Judgment :- SATHIADEV, J. 1. These writ appeals are preferred against the order dated 27-11-1985 in W.P. 11167 and 11168 of 1985. The first of the two writ petitions was filed by one R. Anuradha, who had registered herself in the Employment Exchange at Nandanam, Madras and who responded to an advertisement which appeared in Indian Express dated 26-9-1985 published by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Madras division, inviting applications for filling up 120 vacancies in the cadre of Assistants. Though she possessed the req uisite qualifications, the note in the advertisement to the following effect disentitled her application being considered— “Only candidates registered with Employment Exchanges of Chingleput, South Arcot, North Arco districts and also Union terriorry of Pondicherry will be eligible for appointment in the office of Chingleput, South Arcot, North Arcot Districts and Union Territorry of Pondicherry respectively.” The last date for receipt of applications was 10-10-1985 and, thereafter, candidates will be called for a written test and also interview. Since the respondent-Corporation is a ‘State’ within Art 12. it cannot discriminate citizens of India on grounds of ‘residence’ in matters relating to employment, and therefore, not to be deprived of her chance of getting employment, she had come to Court at the earliest point of time for declaring that the criteria laid down in the advertisement dated 26-9-1985, con fining the recruitment only to candidates registered within certain Employment Exchanges is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 and 16(2). She has sought for a further direction for re-advertisement without the offending clause. 2. W.P. 11167 of 1985 was filed by the National Life Insurance Employees Association, taking up the same points and claiming that family members of the Association who are eligible to apply but for the offending conditions, are being deprived of an opportunity of applying for these vacancies, and hence the Association also has asked for similar reliefs. 3. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petitions by holding that when ultimate selection has to take place preference will be given to those persons residing in those particular places, having regard to the fact that the vacancies for which applications are invited will be in and around these local areas and that stage had not yet reached, and because large number of persons have responded to the advertisement a direction in the nature asked for cannot be issued. It was also held that the note in the advertisement does not offend Art. 16, 4. Mr. NG.R. Prasad learned counsel for appellants, submits that respondent being constituted under a statute and it being a ‘State’ under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India, is in law bound to make available every vacancy to every eligible citizen of India. Instead, by the involved advertisement, it has reserved these vacancies only to those eligible candidates who have registered themselves in the specified Employment Exchange. Such a compartmentalisation not being sanctioned by law, this could not s tand the test of reasonableness, and it bad violated Art. 16 (2) of the Constitution, which the learned Judge had not properly appreciated. 5. Mr. J. Kanakaraj, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation, submits that the exclusion is not made based on ‘residence’ and that any one residing in any part of India could get themselves registered in the specified Employment Exchanges and it was a reasonable classification evolved so that the vacancies may be evenly distributed, and the nature of the post is also relevant factor and hence it would not result in offending Art. 16(2) by confining the recruitment only to persons who have registered in the concerned Employment Exchanges. It will also be easier to verify about the correctness of the claim made, if the applicants are confined to the concerned Employment Exchanges. There had been certain circulars issued bv the Central Government in this regard and therefore any non-provision in this regard in the regulations of the Corporation cannot be a ground to deprive it, to incorporate the stipulations which are found in the advertisement. It had been done in the larger interests to evenly distribute the vacancies and hence ‘residence’ had not played any factor; but what had been taken into account is confined to registration within certain areas. Anyone residing in any part of the countary is eligible to get registration in any Employment Exchange. Therefore, it cannot be said that in respect of the specified Exchanges, only those residing in those Districts alone had registered with them. 6. Anyone residing in any part of the countary is eligible to get registration in any Employment Exchange. Therefore, it cannot be said that in respect of the specified Exchanges, only those residing in those Districts alone had registered with them. 6. Though Art. 13 does not mention the word ‘residence’ Art. 16, dealing with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, states that no citizen shall, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for or discriminated against in respect of any employment or office under the State. It is not in dispute that the respondent-Corporation is a State within the meaning of Art. 12. S. 4 of Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act 1959 provides for notification of vacancies to Employment Exchanges. S. 4(4) states as follows— “Nothing in sub-S.(1) and (2) shall be deemed to impose any obligation upon any employer to recruit any person through the employment exchanges to fill any vacancy merely because that vacancy has been notified under any of the sub-sections-” Therefore, there is no provision made in the said Act compelling recruitment to be made only through Employment Exchanges when a question arose as to whether the ‘establishment’ in the public sector or establishment in the private sector as defined in the said Act, may make appointments to posts to which the Act applies of persons not sponsored, by Employment Exchanges; a further question was also posed whether the Act covers Government establishments also? In dealing with these points in Union of India v. Haragopal 1 it was held in paragraph 9 therein as follows— “White the Government is at perfect liberty to issue instructions to its own departments and organisations provided the instructions do not contravene anv Constitutional provision or any statute, these instructions cannot bind other bodies which are Created by statutes and which function under the authority of statute.” 