Krishnan v. Gomathy Amma — 1989 DIGILAW 432 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the tenant of a building and the respondent is the landlord. Eviction petition was filed by the landlord on the ground of arrears of rent, for bona fide need and on the allegation that the tenant has already in his possession a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements, in the same city. In the heading to the petition only S.11(3) and 11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter called the Act were mentioned. The parties went to trial, evidence was adduced and ultimately on 5-12-1986 a compromise petition dated 1-12-1986 was filed by the parties containing the following terms: 1) The landlord's son has secured a Government job and there is no need of the petition schedule building. 2) The arrears of rent due to the landlord is Rs.8,500/- and tenant shall pay the arrears at a rate of Rs.250/-per month along with another Rs.250/- as rent for the current months. 3) If two consecutive defaults are made in payment of arrears of rent, the landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenant from the building, treating the balance arrears as arrears of rent. 4) The tenant shall be entitled to continue in possession of the plaint schedule building and conduct his trade without causing any damage to the building and if he violates this condition the landlord shall be entitled to evict the tenant. 5) The arrears mentioned above shall be paid every month and the tenant shall obtain receipt for the same from the landlord. 2. On the basis of the above compromise petition filed by the parties the Rent Control Court passed an order dated 5-12-1986 to the following effect:- "The petitioner and the counter-petitioner filed compromise on 5-12-1986. In the compromise petition it is stated that the petitioner's son had got a government job. Therefore he did not require the building for his own use. The counter-petitioner stated that he shall pay arrears of rent Rs.8,500/- along with the monthly rent of Rs.250/-. If the counter-petitioner has defaulted to pay the rent as stated the petitioner has right to evict the counter-petitioner from the petition schedule building. The counter-petitioner is allowed to conduct business as now exists. Compromise recorded and R.C.P. disposed of in terms of compromise." 3. If the counter-petitioner has defaulted to pay the rent as stated the petitioner has right to evict the counter-petitioner from the petition schedule building. The counter-petitioner is allowed to conduct business as now exists. Compromise recorded and R.C.P. disposed of in terms of compromise." 3. According to the landlord the tenant committed default in payment of the arrears of rent stipulated in the compromise order and thereupon she filed E.P.No.482/ 87 for execution of the said order. The application was resisted by the tenant on the ground that the order is not executable. The order is a nullity and cannot be executed as the court was not satisfied at the time of passing of the same as to whether any of the conditions necessary for evicting a tenant existed at the time of the order. The order is not an executable one as contemplated by the parties and the compromise will create a new tenancy and eviction can be had only by filing another petition under the provisions of the Rent Control Act In any view of the matter there was no default in complying with the conditions in the order and an such the landlord is not entitled to execute the order. The execution court overruled the objections of the tenant and ordered delivery of the property to the landlord. Against the above order the tenant preferred a revision before the District Court, Trivandrum under the proviso to S.14 of the Act The District Court after elaborately considering various objections confirmed the order of the execution court against which this revision is filed by the tenant 4. Before this court also Mr. K.C. John, counsel for the petitioner, reiterated, all the contentions raised before the courts below. The three questions that arise for consideration are i) whether the Rent Control Court was satisfied as to the existence of any condition necessary for an order of eviction under S.11 of the Act when it passed the compromise order dated 5-12-1986; ii) whether the parties contemplated an executable order when they filed the compromise petition or whether the panics intended a new lease arrangement; and iii) whether there was default in complying with the provisions of the compromise order. I shall consider these points in seriatim. Point No. I 5. According to counsel for the revision petitioner the eviction was filed only under S.11(3) and 11(4)(iii). I shall consider these points in seriatim. Point No. I 5. According to counsel for the revision petitioner the eviction was filed only under S.11(3) and 11(4)(iii). Eviction on the ground of arrears of rent is provided in S.11(2)and the said section was not mentioned in the petition. According to counsel though there is an admission in the compromise petition that there are arrears of rent, since the petition was not under S.11(2), the court had no occasion or necessity to apply its mind to that statutory requirement before passing an order for eviction. Counsel contended that the arrears of rent were not mentioned as one of the grounds and as such the court had no necessity to consider that aspect before passing the compromise order. Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in Ferozi Lal v. Man Mal (AIR 1970 SC 794) and Kaushalya Devi v. K. L. Bansal (AIR 1970 SC 838). In the former decision it was observed, construing the analogous provisions in the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, as follows: "5. From this provision, it is clear that after the Rent Control Act came into force, a decree for recovery of possession can be passed by any court only if that court is satisfied that one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.13(1)are established. Without such a satisfaction, the court is incompetent to pass a decree for possession. In other words, the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon its satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in S.13(1) have been proved. 6. From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity." The latter decision followed the dictum laid down in the above decision. Based on the dictum in the aforesaid decisions it was contended by counsel for revision petitioner that the court could not have been satisfied in this case as to whether there were arrears of rent or not since the ground as such was not taken in the petition for eviction filed before the Rent Control Court. 6. Counsel for the respondent-landlord on the other hand contended that if from the order or from the records it is manifest that sufficient materials were available before the court to prove any one of the conditions necessary for passing an order of eviction under the Act, then the compromise order cannot be challenged as a nullity. According to counsel necessary averments regarding arrears of rent were in the Rent Control petition and materials were available from the records in the case itself that there were arrears of rent. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the compromise order was passed without applying its mind by the Rent Control Court. In this connection he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in K. K. Chari v. R. M. Seshadri (AIR 1973 SC 1311). After elaborately considering the various decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, the law on the point was laid down by Justice Vaidialingam on behalf of the Court in the following terms: "24. We are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that the decree for eviction in the case before us has been passed solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. No doubt a reading of the order of the court dated March, 31, 1969, isolated from all other circumstances, may give the impression that the decree for eviction is passed because of the compromise between the parties. It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is no doubt true that the order on the face of it does not show that the court has expressed its satisfaction that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. If the court had expressed its satisfaction in the order itself, that will conclude the matter. That the court was so satisfied can also be considered from the point of view whether a stage had been reached in the proceedings for the court to apply its mind to the relevant question? Other materials on record can also be taken into account to find out if the court was so satisfied. The High Court has proceeded on the basis that even if there was material before the court, when it passed the order of eviction by consent, from which it can be shown that the court was satisfied about the requirement of the landlord being bona fide, nevertheless such an order will be a nullity unless the Rent Controller has given his decision in favour of the landlord. In our opinion, this view is erroneous." "26. The true position appears to be that an order of eviction passed on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S.10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement, it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. 27. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. 27. It is no doubt true that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry. It is no doubt true that each case will have to be decided on its own facts to find out whether there is any material to justify an inference that an admission, express or implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or other of the statutory grounds." 7. The same view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas v. Palpatram Ichharam (AIR 1974 SC 471). After referring to the aforementioned decision, their Lordships observed as follows: "26. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under S.58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong." 29. Be that as it may, in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity, is taken, the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the Executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court's jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the Rent Court could have-as distinguished from must have-been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission, in the compromise, incorporated in decree, of toe fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12(3)(a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity." 8. Since in the instant case, there was a clear admission, in the compromise, incorporated in decree, of toe fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12(3)(a), the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity." 8. From the above quoted decision of the Supreme Court it is clear that the executing court can find out from the compromise order itself whether circumstances existed warranting an order for eviction under the particular Rent Control Act It is further clear that if on the face of the compromise order the existence of a ground under the Rent Control Act is not discernible the executing court may look into the other records in the Rent Control Court to ascertain whether any material or ground existed warranting an order for eviction under the Act. If on such examination prima facie it is found that materials are