Advocates appeared : Rajendra V. Pai, for petitioners in both the petitions. K.J. Abhyankar, for respondents other than the Tribunal in both the matters. JUDGMENT - SHARAD MANOHAR, J.:---Neither law nor equity is in favour of these petitioners. The only point that is probably sought to be set up is that they are the tenants and as tenants they are invested with all the angelic qualities. Evidently, they do not think that the tenants' duty is to pay rent. For years and years together, even the pittance of rent payable they have not paid and still they want this Court's help to prevent the landlords from taking possession. 2. Facts are very simple. The lands in question which are agricultural lands are 5 in number totally admeasuring about 5 acres 12 gunthas. Their total assessment is 21 rupees 5 annas. This means that these are very valuable lands. The rent payable hardly exceeds Rs. 350 per year. But even that rent was not paid by the tenants from the years 1952 to 1955. After giving notice for payment of rent each year, the landlords filed an application under sections 14 and 29 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter, the Tenancy Act) for recovery of possession of the suit lands. In view of the pendency of this application, the tillers' day was postponed. An order was passed in the application by the Tahsildar on 19th October, 1959. By the order of that date, the Tahsildar did not dismiss or reject the application. It is worthwhile setting out the order itself, which runs as follows :- "ORDER" "The opponent should pay the applicant Rs. 1389-1-0 as the rent for the year(s) 1952-53 to 1958-59 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the applicants should recover the possession of the suit lands except R.S. No. 187/5 from the opponent. Parties to bear their own costs." This clearly shows that the application was not at all rejected by the Court. Parties to bear their own costs." This clearly shows that the application was not at all rejected by the Court. No doubt, it would also mean that the tenancy was not terminated; but, in one sense, the order was final viz., that if the tenants did not deposit the rent within the period mentioned in the order, the landlords would be entitled to take possession of the lands which would mean that the tenancy of the tenants would stand determined on that date. 3. It was the landlords, the present respondents, who were aggrieved by the said order. They filed appeal against that order to the District Deputy Collector. No appeal was filed by the tenants as such. In the appeal proceedings that ensued, the tenants very much participated. They opposed the appeal. Their contention was accepted by the District Deputy Collector, the appeal was dismissed but the point is that the order passed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun was confirmed by the District Deputy Collector. This means that the order passed by the Tahsildar directing the tenants to pay Rs. 1389-1-0 as rent for the years 1952-53 to 1958-59 within one month from the date of the receipt of the order is confirmed by the Prant Officer. One more significant aspect of the order is that though the defaults were for the period between 1952-1956, the payment of rent ordered is not till 1955-56 only but till 1958-59. That means that the tenants were directed to pay even rent for the subsequent two years. The tenants have paid nothing towards this rent. It follows that they have paid nothing even for the subsequent period. Right till June 1974, they went on remaining in possession of the lands and enjoying the produce from the lands without paying a farthing of rent to the landlords, although they knew full well they were directed to pay all the areas of rent within one month from the date of the communication of the order. I repeat the fact that the order was communicated to them is not disputed by Mr. Pai, the learned Counsel for the petitioners tenants appearing before me. Their plea is that the order of rent Prant Officer was not communicated to them which, as will be presently pointed out, is neither here nor there. 4. I repeat the fact that the order was communicated to them is not disputed by Mr. Pai, the learned Counsel for the petitioners tenants appearing before me. Their plea is that the order of rent Prant Officer was not communicated to them which, as will be presently pointed out, is neither here nor there. 4. The order of the Deputy District Collector confirming the order of the Tenancy Aval Karkun was passed on 21st October, 1968. The tenants went on refraining from payment of rent during all the subsequent period as well. It is stated before me by Mr. Pai that the certified copy of the order of the Prant Officer was applied for by the landlords on 18th February, 1974. Mr. Pai's contention is that the Agricultural Lands Tribunal started proceedings under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act in the year 1972 which was the reason why the landlords wanted to start the proceedings for the restoration of the lands. According to him, the landlords applied for the restoration of the lands by filing an application in that behalf on the basis of the order of the Tenancy Aval Karkun dated 19th October, 1959, confirmed by the District Deputy Collector on 24th September, 1968. In June 1974 they got a certified copy of the order that they had applied for. The tenants' plea is that in 32-G proceedings, they learnt for the first time about the order passed by the Tahsildar, confirmed by the Prant Officer, to pay the arrears till 1958-59 within one month from the date of the knowledge of the order. As will be presently pointed out, this is just impossible and what the petitioners tenants have been telling the Court is nothing but a blatant lie. However, the fact remains that is their contention. Normally, it should have been held that the locus paenitentia given to the tenants was to pay rent within one month from the date of the knowledge of the Court's order and, in default, they were to become liable to hand over possession to the landlords. A possible view would have been that the tenants had lost all rights in respect of the lands. 