N. N. MITHAL, J. ( 1 ) THESE are six appeals purporting to be under Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, arising out of six contempt Petitions moved by opposite party before a learned Single Judge of this Court. ( 2 ) A preliminary question arises as to whether the order impugned in these appeals is amenable to appeal under Section 19 (1) of the said Act. The contention of Sri, B. B. Paul appearing for the appellants is that the order was appeal able for the following reasons: 1) That the contempt petition before the learned Single Judge was itself not legally maintainable since it arose out Of a matter pending before a subordinate court; 2) That the alleged contempt was in respect of violation of injunction order said to have been passed by the subordinate court and there is an alternative efficacious remedy available to the applicant by way of proceedings under Order 39, Rule 2-A (1) of the Code; and 3) That the contempt proceedings under Act 70 of 1971 cannot be extended beyond the territory of India as provided under Section 1 of the Act. Opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 Yashpal Rai and Smt. Vinod being residents of Canada could not be proceeded against for contempt. ( 3 ) BEFORE we proceed to consider the merit of the submissions made by the learned Counsel, it will be better to have a close look at the legal position involved. The relevant portion of Section 19 lays down as under: 19 Appeals -- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- (a) Where the order Or decision is that of single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (a) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. ( 4 ) FROM a plain reading of the section, it would be clear that an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any order or decision of a learned Single Judge but this is not to say that each and every order of whatever nature is amenable to appellate jurisdiction, for the order or decision which Section 19 ( 1) speaks of must have been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Orders or decisions of all other kinds are excluded from it. The scheme of the Act will show that proceedings for contempt are initiated by issuance of a notice under Section 17 and thereafter until the time that the court actually finds the Contemners guilty of the alleged contempt, there may be many intervening orders but each of them would not be appealable, this could not have been the intention of the legislature. The expression An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decisiont cannot be read in isolation but must be deemed to be circumscribed by the expression following it i. e. the order passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish the contemner. Therefore, unless the order is one which has been passed by the court in, exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, it cannot be said to be, an appealable order. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants made a reference in this respect to a decision of the Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishrav. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra1. In that case, the question that came up for consideration was as to when the court assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The Court, in the words of Bhagwati, J. , as he then was, had this to say: The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the court decides to take action and initiate a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. It is only when the court decides to take action and initiate a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. The Court went on to say: Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not therefore, fall within the opening words of Section 19, sub - section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. ( 6 ) RECENTLY the Supreme Court again had occasion to dilate on this point in the case of D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan La12 and the Court had this to say: Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. An appeal will lie under Section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution, when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner, it does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215. ( 7 ) THIS decision substantially endorsed the earlier view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case Baradakanta Misra (supra ). ( 8 ) WHEN can an order be said to be an order which is appealable under Section 19 (1) (a) was a matter of judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Das v. Honble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon. ( 8 ) WHEN can an order be said to be an order which is appealable under Section 19 (1) (a) was a matter of judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court in the case of Purshottam Das v. Honble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon. 3 It was laid down in that case that an order to be appealable under Section 19 (1) must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere intiation of proceeding for contempt by issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. The court further said that the matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemner asking the High Court to drop the proceeding. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under Section 19. If the court on being asked by the contemner to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act declines to do so, it may well be that an appeal may lie under Section 19 (1) as some orders even though made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appelable. ( 9 ) FROM the above it will be seen that there is no total bar on an appeal against an order passed at an intermediate stage. It will depend upon the nature of contention raised and the manner in which the same has been disposed of by the court. In case a contention which goes to the very root of jurisdiction is raised and the same is turned down, certainly it must give rise to a right of appeal under Section 19 (1 ). Even the Supreme Court in the above case mentioned in the penultimate paragraph: We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the order decides some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other. Even the Supreme Court in the above case mentioned in the penultimate paragraph: We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the order decides some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other. But unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their rights the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. ( 10 ) COMING now to the order which is challenged in this appeal. Appellants Nos. 1,2,5,6 and 7 who are appellants before us were represented before the learned Single Judge by Shri B. B Paul They are all shown to be residents of Allahabad in the memo of appeal. Opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 were Yashpal Rai and Smt. Vinod who are residing in Canada but were represented before the learned Single Judge by Sri Bhagwati Prasad, Advocate as the record of the case before the learned Single Judge shows. When opposite parties Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 had appeared before the learned Single Judge on 12-4-1982, they had moved an application seeking