7. Hence, it cannot be the claim of the respondent that because of the provisions of this Act, it had chosen to confine the appointment only through Employment Exchanges, what is contended by learned counsel for the appellants is that, the advertisement had not enabled every one registered in every Employment Exchange to apply and it had restricted it only to four Employment Exchanges and hence it is irrational and illogical. The respondents counsel would state that this was done by taking note of the fact that vacancies arise in the districts of Chingleput, South Arcot & North Arcot, and also in the Union territory of pondicherrv, and the nature of posts being such that if recruitment is made in and around the concerned mofussil branches, it should be beneficial to applicants, who have registered in the concerned Employment Exchanges. The crux of the matter is to find out whether by the advertisement, there is any indication that only persons residing in the said District are to be considered or the opportunity of employment had been thrown open to every eligible candidate in the country. If it be made out from the advertisement the persons residing in a particular area is ‘preferred for employment’ then Art. 16(2) is offended. In the opening part of the advertisement, it is stated as follows— Applications are invited from eligible candidates preferably residing in and around our mofussil branches situated in the districts of Chingleput. South Arcot and North Arcot and Union territory of Pondicherry excluding Karaikal, Enam and Mahe or filling up approximately 120 vacancies in the cadre of Assistants with the following reservations “ After furnishing the scale of pay, the requirement of age and educational qualifictions and relaxation extended; a ‘note’ is incorporated as extracted earlier. A reading of these two paragraphs in the advertisement leads to the irresistible conclusion that by resorting to recruitment confined to these Employment Exchanges, the Corporation is aiming to prefer applicants residing in the concerned districts. In A.V S.N. Rao v. State of A P. 2 in dealing with S 3 of the Public Employment (Requirement as to residence) Act, 1957, it was held that it is ultra tires of the Constitution because— “The Constitution, as it stands, speaks of a whole State as the venue for residential qualification and it is impossible to think that the Constituent Assembly was thinking of residence in Districts, Taluqas, Cities towns or village.” S. 3 enabled the Central Government to make rules relating to appointment to any subordinate service or post in Amdhra Pradesh relating to residence within the Telengana. It is this judgment which led to Art. 371-D being included in the Constitution by an amendment. It is this judgment which led to Art. 371-D being included in the Constitution by an amendment. Yet, the learned counsel for the respondent would rely on the decision in Ramsaran v. D.G.I. of Police, Ajmere 3, which dealt with the three-tier system being maintained in the Police force in the State of Rajas than. The department being divided into different ranges, and personnel being posted in a particular range, is not an uncommon feature, Personnel being confined to only certain areas relating to transfer, posting, seniority etc, so long as they are in a lower cadre, is a regular feature of service rules. But, when recruitment is made to any post, applications are received from all over the State. Therefore, when the ‘note’ says that ‘only’ candidates in the specified Exchanges alone are eligible to apply, it results in a classification, which is unwarranted, unjust and not provided, even in the Regulations of the respondent-Corporation. Under S. 49(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, the service conditions could be regulated only by Regulations framed by it and not by administrative decisions taken by different authorities stipulating terms and conditions, which offend Constitutional provisions. I n the opening part of the advertisement, the intention of extending ‘preference’ to those residing in the branches situate in the areas mentioned therein clearly bring about the intention of confining recruitment based on the residence of the applicants and to achieve it, the registration in the concerned Employment Exchanges had been adopted. 8. The plea of the respondent that the nature of posts is such that those in and around the concerned branches could be employed, will have no relevance, because even in respect of those posts, they are transferable. 8. The plea of the respondent that the nature of posts is such that those in and around the concerned branches could be employed, will have no relevance, because even in respect of those posts, they are transferable. Learned counsel for the respondent had relied on Air India v. Nergesh Meera 1, M/s. B.Y. Kshatriya v. S.A.T.R. Kangan Union 2 and B.Y. Kshatriya Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India 3, to show that there could be a reasonable classification adopted to achieve certain Objectives as found in the enactments, but in the instant case, when Regulations had been framed under the Life Insurance Cor-Corporation Act relating to recruitments and appointments go be made by it the offending procedure, above referred to, should not have been adopted by it, It is therefore, violative of Art. 16(2), and hence the appellant in W A 69 of 1986 though registered in the Employment Exchange at Nandanam, was eligible to apply. She had already submitted her application but was not allowed to write the examination and participate in the interview. A vacancy had been reserved, and, therefore, except with regard to the offending note; in other respect she having been eligible to apply on the crucial date, the respondent is hereby directed to treat her application as valid in law with reference to the advertisement made on 29-4-1985. She was entitled to appear for the examination and the interview for one of these vacancies. Instead of holding a separate examination for her, it is stated by her counsel that pursuant to an advertisement made on 3-7-1989, examinations are to be held on 10-9-1989, and that she can be issued a hall ticket to participate in the said examination. If she comes out successful, she is entitled to be interviewed. This will avoid the Corporation holding a separate examination and interview for her. But the participation in the examination and interview, cannot be treated for vacancies now notified, but in respect of the vacancies which arose in 1985. Hence, it cannot be claimed that she had become overaged. Her right to employment will depend upon her performance in the examinations and in the interview. With these directions. W.A. 69 of 1986 is allowed. 9. Hence, it cannot be claimed that she had become overaged. Her right to employment will depend upon her performance in the examinations and in the interview. With these directions. W.A. 69 of 1986 is allowed. 9. As for W.A. 68 of 1986 is concerned, the writ petition was filed for a declaratory relief and when in these days, public interest litigations are filed, it cannot be said that the association, which is vitally interested relating to recruitment procedure in the respondent Corporation, cannot ask for a declaratory relief, Now that W.A. 69 of 1986 is allowed by holding that the offending note in the advertisement dated 26-9-1985 is violative of Art. 16(2) of the Constitution, to that extent alone, this writ appeal is allowed. The further prayer for re advertisement is not necessary to be granted by now, the recruitment process had been completed and all the vacancies except for the one reserved pending disposal of the matters in this Court, are filled up. No costs.