JUDGMENT : G.B. Patnaik, J. - Original Plaintiff is the Appellant against the judgment and decree of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, in Title Suit No. 15 of 1969. He having died during the pendency of the first appeal, his legal representatives have been substituted. The Plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract and for a declaration that Defendant No. 1 and his legal representatives did not acquire any title pursuant to the sale-deed dated 3-2-1967 executed by Defendant No. 3. The Plaintiff also prayed for restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiffs possession over the land in question. 2. Plaintiff's case, briefly stated, is that the disputed property appertains to Jamabandi No. 21, Khata No. 95, mauza Choudhury Bazar and measures Ac.0.025 decimals with the house standing thereon. The said property belonged to Kartik Nandy and Gopal Nandy. Late Dolagobinda purchased the same from the two Nandy brothers under a registered sale deed dated 30th of March, 1938, and possessed the same as owner thereof. Dolagobinda inducted the Plaintiff as a tenant and Plaintiff was paying monthly rent. Dolagobinda was the Karta of the family consisting of himself and his sons. Krushna, one of his sons, died in 1963 leaving behind Defendants 8 to 15. Dolagobinda wanted to sell away the property for family necessity. The Plaintiff who was in possession of the land as tenant offered to purchase the same. The consideration was fixed at Rs. 8,000/- and Dolagobinda took an advance of Rs. 1,500/-. Dolagobinda took further advance on different dates towards the agreed consideration money and in accordance with the terms of the agreement for sale, the Plaintiff was to pay the balance consideration money of Rs. 6,000/- within a period of three years from the date of the contract i.e. 28-5-1963. Dolagobinda, however, died prior to expiry of three years period on 8-1-1966 leaving behind Defendants 2 to 15 as his heirs and these legal, heirs were bound by the terms of the contract. But when the Plaintiff offered for the balance consideration money and requested them to execute the sale deed, they did not pay any attention to the Plaintiff's request. The Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to pay the balance consideration money of Rs. 6,000/-. But when the Plaintiff offered for the balance consideration money and requested them to execute the sale deed, they did not pay any attention to the Plaintiff's request. The Plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to pay the balance consideration money of Rs. 6,000/-. The Plaintiff came to learn that Defendant No. 3 had executed a registered sale deed in respect of the property in question in favour of Defendant No. 1. Therefore, the Plaintiff was forced to file the suit for specific performance. It was further alleged in the plaint that the Defendants had the notice and knowledge of the contract between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda and even knowing about the pre-existing agreement to sell, the Defendant No. 1 purchased the property. With these allegations, the Plaintiff filed the suit for enforcing the contract between him and Dolagobinda. 3. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement denied the allegations made in the plaint. According to him the Plaintiff took the signature of Dolagobinda on certain blank papers on false representation and one such paper was converted to a deed of agreement. There was no necessity for Dolagobinda who was a rich man to enter into a contract to sell the property in question and Dolagobinda never agreed to sell the suit property nor he ever executed any document on receipt of a part consideration as alleged in the plaint. He denied to have any knowledge about the so-called contract between the Plaintiff and late Dolagobinda. According to him under the registered partition deed dated 23rd of June, 1954 the suit property fell to the share of Defendant No. 3 and Defendant No. 3 executed a registered sale deed on 3-3-1967 in favour of Defendant No. 1 after receiving due consideration therefor. The said sale was genuine and for consideration and Defendant No. 1 acquired valid title on the basis of the sale deed. Defendant No. 1 also contended that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The original Defendant No. 1 having died during the pendency of the suit was represented by his legal representatives, Defendants 1-ka to I-gha, who adopted the written statement filed by the original Defendant No. 1. 4. Defendants 3 to 6 and 8 have filed a joint written statement and they also substantially support the stand of Defendant No. 1. The original Defendant No. 1 having died during the pendency of the suit was represented by his legal representatives, Defendants 1-ka to I-gha, who adopted the written statement filed by the original Defendant No. 1. 4. Defendants 3 to 6 and 8 have filed a joint written statement and they also substantially support the stand of Defendant No. 1. According to them there was no contract between the Plaintiff and late Dolagobinda and there was no family necessity for which Dolagobinda could have at all entered into a contract. It was also stated by them that the lease of the land expired on 31-3-1973 and thereafter the lease has not been renewed in favour of the legal representatives of deceased Dolagobinda, but, on the other hand, Defendant No. 1 has been recognised as a tenant and the State has accepted rent from him. Therefore, there is no subsisting right with Dolagobinda to be parted with in favour of the Plaintiff. They also contended that the State of Orissa being a necessary party, non-inclusion or the State was fatal to the suit. 5. Defendants 9 to 12, 14 and 15 have filed a joint written statement. Though they admit about the existence of a contract between the Plaintiff and late Dolagobinda but they contend that the agreement cannot be specifically enforced against them. They further contend that the Plaintiff never offered to pay the balance consideration money. 6. On these pleadings the trial Court framed nine issues and on issue No. 5 came to hold that the deed of agreement was genuine and Dolagobinda having agreed to sell the suit property to the Plaintiff for consideration of Rs. 8,000/- received Rs. 1,500/- on 8-5-1963 and Rs. 500/- on 28-5-1963 and registered the agreement acknowledging receipt of the same. On issue No. 6, the learned Trial Judge found that Dolagobinda entered into the agreement for sale of the suit property as the Manager of the family and the property was the joint family property and there was no legal necessity for the contract in question. It was further found that there was no evidence on record to show that it was for the benefit of the family. Consequently, it was held that the suit agreement was not valid in law and, therefore, could not be enforced against the heirs of Dolagobinda. It was further found that there was no evidence on record to show that it was for the benefit of the family. Consequently, it was held that the suit agreement was not valid in law and, therefore, could not be enforced against the heirs of Dolagobinda. On issue No. 7, the learned Subordinate Judge found that the deceased Defendant No. 1 as wen as the heirs of Dolagobinda had been aware of the prior agreement between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda prior to the execution of the sale deed by Defendant No. 2 in favour of Defendant No. 1. On issue No. 8 the learned Subordinate Judge held that the State Government not being a party to the suit, it could not be adjudicated as to whether the right of renewal was continuing which could be enforced and therefore, the contract between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda could not be enforced and no enforceable decree could, therefore, be passed. It was further held that the agreement between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda was not enforceable against the legal representatives of Dolagobinda. On issue No. 3, the learned Trial Judge found that the State Government was a necessary party and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary party. On issues Nos. 1, 2 and 9, the learned Subordinate Judge hold that the suit for specific performance was not maintainable but the Plaintiff was entitled to receive Rs. 2,000/- which he had paid as consideration money to late Dolagobinda. On these findings, the prayer for specific performance was negatived, but the suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- against Defendants 3 to 15 with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realisation. The Plaintiff assails the judgment and decree rejecting his prayer for specific performance of contract in this appeal. 7. On behalf of Respondent No. 1, a memorandum has been filed challenging the findings of the Court below on issues Nos. 5, 6 and 8 as those findings are against Respondent No. 1. 8. Mr. The Plaintiff assails the judgment and decree rejecting his prayer for specific performance of contract in this appeal. 7. On behalf of Respondent No. 1, a memorandum has been filed challenging the findings of the Court below on issues Nos. 5, 6 and 8 as those findings are against Respondent No. 1. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, raises the following contentions in assailing the judgment and decree of the Court below: (i) The contract in question is neither contingent upon grant of permission by the Khasmahal authorities nor the non-renewal of the lease in favour of Dolagobinda can make the contract unenforceable and the Sub-coordinate Judge committed gross error in coming to the conclusion that the contract is unenforceable on the aforesaid score. (ii) Even though the State is the paramount owner of the property, in a suit for specific performance of contract in question, State cannot be said to be a necessary party and the Subordinate Judge erred in law in dismissing the suit on the ground of State not being a party to the suit. (iii) In view of the averments made in the contract itself and on the materials on record, the only conclusion possible is that Dolagobinda entered into the contract and received the money for legal necessity and for the benefit of the family and such a contract, therefore, would be binding on the legal representatives of Dolagobinda and would be binding on the family and the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge to the contrary cannot be entertained. (iv) In any view of the matter, the contract Could be enforced at least so far as the interest of Dolagobinda in the property is concerned and the suit cannot be dismissed in entirety. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, contends that the contract itself is not genuine and the finding of the Subordinate Judge that it is genuine is liable to be reversed. He further contends that the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Defendants had the prior knowledge of the contract between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda is contrary to the evidence on record and accordingly must be set aside. He further contends that the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the Defendants had the prior knowledge of the contract between the Plaintiff and Dolagobinda is contrary to the evidence on record and accordingly must be set aside. The learned Counsel then urges that on the materials on record it is not possible to come to a conclusion that there was any necessity for the agreement to sell the land in question and, therefore, such an agreement is unenforceable as Dolagobinda, the father, had no authority to encumber the joint family property. The learned Counsel lastly urges that the property being joint, no coparcener could claim any specific interest in any specific property and in that view of the matter, the question of contract being enforced so far as the interest of Dolagobinda is concerned does not arise. The rival submissions require a closer examination of the evidence on record and the law on the subject. 9. So far as the first submission of Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, is concerned, we find considerable force in the same. The parties to the contract agreed to bind themselves to the terms of the contract between them. That contract does not become unenforceable merely because the Khasmahal authorities had not renewed the lease in favour of late Dolagobinda. The fact that a renewal of the lease is required from the Khasmahal authority does not make the contract between the parties as a contingent one. This question no longer remains res integra and has been raised and decided in several cases by the Supreme Court and this Court. (See, Rajkishor Mohanty and Another Vs. Banabehari Patnaik and Others, ; Mrs. Chandnee Widya Vati Madden Vs. Dr. C.L. Katial and Others, and a Bench decision of this Court in First appeal No. 39 of 1976 (Srimati Nalini Prabha Patnaik v. Niranjan Sanyal and Ors.) disposed of on 17-12-1984). In fact, the Orissa High Court had taken the same view as that of the Subordinate Judge in the present case in the case of Golab Ray and Another Vs. Muralidhar Modi and Others but on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the same. (See, Muralidhar Modi v. Golab Ray and Ors. 10 (1968) Orissa Judicial Decisions, 200). This being the settled position, the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained and on the other hand, the first contention of Mr. Muralidhar Modi and Others but on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the same. (See, Muralidhar Modi v. Golab Ray and Ors. 10 (1968) Orissa Judicial Decisions, 200). This being the settled position, the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge cannot be sustained and on the other hand, the first contention of Mr. Mukherjee must be upheld. 10. So far as the State not being added as a party is concerned, we also find sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Mukherjee. In a suit for specific performance of contract in respect of the property in question, State cannot be held to be a necessary party merely because the land in question is a Khasmahall and In directing specific performance, State has no role to play, nor the decree would become unenforceable in the absence of State as a party to the litigation. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge on this score is accordingly set aside and it is held that the State is not a necessary party to the suit and, therefore, the suit will not fail for non-inclusion of the State as a party. The second submission of Mr. Mukherjee is accordingly upheld. 11. But so far as the third submission of Mr. Mukherjee is concerned, we are unable to accept the same. The property in question was the joint family property. Dolagobinda was the father and was acting as Karta of the joint family. The manager of a joint Hindu family has power to alienate the joint family property so as to bind the interest of both adult and minor co-parceners in the property provided the alienation is made for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. A manager not being the father can also alienate even the share of a minor co-parcener to satisfy an antecedent debt of the minor's father when there is no other course open to him. A Hindu father, however, has some special powers of alienating co-parcenary property which no other co-parcener has. A manager not being the father can also alienate even the share of a minor co-parcener to satisfy an antecedent debt of the minor's father when there is no other course open to him. A Hindu father, however, has some special powers of alienating co-parcenary property which no other co-parcener has. But those powers are that; (i) he may make a gift of ancestral movable property to the extent mentioned in Article 225 and even of ancestral immovable property to the extent mentioned in Article 226; (ii) he may sell or mortgage ancestral property, whether movable or immovable, including the interest of his sons, grandsons and great-grandsons therein, for the payment of his own debt, provided the debt was an antecedent debt and was not incurred for immoral or illegal purposes, and except as aforesaid, the father has no greater power over co-parcenary property than any other manager. (See, Article 256 of Principles of Hindu Law by D.F. Mulla). Admittedly, in the present case, the contract to sell was neither for payment of any debt of Dolagobinda and, therefore, the question of any antecedent debt does not come for consideration. Consequently, the special power of a father to alienate the co-parcenary property really does not arise for consideration in the present case. The contract to sell, therefore, must satisfy that the same was made by the manager of a co-parcenary property and the same can be sustained if it is established that it was for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate. (See. Article 242 of Mulla's Hindu Law). In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee for the Appellants very much relies upon the statement made in the contract (Ext. 1) itself to the effect that the contract was for necessity. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel. Recitals in a deed of legal necessity do not by themselves prove the necessity in question though the same can be looked into, but their value varies according to the circumstances in which the transaction was entered into. If there are other evidence proving the necessity then the recitals can be looked into to corroborate the same. (See, Dhana Das and Ors. v. Panda v Das and Ors. 1974 (1) C.W.R. 350). If there are other evidence proving the necessity then the recitals can be looked into to corroborate the same. (See, Dhana Das and Ors. v. Panda v Das and Ors. 1974 (1) C.W.R. 350). Where a sale is made by the manager of a joint Hindu family of any joint family property, the alienee is bound to enquire into the necessity for the alienation and the burden squarely lies on him to prove that there was the necessity in fact or that he made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity and did all that was reasonable to satisfy himself as to the existence of such necessity. This being the position of law, if we scan the evidence, there is no other option for us than to hold that the Plaintiff has utterly failed to prove the existence of any legal necessity or that he had made any enquiry with regard to such existence which he bona fide believed. Mr. Mukherjee took us through the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 6 and D.Ws. 1 and 2, but after going through the aforesaid evidence, we are unable to interfere with the conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge on this score. The conclusion of the learned Subordinate Judge that there was no legal necessity established in this case for which the contract in question was entered into remains unassailable. In view of the law as discussed earlier, once we hold that there was no necessity for sale, the contract itself becomes unenforceable and, therefore, the suit must fail on this ground alone. The third submission of Mr. Mukherjee the learned Counsel for the Appellants, is accordingly rejected. 12. Coming to the fourth contention of Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, we also do not find any substance in the same. According to the Mitakshara law as administered in this State, no coparcener can alienate even for value his undivided interest without the consent of other co-parceners unless the "alienation is for legal necessity or for payment by a father of antecedent debt. We have already found that there was no legal necessity nor the contract in question was to discharge any antecedent debt. Admittedly, there has been no consent from other co-parceners. We have already found that there was no legal necessity nor the contract in question was to discharge any antecedent debt. Admittedly, there has been no consent from other co-parceners. In that view of the matter, the contract in question cannot be held to be valid even in respect of the interest of late Dolagobinda in the joint family property. The fourth submission of Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, is, therefore, without any substance and is accordingly rejected. 13. So far as Mr. Basu's cross-objection is concerned, it clearly centres round the finding of genuineness of the contract. Mr. Basu in that connection contends that since in Ext. 1 there has been no mention of any earlier agreement, the agreement must be held to be not genuine. We are not prepared to accept the aforesaid contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents. The Subordinate Judge has clearly discussed the entire evidence on record and has come to a conclusion that the agreement is genuine. No material has been produced before us to take a contrary view. The said conclusion of the Subordinate Judge is accordingly sustained and the cross-objection is rejected. 14. In view of our conclusion on the third and fourth submissions of Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Counsel for the Appellants, the appeal fail and the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge are upheld. This first appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. A.K. Padhi, J. I agree. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed