Judgment : This is a petition filed under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash, the proceedings in C.C.No.513 of 1988 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur. 2. The respondent herein preferred a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Poonamallee on 6.9.1983 against the petitioner impleading him as the Treasurer of Shree Jain Sangh, Villivakkam and against three others, viz. (1) Shree Jain Sangh, Villivakkam, represented by its President Fathelal Ji, (2) Fathelal Ji, son of Sathya Danjee, President, Shree Jain Sangh, Villivakkam and (3) Ramlalji, son of Abeckand, Secretary, Shree Jain Sangh, Villivakkam for the alleged offences under Sec.56 of the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act and under Sec.403 read with Sec.34, I.P.C. and learned Magistrate took the complaint on file on 14.9.1983 against the petitioner alone for the said offences. 3. The allegation in the complaint were that the body corporate represented by its President Fathelalji, and the other office bearers of Shree Jain Sangh canvassed subscriptions for a chit for Rs.30,000 to be run by the Sangh. The respondent was also approached and it was represented that the Sangh had obtained the necessary legal sanction for the running of the said chit. The respondents believing the said representation agreed to subscribe as one of the members of the said chit and joined the chit transaction and he started making payment of monthly instalments at Rs.1,500 each. The first chit was auctioned on 5.6.1982 and dividend was paid to the respondent. He was stated to have regularly paid the subscriptions upto 5.2.1983. Thereafter, the petitioner and other office bearers refused to receive the contribution from the respondent and continued the auction without the respondent’s subscription. The respondent demanded the amount subscribed by him, less the dividends paid to him. Since the office bearers of the Sangh inclusive of the petitioner did not oblige him in returning the amounts subscribed by him, he was compelled to take recourse under law, in the sense by filing a complaint. 4. Though the complaint was taken on file only against the petitioner, the respondent did not at all pursue the matter further by filing any revision before the competent forum against the order of discharge made by learned Magistrate of the other three accused against whom also complaint had been filed. 4. Though the complaint was taken on file only against the petitioner, the respondent did not at all pursue the matter further by filing any revision before the competent forum against the order of discharge made by learned Magistrate of the other three accused against whom also complaint had been filed. Pursuant to the orders of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu, learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Poonamallee transmitted the records of this case on 12.10.1983 to learned Judicial II Class Magistrate No.I, Saidapet for further proceedings. At this stage, it appears that the respondent filed Crl.M.P.No.6880 of 1985 before this Court for a direction to summon additional witnesses and also obtained stay of further proceedings. Subsequent to this dismissal of the said Crl.M.P. and subsequent to the upgradation of learned Judicial II Class Magistrate and constitution of the Court of Judicial Magistrate at Ambattur, the records of this case were transmitted to learned Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur and case is now pending in C.C.No.513 of 1988. It appears that the respondent examined himself as P.W.1, besides examining another witness viz. P.W.2. 5. The respondent appeared to have been adopting dilatory tactics for not proceeding further with the case, in the sense of examination of further witnesses and consequently, the matter had been adjourned several times. When the petitioner’s counsel pressed for action to be takes under Sec.204 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for dismissal of the complaint, the respondent appeared to have taken out process for examination of the petitioner-accused as a witness on his behalf and the Magistrate also appeared to have issued process therefore. At this stage, the petitioner has come forward with the present petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would press the following points for consideration. (1) The issuance of the summons to the petitioner-accused is in utter disregard to the salient and sanguine provisions adumbrated under Art.20(3) of the Constitution of India and Sec.315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, the issuance of process to the petitioner-accused is liable to be quashed as being illegal and contrary to law; and (2) Theentire materials on record, if properly scanned and sifted with care and caution would reveal that the petitioner-accused could not have committed any offence either under Sec.56 of the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act or under Sec.403, I.P.C. 7. Regarding the first bone of contention, there can be no manner of doubt whatever that the learned Magistrate had of course as per the prayer of the respondent-complaint, issued process to the petitioner-accused to be examined/as a prosecution witness in proof of the case of the process by the Magistrate to the petitioner-accused that is challenged by learned counsel for the petitioner, as offending the provisions of Art.20(3) of the Constitution of India as well as Sec.315 of Crl.P.C. For better appreciation of the stand taken in this regard, the aforesaid provisions may be quoted here. 8. Art.20(3) of the Constitution of India couched in the following terms: “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 9. So much of the portion of Sec.315, Crl.P.C. as is relevant for our case may be stated hereunder and the same couched in the following terms: “Any person accused of an offence before a criminal Court shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on Oath in disproof of the charges made against him or any person charges together with him at the same trial; Provided that (a) heshall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing; (b) his failure to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties of the Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same trial.” 