5. A possible view would have been that the tenants had lost all rights in respect of the lands. 5. The Agricultural Land Tribunal which had instituted the proceedings under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act, however, took a different view and held that the tenants were deemed to have become owners of the lands under section 32 of the Tenancy Act. While arriving at this conclusion, the Agricultural Lands Tribunal appears to have been impressed by the fact that tenants had deposited the amount directed by Tahsildar in June 1974. Mr. Pai, the learned Counsel for the petitioners stated that a sum of Rs. 1,389/- was deposited. This accounted for the arrears till 1958-59. For the entire subsequent period of about 15 years, the so-called tenants were in arrears. In spite of this position, the A.L.T. passed an order on 15th July, 1974, holding that the tenants had become deemed purchasers of the lands and price of the lands was fixed by the A.L.T. This position was confirmed by the appellate authority on 30th November, 1978. Revision Applications Nos. 58 of 1979 and 66 of 1979 were filed by the respective respondents in these two petitions. The Revenue Tribunal took the view that the tiller's day stood postponed in the instant case, because no order rejecting the landlord's application for possession was ever passed by the tenancy Court. According to the Tribunal, the proceedings under section 32-G were misconceived. The order passed by the two Courts below holding that the tenants had become owners of the lands was, therefore, set aside by the learned Member of the Tribunal and the Tribunal ordered that 32-G proceedings should be kept pending till the present respondents' application for restoration of possession filed under section 14 read with section 29(2) of the tenancy Act was decided. It is against this order that the tenants have filed these two petitions in this Court. I may mention here that the lands and the tenants of the lands are the same in both the petitions. Only the landlords are different. The two sets of respondents together are the owners of all the lands. 6. In my opinion, the mere chronology of events is enough to show that the tenants have neither law nor equity in their favour. Let me first examine the position of law. Only the landlords are different. The two sets of respondents together are the owners of all the lands. 6. In my opinion, the mere chronology of events is enough to show that the tenants have neither law nor equity in their favour. Let me first examine the position of law. There is no dispute :--- (a) that the petitioners were the tenants in respect of these 5 lands even before 1952. (b) that they had committed default in payment of rent for three years - 1952-53 till 1955-56. (c) that a lawful application was filed by the landlord (predecessors-in-title of the respondents) for recovery of possession of the suit lands from the petitioners under section 14 read with section 29 of the Tenancy Act, after giving necessary yearly notice to the tenants in that behalf. (d) that the Tenancy Aval Karkun did not reject the application at all at any time. The Tenancy Aval Karkun passed a conditional order giving further relief to the tenants by giving them opportunity to deposit the entire rent within one month from the date of communication of that order to themselves. (e) that the tenants did not pay that rent, even though the order was communicated to them within the prescribed period by the Tenancy Aval Karkun. (f) that in the appeal filed by the landlords, the tenants had very much participated. They contested the appeal and the appeal was dismissed by the District Deputy Collector in the year 1968. They, no doubt, contended in the year 1974 that the order was never made known to themselves; but Mr. Pai, the learned Counsel appearing for the tenants was gracious enough not to press into service these contentions regarding the validity of the contentions. The tenants' brother contested the appeal filed by the landlords and it was pending for well nigh 9 years before the Deputy District Collector. It is just inconceivable that the tenants did not know the nature of the order passed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun which order they themselves were defending. (g) that even after the order was passed by the Prant officer in 1968, the tenants went on merrily remaining in possession without paying anything towards the rent. (h) that even in June 1974, the amount that was deposited by them, as the record shows, is Rs. 1389/- only. (g) that even after the order was passed by the Prant officer in 1968, the tenants went on merrily remaining in possession without paying anything towards the rent. (h) that even in June 1974, the amount that was deposited by them, as the record shows, is Rs. 1389/- only. This means that nothing was paid towards the subsequent arrears of rent from 1959 till 1976. (i) that the landlords' application dated 18th March, 1974 is just shelved by the