ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - This revision has been directed against the judgment and order dated 19-1-1989 passed by the V Additional District Judge, Fatehpur in S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 1984 (Misc. Case No. 2/74 of 1988). by which applications 27-C and 35-C were rejected. 2. Facts in brief are that there is a temple of Thakur Ram Laxman Janki situate at Sunahala Bagh, Bindki, district Fatehpur. A number of shops facing towards Banda-Achhalda road and residential quarters behind the shops have been let out to the tenants on monthly rent of Rs. 65/-. The properties situate within the precincts of temple have been dedicated to deity (Thakur Ram Laxman Janki by means of a trust-deed). Applicant No. 2 is the Sarbarakar of the trust and manages its affairs. 3. A shop therein is in occupation of opposite parties Mewa Lal and Ong Prakash on monthly rent of Rs. 65/- who fell in huge arrears of rent and despite notice failed to pay the arrears of rent with effect from August, 1979. The tenancy of the opposite parties was thus determined and a suit for their ejectment, recovery of arrears of rent and damages was filed in the court of District Judge Fatehpur which was registered as S.C.C. Suit No. 3 of 1984 and was transferred to the court of V Additional District Judge, Fatehpur for disposal according to law. 4. It has been alleged that the opposite parties Nos. I and 2 avoided service of summonses and therefore orders to proceed ex parte were passed and ultimately vide judgment and order dated 19-9-1985 an ex parte decree was passed. Pursuant to the ex parte decree, execution proceedings were initiated and the opposite parties were dispossessed on 23-4-1986 from the shop in dispute. Consequent to the eviction of the opposite parties, the applicants after carrying necessary repairs and installing fixtures and fittings opened a Medical Store in the name and style Bharat Medical Store. A licence for the same was obtained in the name of Hari Shanker Gupta who is son of applicant No. 2 Ram Nath-alias Munni Lal. 5. The opposite parties filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 29-4-1986 for setting aside the judgment and order decreeing the suit ex parte. 6. Necessary objections were filed on behalf of the applicants on 1-1-1987. This application under 0.9. 5. The opposite parties filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 29-4-1986 for setting aside the judgment and order decreeing the suit ex parte. 6. Necessary objections were filed on behalf of the applicants on 1-1-1987. This application under 0.9. R. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the judgment and order decreeing the suit ex parte was dismissed on 26-10-1987, but later on an application filed on 30-10-1987 for review of the order the trial court vide its judgment and order dated 1-12-1987 set aside the ex parte decree. 7. The applicants filed a Civil Revision No. 1043 of 1987 in this Court. 8. Meanwhile the opposite parties had filed an application for restitution under Sections 144/151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being put back in possession over the shop in question. 9. The revision (Civil Revision No. 1043 of 1987) preferred by the applicants was dismissed by this Court. However, the question relating to the matter under Sections 144/151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was left to be agitated before the trial court. 10. The applicants filed objections against the application filed by the opposite parties under S. 144/151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, on the ground that the application is not maintainable; that the shop in question was used by the opposite. parties Nos. 1 and 2 as Godown and no business was carried on by them and as such have not suffered any loss on account of their ejectment; that the applicants had obtained possession over the shop in dispute in execution of the ex parte decree and that the opposite party No. 1 Mewa Lal has entered into a compromise with the applicants in respect of the shop in question on 7-2-1988 which was filed in the court on 10-2-1988. This compromise is the hone of contention between the parties. The applicants have alleged that it provided that the opposite parties have given their right in respect of the shop in dispute and have received Rs. 5,000/- as compensation and in lieu of the shop in question a Godown in the same complex has been given to the opposite parties. I t is alleged that after receiving the amount of Rs. 5,000/- as compensation and in lieu of the shop in question a Godown in the same complex has been given to the opposite parties. I t is alleged that after receiving the amount of Rs. 5,000/- the opposite parties are dishonestly trying to wriggle out of the compromise and are alleging it to he a forged and fictitious one. It is alleged that the learned V Additional District Judge without application of mind to the compromise proceeded to dispose off the application under Sections 144/ 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned V Additional District Judge vide its order dated 11-8-1988 decided the application under Sections 144/151 of the Code in favour of the opposite parties. 11. Aggrieved, the applicants preferred a writ petition No. 15139 of 1988 in this Court. This petition was allowed on 16-9-1988 (reported in AIR 1989 All 6 ) and the order dated 11-8-1988 was quashed. The court below (respondent V Additional District Judge) was directed to keep the restitution application pending before it and to dispose it off in the light of the observations made. This Court found that it was imperative for the court below to have recorded a clear finding about the compromise alleged to have been filed in the case and to decide that it was lawful, genuine and was to the satisfaction of the court and the same was in respect of the subject matter of the suit. As per the directions of this Court, the learned V Additional District Judge proceeded to dispose of the application (27-C supported by an affidavit 28-C) filed under 0. 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 7-2-1988 for verifying the compromise arrived at between the parties. This compromise provided that the defendants (opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2) will not have any right and possession over the disputed shop and in lieu thereof would be provided a Godown situate inside the temple complex and would pay the agreed rent. 12. This application filed by the applicants under 0. 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 7-2-1988 was opposed by the defendants (opposite parties) by filing objections (40-C supported by an affidavit 41-C). It was stated by the defendants -(opposite parties) that no such compromise, as alleged by the plaintiffs, (applicants) was ever signed by the defendants (opposite parties). 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure on 7-2-1988 was opposed by the defendants (opposite parties) by filing objections (40-C supported by an affidavit 41-C). It was stated by the defendants -(opposite parties) that no such compromise, as alleged by the plaintiffs, (applicants) was ever signed by the defendants (opposite parties). It was also alleged that as specified in the compromise the second party Mewa Lal, major son of Banshi Lai, proprietor firm Mewa Lal Om Prakash, has never been a party to the suit alone. It was stated in the objection that Mewa Lal has been arrayed as defendant No. 1, while Ong Prakash has been arrayed as defendant No. 2 and these two persons are parties to the suit. It was further stated that the compromise has not been signed neither by Mewa Lal nor Om Prakash in his own capacity. It was asked that the compromise is fictitious one and does not bear the signature of Mewa Lal. It was further alleged that even if it is assumed that Mewa Lal signed it, even then the compromise cannot be said to be lawful and no question for verification of the said compromise arises. Lastly it was alleged that Mewa Lal is not proprietor of Firm Mewa Lal Om Prakash and on this ground also the compromise is not lawful and cannot be acted upon. During the hearing of this application filed by the applicants, they further filed an application 35-C for taking specimen signatures of Mewa Lal before the court, so as to have comparison of such signatures with the one bearing on the alleged compromise. Necessary objections (39-0 were filed against application 35-C. It was alleged by the opposite parties that the applicants are resorting to this device only to delay the proceedings of this case and to thwart the opposite parties from entering into possession. In the light of the application filed by the applicants and the objections preferred by the opposite parties, the court below proceeded to examine the genuineness, bona fide and lawfulness of the compromise as per the directions of this Court. The court below by a reasoned and comprehensive order came to the conclusion that there is no necessity of taking specimen signatures or filing the expert report. It further found that the compromise is not lawful as it is not between the contesting parties. The court below by a reasoned and comprehensive order came to the conclusion that there is no necessity of taking specimen signatures or filing the expert report. It further found that the compromise is not lawful as it is not between the contesting parties. In view of the fact that Om Prakash who was not the party to the suit, has not signed the alleged compromise, the court below further found that letting out of the Godown in favour of Mewa Lal by the applicants, would be contrary to the provisions of Act No. 3 of 1972 as the contract in the absence of an allotment order cannot be arrived at. Another radiant fact as was found by the court below is that the judgment and order dated 26-10-1987 was passed setting aside the ex parte decree and in all likelihood the opposite parties were to be put back into possession and hence there was no necessity of the alleged compromise dated 7-2-1988. Relying on various citations, the court below found that the compromise alleged to have been executed between the parties being neither genuine nor lawful cannot be acted upon. 13. Hence this revision by the applicants against the judgment and order dated 19-1-1989 dismissing the applications 27-C and 35-C and further directing the defendants to take necessary steps for taking back the possession of the shop in dispute. 14. This revision was directed to be listed for admission and is being disposed of at the admission stage. 15. Before proceeding to dispose off this revision it may be significantly mentioned that the learned V Additional District Judge who had earlier dismissed the applications filed by the opposite parties Mewa Lal and Om Prakash under O. 9, R. 13, C.P.C. read with S. 151 of the Code for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 19-9-1985 reviewed the order dated 26-10-1987 and by order dated 2-12-87 set aside the ex parte decree dated 19-9-1985 and the suit was directed to be restored to its original number for disposal according to law. The opposite parties, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1-12-1987, preferred a revision No. 1034 of 1987 under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This revision was dismissed at the admission stage on 1-2-1988 by Hon'ble A. P. Mishra, J. after the opposite parties had put in appearance. 16. The opposite parties, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1-12-1987, preferred a revision No. 1034 of 1987 under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This revision was dismissed at the admission stage on 1-2-1988 by Hon'ble A. P. Mishra, J. after the opposite parties had put in appearance. 16. Heard Sri D.N. Mishra, learned counsel for the applicants and Sri Shri Kant, learned counsel for the opposite parties. 17. The learned counsel for the applicants has streneously urged that the court below erred in law in deciding the validity of the compromise without obtaining the expert opinion as regards the signature of Mewa U. I find no merits in this submission. This alleged compromise is dated 7-2-1988. The circumstances surrounding this compromise are manifestly dubious and the court below rightly came to the conclusion that it does not satisfy the requirements of O. 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is recited herein below :- "Rule 3 - Compromise of suit - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise (in writing and signed by the parties), or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith (so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit). (Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question: but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment)." 18. The postulates of the above provision clearly indicate that the compromise has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court. Instantly the opposite parties have vehemently denied the execution of such a compromise. The postulates of the above provision clearly indicate that the compromise has to be proved to the satisfaction of the court. Instantly the opposite parties have vehemently denied the execution of such a compromise. The applicants had filed the suit against the opposite parties Mewa Lal and Om Prakash and had alleged that they are the tenants of the shop in dispute. However, on the face of this compromise it is found that it has been allegedly signed by Mewa Lal acting as proprietor of the Firm Mewa Lal Om Prakash. It is thus clear that the opposite parties had not entered into a compromise with the applicants. Nowhere it is shown that Mewal Lal was acting on behalf of Om Prakash. On the other hand it is shown that Mewa Lal being the proprietor of the firm has acted in his own right to enter into the compromise. Itl is thus manifest that the parties to the compromise have not signed and as shown above the parties would mean applicants on one side and opposite parties Mewa Lal and Om Prakash on the other. In the absence of Om Prakash having signed the compromise, it will not be deemed to be a compromise as required under law. 19. The learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that lower court erred in not permitting the applicants to obtain the signature of Mewa Lal in court and then obtain the expert opinion. The lower court rightly refused to do so as there was absolutely no occasion to direct Mewa Lal to give his signature in court and (hen send the same for the opinion of an expert. The court below has clearly held that the compromise has not been signed by the parties. Even if Mewa Lal would have been found to have signed the compromise as alleged by the applicants, then it would not have enured for the benefit of the applicants as it does not satisfy the requirements of O. 23, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 20. Further the execution of the compromise is highly dubious and the surrounding circumstances clearly reveal that it is the authorship of an ingeneous mind. The applicants had preferred a revision against the order dated 1-12-1987. This revision, as has been shown above, was dismissed by the Court on 1-2-1988. 20. Further the execution of the compromise is highly dubious and the surrounding circumstances clearly reveal that it is the authorship of an ingeneous mind. The applicants had preferred a revision against the order dated 1-12-1987. This revision, as has been shown above, was dismissed by the Court on 1-2-1988. There was hardly any occasion when the parties were fiercely litigating for the vindication of their right to have executed the alleged compromise. Reflectively this compromise inheres ingenuity. The opposite parties had been dispossessed and they were trying to obtain possession. It belies human conduct that the opposite parties after dismissal of the revision filed by the applicants against the order dated 1-12-1987, would prefer to enter into a compromise just within six days of the dismissal of the revision on 1-2-1988. 21. The learned counsel for the applicants then submitted that the compromise is lawful. The submission being wholly ill-merited deserves to be spurned. The Court below rightly found that the compromise is not singed by the parties and once it has not been done, the alleged compromise would not be deemed to be a lawful. Another fact which is radiantly emerging from the record is that in lieu of the shop in dispute, the opposite parties in terms of the compromise were to be provided a Go-down in the back of the said premses. This could not have been done when an order under S. 16 of Act 13 of 1972 which enjoins for an allotment order by the District Magistrate is required. 22. Before parting with this revision it may be observed that the applicants after dispossessing the opposite parties are adopting dilatory tactics in order to prevent the opposite parties to be inducted back into the shop in dispute. The applicants are thrusting upon the opposite parties litigation much to the detriment of the latter. Such a sacrilegious exercise deserves denunciation. The Court below rightly came into the conclusion that the opposite parties shall be put hack into possession. The Court below has found that the compromise is neither a lawful one nor has been signed by the parties. On the face of the compromise there was no material to show that the opposite parties had either expressly or impliedly agreed to enter into the alleged compromise. The Court below has found that the compromise is neither a lawful one nor has been signed by the parties. On the face of the compromise there was no material to show that the opposite parties had either expressly or impliedly agreed to enter into the alleged compromise. The applicants have already succeeded in delaying the delivery of possession to the opposite parties and this attempt has to be discarded. 23. Neither the Court below in exercise of his jurisdiction acted illegally or committed any material irregularity as to invite any interference. The present revision, as has been shown above, is wholly ill-merited and is reflective of niala fides of the applicants to thwart the delivery of possession to the opposite parties. 24. In view of the above, the revision deserves to be dismissed. 25. At this stage it is also imperative that the opposite parties are delivered possession of the shop in dispute forthwith. 26. In the result the revision fails and is hereby rejected. The Court below is directed to take steps forthwith for putting the opposite parties into possession of the shop in dispute.