JUDGMENT Sengupta, J. 1. This Revisional application by the plaintiff is directed against the order dated April 19, 1988 made by the Assistant District Judge, First Court, Alipore in Money Suit No.8 of 1978. Be it recorded that notice of this application was served on the Respondent and an affidavit-of-service to that effect has been filed. The Respondent, however has not entered appearance. 2. Shortly stated the facts are that the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit in 1978 claiming, inter alia, a decree for Rs. 2 lacs for injury alleged to have been inflicted upon his character, reputation and/or standing by the publication and/or dissemination of certain alleged defamatery and libellous matter published by the defendant-respondent. The respondent/defendant appeared in the suit and contested the same by filing written statements. 3. The examination-in-chief of the plaintiff-petitioner commenced in September, 1986 and was concluded on December 10, 1987. The date for cross-examination of the plaintiff was fixed on April 19, 1988. Parties were present. Instead of directing the Counsel for the defendant to proceed with the cross-examination of the plaintiff, the learned Assistant District Judge directed de-novo hearing of the case for the reasons mentioned in the impugned order. The material part of the impugned order is as follows :- "I am astonished to find that the evidence in examination-in-chief has run into 39 pages. More than one Presiding Officer of this Court recorded the evidence. On a perusal of the evidence I find that many irrelevant matters have been recorded in the examination-in-chief which were not at all necessary for adjudication of this suit. This has made impossible for me to proceed further on this evidence. I am apprehensive that if I proceed with such lengthy evidence then it will cause loss much of my valuable judicial hours and that it will cause loss to the other litigants who appear before this Court to seek justice. So I find that this is a fit case where, de-novo hearing should be made." 4. We are unable to sustain the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Assistant District Judge. There was no prayer made by any of the parties for expunction of the evidence already recorded in examination-in-chief of the plaintiff nor was any prayer made by any of the parties for de-novo hearing. We are unable to sustain the reasoning and the conclusion of the learned Assistant District Judge. There was no prayer made by any of the parties for expunction of the evidence already recorded in examination-in-chief of the plaintiff nor was any prayer made by any of the parties for de-novo hearing. Merely because evidence in examination-in-chief ran into 39 pages containing allegedly irrelevant or unnecessary matters cannot be a ground for directing a de-novo hearing. If any irrelevant or unnecessary matters have been introduced in the examination-in-chief it was for the Presiding Officer to disallow such matters when the evidence was recorded. In any event, it was for the Counsel for the defendant to deal with such matters in cross-examination of the witness. It is only after the conclusion of the evidence of the parties not at the stage when the witness is cross-examined, the question of appraisal and assessment of evidence and weight to be attached to such evidence would came up fur consideration. The learned Judge was apprehensive that the lengthy evidence would cause loss of judicial hours and also cause injustice to the litigants. He, however, failed to take note of the fact that a suit of 1978 where the evidence of one of the witnesses was not even concluded in 1988 could not be expedited by resorting to de-novo hearing. In our view, the learned Judge in directing a de-novo trial has misdirected himself and acted with material irregularity. He committed error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision in the suit. For the reasons aforesaid the application is allowed. The order under revision is set aside. The learned trial Judge shall proceed to hear the suit as expeditiously as possible having regard to the fact that already a decade has passed since the institution of the suit. All interim orders will stand vacated. There will be no order as to costs. Desai, C. J.: I agree.