B. C. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THROUGH this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner questions the vires of S. 30 (1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1981 (Act No. 35 of 1981 ). This provision is as follows"30. Disqualification for being office-bearer of Panchayat.- (1) No person shall be eligible to be an office-bearer of a Panchayat who -xxx xxx xxx (e) has been dismissed from the service of the State Government or Central Government or the Panchayat or any other Local Authority or a Co-operative Society or any public sector undertaking under the control of the Central Government or the State Government; or" ( 2 ) AS a step towards implementation of the directive principle contained in Article 40 of the Constitution of India that the States shall take steps to organise village Panchaynts and endow them with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self government, the State of Madhya Pradesh first enacted the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962. This Act was subsequently replaced by the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Repeal Ordinance, 1981 (No. 6 of 1981) and the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 (No. 8 of 1981) which have since been repealed by the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which received the assent of the Governor on 6th October, 1981 and was published in Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra on 7th October, 1981. The repealed Panchayats Act, 1962 provided for establishment of Gram Sabhas, Gram Panchayats and Janpad Panchayats. This three tier system of Panchayat Raj is maintained under the 1981 Act also Sec. 3 whereof provides that for the purpose of the Act, there shall be established a Gram Panchayat for a village or group of villagers; a Janpada Panchayat for a block; and a Zilla Panchayat for a district. According to S. 4 (I) of the Act, a Gram Panchayat for a village or group of villages is established by the order of the State Government or of any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf specifying the name of the Gram Panchayat by which it shall be known, its headquarters, the limits of the area within its jurisdiction and population of the Gram Panchayat area. Such Gram Panchayats shall be a body corporate by the name specified therefor in the order or notification under Sec. 4, and shall have power to acquire, hold or transfer property, movable or immovable, to enter into contracts and to do all other things necessary for the purpose of the Act. Chapter-III of the Act contains various provisions for constitution of the Panchayats. For constitution of a Gram Panchayat, it contemplates preparation of a voters list. A person shall be disqualified for registration in the list of voters of a Gram Panchayat area, if he falls in any of the categories specified in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of sub-section (1) of S. 9, which are as follows"9. Disqualification for registration of voters in the list of voters of Gram Panchayat area.- (1) A person shall be disqualified for registration in the list of voters of a Gram Panchayat area if he - (a) is not a citizen of India; or (b) is of unsound mind and stands as so declared by a competent Court; or (c) is convicted of an offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (No. 22 of 1955), unless a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his conviction; or (d) is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law relating to corrupt practices and other offences in connection with election; or the eligibilityqualifications for a person to be registered as a voter in the list of voters of Gram Panchayat are specified in Section 10. Every gram panchayat shall consist of " (i) Panchas elected from the wards; and (ii) Panchas co-opted, if any, under sub-sections (3), (4) and (5) of S. 11. Every person whose name is included in the list of voters shall be qualified to vote at the election of a Panch of a Gram Panchayat. Every Gram Panchayat shall have a Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch elected in accordance with S. 15. Section 30 categorises classes of persons which shall not be eligible to be office-bearers of a Panchayat including Gram Panchayat. Since reference was made to various clauses of this section during the course of argument by the learned Counsel for the parties, it shall be useful to reproduce the relevant clauses of this section. They are as follows :""30. Section 30 categorises classes of persons which shall not be eligible to be office-bearers of a Panchayat including Gram Panchayat. Since reference was made to various clauses of this section during the course of argument by the learned Counsel for the parties, it shall be useful to reproduce the relevant clauses of this section. They are as follows :""30. Disqualification for being office-bearer of Panchayat.- (1) No person shall be eligible to be an office-bearer of a Panchayat who -- (a) has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, been convicted - (i) of an offence under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (22 of 1955), or under any law in connection with the use, consumption or sale of narcotics or any law corresponding thereto in force in any part of the State, unless a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case has elapsed since his conviction; or (ii) of any other offence and been sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six months, unless a period of five years or such lesser period as the State Government may allow in any particular case, has elapsed since his release; or (b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent Court; or (c) is an applicant to be adjudged an insolvent or is an undischarged insolvent; or (d) holds an office of profit under any Panchayat or is in the service or any other local authority or co-operative societies or the State Government or Central Government or any public sector undertaking under the control of the Central Government or the State Government Provided that no person shall be deemed to have incurred disqualification under the clause by reason of being appointed as a Patel under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (20 of 1959); or (e) has been dismissed from the service of the State Government or Central Government or the Panchayat or any other Local Authority or a Co-operative Society or any public sector undertaking under the control of the Central Government or the State Government; or"an analysis of provision of this Sec. 30 shows that persons disqualified for being office-bearers of a Panchayat have been put in two categories as to the duration of continuance of this disqualification. In the first category fall those whose disqualification will not continue beyond five years of their conviction for certain offences, as mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1 ). In the second category fall persons who are disqualified for good. Such persons are mentioned in clauses (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1 ). It is this second category which, includes persons who are dismissed from service of the Government or many other institutions enumerated in clause (e ). It is significant to notice that such dismissal from service disqualifying a person from being office-bearer of a Panchayat may be for any reason or on any charge whatever and the State Government is not vested with any power to relax the duration of disqualification on this count as in the case of a convict under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1 ). Contention by Shri N. K. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, is that the provisions of clause (e) are wholly unreasonable, utterly arbitrary besides being discriminatory and thus are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, claimed that this clause (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the Act be struck down. ( 3 ) ARTICLE 13 (2) of the Constitution of India prohibits the State to make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and provides that any law made in contravention, shall be void. Article 254 (1) confers jurisdiction on the Legislature of a State to make laws for the whole or any part of the State. The words "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" with which Art. 245 (1) opens indicate that the object of Art. 245 (1) is not to exempt either the Parliament or the State Legislature from any of the limitations which are imposed by other provisions of the Constitution upon legislative power. The powers of the Union and the State Legislature are thus limited by the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. This will be so even where the legislation is undertaken in pursuance of the directive principle. See State of Bombay v. United Motors, 1953 SCR 1069. The powers of the Union and the State Legislature are thus limited by the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. This will be so even where the legislation is undertaken in pursuance of the directive principle. See State of Bombay v. United Motors, 1953 SCR 1069. The Court attaches great weight to the legislative judgment and may start with assumption that the Legislature is the best Judge of what is good for its community by whose suffrage it comes into existence. Our Constitution, however, confers on Courts express power of judicial review. Article 13 assigns the Court the role of a sentinel on the 'qui vive'. The Courts are, therefore, always alive to and cannot desert their duty to determine finally the constitutionality of a stature. See Kochunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725 . In determining such constitutionality of a provision alleged to be violative of a fundamental right, the Court must weigh the substance, the real effect and impact thereof on the fundamental right, and would not allow a Legislature to bypass a constitutional prohibition by employing indirect methods. Right to be elected to an office created/ established under some statute is not a fundamental right of a citizen. It is not a common law right either. In Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 , it was emphasised that outside the statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. They are statutory creations and are, therefore, subject to statutory limitation. See also Umesh Pandey v. State of M. P. (M. P. No. 1184 of 1989 (J), decided on 30-6-89 (reported in 1989 Jab LJ 550 ). The Legislature is well empowered to prescribe eligibility qualifications for being so elected. Authority in favour of Legislature must also be conceded to impose restrictions and provide dis-qualifications in that behalf. All the same, such restrictions cannot be permitted to be no unreasonable as to result in depriving a citizen, otherwise eligible, of such right created by a statute. The restrictions coming in form of disqualifications must be reasonable. Such restrictions being limitations in the enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature and must bear a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to achieve. The restrictions coming in form of disqualifications must be reasonable. Such restrictions being limitations in the enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature and must bear a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature seeks to achieve. In order to know if a given restriction is reasonable or otherwise, one must look to the nature of right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions at that time. See Laxmi v. State of U. P. , AIR 1981 SC 873 and Trivedi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 1323 . In judging such reasonableness, it is not only permissible but also necessary for the Court to look into all contemporaneous legislation passed as a part of a single scheme. The scope of inquiry of reasonableness of classification on the ground of Art. 14 is not the same as under Art. 19, although in certain fields, the requirements of the two Articles may converge. This view finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Deena v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1155 , paras 15 and 16. It is settled proposition of law that the determination by the Legislature of what constitute a reasonable restriction is not final or conclusive. It is subject to the supervision of the Court. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was), in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , after referring to certain passage from "the Rule of Law and the Welfare State" by Herry Jones, observed that "it is indeed unthinkable that in a democracygoverned by the rule of law, the executive Government or any of the officers should possess arbitrary power over the interest of its individuals". The learned Judge further said that every action of the executive must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness and referring to the decisions of the Supreme Court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 ; and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , lucidly analysing the principles contained in Art. 14, made the following observations :"the principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Art. 