interests of justice, or that the accused persistently disturbs the proceedings in Court, the Judge or Magistrate may, if the accused is represented by a pleader, dispense with his attendance and proceed with such inquiry or trial in his absence, and may, at any subsequent stage of the proceedings, direct the personal attendance of such accused. (2) If the accused in any such case is not represented by a pleader, or if the Judge or Magistrate considers his personal attendance necessary, he may if he thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded by him, either adjourn such inquiry or trial, or order that the case of such accused be taken up or tried separately. 6. Suppose the Magisrate refuse the prayer of an accused under Sub-section (1) of Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure and does not permit him to be represented by a lawyer, even then at any stage of the trial, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance u/s 317, Code of Criminal Procedure If the Magistrate dispenses with the personal attendance and allows the accused to be represented by a lawyer, allowing his petition u/s 205(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, even then at a subsequent stage can direct the personal attendance of the accused under Sub-section (2) of Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of the above reasoning, on a reading of Sections 205 and 317, Code of Criminal Procedure it is clear that the very nature of an order passed by the Magistrate on a petition filed u/s 205(1), whether he allows it or rejects it, is such that it cannot but be said to be an interlocutory order ( See N.L. Poddar and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. Bihar Bar Council Journal of Patna High Court 132 ). 7. It is the settled position of law that the normal rule is that the accused persons are bound to appear at the trial. (See Suraja Dei and Anr. v. Chandramani Sahu and Ors. 1970 (1) C.W.R. 105). As a corollary it follows that the accused has no right to have his personal attendance dispensed with. Hence only, discretion is given to the Magistrate or Judge under Sections 205 and 317, Code of Criminal Procedure whether or not to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. From Amarnath's case of the Supreme Court (supra) it is seen that an order is not an interlocutory order if it substantially affects the rights of an accused. Hence only, discretion is given to the Magistrate or Judge under Sections 205 and 317, Code of Criminal Procedure whether or not to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused. From Amarnath's case of the Supreme Court (supra) it is seen that an order is not an interlocutory order if it substantially affects the rights of an accused. It that test is applied, keeping in mind that the normal rule is that the accused persons are bound to appear at the trial, the order passed by a Magistrate rejecting the petition u/s 205(1), Code of Criminal Procedure which does not affect or touch the right of the accused, is only an interlocutory order. (See A.P. Jain v. State of Rajasthan, Vol. 29 The Rajasthan Law Weekly, 1978, page 518). 8. From whatever point of view the matter is looked at, the order passed by the Magistrate rejecting the petition u/s 205(1), Code of Criminal Procedure is interlocutory. Hence, such an order passed u/s 205(1), Code of Criminal Procedure can be interfered with only in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. While dealing with the the scope of exercise of the inherent powers u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure and with the powers of the High Court to interfere with an interlocutory order in spite of the bar under Sub-section (2) of Section 397, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court, in Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra made the following observation: But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of those problem would be to say that the bar provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) 'can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. From the above quoted observations, it is clear that the inherent powers must be exercised very sparingly and that too for the purpose of securing the ends of justice and when the order, if allowed to stand, would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. 10. Personal appearance of an accused is the rule in criminal cases of a serious nature, involving moral turpitude and punishable with imprisonment for some length of time. On the other hand, where the offence is punishable with fine only, and involves no moral turpitude, the exemption should be the rule. This view receives support from the decision Sachidananda v. State, AIR 1969 Mys 95, and Sushila Devi Vs. Sharda Devi. In Suraja Devi v. Chandramani Sahu 1970 (1) C.W.R. 105, this Court also held that the normal rule is that the accused persons are bound to appear at the trial. 11.. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on Rudrapanki Dhurjati Devara alias Dhurjati Devara v. Rama Chandra Subudhi, (1988) I O.C.R. 108. This decision reiterates the settled principle of law that Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure confers wide discretion on the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear through his pleader, but that discretion must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. This decision reiterates the settled principle of law that Section 205, Code of Criminal Procedure confers wide discretion on the Magistrate to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear through his pleader, but that discretion must be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. That is a case where cognizance was taken against the Petitioner, a Branch Manager of a Bank, under Sections 294 and 341, I.P.C. both of which are offences alternatively punishable with fine only. Even then a direction was given by this Court that the Petitioner must appear in person before the learned Magistrate, whereafter the Magistrate would dispense with further personal appearance until it is again required by him in the interests of justice. In the matter of discretion u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Whether in a given case the personal attendance of the accused should be dispensed with would depend upon the facts of that particular case. 12. As observed by the Supreme Court in Gopal Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan bigamy is a serious offence and the maximum punishment u/s 494, I.P.C. is seven years and therefore, when the offence of bigamy is proved, the Court cannot take a very lenient view. The husband who marries for the second time deserting his first wife to her fate, deserves a deterrent sentence. In this context the following observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sushila Devi's case (supra) are considered material and relevant. No doubt it is conceivable that (even in a case of murder not involving a question of identity) personal appearance can be dispensed with till the very last stage without very serious censequences to either party in that particular case. However, that would result in the impression that a serious criminal case is a picnic or show in which the accused can take part by proxy merely by briefing a lawyer. That certainly is not the intention of law nor is it sound public policy. I fully agree with the views contained in the above quoted observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. 13. That certainly is not the intention of law nor is it sound public policy. I fully agree with the views contained in the above quoted observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. 13. So in the facts of the present case when the impugned order is passed, directing the accused persons (the present Petitioners) to appear in Court after taking cognizance against them, under Sections 494, 494/109 and 494/114, I.P.C. it cannot be said that the Magistrate has abused the process of the Court in summoning the accused to be present, nor can it be said that interference with such an order is necessary for securing the ends of justice. 14. In the result, I find that in rejecting the petitions u/s 205, Code of Criminal Procedure the learned Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate committed no such illegality so as to justify interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers. So both the Criminal Misc. Cases are devoid of merit and, therefore, dismissed. 15. Criminal Misc. Cases dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed