Judgment :- 1. Defendants 2 to 7 are the appellants. Plaintiff (respondent) filed the suit for recovery of possession of the plaint scheduled building on the strength of his title and for arrears of rent as well as future rent. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief. The learned Sub judge allowed A.S.190 of 1987 and decreed the suit. Claim regarding arrears of rent was not allowed. 2. Plaintiff's case is that the plaint scheduled land and building belonged to Kumari Varghese, that she gifted the property as per Ext. A-1 gift deed dated 11-7-1978 to him, that the building in the property was given on rent to the original defendant on 15-7-1978 and that thereafter he defaulted payment of rent. Suit notice was sent to the original defendant. He sent reply denying the lease and setting up tenancy under Kankole devaswom. 3. As the defendants denied title of the plaintiff the prime question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing his title to the property. Plaintiff relies on Ext.A-1 gift deed executed by Kumary Varghese in his favour. In Ext. A-36 the power of attorney in favour of P.W.1 Kumary Varghese's possession over the property (portion of which is the plaint schedule property) is mentioned. This was long before the suit. Kumary Varghese obtained purchase certificate as per Ext. A-11 long before suit Ext. A-10 is the document of assignment in favour of Kumary Varghese. It is contended by the appellants that in view of Ext. a-11 there was no necessity to get an assignment in favour of Kumary Varghese. The explanation given by P.W.1 is that his daughter's husband insisted upon an assignment deed and that was the reason why it was got executed. Plaintiff has established his case that Madhavan was a tenant under Kankole devaswom from whom Kumary Varghese obtained right in the property. P.W.2 was examined to prove that Madhavan was a tenant under Kankole devaswom. Ext. X-1 is the register maintained by Kankole devaswom. Ext. X-2 shows that Parameswara Warriar who is alleged to have issued Exts. B-1 and B-2 took charge on 13-10-1972. Ext.B-1 is alleged to have been issued by Parameswara Warriar. It is dated 13-1-1972. Obviously this document cannot be accepted as true as Parameswara Warriar took charge in the devaswom only on 13-10-1972. Ext. X-2 shows that Parameswara Warriar who is alleged to have issued Exts. B-1 and B-2 took charge on 13-10-1972. Ext.B-1 is alleged to have been issued by Parameswara Warriar. It is dated 13-1-1972. Obviously this document cannot be accepted as true as Parameswara Warriar took charge in the devaswom only on 13-10-1972. There is also no corresponding entry in Ext.B-2 with regard to Exts. B-1 and B-2. P.W.2 stated that Ext.B-2 does not contain Jama number and the property mentioned in Ext.B-2 does not belong to the Devaswom. 4. Learned Sub Judge held that the preponderance of probabilities indicate that defendant was occupying the building under the tenant of Kankole devaswom and so he cannot have any better right than that what the original tenant has under the Devaswom. Counsel for the appellants submitted that the lease set up by the respondent has not been established. Respondent's case is that the appellants are his tenants. There is ample evidence that respondent is having title to the property. Appellants can succeed only if they show that respondent's title is lost by any manner known to law. As the appellants have not proved any better title or their tenancy directly under Kankole devaswom and as the evidence shows that Madhavan the predecessor of Kumari Varghese was a tenant under Kankole devaswom, contention of the appellants that they have lease-hold right directly under Kankole Devaswom cannot be accepted. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there is evidence that atleast from 1965 appellants' predecessor was in possession of the property and as the suit has been filed beyond the period of 12 years respondent cannot succeed in the suit. There is no evidence of possession by the original defendant of the property with hostile animus to the plaintiff. To prove adverse possession plea appellants should have proved hostile possession beyond the statutory period. The lower appellate Court held that in the absence of hostile animus the appellants cannot succeed in establishing their case of adverse possession and limitation. 6. In Kochukunju Nair v. Velayudhan Nair (1980 K.L.T. 319) Khalid, J. (as he, then was) held that the question whether possession found is adverse or not is clearly a question of law. A contrary position is taken in 1985 K.L.T. S.N. 47. Paripoornan, J. held in Annam v. Velayudhan (1985 K.L.T. SN. 6. In Kochukunju Nair v. Velayudhan Nair (1980 K.L.T. 319) Khalid, J. (as he, then was) held that the question whether possession found is adverse or not is clearly a question of law. A contrary position is taken in 1985 K.L.T. S.N. 47. Paripoornan, J. held in Annam v. Velayudhan (1985 K.L.T. SN. 47 -case No. 74) that a finding regarding adverse possession is one of fact. In Shambu Bhat v. Karnataka Vyavasaya Varthaka Sangham Ltd. (1987 (1) K.L.T. 768) Varhese Kalliath, J. observed that a finding on a question of limitation recorded by the final fact finding Court, on an appraisal of evidence, is a finding of fact which cannot be set aside by the High Court under S.100 of the C.P.C. in Manikayala Rao v. Narasimhaswami (AIR 1966 S.C.470) the Supreme Court held that the question of adverse possession is one of fact. In Dudh Nath v. Suresh Chandra (AIR 1986 S.C 1509) the Supreme Court held that the High Court in the exercise of its power under S.100 C.P.C. cannot make a fresh appraisal of the evidence and come to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the first appellate court and the finding on the question of limitation recorded by the first appellate court on appraisal of evidence after taking into consideration the entire circumstances in the case is a finding of fact which cannot be set aside by the High Court in the exercise of power under S.100 of the Civil Procedure Code. In view of the Supreme Court decision the settled legal position is that finding on a plea of adverse possession is one of fact. As the lower appellate Court on appreciation of evidence held that the appellants have not succeeded in establishing their case of adverse possession and limitation and as it is a finding of fact this Court cannot interfere with that finding in the Second Appeal. There is no merit in the Second Appeal and hence the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.