authorities. No order is passed in that behalf. From the very nature of things, the application is the continuation of the proceedings under section 14 read with section 29 of the Tenancy Act and until that application is finally decided, the proceedings under section 32-G are hopelessly misconceived. Even the suo motu proceedings under section 32-G cannot be started by the A.L.T. until the application for restoration of possession filed by the landlords is finally decided and rejected by the Tenancy Authority. In the instant case, there is no such order of final rejection of the landlords' application for possession is passed by any Tenancy Authority whatsoever. The provision to section 32 which are relevant for this purpose are very clear. Provisions of section 32(1)(b)(iii) is the only proviso relevant in this behalf. The proviso runs as follows :--- "Provided that if an application made by the landlord under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as "the postponed date ": The proviso leaves no room for doubt that the tillers' date is postponed until the final order of rejection of the landlords' application for possession is passed. As pointed out above, no such order rejecting the landlords' application, for possession has been ever passed by any Court till this date. As pointed out above, no such order rejecting the landlords' application, for possession has been ever passed by any Court till this date. No doubt, the Tahsildar, by his letter dated 19th October, 1959, gave opportunity to the tenants to deposit the rent within one month from the date of the communication of the order; but likewise a right was given to the landlords to apply for restoration of possession if this condition was not fulfilled by the tenants. This obviously means that the landlord's application for possession is not finally rejected by the Tenancy Aval Karkun. The Deputy District Collector had only dismissed the appeal filed by the landlords against that order. This clearly means that there is no final order of rejection of the landlords' application for possession passed even by the Deputy District Collector. According to the scheme of section 32-G, until the landlords' application for possession is rejected, the proceedings under section 32-G cannot start at all. In spite of this position the A.L.T. has chosen to institute those proceedings and to hold that the tenants have become owners. Likewise, the Deputy District Collector has taken the same view and has held that the tenants had become owners because, according to him, the landlords' application for possession was rejected. It is difficult to understand as to from what place these two authorities got this information. The record does not show any such order of rejection passed by any authority whatsoever. 7. In my opinion, the Tribunal was very much right in coming to the conclusion that proceedings under section 32-G could not even be initiated until the landlords' application for possession was finally decided. In my opinion, to the application filed by the landlords dated 18th March, 1974 (this date is given by Mr. pai in the Chronological Statements of Facts submitted by him), there is no answer. The final locus paenitentiae was given to the tenants to pay the arrears of rent within one month from the date of communication of the order to the tenants. The order was very much communicated to them. They defended that order in the appeal. They, no doubt, had the cheek to contend before the other authorities, particularly in the proceedings under section 32-G, that they never got the information of that order; but by making such a statement they were telling the Court nothing but a blatant lie. The order was very much communicated to them. They defended that order in the appeal. They, no doubt, had the cheek to contend before the other authorities, particularly in the proceedings under section 32-G, that they never got the information of that order; but by making such a statement they were telling the Court nothing but a blatant lie. They did not comply with that order. As the law stood on that date, the Tenancy Aval Karkun need not and could not have given to them even the further time of one month to pay the arrears of rent. A mistake was committed by the Tenancy Aval Karkun in favour of the tenants; but even that mistake the tenants would not take advantage of. They remained stubborn in the matter of abstinence from payment of rent. The one month period had expired. They had, therefore, lost right to pay the rent. The only alternative that would be open before the Tahsildar would be to pass the order for restoration of lands to the landlords. No other option was left to him by the Tenancy Aval karkun by his order dated 19th October, 1959. In spite of this position, the two tenancy courts have gone out of their way to shower favours upon the tenants. I see no justification for such an approach and, in my opinion, the order passed by the Revenue Tribunal is quite correct and justified both in law and equity. 8. The result is that the petitions fail. The Rules earlier issued in the petitions stand discharged with costs. 9. In view of the fact that the application filed by the landlords dated 18th March, 1974 is hanging fire before the Court for no reason whatsoever for the last 15 years and in view of the fact that the order on the application, it appears, is a foregone conclusion as mentioned above, the Tahasildar is directed to hear and dispose of the said application within one month from the receipt of the writ of this order. Rules discharged. -----