10. Sec.315, Crl.P.C. enables an accused person to be a competent witness on his behalf and he can give evidence on oath in disproof of the charge made against him. But the Court cannot compel him to do so. It may be necessary for him to enter the witness box for substantiating his defence. But this is no reason for saying that the criminal Court can compel him to be a witness against himself and the same is in violation of Art.20(3) of the Constitution. He cannot be compelled to give evidence as a witness for prosecution. When his request for examination of himself as a defence witness is accepted by the Court, he becomes a witness like any other witness. He cannot be compelled to give evidence as a witness for prosecution. When his request for examination of himself as a defence witness is accepted by the Court, he becomes a witness like any other witness. As such, from the aforesaid provisions, it is fluidly clear that it is not legally permissible to compel and accused to be a witness against himself in proof of the case of the prosecution, unless he himself opts to get himself examined as a witness for defence. 11. In view of what has been stated above, it goes without saying that the act of learned Magistrate in issuing process to petitioner to be examined as a witness for prosecution in proof of its case, is clearly in utter disregard and flagrant violation of the provisions of Art.20(3) of the Constitution and Sec.314, Crl.P.C. As such the order of the Magistrate in this regard cannot be allowed to stand and the same deserved to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. 12. The second bone of contention revolved on the larger question of there being no case (having been) made out against the petitioner, even if all the materials available on record are taken for granted to be true. As adverted to earlier, though the respondent has initiated proceedings by lodging a complaint against the petitioner as well as three others, the cognizance of the case has been taken against the petitioner alone for the alleged offence under Sec.56 of the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act and under Sec.405, I.P.C. A bare perusal of the averments in the complaint and the sworn statement of the respondent, besides his evidence as P.W.1 and of the evidence of P.W.2 would not at all reveal that there was any representation at any point of time by the respondent to anyone inclusive of the petitioner that Shree Jain Sangh had obtained the requisite permission for conducting chit transactions under Sec.56 of the Tamil Nadu Chit Funds Act. Besides this, the materials on record do not point out that the chit monthly subscriptions had been entrusted by the respondent-complaint to the petitioner and he converted the same to his own use. As such, practically there is dearth of materials pointing out the hand of the petitioner committing any of the aforesaid offences. 13. Besides this, the materials on record do not point out that the chit monthly subscriptions had been entrusted by the respondent-complaint to the petitioner and he converted the same to his own use. As such, practically there is dearth of materials pointing out the hand of the petitioner committing any of the aforesaid offences. 13. At this juncture, learned counsel for the respondent would include and submit that since the respondent was not at all issued any receipt for making payments of monthly subscription, there is no other go for him, except to seek issuance of process to the petitioner-accused for the production of relevant registers in his custody in proof of payments made by him towards the chit transaction and therefore, it had become necessary that the respondent has to be given an opportunity to have his case proved by causing the production of the register stated to be in the custody of the petitioner accused. Learned counsel for the petitioner repelled the submissions so made by stating that it is nothing but testimonial compulsion failing within the purview of Art.20(3) of the Constitution and therefore, such a course is not permissible. 14. Useful reference may be made to the decision in State of Gujarat v. Shyamdal, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1251. Wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 31, observed as follows. Crl.M.P.No.4753 of 1989. “There is one other consideration is important. Art.20(3) has been construed by this Court in Kaluoghi’s case, to mean that an accused person cannot be compelled to disclose documents which are incriminatory and based on his knowledge. Sec.94, Criminal Procedure Code permits the production of all documents including the above-mentioned class of documents. If Sec.94 is construed to include an accused person, some unfortunate consequences follow. Suppose a police officer and here it is necessary to emphasize that the police officer has the same powers as a Court directs an accused to attend and produce a document. According to the accused, he cannot be compelled to produce this document under Art.20(3) of the Constitution. What is he to do? Suppose a police officer and here it is necessary to emphasize that the police officer has the same powers as a Court directs an accused to attend and produce a document. According to the accused, he cannot be compelled to produce this document under Art.20(3) of the Constitution. What is he to do? If he refused to produce it before the police officer, he would be faced with a prosecution under Sec.175, Indian Indian Indian Penal Code, and in this prosecution he could not contend that he was not legally bound to produce it because the order to produce is valid order, if Sec.94 applies to an accused person. This becomes clearer if the language of Sec.176 is compared with the language employed in Sec.485, Cr.P.C. Under the latter section a reasonable excuse or refusing to produce is a food defence. If he takes the document and objects to its production, there is no ‘machinery provided for the police officer to hold a preliminary enquiry. The police officer could well say that on the terms of the section he was bound to listen to the accused or his counsel. Even if he were minded to listen would he take evidence and hear arguments to determine whether the production of the document is prohibited by Art.20(3). At any rate, his decision would be final under the Code for no appeal or revision would lie against his order. Thus it seems to us that if we construe Sec.94 to include an accused person, this construction is likely to lead to grave hardship for the accused and made investigation unfair to him.” 15. On the basis of the observations of the Supreme Court as stated above, no opportunity as prayed for by learned counsel for the respondent could be afforded for causing production of the register in the custody of the petitioner-accused. 16. In view of my discussion on both the points it goes without saying that the petition deserves to be allowed. 17. In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings in O.C.No.513 of 1988 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur is quashed.