available for ordering eviction, the executing court has to execute the compromise order as such. In the background of the above decision and on consideration of the pleadings and other evidence in the case it is clear that the Rent Control Court was satisfied that there were arrears of rent on the date of eviction petition warranting an order for eviction. S.11(2) of the Act provides for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and it will be advantageous at this stage to quote the above provision: "(2) (a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. S.11(2) of the Act provides for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent and it will be advantageous at this stage to quote the above provision: "(2) (a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf. (b) If the Rent Control Court order giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of, the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, it shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the application thereof by him: Provided that an application under this sub-section shall be made only if the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant intimating the default and the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent together with interest at six per cent per annum and postal charge incurred in sending the notice within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice or of the refusal thereof. (c) The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow, and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such further period, as the case may be, it shall vacate that order." Before the compromise order was passed, evidence had been adduced by the parties in the matter before the Rent Control Court. Under the proviso to S.11(2)(b) a registered notice to the tenant intimating him the default in the payment of rent is a condition precedent for an application under S.11(2). Before the filing of the Rent Control Petition the landlord has sent such a notice to the tenant on 27-3-1984 which before the Rent Control Court. Under the proviso to S.11(2)(b) a registered notice to the tenant intimating him the default in the payment of rent is a condition precedent for an application under S.11(2). Before the filing of the Rent Control Petition the landlord has sent such a notice to the tenant on 27-3-1984 which before the Rent Control Court. Though no doubt S.11(2) as such was not mentioned in the heading to the petition, in Para.7 it was clearly averred that there were arrears of rent. It was alleged: " The counter-petitioner has also not paid the rent due from March 1984". In the objection filed by the tenant to the above, petition in Para.7 it was averred as follows: "The allegation that the counter-petitioner has not paid rent from March, 1984 is denied. The rent for the said period fell in arrears due to the vehement refusal on the part of the petitioner to receive the same on hand." From the aforesaid allegations it is clear that the parties went to trial on the ground of arrears of rent also. PW.3, husband of the petitioner in the Rent Control Court was examined on her behalf. He also gave evidence that there were arrears of rent on the date of the petition and it is seen that he has not been cross-examined on that question. In the compromise petition itself there is a statement by the tenant that there were arrears of rent to the extent of Rs.8,500/-. The Rent Control Court was justified in passing the order of eviction as there were sufficient materials on record to prove that the ground of arrears of rent had been made out by the landlord. I agree with the courts below that the compromise order for eviction is not a nullity and it was passed by the Rent Control Court after satisfying itself that the necessary grounds for eviction existed for passing of that order. Point No.2 9. The revision petitioner contended that from the wording of the compromise petition it is clear that no executable order as such was contemplated by the parties and that a new lease arrangement was intended to come into existence by the parties. Point No.2 9. The revision petitioner contended that from the wording of the compromise petition it is clear that no executable order as such was contemplated by the parties and that a new lease arrangement was intended to come into existence by the parties. Counsel for the revision petitioner laid great stress on two provisions of the compromise petition, namely the provision for payment of future rent at the rate of Rs.250/- per mensem and also the clause to the effect that the tenant shall be entitled to continue in possession and conduct the trade in the building without causing any damage to the building. These two provisions according to him will abundantly make it clear that a new lease arrangement was contemplated by the parties and not an executable order as contended by the landlord. Counsel for the tenant relied on the decisions in K.M. Shah v. S.N. Kankaria (AIR 1982 Bombay 532), Ramiah Chettiar v. Shankarlingam Pillai (1970 R.C.J. 732), R. Thangasami Nadar v. Mr. A.S. Duraisami Nadar (1971 R.C.J. 572) and Prithvichand Ramchand Sablok v. S. Y. Sinde (1985 (1) R.C.J 514) wherein according to him similar compromise arrangement has been held to be a new lease arrangement and not an executable order as such. Counsel for the respondent-landlord relied on the decision in Ramamurthy Subudhi v. Gopinath (AIR 1968 SC 919) to contend that no fresh agreement is contemplated under the compromise. It is well-settled that the provisions of one document cannot be interpreted with reference to the provisions in another document. Such decisions are not helpful in interpreting documents where the circumstances in which they were made are different. On going through the provisions in the compromise petition, I do not find anything which militates against the court intending to pass an executable order of this nature. Under S.11(2) of the Act the order for eviction can be passed if there are arrears of rent and when the other conditions in the section are satisfied. S.11(2)(c) provides that the order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow. S.11(2)(c) provides that the order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow. The above clause also gives the tenant a right to deposit the arrears of rent within a period of one month or such other period as the court may give and if such deposit is made the Rent Control Court shall vacate the order. From the above provision it is clear that it is not as if the landlord-tenant relationship comes to an end on the very passing of the order if the ground for eviction is arrears of rent. In any view, no eviction order can be executed within a month. The Rent Control Court is free to grant time for more than one month. The tenant has got the liberty to get the order set aside within that time by depositing the arrears due from him. In these contingencies it certainly cannot be said that the tenancy arrangement will come to an end by the mere passing of the order. Until any one of the contingencies has happened the tenant will continue under the old arrangement and the landlord-tenant relationship will continue. In this particular case, the tenant was allowed to discharge the arrears of rent in monthly instalments of Rs.250/-. The order further provided that the landlord shall be entitled to evict only if the tenant commits default of two consecutive instalments in paying the rent. In other words, the order of eviction will come into operation only when two consecutive defaults in paying the instalments are made by the tenant. The provisions in the compromise petition relied on by the revision petitioner, according to me, are only in consonance with the fact that the landlord-tenant relationship shall be continued till the eviction order comes into effect. The two provisions relied on are only to be effective during the period when the tenant will continue as such and it will not in any way be in negation of a right of the landlord to evict if the contingency mentioned in the compromise petition comes into effect. The two provisions relied on are only to be effective during the period when the tenant will continue as such and it will not in any way be in negation of a right of the landlord to evict if the contingency mentioned in the compromise petition comes into effect. That the landlord-tenant relationship shall not come to an end by the mere filing of an eviction petition in the case of tenancies governed by the Rent Control Acts is clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in v. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal (AIR 1979 SC 1745). In that case, the question arose as to whether a notice under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary before filing a petition under the Rent Control Act. In considering that question, it was held that the provisions in the Rent Control Act which is a self-contained code contain ground for eviction of the tenants, that such tenants are not normally governed by the provisions of S.106 of the T.P. Act and that they can be evicted only on proof of conditions mentioned in the concerned rent control legislation. In this context their Lordships observed (the head-note gives a clear summary of the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court which is to the following effect): "In order to get a decree or order for eviction against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act it is not necessary to give notice under S.106 T..P..Act. Determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with S.106 of the T.P. Act. On the question of requirement of such a notice under S.106 T.P. Act the difference in the language of various State Rent Acts does not bring about any distinction. It is not correct to say that S.106 of the T.P. Act merely providing for termination of a lease either by the lessor or the lessee by giving the requisite notice is an extra protection against eviction. It is not correct to say that S.106 of the T.P. Act merely providing for termination of a lease either by the lessor or the lessee by giving the requisite notice is an extra protection against eviction. The purpose of this provision is merely to terminate the contract which the overriding Rent Acts do not permit to be terminated. Even if the lease is determined by forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act the tenant continues to be a tenant, that is to say, there is no forfeiture in the eye of law. The tenant becomes liable to be evicted and forfeiture comes into play only if he has incurred the liability to be evicted under the State Rent Act, not otherwise." 10. From the provisions in the present compromise order it is clear that the eviction order will not come into operation immediately. It will come into operation only on the contingency mentioned therein. Till then the landlord-tenant relationship shall continue and the provisions quoted earlier and relied on by the revision petitioner are only in consonance with the continuance of such relationship and not for creating a tenancy between the parties. In this view of the matter I overrule the contention of the revision petitioner. 