JUDGMENT This application under Article, 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for setting aside the sale deed dated 31-7-89, executed by the Bihar State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) in favour of respond no. 3, Suresh Prased, after the properties in question has been auction-sold in accordance with the provisions of sections 29 and 30 of the State Financial Corporation Act, (hereinafter reforred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner had taken a loan of Rs. 1,67,000/- from the said Corporation and had mortgaged the properties in question for the advance of the loan. When the payments were not made notice under section 29 of the Act, was issued and ultimately the properties, which had been mortgaged with the Corporation were sold at a public auction and purchased by the aforesaid respondent Suresh Prasad. Later, a registered sale deed dated 31-7-89 was executed by the Corporation in his favour. 3. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ application (C.W.J.C. No) 3809 of 1989) for setting aside the same sale, which was heard by a Bench of this Court and the following order was passed on 26-8-89- "Heard. This application is dismissed as withdrawn. However, this order shall not prejudice the petitioner from pursuing any other remedy in accordance with law." It appears that in the earlier writ application, the Corporation, which bas appeared at the stage of admission itself, in formed the Court that a registered sale deed had already been executed in favour of the auction-purchaser in respect of the properties, which had been mortgaged with the Corporation. Thereafter, this Court passed the aforesaid order. 4. Now, the present application has been filed, as already stated above, for setting aside the registered sale deed dated 31-8-87, which was executed by the Corporation in favour of the respondent aforesaid after the auction sale. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that as the earlier writ application had been dismissed as withdrawn without a reasoned order, the order passed in that writ application shall not debar the petitioner from filing a second writ application, on the principle of res judicata. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that as the earlier writ application had been dismissed as withdrawn without a reasoned order, the order passed in that writ application shall not debar the petitioner from filing a second writ application, on the principle of res judicata. In this connection reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in this case of The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and another (AIR 1978 Supreme Court, 1283). In that case it was observed as follows- "In the instant case the award of the Tribunal, no doubt, was challenged in the special leave petition filed in this Court, on almost all grounds which were in the subsequent writ proceeding agitated in the High Court. There is no question, therefore of applying the principles of constructive res judicata in this case. What is however, to be seen is whether from the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine it can be inferred that all the matters agitated in the said petition were either explicitly or implicitly decided against the respondent. Indisputably nothing was expressly decided. The effect of a non-speaking order of dismissal without anything more indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to have decided that it was not a fit case where special leave: should be granted. It may be due to several reasons. It may be one or more. It may also be that the merits of the award were taken into consideration and this Court felt that it did not require any interference. But since the order is not a speaking order, one finds it difficult to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants that it must be deemed to have necessarily decided implicitly all the questions in relation to the merits of the award. A writ proceeding is a different proceeding. Whatever can b:: held to have been decided expressly, implicitly or even constructively while dismissing the special leave petition cannot be re-opend. But the technical rule of res judicata, although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. But the technical rule of res judicata, although a wholesome rule based upon public policy, cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. It is not safe to extend the principle of res judicata to such an extent so as to found it on mere guesswork” Refrence was also made to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Pujari Bai etc v. Madan Gopal (dead) L.Rs. viz. Smt. Jaiwanti and others (AIR 1988 Supreme Court, 1764). There the question which fell for consideration was as to whether the suit of the appellants was barred by res judicata in view of the summary dismissal of her writ petition earlier. Reference was made to the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Cochin Port Trust (supra), and was observed as follows- 'It is not disputed that the writ petition filed by the appellant against the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer was dismissed in limine. This order dated 14-4-1969 was passed by the Division Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court. It was one word order. The question of res judicata apparently arises when a controversy or an issue between the parties has been heared and decided." In view of the series of judgments of the Supreme Court it cannot be urged now that any order summarily dismissing a writ application without any reason shall debar the same petitioner from pursuing his remedy at any other forum including by way of filing a suit, on principles of res judicata. As such there should not be any difficulty in holding that as the order dated 26-8-89 passed in the writ application (C.W.J.C. No. 3809 of 1989) filed on behalf of the petitioner, was not a speaking order, there is no question of that order operating as res judicata so far the present writ application is concerned. 5. As such there should not be any difficulty in holding that as the order dated 26-8-89 passed in the writ application (C.W.J.C. No. 3809 of 1989) filed on behalf of the petitioner, was not a speaking order, there is no question of that order operating as res judicata so far the present writ application is concerned. 5. But the Supreme Court has also considered the question as to whether a petitioner, who has withdrawn his application under Article 226 of the Constitution without the permission to file a fresh application under Article 226 of the Constitution, can file a second writ application, has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others (AIR 1987 Supreme Court, 88). From a bare reference to the aforesaid judgment it shall appear that the Supreme Court applied the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code, and pointed out as follows : "The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao's case (supra) is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interests of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics, In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution once again. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics, In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier writ had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition". From order dated 26-8-89 passed in the earlier writ application it appears that the said application had not been withdrawn with the permission to file a fresh application under Article 226 of the constitution. As such, the second application is not maintainable not on the ground of principle of res judicata but on the principle of public policy underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code. In our opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service (supra) is fully applicable and it is not possible for us to entertain a second writ application for the same cause of action. 6. This writ application is, accordingly, dismissed. Before we part with this order, we may point out that on behalf of the petitioner it was urged in the present application that even if a registered sale deed has been executed in favour of the respondent aforesaid by the Corporation the validity of that sale deed can be questioned in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this connection reference was made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Swastic Automobiles and others v. Bihar State Financial Corporation and other (AIR 1989 Supreme Court, 1551). In this connection reference was made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Swastic Automobiles and others v. Bihar State Financial Corporation and other (AIR 1989 Supreme Court, 1551). The learned counsel appearing for the Corporation rightly pointed out that from bare reference to the judgment aforesaid it shall appear that the sale had been set aside by a consent order apart from the fact that from the judgment of the Supreme Court it does not appear that in that case any registered document had been executed in favour of the purchaser. Application dismissed.