exemption from attendance before the court. The application was allowed and the relevant portion of the order passed it The personal present of the opposite parties Nos. I, 2, 5 6 and 7 is exempted unless otherwise directed by this Court. ( 11 ) SUBSEQUENTLY the applicant moved for recall of this order vide his application dated 10-1-1983. This application was disposed of by the learned Single Judge on 24-1-1983 and it was clarified that the order dated 12-4-1982 will remain in operation until the court Orders otherwise. Therefore, despite my order dated 12-4-1982 the Court hearing now the contempt application would be entitled to pass an order for the presence of the contemner in. case it so feels. In the same order, the Court further observed that my order dated 23-4-1982 will not prevent the applicant from getting appropriate orders from the Bench hearing the contempt application in convention with the presence of opposite parties Nos. 8 and 9. Ultimately the application was rejected. Later on 15-7- 1982 an application was moved on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 by their counsel Sri Bhagwat Prasad seeking exemption from personal appearance by them. 8 and 9. Ultimately the application was rejected. Later on 15-7- 1982 an application was moved on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 by their counsel Sri Bhagwat Prasad seeking exemption from personal appearance by them. The application was ordered to be listed after two weeks and in the meantime the applicant was granted time to file an objection. A separate order was also passed as under: In this case there are 9 opposite parties. Opposite parties Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 are represented by Shri N. C. Upadhya and Sri K. M. Hajela. Opposite parties Nos. 8 and 9 are represented by Sri K. L. Grover. Today Sri Bhagwati Prasad, Advocate, has made a statement that he is representing opposite-parties Nos. 3 and 4 and has also filed his appearance in their behalf. All the opposite parties are thus served in this case. Applicant Sri Baldev Raj has raised the objection regarding the Vakalatnama filed on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 on the ground that in the body of the Vakalatnama it has not been mentioned by these opposite parties that Sri Bhagwati Prasad has been engaged as a counsel in this case. Sri Bhagwati Prasad, Advocate, has made a statement that he has in fact been engaged by opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 to conduct this case. In view of the statement of Sri Bhagwati Prasad, the appearance filed in this application in my opinion can be accepted. Shri Bhagwati Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 prays for and is granted a months time for filing counter-affidavit. List this case for orders immediately after a month. ( 12 ) THUS the record reveals that so far as the opposite parties Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 are concerned, their personal presence was exempted by the court subject to any order passed by the Court later on, while the application for exemption by opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 has remained pending since then. This then was a stage when the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge. It appears that on the date fixed counsel for opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 has remained pending since then. This then was a stage when the impugned order was passed by the learned Single Judge. It appears that on the date fixed counsel for opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 was not present, yet Sri Paul who represented the other set of opposite parties contended on their behalf that since they were residents of Canada, no proceeding under the Contempt of Court Act may be taken against them as the Act did not apply beyond the territorial limits of India. The order reveals that the court did not express any opnion on the merit of this question. It also declined to record the submission made by the applicant in this behalf as, according to the learned Single Judge, it was not necessary to do so at that stage. It was also mentioned in the order that when opposite parties Nos. 3 and 4 appear they can raise such objection about jurisdiction as may be available to them. The court thereafter passed an order requiring the parties to appear before it in order to assist the Court in disposal of the case which is lingering since 1982. This is the entire. order which is under challenge. ( 13 ) A mere look into order will show that it does not dispose of any contention raised by any of the parties before it on merits. The order also cannot be said to be prejudicial to the interest of my one. It is a simple order asking the parties to appear before it in the same manner in which the parties are summoned to appear before it when a notice under Section 17 of the Act is issued. The principles which have been laid down in the cases reported in 1974 S. C. and 1978 S. C. are fully applicable to the fact and circumstances of the present case also. The order prima facie cannot be said to be one that has been passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish the appellants. ( 14 ) THE questions whether the contempt petition being not maintainable or that it related violation of injunction order passed by the subordinate court cannot be said to be matters which had either been touched or decided by the impugned order. ( 14 ) THE questions whether the contempt petition being not maintainable or that it related violation of injunction order passed by the subordinate court cannot be said to be matters which had either been touched or decided by the impugned order. In any event, both these questions would be matters which will require consideration only when the appeals were heard on merit. Therefore, we are of clear opinion that the order impugned in this appeal is not one amenable to appellate jurisdiction in terms of Section 19 (1) of the Act. ( 15 ) IN the end, we may also refer to a few cases mentioned by the learned Counsel for the appellants, 1981 A. W. C. 314 has no application to the facts of the present case. Similarly 1981 A. W. C. 521 has no application at this stage and may be relevant only when the contempt matter is heard on merits. So is the case with 1983a. W. C. 29. 6 1984 A. W. C. 653 is a case which goes contrary to the submission made by the learned Counsel and it was held that if the Court refuses to proceed with contempt, no appeal lies against such an order, 1985 A. W. C. 103 also is not applicable as it was a matter concerning the maintainability of a revision against an order passed under Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sri Paul also cited a decision of Honble J. P. Singh, J. decided on 27-8-1984 but that was a matter concerning Habeas Corpus Petition and is not relevant for our purposes. ( 16 ) HAVING, therefore, considered all the contentions raised, by the learned Counsel, we find that it is not a case covered by Section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Court Act and the appeal is not maintainable. It is accordingly dismissed in limine. This order will also govern all the other connected appeals. There will be no order as to costs. ( 17 ) LET the record of the case be sent to the learned Single Judge forthwith. Appeal dismissed. .