11. Counsel for the revision petitioner further contended that on the terms of .the compromise order it can be seen that no order for eviction as such is passed and the landlord will have to file a fresh petition for eviction as there is no provision in the petition or in the order to the effect that the landlord will be entitled to get delivery of the building in execution of this order. I find it difficult to accept the contention. The Rent Control Petition was not dismissed but was ordered in accordance with the compromise petition. The compromise petition provides that in case of default of two consecutive instalments the landlord shall be entitled to get possession of the property from the tenant after evicting him. This certainly is an order allowing recovery of possession in case of default is committed by tenant and an executable order is clearly made by the Rent Control Court. 12. Similar provisions in a compromise order were considered in two decisions of this Court--Balakrishna Reddiar v. Madhavan Pillai (1978 KLT 495) and Achuthan v. Dr. A. J. John (1986 KLT 804). 12. Similar provisions in a compromise order were considered in two decisions of this Court--Balakrishna Reddiar v. Madhavan Pillai (1978 KLT 495) and Achuthan v. Dr. A. J. John (1986 KLT 804). Both these decisions relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Chand v. Harnam Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2065) wherein in respect of a similar decree it was observed by the Supreme Court as follows: "A clause in a decree passed in terms of an arbitration award providing that on the happening of certain events the vendor shall be entitled to take back possession of the property does not make the award declaratory so as to make it incapable of execution. The intendment of the award is that on the happening of stipulated events the vendor would be entitled to apply for execution of the award and obtain possession of the property. The mere fact that the award fails to maintain filing of an execution application does not make it declaratory. It is never a pre-condition of the excitability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the party entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief.' 13. On a reading of the compromise petition and the consequential order, I have no hesitation to hold that the Rent Control Court intended to pass an executable order and that the landlord is entitled to evict the tenant in case he commits default of the provisions contained in the compromise order. Point No.3 14. The contention of the revision petitioner is that there were no arrears of rent on the date of the eviction petition or on the date of the compromise order. In support of the above contention the petitioner has produced two documents along with a petition for receiving the same in evidence, as CM.P.No.21736/89. The first document is the lease deed executed by the parties. It provides that the lease shall be for a period of one year and it shows that an amount of Rs.10,000/- was paid as advance to the landlord to be kept by her. A receipt for Rs. 10,000/- is also produced along with the lease deed. The first document is the lease deed executed by the parties. It provides that the lease shall be for a period of one year and it shows that an amount of Rs.10,000/- was paid as advance to the landlord to be kept by her. A receipt for Rs. 10,000/- is also produced along with the lease deed. Counsel for the revision petitioner contended that if this amount of advance is taken into account, in view of the provisions in S.8 of the Act, there shall be no arrears and that the order of the Rent Control Court ordering eviction on the ground of arrears of rent is without jurisdiction. Apart from the question of admissibility of the lease deed it being for a period of one year, this contention cannot be countenanced at this stage. First of all, it is admitted in the compromise petition itself that there were arrears of rent. Secondly, in Para.3 of the Rent Control Petition it is stated by the tenant that the above amount was paid for the construction of an extension to the existing building. He further pleaded that the construction had not been made and that he was going to take steps to get the amount back. In Para.7 it is admitted that there were arrears of rent. In these circumstances, the amount of Rs. 10,000 was treated only as a loan by the tenant and not as advance towards rent as contemplated under S.8 of the Act Moreover, one does not know as to whether any adjustments were made between the landlord and the tenant at the time of filing the compromise petition. It is pertinent to note that this objection was not raised in the objection to the present execution petition and the contention taken in revision for the first time without giving any opportunity to the decree-holder to adduce evidence in the matter cannot be countenanced. I overrule the above contention. Admittedly the tenant had not complied with the compromise order on the date of the E.P. and the decree-holder is perfectly justified in executing the order. In these circumstances I do not think this is a fit case where the petitioner can be allowed to adduce additional evidence in the matter. I dismiss C.M.P.21736/89 for additional evidence. 15. Admittedly the tenant had not complied with the compromise order on the date of the E.P. and the decree-holder is perfectly justified in executing the order. In these circumstances I do not think this is a fit case where the petitioner can be allowed to adduce additional evidence in the matter. I dismiss C.M.P.21736/89 for additional evidence. 15. The decision in Modern Hotel, Gudur v. K. Radhakrishnaiah (AIR 1989 SC 1510) was in an appeal from the proceedings before the Rent Control Court and not in execution, and for the reasons stated by me earlier, the principles laid down in the decision cannot be made applicable at this stage. 16. In the result, I find no merit in the C.R.P. and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Dismissed.