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. "in order to stand the test of reasonableness, the State action must conform to some standard or norm which is "rational and nondiscriminatory". Exclusion of persons by discrimination cannot be allowed to stand. This principle has ever since been projected in the field of administrative action and contractual relationship and was reiterated by the Supreme Court in M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of J. and K. , AIR 1980 SC 1992 . ( 4 ) WHETHER the provision under consideration stands the test aforesaid before it can be upheld as valid piece of legislation is now the question. With no amount of hesitation, we may say that it does not. The underlying idea behind the legislation in question is to allow the inhabitants of a village or a group of villages to participate in and manage all municipal functions. Every eligible person, therefore, has a right to be elected to the body (in the present case, the Gram Panchayat) and thus actively deliberate in performing such functions. At the same time, the legislature in its wisdom thought, and we think rightly, to debar persons suffering conviction on certain criminal charges from being elected as office-bearers but only for certain duration, not exceeding beyond five year. Presumably, in so enacting; the legislature seems to be thinking that even a convict would reform himself as the time passes. The term of this clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 30 further indicates that as soon as the insolvent is discharged, the disqualification so attached on account of insolvency of a person ceases. Similarly, under clause (d), it is the person who "holds" office of profit is disqualified. The term of this clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 30 further indicates that as soon as the insolvent is discharged, the disqualification so attached on account of insolvency of a person ceases. Similarly, under clause (d), it is the person who "holds" office of profit is disqualified. This disqualification also disappears as soon as the person removes himself from that office and ceases to hold that office. When then and for what good reason the stigma attached to a person "dismissed from the service" is to continue for all time? There appears to us no good reason for making such a provision. The dismissal of a Government servant may be on various grounds and more often may not be on a charge involving any moral turpitude, as in the present case, where the petitioner was removed from the service because of his continuous absence signifying his unwillingness to work. If by mere lapse of time, the vice resulting from conviction loses all significance, why not so in case of a dismissed Government servant? Even from the object sought to be achieved, we have not been able to discern any underlying purpose of this restriction on the statutory right of a person to be elected as office-bearer of a Gram Panchayat. Comparing with imposition of the restriction in case of a convict on a criminal charge and on an insolvent and the person holding an office of profit, we find the restriction contained in the provision under consideration (clause (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the M. P. Panchayat Act, 1981) to be wholly out of proportion. We are constrained to observe that even in the case, like the present one, where the vires of a statutory provision concerned right of citizens created under statute has been questioned, the State Government exhibited somewhat indifferent attitude and has not even exhibited any return justifying the enactment. Shri S. N. Dixit, learned Deputy Advocate General, while addressing the Court in his attempt to defend the action, only stated that the underlying idea behind the impugned provision is to put up an ideal picture of the person representing the voters. Learned Counsel, however, could not point out in what manner a dismissed Government employee was different from and on what basis was dealt with more severely than a convict. Learned Counsel, however, could not point out in what manner a dismissed Government employee was different from and on what basis was dealt with more severely than a convict. This discrimination could not be defended, except by throwing a vain suggestion that the dismissed employees form a class in themselves. ( 5 ) IT is also worthy of note that similar provisions appear in the M. P. Panchayat Act, 1962 (Section 17 (1) (e) ). That provision was as follows"17. Disqualification for being Panch, Sarpanch and Up-Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat.- (1) No person shall be eligible to be a Panch, Sarpanch or an Up-Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat who --xxx xxx xxx (e) has been dismissed from the service of the State Government or any local authority for corruption or disloyalty to the State, unless a period of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; or"while introducing that provision, the Legislature appears to be quite alive to the cause leading to the dismissal and was of opinion that even that dismissal on a charge of corruption or disloyalty to the State will cease to be a disqualification after a lapse of five years of the dismissal. The other causes of disqualification mentioned in S. 17 of the old Act are maintained in the present Act without any change. No reason, however, has been assigned for this significant departure in case of a dismissed Government employee in the present Act. The learned Deputy Advocate General also could not assign any reason, much less cogent and acceptable reason, for this departure. It may also be noticed that in all enactments providing for election as office-bearers of local bodies, no such restriction is imposed. Reference may be made to S. 35 (1) (g) of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961 and S. 17 (1) (a) and (h) of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and above all Section 9 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In all these enactments, the disqualification attaching to a person, otherwise eligible, to contest an election on account of his dismissal from Government service ceases after certain time as specified in relevant provisions mentioned above. In all these enactments, the disqualification attaching to a person, otherwise eligible, to contest an election on account of his dismissal from Government service ceases after certain time as specified in relevant provisions mentioned above. ( 6 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, we are of opinion that clause (e) of sub-section (1) of S. 30 of the M. P. Panchayat Act, 1981 is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution as it imposes unreasonable restriction upon a right of a person, otherwise eligible, to be elected as office-bearer of a Panchayat, and is hereby struck down. Consequently, the petition is allowed and the order Annexure A/2 whereby the petitioner's nomination paper was rejected, is quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioner. Petition allowed. .